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n the years 1880–1882, Jules Ferry, then minister of 
public education and president of the Council of ministers 
(akin to prime minister),1 presented a series of laws to the 
French parliament designed to establish a system of universal primary 
education that would, according to the political slogans of the ruling 
party, be “obligatory, free and laic.” at the same time, he vigorously 
defended the bill introduced by his close collaborator, Camille Sée, 
instituting a nationwide network of public secondary schools for girls. 
With these actions he raised a firestorm of controversy pitting Catholics 
against proponents of lay education that would embroil the nation for 
the ensuing thirty-five years. Culminating in the Dreyfus affair, which 
divided the country into two warring camps, roughly from 1897 to 
1900, and in the official separation of Church and State in 1905, the 
internal strife lasted until the beginning of World War i, and the effects 
of these educational reforms are still felt even today (see Chatin, “‘France 
is my mother’” 129).
 The linchpin of the curriculum in the new schools was to be its 
course in “moral and civic education,” designed to replace the classes 
in “moral and religious education” of the Catholic schools. The new 
system was to be universal not only in the sense of being obligatory for 
all children but also, and more importantly, in that of being grounded 
in the principle of universality asserted in the Declaration of the rights 
of man and of the Citizen, issued in 1789 and incorporated into the 
in t r o d u C t i o n
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Constitution of the First French republic. branding Catholicism as just 
one religion among several in France, Ferry and his Opportunist col-
leagues sought to unify the nation and justify the secularization of the 
schools under the banner of an “independent morality” allegedly com-
mon to all peoples of all times. When inculcated into the children of 
France, this morality, consistent with the positivist notion of a univer-
sally human social sense at the basis of morality, or with the enlight-
enment conception of a universal human subject whose personhood 
resides in the dignity of a rational being capable of moral action and 
thus of governing himself, and in either case independent of any partic-
ular set of beliefs or dogmas, would serve to form true and loyal citizens 
of the Third republic, worthy of participating in the self-government 
made possible by universal suffrage.
 From the start, the Catholic opposition argued that a school with-
out God must be a school against God, that is, a breeding ground 
of vice and iniquity that would destroy national character and unity. 
in subsequent years, both the nationalist right and the anarchist left 
asserted that, by ignoring or overriding particulars of history, region, 
and race, republican universalism eliminated the creative spontaneity of 
history, the uniqueness of different cultures and individuals, and true 
human freedom. The abstract enlightenment subject, they claimed, was 
nothing but an “empty simulacrum, a philosophical marionette” easily 
tyrannized by the centralized powers of Jacobin government (Taine, 
Révolution jacobine 9). The education the republic proffered to its peas-
ant and working classes led to the creation of a mass of declassés, people 
who had lost all sense of their prior identities and who could not find a 
home among the upper classes either. in short, the new identity of the 
republican citizen, the enemies of the republic alleged, signified in fact 
the destruction of both individual and national identity.
 The same disputes between the universal and the particular have 
often resurfaced in both politics and education until today.2 Since the 
langevin-Wallon report in 1947, professors of education on the left 
have argued that democratic schooling should balance universality, pro-
viding equal opportunity for all pupils, and particularity, developing 
each child’s individual aptitudes to the fullest, in order to serve both the 
collective good and individual happiness. While endorsing these princi-
ples, later educators such as louis legrand, antoine Prost, and Philippe 
meirieu have contrasted the increasing democratization of admission 
to the secondary schools with the ever-growing abstraction, formalism, 
and theoretical bent of the subjects taught, not only in math and science 
but in the social sciences and humanities as well. like their university 
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counterparts, they target the prevalence of universalizing abstract reason 
as a major source of the crisis in the schools, for technocratic educa-
tion gives exclusive preference to the “abstract intelligence” that many 
immigrant and working-class pupils lack, and it ignores the education 
in multicultural values they believe would fulfill the socializing task of 
today’s schools.
 Critics of the center right counter that universalism is the essential 
characteristic of French schooling, and that it is actually the ideology 
of the left that supports the technological mentality in the schools that 
both sides profess to fear and deplore. in the 1980s, Jean-Claude milner 
reasserted the main claim of the Ferry schools: that they alone shape 
the identity of French children into the true republican citizens of the 
future by providing universal access to the knowledge that guarantees 
civil rights in a country with neither the bill of rights of the U.S. Con-
stitution nor the principle of habeas corpus in britain. expanding mil-
ner’s argument at the start of the new millennium, Denis Kambouchner 
constructed the problem as a quarrel between the “schools-that-teach 
[content, knowledge]” and the “techno-pedagogues” of the left, who 
worry about principles and methods at the expense of subject mat-
ter. he contrasts Condorcet’s universal humanism with the ‘German 
romantic’ particularism of ethnicity, in order to argue that attention to 
the multicultural backgrounds of the pupils will inevitably detract from 
the cause of national unity it is supposed to support.
 Criticism of higher education has followed a similar pattern. The 
modern French university system was created at the turn of the twen-
tieth century and modeled on the German system initiated by Wilhelm 
von humboldt in berlin at the beginning of the nineteenth century. The 
idea of the University, as scholars are fond of calling it, is the enlighten-
ment ideal of the independent, disinterested practice of universal reason 
with the aim of producing objective research and individual develop-
ment (Bildung).
 Social critics such as Pierre bourdieu have argued that the univer-
salism of the university is an illusion; in reality, it represents the values 
and interests of the bourgeoisie of a particular period in history, and 
therefore excludes, or at least dooms to failure, the majority of farmers 
and working-class students (Reproduction). Jacques Derrida points out 
that the rights asserted by the Declaration of the rights of man are not 
in fact ‘natural’ and therefore not universal, but are performed by the 
declaration itself, in a particular language and in a particular historical 
and social context. as a result, the university can never actually attain 
the autonomy of its idea; there will always be a tension between the 
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University and the State (Right to Philosophy i). Jacques lacan sees the 
universalizing Discourse of the University as a mask hiding and serving 
the domination of the Discourse of the master—that is, as a means of 
control rather than a path to liberation (The Other Side of Psychoanalysis). 
and François lyotard, referring to ludwig Wittgenstein, argues that 
there is no metalanguage, and therefore no possibility of a universal 
reason that could, in all cases, adjudicate disagreements among compet-
ing claims; there is only a multiplicity of heterogeneous, incommensu-
rable, and therefore irreconcilable language games. as a result, the rug 
has been swept out from under the foundations of modern educational 
systems—emancipation of the people through learning in the French 
tradition (Postmodern Condition).
 attacks against the universalism of bourgeois republicanism similar 
to those of right-wing nationalism at the turn of the nineteenth century 
have been renewed in recent decades by critics and theoreticians who 
identify themselves as belonging to the political left. Unwittingly echo-
ing anatole France, Cornel West has characterized this “cultural politics 
of difference” as the tendency “to trash the monolithic and homoge-
neous in the name of diversity, multiplicity and heterogeneity; to reject 
the abstract, general and universal in light of the concrete, specific, and 
particular; and to historicize, contextualize and pluralize by highlight-
ing the contingent, provisional, variable, tentative, shifting and chang-
ing” (19).
 a decade earlier, edward Said denounced the cultural imperialism of 
nineteenth-century orientalism that privileged ‘vision’ over ‘narrative,’ 
by which he meant the universalizing and reifying categorization of the 
colonized designed “to wipe out any traces of individual arabs with 
narratable life histories” (229), eliminating both sensuous particularity 
and historical contingency. and while lyotard found that it is narra-
tive—the grand enlightenment narrative of human emancipation—that 
effects universalization, the thrust of his critique of modernism is to 
open a path toward ‘little stories’ that would preserve the identity of 
minority groups or colonized cultures. For homi bhabha, “the aim 
of cultural difference is to rearticulate the sum of knowledge from the 
perspective of the signifying position of the minority that resists total-
ization” (162). in this stance we can hear echoes of the lacanian valo-
rization of the nonnarcissistic Other as well as of the deconstructive 
critique of that philosophical notion of truth as presence which acts to 
marginalize and ultimately to repress difference. Shoshana Felman sum-
marized “Derrida’s . . . critique . . . of traditional philosophy,” in the 
assertion that “Western metaphysics is based on the totalitarian principle 
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of so-called logocentrism, that is, on the repressive predominance of 
‘logos’ over ‘writing’ . . .” (22). Others claim that the totalitarian prin-
ciple has arisen not from Western metaphysics in general, but more 
specifically from the “enlightenment’s universalism and rationalism.” 
in “Feminism, Citizenship, and radical Democratic Politics,” Chantal 
mouffe has described these twentieth-century attacks on “the idea of 
a universal human nature, of a universal canon of rationality through 
which that nature could be known as well as the traditional conception 
of truth” (369–70).
 an important segment of feminist thought has participated in this 
movement, as can be heard in the call that Julia Kristeva issued in 1979, 
in “Women’s Time”: “[T]he struggle is no longer concerned with the 
quest for equality, but, rather, with difference and specificity . . . in order 
to discover, first, the specificity of the female, and then, in the end, that 
of each individual woman” (196). luce irigaray put the negative case in 
forceful terms: “any universal [other than that of the natural economy] 
is a partial construct and, therefore, authoritarian and unjust. . . . [O]ur 
identity cannot be constructed without a vertical and horizontal horizon 
that respects that difference between the sexes” (205). Sandra bermann 
concluded that american feminists have been even more radical oppo-
nents of the universal, more committed proponents of the particular 
that grounds cultural diversity in “specific feminist histories, in which 
differences of race, religion, class, ethnic group and sexual preference are 
foregrounded” (105). in short, as Joan Scott has observed in her book 
on the parity movement, for these “first wave” feminists, enlightenment 
ideology was a false universalism, for the allegedly neutral figure of the 
abstract subject was in fact “imagined as male” (Parité 4).
 Champions of universalism have not remained silent during this 
time, starting with Julien benda’s epoch-making La trahison des clercs 
(Betrayal of the Intellectuals; 1927; see also Chaitin, “education and 
Political identity”). Writing in the aftermath of World War i and dur-
ing the rise of fascism and nazism, benda bemoaned the fact that even 
intellectuals, including leading writers and university professors, had 
abandoned the universalist principles that make the disinterested pursuit 
of truth possible in favor of practical and political interests. Those mod-
ern intellectuals who not only love the particular but raise it to the level 
of a divinity in a new practical religion assuage the consciences of the 
politicians and the citizens who indulge in the worst forms of egotisti-
cal passion, the love of self writ large that constitutes modern national-
ism. in the early 1960s, Jean-Paul Sartre chimed in with his attempt 
to reconcile universalism and particularism, G. W. F. hegel and Søren 
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Kierkegaard, via his concept of the “singular universal,” according to 
which man is the being who brings forth the universal by transcending 
(dépasser) the absolute singularity of the contingent events of life and 
history, giving them meaning (le sens; “l’universel singulier” 174–75).
 Once particularism had shifted to the left, voices from the right, 
most notably alain Finkielkraut in his Defeat of the Mind (La défaite de 
la pensée; 1987), adopted benda’s arguments to fuel a frontal attack on 
the anticolonial ideology of UneSCO and on the particularist aspects 
of structuralist, poststructuralist, postcolonial, and postmodern thought. 
his basic argument is that, in rejecting european universalism as a dis-
guise for ethnocentrism and colonial domination, in emphasizing differ-
ence and cultural identity at the expense of man and the real person in 
place of the abstract individual, the ‘decolonizers’ have reverted to the 
ideas of Johann Gottfried von herder and Oswald Spengler, espousing 
the narcissistic love of self in the form of one’s ethnic or class identity 
and destroying any sense of a legitimate hierarchy of values (58). The 
logical result of this reasoning is that the peoples of the former colonies 
have now become the slaves of their national identity (95 French ed.; 
69 english ed.). For the enlightenment, freedom was impossible for the 
ignorant (168 French ed.; 125 english ed.). One became an individual 
in overcoming appetites, self-interest, and prejudices. For consumer 
society, on the contrary, freedom and culture are defined by the satis-
faction of needs; thus the idea of distancing oneself from “instinct and 
tradition” has been lost (169 French ed.; 125 english ed.). With the 
current challenges to the enlightenment, the ideas that form the basis 
of our modern schools—only thought confers autonomy and only self-
exertion produces thought—have fallen by the wayside (169–70).
Bourget and the Lessons of Literature
The attempt to create a new national identity of loyal citizens of the 
republic based on universal secular morality rather than God-given 
commandments produced a trauma in the national psyche that gave 
rise to culture wars very similar to those of today in France, the United 
States, and elsewhere. in undermining the Catholicism that had offered 
easy answers to the questions at the root of identity, the reforms cre-
ated an existential angst to accompany the political and social anxiety 
resulting from the upheavals and wars since the revolution, above all 
the devastating military defeat in the Franco-German War of 1870–71 
and the bloody civil war of the Paris Commune in 1871. now both 
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education and identity became political matters. What might seem at 
first sight to be narrow questions of pedagogy such as curriculum or 
teaching methods became, therefore, entangled in what might be called 
the first experiment in postmodern performativity, a complex effort on 
a hitherto unprecedented scale to alter the identity of a modern nation. 
For that reason, disputes over education produced a kind of ideologi-
cal polygamy in which, as mona Ozouf so happily put it: “[P]edagogy 
was married to law, politics, economics, metaphysics and morals” (18).3 
and, i would add, to literature as well.4
 While it was primarily in the schools that the determining battles 
were waged from the 1880s until well after the turn of the century, it 
was in narrative that the human implications of the issues raised by the 
education wars were articulated, appraised, and dramatized (on the role 
of the serial novel, see m. Ozouf 18). in his highly influential Essais 
de psychologie contemporaine (1883) and the Nouveaux essais (1885; see 
mansuy 372–76), Paul bourget puts narrative in opposition to edu-
cation, but as its rival as much as its negation. his opening gambit 
is to establish the parallel and thus the implicit competition between 
literature and institutional forms of education such as religion and the 
public school system. in the forewords to both volumes he justifies his 
“psychological” analysis of literary works, rather than the normative aes-
thetic judgments or the biographical accounts customary in the criticism 
of the times, by setting up literature as a powerful force in the moral 
education of the young, in overt conflict with parental upbringing and 
traditional influences (“avant-Propos de 1883” xvi; “avant-Propos de 
1885” xx).
 The novelist as educator was in fact a common theme in nineteenth-
century France. Jules vallès made the point more succinctly and more 
brutally than bourget in “victimes du livre,” an article reprinted in 
Les réfractaires (1876)—“The book Will Kill the Father”—as well as 
in his novel L’enfant (1878). a few years after bourget, maurice bar-
rès would describe his antiauthoritarian Culte du Moi novels as a work 
of edification (“examen des trois romans idéologiques” 17). alphonse 
lamartine, victor hugo, George Sand, Émile Zola, bernard lazare, 
and many other writers agreed that their mission was to educate the 
public.
 literature is a powerful educational force, yes—but, according to 
bourget, in the wrong direction. Unfortunately, the moral lesson of 
the major writers of the preceding generation, those who exercise the 
strongest influence on present-day youth, is the loss of traditional values 
compounded by the failure to replace them. The present generation in 
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France suffers from a sense of pessimism and depression that is not just 
the effect of arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy but betrays the exis-
tence of a deep crisis, a “moral malady” (“avant-Propos de 1885” xxii). 
having enumerated the symptoms of the modern illness of decadence, 
bourget proceeds to diagnose its profound cultural causes rendered vis-
ible in the literature of the Second empire: dilettantism, nihilism, and 
cosmopolitanism; the perversions and impotence of modern love; the 
effects of science; the conflict between democracy and high culture. Ulti-
mately he isolates two pathogenic bacilli under his cultural microscope: 
science and democracy. it is they that have dried up the wellsprings of 
moral life, without having found a way to replenish them (xxv). now, 
under the Third republic, the infection is being spread by the schools, 
the main effect of whose teachings is to undermine the identities of their 
pupils (166–67).
 bourget conjures up the fantasy of an army of nihilists launched on 
a crusade of negativity, destroying everything in a paroxysm of rage at 
being unable to find certain knowledge (Essais de psychologie contempo-
raine 84). Contingency has thus invaded the bastion of belief, with one 
set of ideas being considered just as valid as another, and its agents pro-
vocateurs are science and democracy abetted by the diversity of ‘races.’ 
The insidious march of contingency is not content with planting its 
black flag of anarchy in heaven, earth, and society; it inflicts a similar 
fate on identity in the writings of Gustave Flaubert. adapting the power 
of romantic prose to describe the concrete details of decor, costume, and 
the representation of character, he succeeded in giving fictional realiza-
tion to the english conception of the inner self as an “association of 
ideas,” by depicting the series of images that pass through the heads of 
his characters and capturing the rhythm of their recurrence (165).5 With 
this unique blend of romanticism and science, Flaubert depicts the ‘ego’ 
as the ‘collection of little facts’ of hippolyte Taine’s theories (166). as 
bourget explains in his essay on Taine, the basic problem is that this 
notion of the self as a series of events jettisons the idea of an abiding 
“substance” behind mental phenomena and thus that of an immortal 
soul (226). in the realm of the self multiplicity is not only the archen-
emy of unity, order and harmony; its very presence calls into question 
the necessity and perpetuity of being.
 The only island of certainty in this sea of skepticism is the science 
Taine espoused in his philosophy. here at last is a single principle of 
cause and effect capable of unifying all of nature by means of the induc-
tive logic that makes it possible to subsume the observations of particu-
lar phenomena under larger and larger general laws. The trouble is that 
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this system, which exalts the power of the human mind, at the same 
time abases the individual will before the inexorability of the supreme 
forces of the natural and social milieus. The only sensible counsel in this 
situation is the ethic of resignation preached by Spinoza or Goethe. For 
bourget, although not for Taine himself, the inevitable effect of science 
is once again a kind of nihilism (242–43). in literature, this concep-
tion has led to the reduction of the self to a kind of nothingness caught 
between instinct and milieu in the fiction of the naturalist school of 
Zola and his disciples, just then at the height of their influence in the 
aftermath of the Soirées de Médan manifesto and the polemical essays of 
the Roman Expérimental.
 literature produces devastating as well as salutary effects, precisely 
because art is the great competitor of life. The tragic flaw of the con-
temporary adolescent is the desire to know and experience everything, 
a desire he can satisfy in no other way than through reading. The idyl-
lic unity and energy of his childhood self and world are consequently 
swamped by an uncontrollable tide of disparate ideas and forces—causal, 
critical, educational, political, and international.
 The hero of this tragic tale is ostensibly the youth whose sensibility 
is educated through his contact with literature, but bourget intimates 
clearly that in fact its vicissitudes recount the fate of reading in general 
in modern France. instead of preparing us for experience or substituting 
for it, reading distorts experience, prevents us from enjoying or even 
from having it, as with emma bovary. The constant bombardment of 
heterogeneous ideas isolates us from nature, society, and the uncon-
scious wellsprings of personality, precluding the formation of a stable, 
unified, and forceful self, secure in its relation to other people and the 
world. reading must therefore be added to science and democracy as 
the third scourge of modern society. narrative may be our best source of 
knowledge about the moral life understood in its widest sense as the life 
of sentiments and values, as bourget repeatedly asserts, but it is also, he 
continues, at least in its present decadent and naturalist forms, a teacher 
of demoralization and despair.
The Noel of Ideas
in his essay on the Goncourt brothers, bourget contrasts their objective 
“novels of observation” with the distortion of reality found in the “the-
sis novels” of Sand (Essais ii 155–56). although bourget does not dwell 
on the topic, his little phrase roman à thèse was destined to become a 
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catchword in the succeeding decades, precisely because it came to stand 
for everything that was considered worst in the myriad attempts to carry 
out the program of merging politicized morality and the fictional rep-
resentations of identity in the literature of the Third republic. indeed, 
the very name of this subgenre has remained a term of opprobrium to 
this day, a curious and possibly unique fact of literary history that is all 
the more surprising in an era that prides itself on having abandoned, at 
least officially, the notion of a hierarchy of genres. (See, for instance, the 
passages by Sartre and Simone de beauvoir quoted in the Grand Robert 
dictionary’s entry under “roman à thèse”).
 The solidification of the name ‘thesis novel’ with its henceforth 
inseparable stigma occurred as a result of the convergence of develop-
ments both within the field of literature and outside it in the culture at 
large.6 The crucial precondition for this process was the transformation 
of the literary field during the Second empire, which was increasingly 
dominated by l’art pour l’art on the one hand, and the positivist notion 
of realism on the other. The first condemned the novel of ideas for 
besmirching the purity of art, which should maintain its autonomy by 
excluding all supposedly external discourses such as those of politics, 
philosophy, religion, or morality—the ability to incorporate, which crit-
ics from Friedrich Schlegel to mikhail bakhtin have singled out as the 
defining characteristic of the novel form. The second redefined the con-
cept of proof in keeping with the empiricist method of induction from 
the observation of a multitude of particular cases to general truth, rather 
than the illustration of a predetermined general idea, as was the case in 
the classical conception. however contradictory the two movements 
may have been in certain regards, they came together in defining a new 
meaning of objectivity as disinterestedness, according to which the sub-
ject—the perceiving, feeling, and thinking mind—can reach truth only 
by refraining from injecting itself into the phenomena it surveys or the 
art it is creating. From this perspective, the problem with the thesis 
novel was not the fact that it contained an idea but that it inserted an 
unwanted subjective meaning into its representation and consequently 
departed from objective presentation.
 The progressive hardening of the theoretical category of the thesis 
novel would not have taken place had it not been for the simultaneous 
proliferation of novels that, in the eyes of the critics, deviated from that 
standard and therefore had to be defended or attacked, depending on 
the commentator’s point of view. Writing in 1908, Jean Charles-brun 
accumulates quotations on the subject by bourget, Flaubert, Ferdinand 
brunetière, Jules lemaître, and léon blum, not to mention lesser lights 
i n t r o d u C t i o n   ~   1 1
such as Édouard rod, rené Doumic, victor marguerite, Jules bois, 
marius-ary leblond, eugène montfort, adolphe brisson, Jean viollis, 
and others. he concludes that the recent proliferation of thesis novels 
and social novels results from the democratization of literature com-
bined with the increased pressure of the social environment on contem-
porary novelists, and he adduces as evidence the fact that the two eras 
that produced the most such novels were those that witnessed the most 
widespread debates about social issues—the period around the revolu-
tion of 1848 and that of the Dreyfus affair (Le roman social 53–54, 57). 
Several years later, marcel Proust would look back on the Dreyfus affair 
as a time when, urged to come down from their ivory towers, writers 
used this excuse to “assure the triumph of right, [and] rebuild the moral 
unity of the nation” rather than perform the “true” function of litera-
ture (The Past Recaptured 206). Susan Suleiman makes a similar point 
in her influential treatise on the thesis novel. noting that the Dreyfus 
affair divided the country into two political groups that had virtually 
nothing in common, a division that lasted all the way to the vichy 
government in 1940, she asserts that it’s not by chance that this period 
of ideological polarization produced so many thesis novels: “The thesis 
novel is a genre in which ideological polarization is manifested both as 
a basic theme and as an organizing structural principle” (Authoritarian 
Fictions 69).
 The literary culture wars that accompanied this polarization had 
already begun in the 1880s, in reaction to the Ferry educational reforms 
and the Opportunists’ attempts to separate Church from State. Octave 
Feuillet’s La morte (Aliette) (1886) and bourget’s Disciple (1889), both 
of which focus on the disputes between supporters of the Church and 
partisans of secularization, mark the onset of this new series of novels 
of ideas. each of the other major novels of education i study in this 
book—barrès’s Novel of National Energy (in addition to The Disciple) 
on the political right, France’s Contemporary History and Zola’s Truth 
on the left—was at least partly composed in reaction to the ideological 
issues raised during the affair. While the first volume of barrès’s trilogy 
was published a few months before the Dreyfus case became a national 
affair, it already broaches several of the main political and social themes 
that would form the program of barrès’s nationalism in the succeed-
ing years; and the two other volumes reinterpret earlier events, such as 
the phenomenon of boulangism (1886–1889) and the Panama Canal 
graft scandals (1892–93), in light of the affair (see Sternhell, Maurice 
Barrès 217–20). France’s tetralogy was also overtaken in the middle by 
the affair, which cast a different light on the earlier volumes. it starts 
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out as a critique of the republican leaders’ complicity with the Church 
during the 1890s, after Pope leo Xiii called on the French Church to 
“rally” to the republic and the government had instituted the policy 
of the “new spirit” of reconciliation with the Church, before the affair 
(see appendix a). in the later volumes, however, the affair swallows up 
the earlier plot and appears, retrospectively, to be the logical outcome of 
those earlier phenomena. in writing his novel after the general amnesty 
had quieted the most violent passions of the affair, Zola constructed his 
fictional transposition with the aim of drawing the social and political 
lessons the government was trying to squelch by pardoning all parties 
involved, even those guilty of deception, fraud, forgery, and perjury.7
 in her “notice” to the Pléiade edition of France’s L’anneau d’amé-
thyste, one of the four novels comprising his Histoire contemporaine, 
marie-Claire bancquart states that the writer was responding to the 
same “neurosis of national identity” that inflated the Dreyfus case into a 
national affair. indeed, the structure of French national identity, already 
shaken by the defeat at the hands of the Prussians and the Ferry edu-
cational reforms, was shattered to the core by the affair.8 For those on 
the left, it was clear that the nation had abandoned its historical mis-
sion, and with it, its national identity of spreading human rights and 
liberating the peoples of the world from their tyrants. Dumbfounded 
by this turn of events, France’s spokesperson in the novels, Professor 
bergeret, imagines that the brains of his countrymen have been myste-
riously lobotomized. Zola put the case forcefully in his “Declaration to 
the Jury” at his trial for libeling the authorities who framed Dreyfus for 
treason:
The Dreyfus affair has become a petty matter at this point . . . compared 
to the terrifying questions it has raised. . . . now we need to know if 
France is still the France of the rights of man, the nation that gave liberty 
to the world and which should give it justice. Open your eyes and see 
that, if it is so helpless and confused, the French soul must be stirred to 
its inmost depths in the face of such redoubtable perils. a people cannot 
be subject to such distress without its very moral life being in danger. 
(Vérité en marche 79)
 Those on the right perceived the same crisis of national identity but 
attributed it to the temerity and lack of patriotism of those who chal-
lenged the verdicts of the military courts that condemned alfred Drey-
fus and exonerated Ferdinand Walsin esterhazy (the real perpetrator of 
the treason). by undermining the credibility of the army and its courts, 
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the ‘intellectuals’ who defended Dreyfus represented a mortal threat 
to the very idea of the homeland (speech by former minister of war 
eugène Cavaignac, December 1, 1901, cited in Girardet 174–76). bar-
rès claimed to discover the source of this antipatriotic evil in the Kantian 
universalism taught in the schools and universities of the republic.
verbalism that distances the child from all reality, Kantianism that 
uproots him from his soil and his dead, overproduction of high school 
graduates that creates what we’ve called, after bismarck, “a proletariat 
of degree-holders,” those are our reproaches to the University, those are 
what make its products, the “intellectuals,” enemies of society. . . . The 
philosophy that the State teaches is responsible . . . for people think[ing] 
it is intellectual to scorn the national unconscious and to cause the intel-
lect to function in [the realm of] pure abstraction, beyond the plane of 
reality. (Scènes et doctrines 45)
The Kantian universalism of the republic is destroying the identity of 
its citizens, based on their regional, racial, and historical heritage. These 
rootless intellectuals have become enemies of society who place their 
individual ideas above the cause of national unity. They are “individuals 
who convince themselves that society should be founded on logic and 
who fail to recognize that it rests in fact on prior necessities that are 
perhaps foreign to individual reason” and thus fail to content themselves 
with their proper role in the social order (38). 
 The birth of the republic, with its universal suffrage, universal edu-
cation, and the influential role of public opinion in an era of expanded 
journalism and publishing, provided an advantageous context for the 
abundance of novels of ideas (masson 7). in a democracy, however 
imperfect it may be, the writer has a special role to play in the fight to 
establish the meaning of events in order to sway the public toward the 
policy or candidate she favors (see barrès, Mes cahiers 139–40).9 more-
over, although traditional criticism, from Plato on, has often seen an 
unbridgeable gap between the particularity of narrative and the univer-
sality of cognitive discourse, critics at the turn of the twentieth century 
asserted that the novel was well adapted to convincing readers of the 
validity of general ideas precisely because its very particularity gave it, 
like life itself, “the violence of the concrete” (rené Johannet, quoted in 
Charles-brun 49–50). if the critics justifiably perceive many thesis nov-
els as authoritarian, that is because such texts magnify the ever-present 
but more hidden coercive force of every symbolic system that functions 
within or like a language.
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The Enemy Within
Given the widespread view under the Third republic that the schools 
and teachers possessed the enormous power to control the welfare, the 
destiny, and the very being of the nation, novels about education were 
inevitably, and in many cases explicitly, conceived to be examinations 
of the formation of national identity. my emphasis is therefore on texts 
in which the emotionally charged relation between teachers and pupils, 
at one level or another of the educational hierarchy, plays a major role 
in representing specific ideological systems of education current in the 
national debates instigated by the Ferry reforms. The four novels i exam-
ine in this book respond to the trauma of identity by uncovering what 
i would term the erotics of politics: the subjective roots of political and 
social arrangements and the central fantasies that structure the relation 
of the subject to social realities entailed by competing ideological posi-
tions. in order to make their political programs appealing and those 
of their adversaries abhorrent, these texts deploy fantasy scenarios that 
mobilize the fears and desires awakened in the public by the attempt to 
replace the Catholic Other with that of the republic.
 The perceived loss of an absolute source of truth and guarantor of 
social cohesion in the form of Catholicism and the monarchy awakened 
in French consciousness a sense of the contingency of symbolic sys-
tems, of the Other’s feet of clay. in each of the four model novels i will 
examine a rent is opened up in the fabric of the regnant symbolic system 
that threatens to expose the traumatic real that system serves to shield 
from view. For bourget and barrès, it is enlightenment science and 
universalism that rings hollow; for France and Zola it is God, Catholi-
cism, and spiritualism that are mere covers for emptiness. as ernesto 
laclau argues, by affirming the lack in the Other’s Other, these texts 
imply the existence of an impossible plenitude, the utopia of an unful-
filled demand from society. each, then, offers to fill the void, and thus 
to shore up the nation’s identity, in the battle to name and thus consti-
tute what lacan calls the a-object, that whose possession would con-
fer complete fulfillment on its possessors (laclau 96–100). Taking on 
the role of educators of the nation, the four writers intervened in the 
national debate, redefining its terms by dramatizing the formation and 
destruction of the ideological fantasies that structure social reality and 
sustain the representation of imaginary communities (see Žižek, “Sur le 
pouvoir politique” 43).
 The most visible theme common to these works as to the polem-
ics of republican and antirepublican forces was the need for unity, a 
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unity supposedly lost through the machinations of the other side and 
recoverable only if the correct group were permitted to direct national 
education according to its principles. The unspoken presupposition is 
that unity is equivalent to identity, for both the person and the nation. 
While the sources of disunity are identified differently by writers of the 
left and those of the right, the fundamental fantasy underlying each 
political program is the conviction that the adversarial party, the primal 
enemy, has somehow penetrated within the bastion of the self; indeed, 
as conceptualized in lacan’s notion of the ‘extimate,’ that the very root 
of its existence comes from outside the self. On the national level, the 
homeland is portrayed as striving to rid itself of an alien element which 
is, in fact, as barrès puts it in a telling passage, “the most intimate part” 
of itself.

A Matter of Life and Death: 
Secular Education ersus the Catholic Church
The laws on educational reform introduced in 1880–82 constituted the 
first major set of legislation pushed through by the loose coalition of 
republican groups who, under the leadership of the so-called Oppor-
tunists—léon Gambetta, Ferry, and others—had captured the majority 
of seats in the lower house in the elections of 1877 and in the Senate 
in 1882,1 thus ratifying the victory of the republic over its traditional 
opponents, the legitimist (bourbon) and Orleanist monarchists, and the 
bonapartist supporters of a new empire-style dictatorship. like most 
legislation, whatever its ostensible goals or actual effects, the reform 
laws were meant to serve a political purpose, first and foremost, that of 
ensuring the long-term survival of the still very much embattled Third 
republic (see Chaitin, “‘France is my mother’” 130–31). as Ferry put 
it in a speech delivered some ten years earlier, education was a matter of 
life or death for the republic: Democracy must choose between science 
and the Church (Salle molière speech of april 10, 1870; reproduced in 
legrand 237). The legislation attacked the power of the Church, now 
allied with the old oligarchy of aristocrats and an important segment of 
the traditional bourgeoisie, and at the same time was designed to allay 
fears of a new social revolution by the working classes—which is why 
the socialist parties, still weak from the bloodletting through which the 
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self-appointed versailles government had annihilated the Communards 
in 1871, gave it only lukewarm support (m. Ozouf 84). above all, it 
was designed to give the republicans a foothold in every village and 
rural area in the land, essential to combating the influence of the local 
priest and thus to attaining political power in a regime of universal suf-
frage, as Gambetta had seen as early as 1871.
 The role undoubtedly played by strategies of power politics and 
crass political calculation should not obscure the importance of the spe-
cific ideological content of the proposed reforms or the sincerity of the 
convictions of those who promulgated these reforms. While they were 
no doubt conceived to justify the program to potential members of 
the political movement and to respond to the economic realities of the 
modern industrial world (eros 258), the goal of safeguarding the lon-
gevity of the republic required something more than concocting a pro-
gram that would increase the party rolls and win the upcoming election. 
it entailed the attempt to create something new in the world, a large 
body of loyal republican citizens who would no longer be susceptible to 
the dictates of the Church or to the seductions of authoritarian dictator-
ship—“Caesarism” in the catchword of the enemies of bonapartism (see 
albanese, Molière à l’École républicaine 3–6).
 The novelty and enormity of the task confronting this effort at cul-
tural revolution can be properly measured only against the backdrop of 
the social realities of France in 1870. although united administratively, 
most of the country had none of the characteristics of a modern nation 
as defined by the nationalist rhetoric of ernest renan or maurice bar-
rès, or by the standards of more recent social theorists. as eugen Weber 
emphasizes,
[O]utside the urban centers, over much of France there was no “com-
mon history to be experienced as common,” no “community of comple-
mentary habits,” little interdependency furthered by the division of labor 
in the production of goods and services, and only limited “channels of 
social communication and economic intercourse.” (486)
The slogans for this program had been devised and the program worked 
out in the waning years of the Second empire and the beginning of the 
Third republic, but the fundamental ideas went back, as Ferry noted 
more than once, to the revolution and the “principles of 1789,” espe-
cially as applied to education in the writings of Condorcet. if a signifi-
cant portion of the public became receptive to them in the first decade 
of the republic, it was not because the ideas were new at that time, but 
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because so many of the country’s leaders attributed the disastrous out-
come of the war against Prussia to the superiority of the German school 
system. (See Gambetta’s bordeaux speech of 26 June 1871, in Discours 
et plaidoyers choisis 67.)
 During the empire, the Church had begun to operate essentially as 
a political party, first in support of napoleon iii, who realized at the 
beginning of his reign that, like his namesake, he needed its coopera-
tion in order to consolidate his hold on power, and then in opposition 
to his regime as the latter leaned farther and farther toward the pro- 
democratic and anticlerical forces among the ruling group, especially 
insofar as they backed the fledgling republic of italy in its conflicts with 
the papacy. although it had a liberal wing headed by bishop Dupanloup 
and the Duke de broglie,2 and a reactionary faction whose most out-
spoken proponents were bishop Freppel and the notorious polemicist 
louis veuillot (the model for Zola’s rabid Catholic journalist, vuil-
let, in La fortune des Rougon), throughout the first two decades of the 
republic, until Pope leo Xiii’s encyclical in 1892 calling for Catholics 
to “rally” to the republic and even beyond, the political arm of the 
Church aligned itself with one form or other of monarchy and against 
the republic.3 in reaction to the collusion between the Church and the 
dictatorial empire, liberal proponents of democratic freedom claimed 
to perceive the same authoritarian principles in Catholicism that they 
found in the rule of napoleon iii, and they proceeded to denounce the 
moral teachings of the Church and the schools in which those tenets 
were disseminated.
 While education had always been a point of focus for republican 
politics in France, the issue took on a new urgency after the passage 
of the Falloux laws under louis-napoleon’s aegis as president of the 
Second republic in 1850, which, under the guise of the “freedom of 
education,” had delivered virtually the entire French educational sys-
tem into the hands of the Church.4 in reaction, edgar Quinet issued 
the polemical pamphlet that Jules Ferry would later call “my breviary” 
(eros, 277 n25), L’enseignement du peuple (1850), which argued that 
there was an inextricable contradiction between secular and religious 
education, for political freedom is possible only in countries where 
freedom of thought and conscience are protected, while the Catholic 
Church prohibits both. moreover, in order to ensure civil peace, the 
modern State has a vital interest in teaching a “social morality” of reli-
gious tolerance,5 while the Church, with its claim to be the unique 
possessor of truth, must instruct, and does in fact instruct, its pupils 
to condemn other religions as invalid. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon’s De la 
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justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église (1858) pitted the revolutionary 
ethic of individual freedom and equality, founded on the ‘new idea’ of 
Justice, against the morality of indignity and resignation to the evils 
of this life, based on the old dogma of original sin. a few years later, 
from 1865 until the war with Prussia, Proudhon’s call for a new repub-
lican ethic independent of religion was given widespread currency in the 
journal La Morale Indépendante, founded by the former Saint-Simonian 
alexandre massol. in a similar spirit, the comparatively liberal minister 
of education, victor Duruy, had introduced in 1865 a “neutral”—that 
is, nonsectarian—course of moral education into the so-called special 
secondary schools, which offered professional training in commerce and 
business. in the meantime, the philosopher Étienne vacherot, follow-
ing Proudhon and recalling the ideas of Jules michelet and the repub-
lican opposition to the July monarchy, made liberty the basic principle 
of all law, rights, and justice, and stressed that the most fundamental 
freedom is that of thought. Sheltered from legal control, this freedom 
is nevertheless subject to inhibition by ignorance and superstition. as 
a result, in a democracy this liberty creates the essential duty for fami-
lies and for the state to provide education and moral training to its 
citizens (La démocratie 5). This was also the profound belief of Jean 
macé, a socialist journalist of 1848 turned schoolteacher, who founded 
the ligue de l’enseignement in 1866 to promote popular education 
via the principle of free, obligatory primary schools. The way was thus 
prepared for Gambetta’s strategy in his electoral campaigns of 1869 and 
1871: in order to create citizens of the republic, we must combat igno-
rance, but in order to combat ignorance we must combat the Church, 
since the Church fosters ignorance (Chaitin, “‘France is my mother’” 
132–34). To the working-class population of belleville, he promised 
“primary education, laic, free and obligatory” in 1869 (mona Ozouf 
30). in 1871, he returned to the theme, insisting that the moral training 
in the Congregationist schools was designed to make the children hate 
the modern republican values of free inquiry, science, tolerance, and 
humanity and thus divide the country into two warring factions (report 
of speech in Gambetta’s newspaper, La République Française, november 
25, 1871, in mona Ozouf 27).
 Gambetta’s defense of free inquiry and science indicates the other 
main intellectual source of his educational policy, the positivism of 
auguste Comte and Émile littré. Proposing a remedy for the defeat 
at the hands of the Prussians and the annexation of alsace-lorraine 
in his pivotal speech in bordeaux on June 26, 1871, he mapped out a 
strategy for “regenerating the country and founding a free government” 
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that combined the Proudhonian concern for the emancipation and well-
being of the peasants and working classes with the positivist principles 
of modern education and scientific progress into a policy that would 
form the basis of the radical republicans’ platform for the subsequent 
decade. its key planks were the avoidance of violence, concentration 
on one issue at a time, and designation of rearmament and universal 
national education as the essential first steps in the establishment and 
consolidation of the republic (Discours et plaidoyers 66).
 but of what, precisely, will this universal education consist? First 
and foremost, of science, especially the ‘exact sciences’—mathematics 
and the natural sciences (72). no longer is there a reason to be afraid 
of spreading such knowledge to the hitherto unenlightened population, 
Gambetta continues, attempting to allay the fears of the traditional 
bourgeoisie, whose conviction that critical rationalism leads to social 
unrest had prompted them to support the Falloux laws since the 1850s 
(Weisz 98). On the contrary, we must show the upper classes that it is 
in their best interest to have an enlightened populace of workers and 
peasants; the disastrous results of the war demonstrate that it is vitally 
important to cultivate this as yet untapped source of energy and abili-
ties. moreover, once the peasants understand the advantages they have 
already derived from the republic and the benefits they can expect from 
it in future, starting with the fact that it was the revolution that made 
it possible for them to acquire the land they now possess and gave them 
the right to own it, they will be eager to support the government rather 
than seek to overturn it. Similarly, we must teach the working classes 
that their government is not a greedy, external master but a legitimate 
emanation of their own sovereignty, while allowing them to benefit 
from the advances of modern science and civilization. moreover, the sci-
entific method of thinking can liberate the minds of all citizens, regard-
less of social class. at the same time, the objectivity of that method, its 
alleged disinterestedness, ensures the equal treatment of citizens and the 
lack of bias of the republican government, which alone makes objective 
reason rather than class interest the basis of its policies. in short, such 
education can provide liberty, equality, and the pursuit of happiness for 
all citizens. in fact, when Paul bert, a pupil of the renowned physiolo-
gist Claude bernard and a member of Gambetta’s editorial team on La 
République Française, introduced the Opportunist law on universal pri-
mary education to the Chamber of Deputies in his speech of December 
6, 1879, he listed the same conquests of the revolution to be included 
in the new civics course curriculum (L’instruction civique à l’école 6).
 Gambetta also implies that acquaintance with the exact sciences has 
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a greater role to play in the establishment of social order. here he was 
perhaps thinking of Comte’s three organizing tendencies of the positive 
spirit: (1) the mind grows accustomed to submitting to facts and dem-
onstrations; (2) it acquires the habit of always seeking orderly laws 
within phenomenal appearances; and (3) it develops the custom of con-
sidering that all phenomena are regulated by laws. For Comte, then, the 
study of science inculcates a belief in the rational order of the universe, 
a conviction that, when transferred to the social world, convinces its 
holders of the impossibility of sudden change and thus of the fruitless-
ness of coups d’état and social revolutions. here again, Paul bert made 
this argument quite explicitly in his speech to the lower house of Parlia-
ment in 1879, and in a way that reveals clearly the object of the tacit 
polemic contained in Comte’s principles (8–9).
 it might seem incongruous to invoke the name of Comte as the 
ideological savior of the republic, since he developed his doctrine spe-
cifically in order to counter the “anarchy” of the revolutionary spirit he 
considered to be a dangerous “metaphysical” illusion, thought that par-
liamentary democracy was an expression of the “individualist and revo-
lutionary” spirit, and had therefore gladly welcomed louis-napoleon’s 
dictatorship (see legrand 49–51). by the 1870s, however, most of his 
disciples had gone over, often reluctantly and with strong reservations, 
to the republican side (eros 255; legrand 49, 54). in the aftermath of 
the uprising of the Paris Commune and with the memory of the civil 
strife and class warfare of the short-lived First and Second republics fresh 
in everyone’s mind, the leaders of the republican factions recognized 
that the Third republic would be successful only to the extent that they 
could convince large segments of the population, and especially the new 
industrial bourgeoisie, that it was the regime best capable of establish-
ing public order, for the virtue of positivist education, in addition to 
promoting progress, was precisely that it would assure national unity 
by inculcating the same ideas in everyone, thereby combating “mental” 
and “social anarchy” and guaranteeing “social order” (legrand 47–48, 
quoting various authors from the two main positivist journals, La Phi-
losophie Positive, edited by littré, and the Revue Occidentale, run by Pierre 
laffitte).
Comte with Kant: The Moral Is the Political
Positivism made a second claim to be the guarantee of social unity: it 
asserted the existence of a natural and hence universal “social sense” 
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that acts as the primordial social bond counteracting selfishness and 
uniting mankind. in the latest version of his theory, Comte insisted that 
this social feeling is the true source of morality and should therefore be 
cultivated in children by parents, teachers, and civic leaders6 (Comte, 
Discours sur l’ensemble du positivisme 166–67; cited in legrand 37). it 
was this positivist notion of morality as a fundamental and autonomous 
human feeling that Jules Ferry adopted as his own in his speeches to 
the Freemasons in 1875 and 1876. in the first, Ferry repeated Comte’s 
arguments: that the heart is more powerful than the intellect, that sym-
pathy is as natural an affection as selfishness, that sentiments must be 
cultivated and developed, and that religion is a particularism, since, as 
opposed to the universality of true, i.e., positivist, morality, it teaches 
selfishness in the form of concern for one’s individual salvation (legrand 
182). in the second, he proclaimed that morality is universally human 
and thus distinct from any metaphysical beliefs (245); it follows that 
the state has no need for any divine or transcendent source of moral and 
political legitimacy.
 it was quite logical, then, that armed with this conception of the 
source, nature, and function of morality, Ferry should move its teaching 
to center stage when proposing his educational reforms for the primary 
schools to the legislature in the 1880s. The teaching of morality in the 
public schools became a political issue because it combined the endeavor 
to establish a new republican national unity with an attack on the Cath-
olic Church’s hitherto unchallenged monopoly on morality and moral 
training. While positivism had only lately become associated with the 
republican cause, Ferry could point to a predecessor, Condorcet, whose 
similar plan for school reforms during the revolution authenticated the 
claim that Ferry’s program was consistent with the “principles of 1789.” 
before the Chamber of Deputies on December 20, 1880, Ferry pointed 
out that, like the Positivists, Condorcet asserted that morality is based 
on natural sentiments and reason, attributes shared by all people regard-
less of their social class or religion (Officiel de la République française 
130). “Forming men and citizens” rather than “dialecticians and preach-
ers”—that was the aim of Condorcet’s project and the rationale for his 
recommendation that the new schools he envisioned should teach the 
sciences in place of rhetoric and the classics (Salle molière speech of 
1870, in legrand, L’influence du positivisme 225). The phrase “men and 
citizens” here (which explicitly includes women for both Condorcet and 
Ferry) indicates people whom society has raised above their natural 
condition of fatality and inequality. education is thus a means toward 
the political end of establishing equality among people, and equality 
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in turn can be instituted only by ensuring their liberation from natural 
constraints. To this end, social institutions should free society’s mem-
bers from “natural” differences due to birth as well as to physical con-
stitution. Democratic education should nurture a sense of dignity in 
the members of all social classes and allow all members of an egalitarian 
society to share the same ideas and opportunities (“Discours” 218–22). 
hence the call for teaching the sciences, for the latter include not only 
mathematics and the natural sciences, but also les sciences morales, whose 
first lessons reveal to the child that he belongs to the great family called 
the homeland (225). Teaching morality is thus the nexus in which fra-
ternity, the construction of national unity through the cultivation of the 
“social sense,” is knotted with equality, society’s rectification of natu-
ral inequities, by means of liberty, from the constraints of birth and 
nature.
 in Ferry’s ‘breviary,’ Quinet had argued that while liberty is the fun-
damental political value of the modern state, political freedom cannot 
exist without freedom of thought (la liberté d’examen). Science, the 
result of this freedom and the intellectual basis of modern society, has 
its own certainty, which has no need of religion’s seal of approval. Ferry 
reiterated this claim before the Senate on november 22, 1880, when 
defending the teaching of independent morality in the new secondary 
schools for girls (robiquet 15). reversing the Church’s age-old claims 
to universalism, like Condorcet and Comte, Quinet strove to reduce 
Catholicism to the status of a particularism. Science “exists by itself, 
independent and free. it is the general, universal, absolute religion. Par-
ticular dogmas manifest the spirit of sectarianism” (L’enseignement du 
peuple 119). in a society composed of members of several religions, the 
tenets of any one of them will appear as a form of particularity when 
measured against the whole. The only way to guarantee the continued 
existence of such a society is to transmit its basic spirit from genera-
tion to generation through a laic education that eschews any “particular 
dogma” (120). as Ferry will do later, Quinet clinched his argument by 
citing Condorcet who, already in 1792, opposed morality to the “prin-
ciples of any particular religion” and used this opposition to call for the 
separation of religious and secular national education (153).
 in short, for these republicans the moral is the political. independent 
morality is equated with universality, interpreted as (human) nature, 
science, society. and universality guarantees autonomy, understood as 
human independence from nature; as the independence of human nature 
from the rest of nature; as the independence of individual thought from 
external control; as the independence of the whole of society from the 
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domination of any part of itself; as the independence of secular educa-
tion from religious authority; as the independence of human society 
from transcendent origins, legitimation, or regulation. as Quinet put 
it when refuting the Church’s demand in 1850 for “freedom of educa-
tion,” that is, the right to run their own schools at all levels and every-
where in the country: Freedom is not the solution, it’s the problem; 
how can society establish and maintain liberty? (L’enseignement du peuple 
139).
 but if for some republicans the moral was the political when it came 
to education, for others the political was the moral. instead of deriv-
ing a plan for moral education from what they held to be good for the 
collectivity, the republican nation, these thinkers took as their starting 
point the dignity of the individual, claiming that this fundamentally 
moral conception of humanity is, or should be, the basis of republican 
politics and hence of democratic education. in place of Condorcet and 
Comte, wittingly or unwittingly they hark back primarily to immanuel 
Kant as their intellectual forefather.
 The philosopher and educator Étienne vacherot (former director of 
studies at the École normale Supérieure) argues that democracy is the 
only true—that is, ideal—form of government, for it alone guarantees 
justice, the protection of the rights of its citizens. but we become aware 
of our rights only because of our consciousness of our duties, a realiza-
tion made possible by the fact that, as human beings, we have reason 
and free will and are therefore persons in the strict sense (4). at bottom, 
then, it is freedom that constitutes the essence of being human and the 
basis of personhood, and it is freedom that democracy must protect. 
now what distinguishes democracy from other forms of government? 
Self-government. here the notion of autonomy reappears, as in the 
previously cited arguments, but with one great difference. For vacherot 
as for his model, Kant, true autonomy does not simply mean that which 
comes from within, as opposed to submission to external forces. real 
freedom requires legislating for oneself, giving oneself a law: in short, 
obeying one’s reason, acting in accordance with the moral law (under-
stood in the singular; see Kant 100–1). in the same way, democratic 
government requires a nation to give to itself and to obey its own laws. 
in order to guarantee liberty, it must also have equality in the form of 
universal suffrage, to ensure that each citizen does indeed participate in 
legislating, even if only indirectly.
 The link between morals and politics is therefore asserted to be the 
concept and practice of self-government. but how can a nation rule 
itself if its members remain incapable of exercising their reason? hence 
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the need for universal education (vacherot 5). and vacherot quotes 
Proudhon’s famous lapidary phrase with approval: “Démocracy is 
demopaedia” (in Démocratie 90). his acceptance of Proudhon is not lim-
ited to the sole need for education. Through Proudhon’s concern for 
workers and peasants, vacherot is able to extend the logic of Kant’s 
notions of freedom and dignity to economic issues. The democracy 
he is proposing is not simply the idea of enlightenment liberalism, for 
when you put liberty first, you can condemn the laissez-faire that leads 
to economic as well as social and political privileges and servitude (13). 
With Proudhon he insists that poverty is one of the most potent abridg-
ments of liberty (14). enlightened socialism acts on the basis of free-
dom, morality, human dignity (14). body and soul, matter and spirit 
are tightly connected in humans. Therefore, in order to free the mind, 
you must first liberate the body. (During the Third republic, vacherot 
would retreat from this advanced social position.)
 in the final years of the empire, the cause of independent moral-
ity was spread by means of the journal of the same name. One mem-
ber of massol’s editorial team, Clarisse Coignet, was to become an 
influential exponent of the new educational system established under 
the Third republic. a convert to Protestantism, under the influence 
of Charles Fourier’s brand of socialism since her youth, and a former 
member of the Conseil d’administration of the lemonnier schools for 
young women,7 during the early days of the republic she spoke out 
vehemently for laic education, asserting that Catholicism “is the most 
powerful expression of intellectual despotism the human mind has ever 
presented,” while laic schools are the forerunners of a secular society, 
the new republic, the rights of man, individual liberty, universal suf-
frage, and self-government. The choice is then clear, either Catholicism 
or modern society (“De l’enseignement laïque en France et en angle-
terre” 928–31). The position Coignet states in this article is one she 
had worked out in detail in the book she wrote during her collaboration 
on massol’s journal, La morale indépendante dans son principe et dans son 
objet (1869). like massol, she makes liberty “the human fact par excel-
lence,” the foundation of right (le droit) and thus of both morality and 
politics (5). interestingly, she explains that by making right depend on 
a personal experience accessible to everyone rather than a conception 
of universal reason or an external natural law, independent morality 
ensures respect for the human person, thus avoiding the “crimes and 
follies” that result from theories that make the ends the ultimate crite-
rion of right as well as those that take the self-interest of the majority 
as their gauge (5). Without naming them directly, she takes her stand 
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against utilitarianism, positivism, social Darwinism, and communism 
all at once. With acknowledgments to aristotle, Kant, and philosophi-
cal “criticism,” Coignet proceeds to remove natural science from the 
field of morality by claiming that nature is the domain of blind neces-
sity and bloody struggle, while metaphysical (i.e., religious) notions of 
morals, like science, make people dependent on a higher external order. 
by thus eliminating individual autonomy and responsibility (41), both 
ultimately lead to despotism (55). in their place, she endorses the tenets 
of Kant’s practical reason: the freedom in question is that of justice, a 
liberty that governs itself according to a law that it freely gives itself and 
then follows in action (6).
 One of the early contributors to La morale indépendante was Charles 
renouvier, the most renowned proponent of Kant’s philosophy in 
France in the nineteenth century. already famous in republican circles 
for his Manuel républicain de l’homme et du citoyen (1848), a kind of laic, 
but not antireligious, catechism in democracy composed for the school-
children of the Second republic at the request of the minister of public 
education, hippolyte Carnot (see agulhon, “introduction”), renouvier 
exercised a decisive influence on the teaching of morality and civics in 
the educational system of the Third republic through the dissemina-
tion of Kantian ideas in La Critique Philosophique (abbreviated as RCP), 
the journal he edited along with his collaborator, François Pillon.8 The 
editors marked the occasion of the publication of the review’s second 
volume with a resounding statement whose title sums up their mission: 
“republican Doctrine: or What We are, What We Want to become” 
(2.1.1 [august 8, 1872]: 1–16). in it they asserted that the country was 
in dire need of a “republican philosophy” that would carry on its tradi-
tion of lofty principles and rigorous consequences, affirm the human 
need to believe in the rule of moral law in the universe, and start from 
a first principle that would lead directly to the doctrines of liberty and 
equality (1).
 after criticizing just about everyone else in sight—the Catholics, 
the monarchists, the old bourgeoisie, the two napoleons and their fol-
lowers, the socialists, the Positivists, and above all the Jacobins—who 
allegedly betrayed the principles of freedom and equality they claimed 
to be defending by importing into the revolution the principles of the 
Old regime, imposing artificial unity, extreme centralization, and rule 
by force, in order to ensure the domination of the majority by an active 
minority—renouvier and Pillon announce their first principle, drawn 
from Kant’s Critique of Practical Reason: “the right of the person . . . the 
respect due the person,” which comprises the foundation of the republican 
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principles of liberty and equality (“republican Doctrine” 5). Since the 
old habits and traditions of France have been largely uprooted, the 
country needs a new point around which to rally the nation, and that 
point should be a true ethics that can be taught in the schools and put 
into practice in political action (8).
 Once the fundamental principle has been accepted of treating people 
as ends rather than means due to the presence of reason in every human 
being, everything else follows logically. Conscience and self-interest 
unite in opposing any universal rule based on selfish or vicious motives; 
the notion of justice, which requires reciprocity, equal exchange, and the 
correlation of rights with duties, derives directly from that premise, and 
freedom is the means necessary for reason to accomplish its moral duty. 
hence we must postulate the existence of a real subject of this freedom, 
both moral agent and citizen. They acknowledge that this is a vicious 
circle, but, they argue, that is inevitable since first principles can never 
be proved (12).
 For renouvier, the Kantian scion of the old patrician bourgeoisie 
(agulhon, “introduction” 10–11), the law was the foundation of free-
dom and equality. This notion of the supremacy of the law, especially 
when used to oppose socialism along with Caesarism, made his policies 
appealing to the basically conservative, bourgeois Opportunist republic 
of the following decade. yet, unlike the common run of what John Scott 
has called the “neo-Girondist” conservatives, renouvier had learned 
from his contacts with the socialist writings and followers of Saint-
Simon, Pierre leroux, Proudhon, and above all Fourier, from whom 
he adopted the right to trade unions and producer cooperatives, a right 
forbidden by law until 1884 (John Scott 70). Unlike the majority of 
conservatives of the seventies, he attacked the bloody repression of the 
Communards and protested vigorously the patently unjust treatment of 
those who had survived the hecatomb of 1871 by the government and 
courts of the period (“la raison d’État en 1872”). Some twenty years 
later it would be this notion of the supremacy of the law that would 
rally many younger intellectuals to the cause of Dreyfus.
 renouvier’s Kantian liberalism was able to produce real effects 
through its penetration of all levels of the republican educational sys-
tem (John Scott 76–77). in fact, Kantianism dominated the philosophy 
departments of French higher education until well after the First World 
War. its influence was felt equally in the secondary schools, whose last 
year included a special course on philosophy. looking back on the 
decades since the founding of the republic and citing the teachings of 
renouvier and Jules lachelier, the philosopher alphonse Darlu asserted 
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in 1895 that philosophy, specifically Kant’s doctrine of practical reason, 
had become a social force in France (249).9
 Kantianism was, if anything, even more influential in the primary 
schools than in the higher levels of the educational system. While the 
sponsors of the bills that created the new schools were mostly positiv-
ists, those Ferry appointed to formulate and carry out the directives 
mandated by the laws and the educational commissions they called into 
being were thinkers heavily indebted to renouvier or to parallel radical 
Protestant theology equally under the sway of Kant’s doctrines. Ferdi-
nand buisson, philosopher, director of primary education, and Ferry’s 
most trusted adviser on educational matters (and eventual winner of 
the nobel Peace Prize in 1927), Félix Pécaut, pastor, inspector-general 
of public education, and first director of the École normale Supérieure 
at Fontenay-aux-roses, and Jules Steeg, pastor, inspector general of 
the Université (i.e., of secondary schools),10 director of the Pedagogi-
cal museum, and second director of the newly established École nor-
male Supérieure for women primary schoolteachers and principals at 
Fontenay-aux-roses. all three men had been involved in establishing a 
liberal Protestant Church in neuchâtel at the end of the empire (acomb 
55). although they believed in a personal God, all rejected religious 
dogmas and, most important, believed in the existence of a universal 
and eternal independent morality shared by all peoples in all periods of 
history.11
 To these educational leaders must be added mme. Jules Favre (Julie 
Charlotte velten), a Protestant from Wissembourg appointed first direc-
tor of the newly founded École normale Supérieure at Sèvres, designed 
to prepare principals and teachers for the new secondary schools for 
women (F. mayeur 116). in this capacity she set the tone of the entire 
system for many years. author of a study of the Stoic philosophers, 
she combined their morality with that of Protestantism in her philoso-
phy of education: Teaching is not a mere profession but an apostolate 
whose mission is to contribute to the regeneration and moral emancipa-
tion of the members of the republic. mme. Favre strove to inculcate 
into her pupils the practice as well as the theory of self-rule, allowing 
them much more freedom of movement than was common in those 
days in schools for young women, and strongly encouraging them to 
exercise freedom of thought and independence of action. in the course 
she herself taught on law, while emphasizing the social advantages of 
voluntary obedience to the laws of the state, she put the cultivation of 
the spirit of justice above all utilitarian considerations. Thus she con-
stantly looked at what she took to be the prejudices of her society with 
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a critical eye. She approved of “free”—that is, purely civil—marriage; 
thought illegitimate children should have the same rights as others; and, 
in matters of conscience, taught that passively submitting to paternal 
authority undermined the freedom and dignity of our moral being (see 
réval, Les Sèvriennes). above all, as Françoise mayeur points out, she 
demanded full equality for women, disavowing the officially accepted 
programmatic phrase of the times for women’s education, “equality in 
difference” (121).
 beyond their disputes about the priority of rights or duties, of free-
dom or the moral law, and beyond their differences of focus, all the 
thinkers and educators we have discussed agreed that it is the notion of 
rational self-government that spans the gap between the individual and 
the state, between morality and politics (Coignet, De l’éducation dans 
la démocratie viii). The moral sovereignty of the individual becomes the 
model for the political sovereignty of the people in the republic.
 as a result, the greatest challenge Ferry faced in defending his reforms 
in Parliament was to substantiate the assertion that universal morality 
does in fact exist. in the Senate session of July 2, 1881, trying to stave 
off an amendment that would have reinstated the teaching of religious 
(i.e., Catholic) morality in the girls’ secondary schools, he proclaimed 
that Catholic, Protestant, evolutionist, positivist, utilitarian, and inde-
pendent moralities are all the same: “True morality, grand morality, 
eternal morality is morality without qualification” (robiquet 175). he 
continued: “it’s the morality of duty, ours, yours, Gentlemen, Kant’s 
morality, the morality of Christianity” (176). in his famous letter to 
the primary schoolteachers of the nation of november 17, 1883, he 
explained that duty, that is, the universally recognized set of maxims of 
applied morality, is what counts, a matter independent of the various 
theoretical bases of ethics (Lettre aux instituteurs, cited in legrand 156). 
 The tight relationship between ethics and politics was not just a mat-
ter of principle for the Opportunists. in 1871, Gambetta had already 
accused the Congregationist schools of using moral education for politi-
cal ends. it was consistent with this view that the bill on primary schools 
Ferry’s government brought before Parliament in 1879–80 sought to 
remedy that situation by requiring not simply the teaching of “morals” 
but explicitly giving pride of place in the new curriculum to “moral and 
civic education” (Ferry, cited in reclus 213). in justifying the new civics 
curriculum before the Chamber of Deputies in 1879, bert stressed the 
rationale of inspiring national unity through the teaching of the nation’s 
“reasons for existence and principles of life,” what today we would call 
its culture (L’instruction civique 7).
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 bert was also quick to add that this instruction is especially necessary 
since many schools nowadays—meaning the Congregationist schools, 
of course—teach just the opposite. Ferry himself was not so subtle when 
responding in the Chamber on December 20, 1880 to charges from 
the right that a “school without God would be a school against God.” 
(note that bishop Dupanloup had already argued in his diatribe against 
littré a decade before that positivism would undermine morality and 
social unity.) Claiming that the notion of laic schools implies only that 
they will be nonsectarian, he argued that the purpose of this measure 
was to ensure the security of the republican state. We must safeguard the 
primary school system from falling into the hands of the “prelates who 
have declared that the French revolution is a deicide . . . [and] that the 
principles of ’89 are the negation of original sin” (robiquet 126).
Disparities between Opportunist Theory and Practice
in a country where changes of regime were as frequent as in France in 
the nineteenth century, in a republic that was barely ten years old in 
name and scarcely three years old in fact, the republican form of gov-
ernment was just as much a particularism as Catholicism was, in Ferry’s 
words, “a particular dogma.” if he and his fellow republicans insisted 
so heavily on the universality of their civic morality, it must have been 
in part because they knew that in reality the ethics and the politics they 
championed comprised just one of several possible systems competing 
for supremacy in France.
 The inherent tension between the ostensible universality and actual 
particularity within republicanism existed on several levels in the ideol-
ogy we have been examining and played itself out historically in many 
guises during the subsequent years of the century. its most obvious 
manifestation, of course, was the clash between secular and Church 
institutions of learning. much less visible but even more widespread and 
fateful was the virtual elimination of local peasant cultures in France, 
effected mostly in the years from 1880 to 1914 in an attempt to create 
and enforce the national unity so prominent in the pronouncements 
of thinkers, educators, and politicians alike (Weber 9). The Opportun-
ists made no secret, either, about the fact that their universalism did 
not extend beyond human and civil rights to the domain of econom-
ics; hence the widespread perception that their policy was intended to 
placate the bourgeoisie by avoiding measures designed to alleviate the 
condition of the working classes.
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 The most glaring contradiction between theoretical universalism and 
practical particularism occurred in the differential distribution and sig-
nificance of moral and civic instruction. During the Third republic, the 
moral teaching aimed at reforming the conduct of children from their 
first days in school, the instruction that permeated every aspect of the 
curriculum and drew its examples from everyday life—in short, the les-
sons designed to create the new citizens of the republic—were taught 
only in the primary schools and the new girls’ secondary schools. in 
the traditional boys’ secondary schools, independent morality entered 
the curriculum only as a theory in the philosophy class taken in the 
last year of study. Practical moral training was deemed unnecessary for 
these pupils because of the high cultural value the French attributed to 
the Greco-latin humanities taught in the secondary schools, the study 
of which was assumed to be sufficient to immunize pupils against all 
baseness (bouglé 11).12 The reason for this difference is not far to seek. 
The primary schools, free of charge and located in every commune in 
the country, enrolled the children of the people, while the secondary 
schools catered almost exclusively to the sons of the bourgeoisie. For the 
children of the people, despite all the lofty talk about the autonomy of 
the moral person—or, in a sense, because of it—the thrust of the new 
moral and civic education was to teach them resignation to their lot in 
life and obedience to authority (Prost 10; Katan 436).
 Children of the people were not the only category whose mem-
bers were somehow less than universal. as is well known, women were 
subject to much more significant restrictions on their participation in 
the benefits of universal rights and moral sovereignty, since under the 
Third republic they were once again deprived of the right to vote. in 
the narrower world of education their allegedly natural differences from 
men served as the rationale for their unequal treatment. in order to 
preserve the institution of marriage and secure the “unity of souls” of 
husband and wife, we must have enlightened women who will second 
their husbands’ progressive beliefs rather than cause dissension in the 
family as is now the case due to the nefarious influence of the clergy on 
ignorant women. it is women who have the greatest educative influence 
on future citizens, in their role as mothers. in short, it was as wives and 
mothers, not as citizens in their own right, that educated women were 
needed to protect the republic, primarily, as with the primary schools, 
by weakening the hold of the Church over them (Ferry, Salle molière 
speech, in legrand 235–37; Ferry, defense of Sée bill in Senate, Decem-
ber 10, 1880, in robiquet 10–15; see also discussion in F. mayeur 
58–60).
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 While educators of all stripes agreed that moral habits of thought 
and action must be learned first through practice, and that the example 
set by the teacher is of primary importance, the main bone of conten-
tion among the schoolteachers (instituteurs) was the status of moral 
theory. at first the teaching was based purely on the intuitive sense of 
conscience. already in 1883, however, louis liard, rector of the acad-
emy of normandy and about to be named director of higher education 
in the ministry of Public education, called for a rational demonstration 
of duty in his primary school textbook, Morale et enseignement civique 
à l’usage des écoles primaires (Morals and Civic Education in the Primary 
Schools), a proposal ratified in a directive issued to the school inspectors 
in October 1888. Jules Payot, whose Avant d’entrer dans la vie: aux 
instituteurs et institutrices, conseils et directions pratiques (Before Starting 
out in Life: Advice and Practical Directions for Schoolteachers; 1897) was 
the most popular teachers’ manual until the First World War, insisted 
that morality is as evident a science as geometry, and, like the math-
ematical discipline, must be demonstrated logically to the pupils (15 
n1). Unfortunately, the inspection reports since 1889 showed that both 
the teachers and the students were at a loss when it came to providing 
rational, Kantian proofs of the concepts of morals (16). The problem 
was that morals are a matter of practice, not theory; hence they require 
a pragmatic justification as is provided for in positivist sociology.
 here, in the distinction between the rational and the scientific, lies 
the crux of the disparity between the Kantian and the positivist views, at 
least as it was perceived by the vast majority of the thinkers of the period. 
in the simplified terms utilized in journalism, politics, and pedagogical 
polemics, science means starting from the observation of empirical real-
ity in order to arrive at general laws through the process of induction. 
rationalism means starting from a priori principles combined according 
to logical operations in order to arrive at an understanding of things at 
the level of phenomena. The one is concrete, the other abstract—and 
young children, it was argued, are not capable of grasping abstractions. 
like scientists, they learn first through the use of their windows onto 
the world: their five senses. The first project of the educator should 
therefore be to enhance and train their capacities of observation, to 
teach them to “observe well” (Payot 16–17). Only later will they be 
able to move on, as the scientist does, from observation of particulars 
to seeing the relations among things by abstracting general conclusions 
from the similarities noticed in comparing multiple observations (17). 
instead of lectures, teachers should provide concrete examples in the 
form of “object lessons” (leçons de choses).
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Spiritualist Particularity ersus 
Republican Uniersality
it is evident that in crucial respects positivism and Kantianism are totally 
incompatible. and yet it is equally apparent that, beyond or in spite of 
their disparities, the two were somehow combined as the quasi-official 
doctrine of the Third republic. in “métaphysique et morale” (1893), 
the mission statement that led off the first number of the Revue de 
Métaphysique et de Morale, the spiritualist philosopher Félix ravaisson, 
for many years the dominant force in the philosophy department of the 
Sorbonne, objected to the recent trend in philosophy to condemn meta-
physics as a useless and impossible preoccupation, a trend he attributed 
to both Comte and Kant (6).
 ravaisson’s manifesto was the spearhead of a more general coun-
terattack usually known as the revival of French spiritualism, which 
would soon crystallize right-wing opposition to the “new Sorbonne.” 
This new spiritualism, despite the noisy drumbeating of Ferdinand 
brunetière with his visit to the vatican (“après une visite au vatican,” 
RDD [January 1, 1895]), was a far cry from the doctrines of victor 
Cousin or Jules Simon, let alone official Church dogma of the period. 
as with positivism, there was a lag of several decades from the time of 
its development, in the 1870s and 1880s, to that of its emergence as 
a political ideology. One of the founders of the movement was Émile 
boutroux, for two years the philosophy teacher at the rue d’Ulm of its 
most famous exponent, henri bergson,13 and also a friend of the influ-
ential writer Paul bourget (mansuy 305, n154). like that of ravaisson, 
whom bergson was to acknowledge as an important antecedent to his 
thought (Thibaudet, Le bergsonisme 39), the polemical thrust of bou-
troux’s doctrine was directed against both positivism and Kantianism. 
his point of attack, however, was not so much their common denial 
of the possibility of metaphysical knowledge as their shared emphasis 
on universality. as the title of his thesis—De la contingence des lois de la 
nature (On the Contingency of the Laws of Nature; 1874)—announces, he 
set out to break the ironclad concatenation of universal natural laws that 
rule the entire universe, according to the fundamental scientific premise 
of his times. Defining science as the attempt to eradicate the multiplic-
ity of experience by reducing it to the one of generality—the type, the 
concept, the essence—and to eliminate the changeable—history—by 
reducing it to the immutable—natural laws—he argues that if those 
laws are not necessary in the philosophical sense of the term, then they 
must be dependent on something other than themselves. Spontaneity 
in the universe is not simply an illusion based on our ignorance of the 
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conditions determining phenomena, but bears witness to the existence 
of causes outside the laws of nature.
 in his demonstration, boutroux does not challenge science per 
se; rather, he locates the element of contingency first in the relation 
between the laws that govern the various levels of natural phenomena. 
in other words, he claims it is impossible to deduce or derive in any 
causal or logical fashion the rules of chemistry from the laws of physics, 
those of biology from those of chemistry, and so on. he concludes that 
even in the natural world, “everything is thus radically contingent” (De 
la contingence 29), and when it comes to human beings, where history 
and individual experience play a much greater role, “acts entail essence, 
far from essence being able to explain acts. . . . man is the author of his 
character and of his destiny” (boutroux 145). human behavior is not 
predictable, for it is not determined in advance by an essence or nature 
which would act as its cause. in short, as Sartre would reiterate in his 
own antideterministic arguments in “existentialism is a humanism,” 
existence precedes essence. The contingency of things is an external sign 
of this fundamental freedom, which ultimately derives from a purely 
voluntaristic God—that is, one who, in the last analysis, is not con-
strained by the laws of logic or rationality.14
 While it might seem that this defense of freedom was entirely com-
patible with Kant’s philosophy of practical reason, in fact boutroux 
opposed the latter because, by relegating freedom to the realm of the 
“intelligible,” the unknowable thing in itself, it leads either to a liberty 
unrelated to action and morality (the noumenal self outside the empiri-
cal world), or to a kind of determinism (of the person as phenomenon 
in the determined world). his doctrine, on the other hand, entails its 
real and active presence within the fabric of the known and knowable 
worlds (149). in this respect, boutroux is indeed attacking the antimeta-
physical bias of Kantianism. but the crux of his argument here, even 
more so than with regard to positivistic science, turns on the disregard 
for particulars, for those aspects of individual phenomena and experi-
ence that escape from the general categories and laws they deploy as the 
only knowable reality. at bottom, both modern science and Kantianism 
postulate a subject of knowledge and action devoid of any contingent 
subjective conditions that differentiate one rational being from another, 
as Kant put it, whereas for boutroux God and people are ‘personal,’ in 
the sense of being distinct from one another and at least potentially free 
of any general rule.
 it was bergson’s doctoral dissertation, Essai sur les données immédiates 
de la conscience (Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of 
Consciousness; 1889), that did most to reinvigorate French philosophical 
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spiritualism. like his predecessor, he responds to the claims of both 
positivism in its mechanist and associationist branches and Kantian-
ism, with its assertion of a moral freedom in the world of the ‘thing in 
itself ’ outside the domain of temporality, by developing his notion of 
duration, according to which contingency was tantamount to a free-
dom opposed not only to any determinism, but to any universal law 
in general. The core of his opposition to Kantianism, as to scientific 
predictability in the human realm, is his insistence on the inextricable 
link between freedom and singularity, what today we would call dif-
ference.15 his basic argument is that human action can neither be pre-
dicted in advance nor subsumed under any general law, because to do so 
one would have to translate mental states into some language, and any 
language necessarily deals only with generalized abstractions: Words are 
like numbers or algebraic notation in that they can be applied to whole 
classes of objects, precisely because they ignore all the concrete, sensory, 
and historical aspects of things. but each mental state, like the moments 
of the history of a nation, is unique in its genre, and will never again 
be reproduced. The qualitative multiplicity of such moments represents 
“phases of our real, concrete duration, of heterogeneous duration, of 
living duration” (181).
 The new spiritualists all agree, then, that at a very fundamental level, 
that of the abstract, rational subject of science and of moral action, posi-
tivism and Kantianism are one. as we shall see in more detail in chapter 
3, however, this perceived unity did not preclude a political alliance 
of certain strains of spiritualism and positivism against parliamentary 
democracy and the Third republic. right-wing nationalism and racism 
had no trouble amalgamating the emphasis on uniqueness and contin-
gency in bergson with the similar stress on particularity present in posi-
tivism whenever the latter found it convenient to distinguish its own 
method of empirical observation from the abstract logic of rationalism. 
When applied to the human realm, as in renan’s early L’avenir de la sci-
ence (The Future of Science, composed in 1848), this reliance on empirical 
data was translated into respect for the uniqueness of historical change 
and of bodily life (Future 264, english ed.). The goal of this brand of 
positivism becomes the appreciation of the ethnic differences produced 
by this spontaneity. in its reverence for life, for individuality, for the 
creative spontaneity of history, positivism thus took over, from the com-
parative study of national literatures and the philological study of lan-
guages, the leading themes of romanticism, both German and French. 
 all that was needed for the emergence of the full-blown nationalist 
ideology of “the soil and the dead,” and its even more sinister offspring, 
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the fascist “blood and soil,” was the admixture of the conservative anti-
rationalist arguments of edmund burke, the German romantics’ rein-
terpretation of J. G. herder, and the indigenous doctrines of Joseph 
de maistre and louis de bonald, accomplished in Taine’s multivolume 
Origins of Contemporary France. The crux of their arguments was that 
in its basic function—namely, voting—democracy treats people as pure 
abstractions, mere numbers divested of their individual histories, expe-
riences, and feelings, and that this inhumanity is consistent with the 
Kantian assertion of abstract humanity at the expense of individual sen-
timents and interests—the “pathological” in Kant’s language—and even 
with the worst excesses of the reign of Terror in that there too the life 
of individuals was sacrificed to abstract principles.16 it is this alleged 
contradiction between democracy and liberty that presided over the 
union of antirationalism and right-wing politics and made their pro-
ponents adopt bergson’s arguments about freedom and contingency.17 
Once he makes contingency the bastion of freedom insofar as each of 
us has a unique history that escapes any attempt at characterization 
through universals, once he describes freedom as acting solely in accord 
with one’s self as given in duration—the synthesis of that past experi-
ence—rather than with any external law, then each region or nation can 
understand its freedom to consist in its respect for and adherence to its 
own past, its ancestors, its land, its communal experience, in opposition 
to and exclusion of everything and everyone it considers alien.
The Crisis of Authority: 
France Is My Mother, the Republic My God
Opportunist ideology ignored many of the disparities between Kant 
and Comte because it was of course meant first of all to unite the larg-
est number of people possible behind the new republic. but in order 
to do so, along with the concrete rewards it held out to its supporters, 
it had to convince them and potential converts of the legitimacy of its 
claim to authority, if only to assure them that it had indeed become the 
party most capable of ensuring national order and regeneration. The 
emphasis on independent morality, with its peculiar blend of freedom, 
autonomy, obedience, and conformity, was a versatile weapon in this 
battle, allowing the Opportunists to combat Catholicism while at the 
same time demonstrating their own adherence to a strict moralism that 
could assuage their compatriots’ sense of guilt and allay their fears of 
renewed social rebellions.
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 like most weapons, however, this one had its drawbacks. as reac-
tionary critics had been complaining since the beginning of the revolu-
tion, with the fall of the monarchy authority had become part of the 
problem of government, instead of its solution. bonald had argued that 
power and law must precede society, since without them no society 
could ever be formed. Social order must be separate from human will, 
since it precedes human action (bonald 95, 151–52). burke had already 
proclaimed in 1790 that the existence of society often requires that peo-
ple’s individual as well as collective passions and wills be controlled and 
even thwarted, and “this can only be done by a power out of themselves” 
(151; emphasis in original). Joseph de maistre’s similar analysis of the 
insufficiency of authority in constitutional monarchies and republican 
governments, due to the lack of a “superior authority,” clearly threatens 
the moral and political principles at the heart of Opportunist ideology 
also (2; see Gauchet 32–33). by making the source of morality imma-
nent rather than transcendent, the liberals left it open to the charge that 
it was a partisan matter, to be determined in fact by a particular segment 
of the population in accordance with its own lights and interests.
 it was in order to protect their principles from this kind of attack that 
the Opportunists insisted so heavily on the universality of their morality 
and on its foundation in a realm outside the fray of social, economic, 
and political contention, even if not removed to a domain beyond the 
world of human life. if the same moral principles had existed forever, 
in all places and among all human groups, then it could not be argued 
that they were the result of particular interests. hence the recourse to 
the universality of human reason as the basis for republican ethics and 
politics among the Kantians. alternatively, if morality was a sentiment 
engraved into human nature or a fact of social evolution, as the positiv-
ists contended at one time or another, then it was independent not only 
of religion but of any set of ideas or beliefs whatsoever, and therefore 
all the more universal, albeit in a slightly different sense of the term. 
in either case, whether based on the authority of reason or of fact, the 
control of morality was thus put out of reach of any individual group. 
in short, universality was supposed to assume the role, formerly filled 
by the transcendence of rule by divine right, of supplying a fixed point 
from which action could be judged according to an objective criterion 
independent of the play of contingent forces.
 now one of the major tenets of this universal morality was the asser-
tion of individual freedom, the basic principle of republican politics, 
both as the freedom of thought that justifies the autonomy of the voter 
and as the foundation of sovereignty understood as self-rule. While this 
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capacity was of valuable assistance in combating religious dogma and 
“metaphysics,” it had the unfortunate potential of inciting criticism of 
the republic’s authorities, as well as of its social and political arrange-
ments. it was for this reason that the moral education offered in the 
primary schools emphasized duty, that is, obedience, before broaching 
the question of freedom. The main remedy for this problem inscribed 
into the new curriculum was the coupling of moral training with civic 
education.
 “moral and civic education,” in the consecrated formula of the edu-
cational reform laws, was to furnish the necessary compromise between 
individual freedom and social responsibility. On the simplest and most 
evident level, civic instruction was a matter of creating an informed elec-
torate capable of exercising the vote in a mature way (to use Kant’s term 
for the enlightened person). Thus bert begins by contrasting republi-
can enlightenment with monarchical and dictatorial benightedness in 
explaining the rationale for civics education in his speech to the Cham-
ber of Deputies on December 6, 1879 (Instruction civique 5–6). by this 
contrast, bert intimates that enlightenment is a process of struggle. in 
the list that follows of topics to be covered in civics classes, he openly 
invokes the revolution as the historical and ideological matrix of that 
conflict, implicitly portrays the present republic as its dutiful heir, and 
explicitly characterizes it as the worthy object of its children’s respect 
and gratitude. Two years later, in his defense of this law before the Sen-
ate, Ferry would make the same connection between the Third republic 
and the revolution (see Chaitin, “‘France is my mother’” 143–52).
 There is a striking similarity between the emotions the republic is 
supposed to arouse in its children and the obedience, gratitude, and 
respect toward their parents the primary school textbooks on morality 
aim to inculcate in their pupils. bert and Ferry complete the parallel 
with sentiments of filial piety when they cap their rationale for civic 
instruction by adding love to the equation. The first lessons in bert’s 
civics textbook treat the virtues of the army and the duty of military 
service, explaining that the patrie is a great family, telling the children 
in direct address that it is “your mother.”18 The child, bert argues in his 
speech to the Chamber, must know why he should love France so that 
he will give himself to it entirely, so that he will defend the homeland 
and the “principles whose triumph has made of him a free man and a 
citizen” (6). Strange as it may seem, the notion that you can induce 
people to love by teaching them why they should do so was also a com-
monplace in the lessons on children’s attitudes toward their parents in 
the school ethics texts of the times (renouvier, “Petit traité” 129).
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 The justification for the new civics lessons was thus structured by 
a series of metonymical and metaphorical substitutions: The revolu-
tion becomes the name of the Third republic (which, of course, came 
to power not through revolution but thanks to a military defeat fol-
lowed by a series of proclamations and votes, and which confirmed its 
existence by crushing a revolution), and the republic that of France 
(when the country was still divided fairly evenly between republicans 
and antirepublicans); at the same time, the republic was equated with 
the beneficent parent to whom its citizens owed their very existence (as 
free men and citizens) as well as a host of other blessings that make life 
worth living, and to whom they owe in return gratitude, obedience, 
respect, and ultimately a love whose supreme proof is the willingness to 
sacrifice their very lives.
 moreover, according to Coignet, only members of free countries 
really have a homeland, because as citizens they exercise governing func-
tions and make sacrifices for the nation (“instruction secondaire des 
jeunes filles” 81). here she clearly and unequivocally links republican 
citizenship and autonomous morality to the citizen’s sense of identity. 
like the family, the free state becomes the ideal object of both self-love 
and altruistic love, for, as with the family, the members of a democratic 
state both have it and are it at the same time. The homeland is not sim-
ply France, then, but the republic, for in it alone personal identity and 
national identity can coalesce.
 in order to ensure social cohesion and responsibility, the new civics 
instruction relied much more heavily on subjectifying the citizen’s rela-
tion to the state through identification and the cultivation of love than 
on producing the uniformity of ideas recommended by the positivists. 
The idea of deriving feelings from universal moral principles, rather 
than the reverse, was consistent with Kant’s doctrines and was also 
symptomatic of the more general enlightenment belief in the power of 
reason to inform and reform not only people’s conduct but their very 
being. The primary reason, however, why the idea of teaching people 
to love was unquestioningly presupposed by the authors of laws and 
textbooks, and so easily accepted by the public, was that it was a simple 
restatement of traditional religious teachings, particularly the catechism, 
with the reasons for loving the republic and acknowledging its author-
ity to be legitimate replacing of those for loving God and obeying his 
commandments.
 in fact, as many scholars have pointed out, Third republic educa-
tion strove to make “the homeland [play] the role reserved for God in 
the Catholic schools” (m. Ozouf 114).19 by the end of the century, the 
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schoolteachers of the republic had become “lay monks,” “lay mission-
aries of the truth,” “apostles of progress,” “priests of a religion of love” 
who would “sow the good word in the tender souls of the children” so 
that their “successors will see the harvest of the ideas of justice and fra-
ternal solidarity germinate” (laville 332–34; the last quotation is from 
Payot’s manual for schoolteachers). in her study of Zola’s Truth, béa-
trice laville points out that the drive for secular education was painted 
as a veritable religious crusade, in which Charles Péguy’s famous hus-
sards noirs de la république (black hussars of the republic) were to lead 
the holy war to replace the dying religious faith of the people with the 
ideals of science and make the schools into the new Church of free 
thought (334).20
 nor was it through the schools alone that the republic strove to 
make patriotism into a second religion for the masses. Jean-marie may-
eur, summarizing the conclusions of several important scholarly works, 
reminds us of the concerted efforts of the regime to orchestrate a series 
of representations of the republic through the construction of sculptural 
monuments; the elevation of various figures to the status of national 
heroes; and above all the public festivals, celebrations, and events of the 
1880s, which he calls “the rites of a veritable republican liturgy” (83). 
in 1880, the year July 14 was made into the French national holiday, 
the municipal Council of Paris declared that schoolchildren should par-
ticipate in the official ceremonies in order to rid them of the “practices 
of superstition.” like the First republic, the Third wanted to combat 
the “old dogmas” by creating a civic religion, and while the Goddess of 
reason was not revived, the figure of marianne gave the republic a face 
and a body to worship in place of the virgin (84; see agulhon, Mari-
anne au pouvoir). in those early years, the July 14 celebrations aroused 
special fervor in the popular sections of Paris and the other big cities, 
where they took on the flavor of “political liturgies” (J.-m. mayeur 
84).
 as this last example shows, it was not the patrie as such, but the 
republic, that took over the role of God. Perhaps it would be more 
accurate to say that the modern idea of the homeland as object of love 
and veneration was the invention of the republic. by putting this new 
version of the homeland into the place of a deity, the republic strove to 
construct an “imagined community” characteristic of modern nations 
(see anderson, Imagined Communities), not so much to replace real 
human communities destroyed by modernization (although that would 
become the case more and more as the century came to a close), but to 
supplant the communities that still existed at the time.21 The community 
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of republican patriotism was not only ‘imagined’ in anderson’s sense of 
a group created by the discourse of the nation spread primarily in the 
unified languages made possible by the print media; it was above all 
‘imaginary’ in lacan’s meaning of the term, designed to make the indi-
vidual dependent for his identity, his very being, on the republic, con-
ceived as a transcendent Other that guarantees that identity in return for 
sacrificial devotion. by producing the impression that the new regime 
stood outside the flux of time and thus above partisan divisiveness and 
earthly incompetence and corruption, it meant to prove itself worthy of 
the subjective allegiance, identification, and love of all its inhabitants. 
The transcendence promoted in the civics curriculum thus was to com-
plement the universalism of the moral education in establishing a firm 
foundation for the authority of the still extremely fragile republic.
The Conflict of Identities
The new patriotism, then, was an attempt by a particular regime to 
identify itself with the universal existence of the nation, of an individual 
class to represent the interests of the nation as a whole, of a specific 
set of principles to express the will of the entire people. in order to 
accomplish this feat, it had to convince all its citizens that its interests 
were their interests, that its heroes were their heroes, that its culture was 
their culture, that its principles were their principles: in short, that they 
were it and it was they, and yet at the same time that it was worthy of 
assuming the parental role, while they should be happy to devote their 
filial piety and loyalty to it. The fundamental contradiction between 
the universal and the particular inscribed in this program, which was 
considered necessary for the very survival of the republic yet flew in 
the face of a host of facts, inevitably led to a multileveled civil war of 
identifications.
 The greatest blessing of the republic was supposed to be freedom, 
autonomy, self-rule. yet just as the republic put itself in the position of 
God in its civics courses, so its educators adhered to the same authori-
tarian notions and methods as the Congregationists. With Kant’s asser-
tion of the basically evil character of human nature and Comte’s equally 
strong distrust of the selfishness of the individual, it is not the least bit 
surprising that the republican schools should have adopted this atti-
tude toward children’s education, nor that Durkheim should proclaim 
that education is a “work of authority” almost on a par with hypnotic 
suggestion (Éducation et sociologie 85–87). although there were a few 
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voices raised for the principles of Jean-Jacques rousseau and his suc-
cessors such as Johann heinrich Pestalozzi and Friedrich Froebel, as 
Prost explains persuasively, the child’s spontaneity was generally seen as 
a danger rather than a promise, a source of potential insubordination 
that must be curbed by strong discipline (9). independence of mind 
was a fine ideal for adults, but the goal of children’s education was to 
indoctrinate them with the proper convictions. hence the use, in more 
than one textbook (e.g., renouvier’s Manuel; bert’s Instruction civique), 
of the same method of questions and answers as in the catechism. The 
strongest advocates of free thought did not allow children to doubt the 
word of the teacher. as renouvier puts it in his “Petit traité,” children 
will be raised to the status of adults, that is, of moral persons worthy 
of respect and capable of self-government, only when they have learned 
obedience to duty (RCP 4.49 [January 6, 1876]: 367). he has no trou-
ble reconciling this conception with his liberal principles since, accord-
ing to him, the authoritarian teacher in fact merely “lends his voice” to 
reason and conscience (367).
 The contrast between an ideology of sovereignty and the reality of 
impotent obedience was not restricted to children and the schools. as 
the century wore on, it became most blatant in the case of the growing 
urban proletariat, aware of their powerlessness in the face of an anony-
mous and impersonal state. it was this impression that Zola succeeded 
in capturing so forcefully in Germinal and other novels of the eighties. 
but his portrayal of the effects of industrial and commercial capitalism 
omitted one aspect of the situation that exacerbated its action a hun-
dredfold: namely, the sense of real powerlessness was compounded by 
the promise, new with the republic and specific to it, of partial control 
over government through participation in the electoral process.
 On the theoretical level, the problem was that the war of identifica-
tions took place within the ideology of the republic itself. The conflict 
between the universal and the particular emerged in the two incompat-
ible foundations the republic was trying to use to establish its legiti-
macy: the abstract, impersonal, universal subject of modern science and 
autonomous morality and the image of itself as a parental deity modeled 
after the age-old notion of the God of Christianity. The flaw in this 
imitation was that the republic could not portray itself as a personal 
god without betraying the most fundamental principles of democracy 
as they were understood in France at the time. The series of authorities 
going from parents to teachers to the state left no room for a monarch, 
dictator, or even a president possessed of real executive powers who 
could serve as the concrete representative of the state. but is it possible 
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to identify with an immaterial principle rather than with a tangible fig-
ure? Can the abstract moral agent stripped of all contingent properties 
and obedient to reason alone insofar as he acts morally or politically in 
a democracy at the same time remain the human individual endowed 
with feelings of pity and gratitude, respect and loyalty?
 The most ingenious, even if most evident, attempt to reconcile these 
opposites was the inscription of the revolution at the heart of the myth 
of the Third republic. The obvious purpose of this maneuver was to 
provide the fledgling republic with distinguished predecessors, identi-
fying it as the continuation of the historical mission of France. more 
significant, however, was the endeavor, in imitation of Christianity once 
again, to redefine history in general in terms of the revolution. like the 
advent of Jesus, it was conceived as an occurrence both within history 
and outside it, a meeting point between the universal and the particular, 
the event in which the eternal and universal principles of reason and 
justice interrupted the flow of history by manifesting themselves in a set 
of human actors in a specific time and place.
 The crisis of authority gave rise to a similar contradiction in the 
efforts of the republic to manipulate the identity of its citizens, styl-
ing itself a transcendent Other that can guarantee the existence of its 
members in order to gain legitimacy and obedience while indoctrinating 
them at the same time with the conviction that the democratic State is 
a manifestation of themselves as autonomous, self-governing beings: in 
short, that they are the State. as a result, the educational project of the 
republic provoked a predicament of representation similar to the one 
which occurred simultaneously in the realm of literature, and for much 
the same reasons. in this dual crisis of representation and identity, the 
opposing parties enlisted fiction in their polemical campaigns.
Nation and Mutilation
in 1886, the struggle between Catholic and republican education 
became the subject of La morte (The Deceased), a novel by the society 
writer Octave Feuillet that sparked an outburst of controversy by the 
country’s most notable critics—among them Jules lemaître and Paul 
bourget in France, Walter Pater in england—who attacked or defended 
it on aesthetic, philosophical, and political grounds, often using the 
one as a guise for the others. Sabine, a freethinker raised and trained in 
the ways of positivism by her uncle, Dr. Tallevaut, murders aliette de 
Courteheuse, the good Catholic daughter of a provincial nobleman who 
traces his ancestry back to the time of William the Conqueror, in order 
to have for herself aliette’s husband, the equally aristocratic but con-
siderably less Catholic bernard de montauret, marquis de vaudricourt, 
a modern fellow who is delighted to have freed himself in his youth 
from his religious “superstitions” and his belief in God. The success of 
Sabine’s project does not end the story, however, for, as bourget points 
out in his review, the main subject of the book is the conflict of religious 
beliefs between marital partners. Sabine’s plan succeeds, but her mar-
riage to bernard soon goes sour, as he comes to realize the profound 
incompatibility between his conception of life and marriage and that of 
his liberated spouse. Upon discovering the truth about his first wife’s 
murder and learning that the latter said nothing because she thought he 
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was in on the plot, bernard is overcome with guilt, and on his deathbed 
he converts back to the faith of his youth. Thus Feuillet can conclude 
his opus with a triumphant, albeit melodramatic flourish: “he wanted 
to die in aliette’s religion. alive the poor child had been vanquished: 
dead she triumphed” (305–6; all quotes from La Morte are my transla-
tions from the French).
 Present-day historians of literature generally dismiss Feuillet in an 
icy phrase or two as the epitome of the bourgeois writer, if they deign 
to mention him at all. in this disdain they are only following the lead 
of the most respected novelists of the times—Flaubert, Zola, and the 
Goncourts. yet Feuillet was highly respected (see hauser, 4: 58–59); 
indeed he was the first novelist ever elected to the académie Française 
(in 1863). While his style is a pale imitation of mme. de lafayette 
and his characters stereotypes, Feuillet does abandon, to an admittedly 
limited extent, the manichaeism that plagues so many thesis novels, by 
attributing only the most noble motives and actions to the archpositivist 
Dr. Tallevaut. he can allow himself this show of magnanimity toward 
his ideological opponents, because he then blackens them by painting 
the sorcerer’s apprentice as evil incarnate.
 The choice of a woman to commit the crime, although it was not 
without precedent in nineteenth-century literature and would soon 
become a commonplace of decadent fiction, was something of a novelty 
in 1886. Feuillet found the connection between the two themes of the 
dangers of positivism and the education of women in an essay on the 
great positivist littré by his longtime friend and admirer, the spiritual-
ist philosopher elme Caro (see Caro’s flattering portrait of the writer 
in Poètes et romanciers). in M. Littré et le positivisme (1883), Caro dwells 
on the positivist’s lengthy training and practice as a medical student 
(although he never completed the degree), the many articles he wrote 
and treatises he translated on medical topics, the free medical treat-
ment he provided for the peasants living in the country village where 
his summer home was located, and his modesty in speaking about this 
service. littré’s relationship with his daughter was a mirror image of 
Tallevaut’s with Sabine. as Tallevaut raised his niece, littré himself 
raised his daughter, and she became his faithful helper when she grew 
up. but, out of a spirit of tolerance and respect for his wife’s piety, he 
gave the girl a Catholic upbringing despite his own atheist convictions, 
and even abandoned his plan to have her choose between his beliefs and 
her mother’s when she was old enough to understand such a choice, 
for fear of causing his wife pain (Caro, M. Littré 24–25, quoting an 
unnamed essay by Sainte-beuve). Seen in the light of littré’s actions, 
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La morte appears as a kind of mental ‘experiment,’ as bourget called it in 
his review, designed to show what would have happened if the positivist 
had raised his daughter according to the tenets of his own philosophical 
and antireligious persuasion.
 For Caro’s study is marked by a peculiar ambivalence. he describes 
littré the man as a paragon of personal virtue, yet as laudatory as Caro 
is of littré’s character, that is how harsh he is in his judgment of the 
implications of his philosophy. The philosopher’s overarching thesis is 
that positivism is in reality the negation of everything that is not a 
perceptible phenomenon or a law derived from the latter: namely, the 
rejection of theology and metaphysics. The impetus for his book, with 
its hundred or more pages of detailed analysis and point-by-point refu-
tation, is his fear that, under the Opportunist republic, positivism “is 
in the process of becoming through its negations the official philosophy 
in France” (Caro, M. Littré 197). The main political and social prob-
lem of his times, the struggle between the secular State and theological 
beliefs (167), is therefore the question of the proper foundation for the 
education of humanity: “is positive science up to the task of being the 
only teacher of humanity, the arbiter of its ideas and its mores?” (201). 
his answer, of course, is no. morality in the West has ever depended on 
the ideas of a personal God, the immortality of the soul, and absolute 
duty, independent of human conventions, races, and climates, whereas 
positivism assumes that happiness depends solely on this present life 
and that no being, power, or law transcends the forces of this world. 
Caro’s first conclusion is that the positivist idea of evolutionary progress 
is simply a form of “universal fatalism,” which relieves both individual 
and collective moral responsibility (131–32). he follows this up with 
a statement of the typical Catholic (and also Kantian) reproach to the 
positivist’s creed of accepting the laws of nature: nature is the reign of 
brute force and selfishness, whereas, as Caro puts it in a phrase huys-
mans will remember the following year, “guided by admirable instincts, 
humanity works against the grain [au rebours] of nature” (188).
 more interesting for our purposes, because more specific, more 
inventive, and closer to the experiential form of novelistic representa-
tion adopted by Feuillet, is his argument about the relation between 
morality and happiness. For the positivist, the only force to pit against 
individual happiness is the general happiness. but why should he sac-
rifice his present happiness for so distant and impersonal a goal as the 
future well-being of the human race, an “abstract being” that has no 
separate existence, consciousness, or personal sensation? ‘Sympathy’ is 
the positivist’s response (Caro, M. Littré 242). in everyday life, however, 
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sympathy and disinterestedness, although real phenomena, are generally 
incapable of overcoming self-interest. moreover, this grandiose general 
happiness resembles nothing so much as the sum of individual happi-
nesses—but if that’s the case, why should i sacrifice mine to it? The 
response is that it is also the guarantee of individual happiness, of social 
order. Perhaps—but maybe i don’t think the goal is worth the renuncia-
tion. how can anyone prove empirically that my idea of my own hap-
piness is mistaken (250–51)?
 Feuillet had simply to distribute the two aspects of Caro’s analysis 
among the two positivist characters of his novel in order to represent 
his indictment of republican educational policy. Dr. Tallevaut received 
all of littré’s positive character traits (with an admixture of some fea-
tures from other renowned positivists such as Taine, renan, and Comte 
himself), while Feuillet transformed Caro’s abstract critique of posi-
tivism into the personal characteristics and base actions of the young 
woman the doctor raised, “to serve by turns as his office secretary and 
his laboratory assistant” (La morte 157). Tallevaut inherits littré’s con-
cern for his family in the person of Sabine: his high moral standards, 
his charity toward the peasants, his selfless devotion to science. Feuil-
let even endows him with an attribute Caro refused to positivism, if 
not to littré himself: a religious belief in the promise of science for 
“the moral and religious future of humanity” similar to the “religion 
of humanity” and progress littré wanted to substitute for traditional 
‘theological’ religions (208). Without such an “ideal belief,” man would 
seek only “base and facile pleasures; thus he [would] descend, little by 
little, under his civilized patina, to the moral level of the negro [and 
then] still lower” (211). Despite all Tallevaut’s admirable qualities, the 
aristocrats in the country to which he has retired think poorly of him 
and his ward (156). The physics and chemistry experiments he carries 
out in his laboratory add to the aura of mystery and evil that hovers 
over him, inducing aliette to call his residence “the alchemist’s house” 
(157).
 Feuillet’s novel was but a minor blip on the radar screen of the antin-
aturalist reaction, whose gaudiest splashes were Ferdinand brunetière’s 
Le roman naturaliste (1883), eugène-melchior de vogüé’s Roman russe 
(1886), Théodore de Wyzewa’s Nos maîtres (1887) and the assault on 
Zola’s La terre (Earth) titled “le manifeste des cinq” (The manifesto 
of the Five) (august 18, 1887, Le Figaro). yet La morte did have a far-
reaching although indirect effect on the world of letters through the role 
it played in inspiring bourget’s novel Le Disciple (The Disciple; 1889), a 
resounding success and a powerful influence on the younger generation. 
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like Feuillet, bourget had been impressed by Caro’s book on littré 
(which he reviewed in Le Parlement) and had accepted his thesis that 
positivism leads to despair (mansuy 263), but, unlike his predeces-
sor, bourget had long been an ardent advocate of positivism and had 
a sophisticated understanding of its philosophy, psychology, and ethics 
that he used to advantage in portraying the character and career of his 
counterpart to Tallevaut, the philosopher adrien Sixte.
 The story and the moral lessons of The Disciple are extremely close to 
those of Feuillet. The protagonist, robert Greslou, is a “villainous dis-
ciple” (to use bourget’s own characterization of Sabine) whose actions 
lead to the suicide of his innocent mistress of a single night, even if he 
is not legally guilty of a crime. Greslou’s confession, which makes up 
almost two-thirds of the text, is, so to speak, an enormous expansion 
of the confrontation scene between teacher and pupil in La morte, in 
which the young man strives, like his model, to throw all the blame 
for his misdeeds onto his teacher by demonstrating that they were the 
direct result of the positivist doctrine that forms the nucleus of the men-
tor’s identity. as with the commission of the crime, here too bourget 
mitigates both the pupil’s allegations and their impact on the educator: 
Greslou looks to his confession for absolution from guilt, where Sabine 
took a vicious pleasure in turning her tutor’s own philosophy against 
him; Sixte’s self-assurance is shattered, but he is left to contemplate 
his future, while Tallevaut pays with his life. in both cases, however, 
teacher and doctrine are made to bear a heavy load of responsibility: 
that is, both novels constitute indictments of the ideological justification 
of republican educational policies. in sum, the resemblances between 
the two are so striking, and the differences are so clearly adumbrated in 
bourget’s review of the earlier work, there can be little doubt that the 
master’s text served as an essential intertext for the disciple’s novel.
 bourget’s admiration for Feuillet and the spiritualist lesson of La 
morte, made evident in his defense of it as a legitimate ‘novel of ideas’ 
rather than a ‘thesis novel,’ only underlined his dissatisfaction with the 
weak connection the author constructed between the story and its mes-
sage. both bourget and lemaître protest in their reviews that Feuillet 
has not convinced them of the necessary link between Sabine’s positivist 
upbringing and her crimes, and they wonder whether another type of 
education might not have produced similar results (bourget, “réflex-
ions sur Octave Feuillet” 118; lemaître, review of La morte). bourget 
goes so far as to claim that a novelist with the opposite ideology could 
easily have written a similar novel in which the Catholic girl is a mate-
rialist and a criminal, the freethinker pure and devoted (“réflexions” 
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120). no doubt disturbed by his own imaginings, he pinpoints what 
he takes to be the reason for Feuillet’s artistic failings and suggests a 
remedy for them. The problem, as bourget sees it, is that the author has 
departed from the method of careful psychological analysis he had used 
so successfully in earlier novels such as M. de Camors to provide con-
vincing evidence of the general principle he wanted to illustrate, if not 
demonstrate, through his story. in short, there should be an undeniable 
relation between the principles Feuillet is defending and their alleged 
consequences, and the author should have supplied a whole series of 
‘small human details’ to make the development of her thought seem 
inevitable (120).
 in The Disciple bourget strives to do just that, in the form of the 
lengthy confession Greslou writes while in prison awaiting his trial. 
in order to prove his theorem, or hypothesis, as he prefers to call it, 
the writer must give the reader a view of the internal development of 
the disciple’s ideas and feelings sufficient to show the effects of the 
character’s education on his desires, beliefs, and behavior. The factor 
lacking in the Feuillet novel that bourget is most exercised to furnish is 
the relation between education and the formation of identity.
 in La morte, that relation is simplistic: Despite Feuillet’s professed 
belief in freedom of the will, he represents education as a mechanical 
process of imprinting, in which identity is automatically stamped onto 
the person once and for all. in contrast to Feuillet’s emphasis on the end 
results of his characters’ upbringing, bourget focuses on the dynamic 
processes that shape his characters’ personalities and give rise to their 
actions. The lives of his main characters are changed by their youth-
ful educational experiences, both reflect on the nature and practice of 
education, and both are themselves educators by profession—Sixte, the 
scholar who acts as (anti)spiritual guide to Greslou, then, by exten-
sion, to the youth of France; and the disciple himself, who is as much 
a teacher as a pupil, for he not only becomes the tutor of the young 
lucien de Jussat, but also undertakes the sentimental education of his 
eventual victim, Charlotte. Where Feuillet treats his characters’ identi-
ties like inanimate objects, bourget narrates the many ‘small human 
details’ that constitute their family life, their upbringing, and both their 
formal and informal educations, and he structures his entire text around 
the moments of crisis in their lives in which their identities are thrown 
into jeopardy.
 in good balzacian fashion, then, the text alternates between detailed 
accounts of the characters’ past histories and dramatic scenes in which 
radical transformations in their lives become the pretexts for soul- 
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searching self-analyses. The story opens with the disruption of Sixte’s 
rigid daily routine, a disturbance that provokes a stupor in the shopkeep-
ers of the latin Quarter similar to the sense of an impending upheaval 
in the civilized world produced in the inhabitants of Koenigsberg when 
Kant changed the path of his daily walk upon hearing news of the out-
break of the French revolution. The obvious disproportion between 
Kant’s concern for the world-historic event of the revolution and Sixte’s 
fear for his own well-being when called before the magistrate investigat-
ing the death of Charlotte de Jussat, combined with the description of 
the fanatical regularity of Sixte’s comings and goings, his inability to 
deal with the realities of everyday life, and his withdrawal from normal 
human relationships, creates a mock-epic tone that continues the satiri-
cal tradition of the unworldly professor seen in the writings of alphonse 
Karr, Champfleury, or vallès. but just as Sixte’s life is interrupted by the 
series of events that triggered Charlotte de Jussat’s suicide, so the ironic 
style gives way to the serious tone of drama, if not of tragedy. The visit 
of Greslou’s mother, Sixte’s reading of the young man’s “memoir,” and 
the ensuing trial all force the philosopher to call into question, in a way 
Tallevaut never does, the validity of the credo around which he has built 
his entire life. in similar fashion, Greslou introduces his “monograph on 
the present state of [his] self ” by explaining that “the crisis from which 
[he] suffer[s]” is a kind of geometric resultant of a series of vectors: 
his parental heredity, his childhood environment, and his stint as tutor 
in the unaccustomed aristocratic milieu of the Jussat household (93),1 
which brought him into contact with his antithesis, Count andré, the 
military officer who is the older brother of his pupil, and with their sis-
ter, Charlotte, the young woman he sets out to seduce. This transplanta-
tion, as he calls it, throws him into a turmoil that stretches the fibers of 
his being in ways his early life never had.
 as we know, bourget had already meditated on the themes of edu-
cation and identity in his Essais, particularly in relation to the power 
of literature. Commenting on the author’s childhood enthusiasm for 
reading fiction, michel mansuy remarks that he was destined to become 
one of vallès’s victims of the book (mansuy, Un moderne 14). however 
that may be, there is no doubt that bourget had read vallès’s famous 
article, since he refers to Les réfractaires, in which it was republished, in 
a footnote to his essay on the Goncourts. it is therefore quite likely that 
bourget’s theory of literature as a potent rival of formal education in 
shaping the self derived as much from vallès’s piece as from the writer’s 
personal experience. likewise, his emphasis on these themes in his novel 
seems to be modeled in part after the first two books of the vingtras 
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trilogy, for which he expressed his admiration in reviews appearing in 
the journal Parlement (mansuy 262, 265) and again in the essay on the 
Goncourt brothers, where he praises L’enfant (The Child) and Le bach-
elier (The High School Graduate) for their accurate description of stu-
dent mentality during the Second empire. in The Disciple itself, he has 
Greslou recall vingtras along with Julien Sorel (the hero of Stendhal’s 
The Red and the Black [1830]) and lucien de rubempré (protagonist of 
balzac’s trilogy Lost Illusions [1835–1843]), when he is about to present 
himself for the first time in the Jussat household.
 in fact, bourget had held vallès in high esteem since their first meet-
ing during the Commune, with which the future monarchist strongly 
sympathized as an eighteen-year-old student at the Collège Sainte-barbe 
(mansuy 114–15, 265 n23). The most fateful encounter between the 
two writers, however—one that had profoundly troubling effects on 
both the men and their fiction—may never have taken place in reality 
but only in the repercussions in the real world of their theories of the 
power of literature to shape identity. in the original 1862 version of 
vallès’s article “victimes du livre,” the author states: “every murderer 
in a frock coat, every suicide in a worker’s smock, victim of the book”; 
and he declares that women who killed their husbands or children were 
inspired by reading novels (bellet 190). but when, in 1866, the defense 
lawyer of two men who had murdered an old lady not only made the 
same argument but cited this very article in support, vallès was aghast 
at the power being attributed to his own literary construct—the theory 
of the causative force of the literary. Unwilling to shoulder the burden 
of responsibility for the crimes, in an article published in L’Événement 
on February 26, 1866, he jeered at the claim that their act had been 
inspired by their reading of a serial novel, and he decided to omit the 
offending passage from the Réfractaires version (bellet 191). bellet gives 
evidence that although vallès never formally repudiated his theory, the 
question of the relation between reading and crime always continued to 
haunt him (190, 191).
 Did bourget know the earlier version of vallès’s article? had he read 
the subsequent retraction in L’Événement? it is impossible to answer 
these questions without having access to bourget’s private papers. What 
is certain, however, is that a decade later something very similar hap-
pened to bourget, but in this instance the writer was much more deeply 
implicated than vallès had been. On January 25, 1888, a twenty-two-
year-old law student named henri Chambige was found unconscious 
in a villa near Constantine, algeria, with two bullet holes in his cheek. 
his mistress, mme. Grille, a thirty-year-old married woman from a rich 
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and well-connected Protestant family, lay nearby with several gunshot 
wounds to the temple. he survived, but she did not. at his interroga-
tion, he declared that having decided to end their lives together, he had 
shot her and then himself. While in prison awaiting trial on charges 
of murder, Chambige wrote a long confession recounting his past and 
indulging in minute self-analysis. in the fall of 1888, when the case 
came to trial, the proceedings were widely reported in the Parisian press. 
a multitude of commentaries about the sensational case appeared, start-
ing with the reflections of andré bataille, the legal reporter for Le Figaro 
and a colleague of bourget’s, on the court sessions and the wider impli-
cations of the affair in that paper’s editions of november 2 and 8. as it 
became known that Chambige had had literary ambitions and that he 
was an amateur of contemporary philosophy and psychology, conser-
vative and Opportunist republican journalists had a field day with the 
affair, laying the responsibility for the tragedy directly at the doorstep of 
“decadent” literature in general, and bourget in particular. On novem-
ber 7 and 8, a journalist named Paul bluysen penned a two-part article 
in La République Française titled “Un drame décadent” (a Decadent 
Drama), in which he explained that the events were decadent because 
the killer had committed “a literary crime . . . in his capacity as a disciple 
of Schopenhauer, herbert Spencer, Stendhal and a few contemporary 
past masters in analyses of cruel enigmas whose names you can guess.” 
in case the allusion to bourget’s most famous novel at the time was not 
clear enough, later in the article bluysen mentions the author by name 
and speaks of andré Cornélis (the eponymous protagonist of a lesser-
known work by bourget) and Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s raskolnikov as 
possible inspirations for the crime.
 This was only the first of a veritable explosion of articles about the 
literary dimension of the affair. maître Trarieux, the public prosecutor 
in the Chambige case, attacked the creators of Werther, Julien Sorel, 
and especially raskolnikov in his speech for the prosecution as well as 
in his article “l’affaire Chambige” (The Chambige Case), in the Gazette 
des Tribunaux of november 9, 1888: a few lofty spirits armed with 
especially robust willpower may be capable of entertaining “certain” 
philosophical doctrines (i.e., atheism), but for the great mass of weak 
mortals, such ideas are noxious. Two young writers soon destined to 
become heavy hitters weighed in on opposite sides of the controversy a 
few days later. no doubt feeling himself under attack due to the obvious 
similarities between Chambige’s explanation of his actions and the tenets 
of Philippe, the hero of his recently published Sous l’oeil des barbares 
(Under the Barbarians’ Eyes), barrès showed considerable sympathy for 
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the young man’s attitudes and actions, such as his disdain for the ordi-
nary laws of life, his ‘experimentation’ with the outside world—beauti-
ful scenery, science, women—the cultivation of his inner emotions, and 
his easy acceptance of death (see Carassus 116). barrès was willing to 
concede that the heightened sensibility that led to the crime was indeed 
inspired by high literature, but, he claimed, Chambige had ignored the 
remedy his masters taught in those same works—the power of “splitting 
oneself in two,” of distancing oneself from one’s feelings. like scientists 
working with dangerous substances, sensitivity makers should not let 
their experiments loose in the world (“la sensibilité d’henri Chambige” 
[henri Chambige’s Sensitivity]).
 The same day, anatole France took up the conservative cudgels in his 
piece for Le Temps, “Un crime littéraire—l’affaire Chambige,” arguing 
that Chambige was especially despicable for trying to glorify his crime 
by draping it in the aura of literature. “Wretched, wretched, wretched 
man,” he exclaimed, “the muses are always innocent.” La République 
Française returned to the charge with an anonymous article the fol-
lowing day, “le crime littéraire” (The literary Crime; november 12), 
attributing responsibility for the crime to the “nihilism” of contem-
porary decadent literature. The republican newspaper followed up this 
attack on november 13 with a response to barrès from an influential 
Opportunist deputy, Dionys Ordinaire, who heartily mocks ‘psychol-
ogy’ and wonders rhetorically whether in future the words ‘vice’ and 
‘virtue’ will have lost their meaning. (One wonders whether he had read 
the introduction to Taine’s History of English Literature or Zola’s preface 
to Thérèse Raquin.) The legislator launches a direct attack on barrès and 
the ‘literary school’ he represents for encouraging the young to wrap 
themselves in their self, to make it a ‘citadel’ of individual enjoyment 
and selfish pleasures. For Ordinaire the Gambettist, as for the other 
republican writers, Chambige was merely another victim; the ultimate 
responsibility for the crime rested with the literary school of bourget 
and barrès. if ever there was a “victim of the book” in the eyes of the 
public of 1888, Chambige was it.
 in making this argument, Ordinaire was simply continuing a debate 
about the evils of pessimism and decadence that he and Francisque Sar-
cey, the most noted theater critic of the times and a staunch supporter 
of the Opportunist line, had engaged against bourget and company in 
1885, when the novelist vaulted to the forefront of the european liter-
ary scene with the enormous success of Cruelle énigme. Citing the grow-
ing popularity of Schopenhauer and eduard von hartmann in French 
intellectual circles, the publication of henri amiel’s Journal (Diary) 
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and Joris-Karl huysmans’s A rebours (Against the Grain) in 1884, and 
that of Guy de maupassant’s Bel Ami, Édouard rod’s La course à la 
mort (Race to the Death) and Cruelle énigme in 1885, both had warned 
that the spread of pessimism was corrupting the youth of France, both 
had accused bourget of leading the decadent pack with his Essais and 
his latest novel, and both had asserted that there was in fact nothing 
to worry about now that the Third republic had brought democracy 
and prosperity to the land (mansuy 401–3)! The political background 
of this controversy was the growing disarray of the republic, suffering 
from a series of economic crises and, with the fall of Ferry’s ministry in 
1885, the appearance of such great governmental instability that many 
Opportunists shared the sentiments of Paul Cambon, a close friend of 
Ferry, who wrote that year to his wife that he feared the republic had 
less than a year to live (letter quoted in J.-m. mayeur, Vie politique 120). 
it was this atmosphere that gave rise that same year to the phenomenon 
of boulangism. The worst fears of the republicans seemed on the verge 
of being materialized in 1888, when General boulanger, the minister of 
war whose political movement threatened to topple the Third republic, 
won election after election throughout the country. This, then, was a 
political as much as a literary battle, whose subtext was the ongoing dis-
pute over the educational policies of the republic. Ordinaire was quick 
to claim the Chambige case as a direct corroboration of his accusations 
against one of the most vocal opponents of the regime, the decadent 
‘literary school,’ and therefore as a victory for Opportunist educational 
ideology.
 incredible as it may seem in light of the far-reaching similarities 
between the stories and mentalities of Chambige and robert Greslou 
(mansuy 481–88), as between the ideological disputes surrounding the 
case and those enshrined in the novel, in his preface to The Disciple 
bourget denied that this affair had any influence on his conception of 
the work, and he continued to do so until his death (see autin 37–38; 
mansuy 488). he insisted instead that the idea of The Disciple was sug-
gested to him by what Le Petit Journal called at the time “the mystery 
of the rue Poliveau,” otherwise known as the barré-lebiez case, which 
had occurred some ten years earlier. On april 6, 1878, two packages 
were discovered in the room of a medical student named lebiez on the 
rue Poliveau, each one containing an arm and a leg from a woman’s 
body. it turned out that lebiez and his good friend barré, desperate for 
money, had murdered a dairywoman and stolen her securities on march 
23. barré, clerk in a notary’s office, had crushed her head with a ham-
mer blow and later cashed in the securities. The medical student had cut 
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up her body. The two murderers were given the death penalty in July 
and were executed September 7 of that year. What interested bourget 
about the case and had fascinated the public at the time was the fact 
that the two offenders both came from ‘good’ families, both had their 
baccalaureate degrees—a mark of distinction in those days—and had 
been brilliant students at the lycée in angers they had attended together. 
between the discovery of the body and the identification of the victim 
and the murderers, lebiez gave a public speech in a hall on the rue 
d’assas titled “Darwinism and the Church,” in which he explained the 
theory of the survival of the fittest and applied it to human societies, 
arguing that in life the stronger has the right to ‘Caesarize,’ that is, in 
the political parlance left over from the days of the Second empire, to 
dominate the weaker (see autin, chap. 4, and Frandon, “Fait divers et 
littérature,” for accounts of the affair and references to sources pub-
lished at the time of the events). albert autin, an ardent fan of bourget 
in the latter’s Catholic monarchist period, summarizes the tenor of the 
speech as substituting the “law of the jungle” for the “ancient morality 
of fraternal charity” (50). The scholar adds that lebiez repeated the 
same argument during the trial, using science to justify his crime (50).
 a more recent occurrence may very well have formed a bridge 
between the two cases in bourget’s mind. in 1886, the same year in 
which de vogüé’s influential studies of the russian novel were pub-
lished in book form, barrès wrote an article for La Revue Illustrée titled 
“la mode russe” (The russian Craze), in which he calls barré and leb-
iez “Darwinist murderers” who justified their crime “on scientific prin-
ciples” and compares them to raskolnikov, who of course used Darwin 
to construct his own theory of the right to kill the old pawnbroker in 
Crime and Punishment (barrès, “la mode russe” 125). The link barrès 
establishes among barré-lebiez, Darwin, and raskolnikov does suggest 
a path that opponents of the Opportunists could later follow in order 
to put a rhetorical spin on Chambige’s act radically different from that 
of maître Trarieux and Ordinaire. both groups invoke raskolnikov for 
obvious reasons, but one sees him as the scion of the antisocial prin-
ciples of romanticism and its nietzschean sequel, the other as the natu-
ral offspring of science in its social Darwinian form. instead of reading 
Chambige’s crime as the result of antirepublican decadent literature, 
they could parse it, as in fact bourget would do in his novel, as the 
consequence of the republic’s own positivist doctrine.
 nevertheless, it is obvious that the barré-lebiez story lacks many of 
the distinctive traits of similarity between the Chambige affair and The 
Disciple, above all the seduction of a forbidden woman, the love-death 
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pact that motivates the killing, the hero’s literary ambitions, the confes-
sion he writes in prison, the visits of pupil to master, not to mention 
the evident differences in the presence of two murderers, the brutality of 
the crime, and the public speech. mansuy implies that bourget wanted 
to avoid the shame of appearing to capitalize on the sensationalist press 
reports of a criminal case (488–89), but then why admit that the idea 
for the novel was stimulated by another, equally sensational case? it 
would seem much more likely that bourget disavowed his preoccupa-
tion with the Chambige affair because he was loath to divulge the extent 
of his personal involvement with the young man and the traumatic 
effect it had on his life.
 according to all the evidence, news of Chambige’s crime fell on 
the writer’s head like a bolt out of the blue, disrupting his life just 
as Greslou’s indictment and confession did to Sixte. bourget returned 
from italy toward the end of September 1888 with the manuscript for 
his latest novel, Cosmopolis, well under way (mansuy 467). yet when 
press coverage of the Chambige affair picked up in anticipation of the 
trial, he immediately dropped that project and started work on the new 
manuscript that would become The Disciple. There is good reason to 
believe that bourget’s sudden change of direction was motivated by his 
sense of complicity in—if not responsibility for—Chambige’s offense. 
For the fact is that bourget knew him quite well before the criminal 
case, precisely in the role of master to disciple. like Greslou with Sixte, 
the young man had come to see him several times while a student in 
Paris a few years before, to submit articles and stories to him and to 
discuss his plans to write psychological novels under bourget’s inspira-
tion (a. bataille viii; cited in mansuy 482). and, like Sixte, bourget’s 
first reaction when he was publicly accused of being the instigator of 
Chambige’s crime was to deny all responsibility for it. in words that 
echo those of vallès a decade earlier, bourget wrote that literature can 
have a detrimental impact only on those readers who already suffer from 
some moral defect (bataille ix; cited in mansuy 484 n61).
 in fact, the novel was first titled Adrien Sixte in September of 1888 
and was supposed to describe the philosopher’s impressions of the crim-
inal and the effect on the older man of seeing the impotence of science 
to console the prisoner faced with death. This was basically the posi-
tion bourget found himself in during the fall of 1888. but after reading 
Chambige’s confessions—presumably in bataille’s Causes criminelles—
bourget had a change of heart. no doubt, again like Sixte, he now 
understood that his influence on the student had been much greater 
than what he had been willing to admit, to others or to himself, when 
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he first read about it in the newspapers. he more or less confesses as 
much when he has Sixte read a nasty newspaper article that strangely 
echoes the reproaches made against himself and barrès in reaction to 
the Chambige case. it condemns “modern phlosophy and its doctrines, 
incarnated in adrien Sixte and in several other savants,” and makes 
Greslou’s fate an example of the evils of decadent literature (The Disciple 
313). as a result, in February 1889 bourget changed the title of his 
book, shifted its emphasis to Greslou, and greatly expanded the latter’s 
memoir, filling it with details from his own life to amplify and disguise 
those of Chambige’s.
 For bourget had been going through an upheaval of his own that 
must have made him especially sensitive to the student’s predicament. 
after his father died suddenly in august of 1887, bourget began to flirt 
seriously with a return to the religious faith of his youth (mansuy 443–
45). at the same time, he broke off relations with marie, the woman he 
desperately loved and against whom he had frequently raged, who had 
deceived him once again with another man. extricating himself from 
her milieu of Jewish high finance, from which he had long felt a sense 
of alienation, may have recalled his experiences as a young tutor in the 
family of a rich jeweler and the fantasies he then formed of seducing the 
fourteen-year-old sister of his pupil. This project would have satisfied 
his sexual longing, his rise from his subaltern position in the family, and 
the overcoming of his sense of isolation through incorporation into the 
otherwise indifferent or hostile milieu in which he found himself (man-
suy 166–67).
 Was it due to the reactivation of these forbidden desires that bourget 
recognized himself in Chambige? Was it the resulting sense of respon-
sibility for the latter’s crime that led him to begin at that time to ques-
tion the moral responsibility of the writer? in any case, in “To a young 
man,” the prefatory essay to The Disciple, the writer announces that any 
man of letters should “tremble with responsibility” at the idea that the 
future moral life of the nation depends on what his young readers find 
in his books, and he proclaims that this text is “the study of one of these 
responsibilities” (vii).
 as a result of these upheavals, bourget came to make Greslou as 
much a part of himself as Sixte. as though to indicate the underly-
ing identity of the two characters, bourget took the original first name 
of the younger man, adrien, and bestowed it upon the philosopher 
(whose name in the earliest notes was to be Firmin vialle; mansuy 
531–32). Sixte and Greslou became a concrete example of the theory 
of the divided self about which they speculated in the text and which 
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Taine, ribot, barrès, and bourget himself did so much to popularize 
in the latter years of the century. each represents a facet of the author’s 
psyche, as is shown by the ample borrowings from his own life bourget 
used to describe their lives and personalities, but their combination does 
not add up to the unified self that was bourget’s ideal. On the contrary, 
the shock of the Chambige affair, the eruption of the incomprehensible 
real into the seemingly calm surface of the Symbolic, forced the writer 
to confront the fissures in his own self, which he then assimilated to 
those of the nation, as he insinuates in “To a young man”: “[y]our 
moral life is the moral life of France itself ” (vii).
Experimental Education: 
The Personality under Siege
in this novel of transition, the focal point is not so much the question of 
the alleged dangers of science for morality, as it was in Feuillet’s text and 
in the most vocal critical controversy in the contemporary press, that 
between brunetière and anatole France.2 in The Disciple, the emphasis 
has shifted from the relation of science to morals per se to what bourget 
had called in his Essais “the personality under siege” by education: that 
is, the traumatic effect of the secularization of education on individual 
and national identity. it is the fear of disruption more than corruption 
that haunts bourget’s representation of the perilous process of reeducat-
ing the members of an entire nation to experience themselves as rational 
citizens with specific rights and duties first, as members of their village, 
clan, social class, or church second. The Disciple is thus worthy of criti-
cal attention due to its exploration, through its structure, its narrative 
technique, and its ideology, of the trauma allegedly created, on educa-
tors and educated alike, by the inculcation of the system of independent 
morality based on universal rationalist principles.
 bourget’s concentration on crises of identity was not, therefore, a 
simple matter of pumping up the theme he found in La morte by apply-
ing to it the technique of the “psychological novel.” infusing the stan-
dard reactionary critique of republican moral principles with vallès’s 
acute sensitivity to the havoc republican education might wreak on the 
citizen’s sense of self, on every level The Disciple transmits the experi-
ence of violent upheaval. The turmoil in bourget’s personal and profes-
sional life reverberates through the abrupt swings in the protagonist, 
from routine to crisis, from theory to practice, from innocence to guilt, 
from conviction to uncertainty, and, in the text as a whole, through the 
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jumps from satire to drama, from third-person narration to first-person 
memoir, from Sixte to Greslou, from the freethinking Parisian university 
to the provincial Catholic nobility. The basic rhythm of the novel like-
wise consists of placid stretches of routine calm punctuated by sudden 
moments of feverish excitement.
 as for the technique of narrating an accumulation of myriad “small 
human details,” it is not merely a spiritualizing adaptation of naturalist 
technique to the depiction of the causes of the inner life of thought and 
emotion, and it is more than a procedure for describing gradual devel-
opmental processes. regardless of specific content, in itself the method 
signifies a primary concern for the concrete particularities of human 
life. bourget’s novel begins and ends with third-person narrations that 
pose the problem and then draw, if not claim to prove, general con-
clusions from the ‘empirical evidence’ presented in the middle section, 
composed of Greslou’s first-person memoir. a demonstration in action 
of an inductive theory of the subject,3 it thus constitutes an edifying 
narrative in the empiricist mode.
 The conflict between the inductive and deductive modes of proce-
dure, which formed the crux of bourget’s ongoing debate about the the-
sis novel (in his essay on the Goncourts and his review of La morte, as 
well as in later writings), is in fact thematized in the two main characters 
of the novel, Sixte and Greslou, as well as in its structure. The dividing 
line between master and pupil is no longer that of two equally possible 
interpretations of the conduct to be derived from the same doctrine—
the one idealistic, the other materialistic, as in Feuillet’s Tallevaut and 
Sabine—but rather, as in the conservative philosophies of the later Taine 
and bourget’s contemporaries, boutroux and bergson: that between 
the one who dwells in a purely theoretical realm of abstractions, cut 
off from social relations and practical experience, and the other who, in 
attempting to live by the teacher’s general principles, brings them into 
acute conflict with the realities of concrete particularity. Sixte’s single-
minded devotion to his education as a youth, followed by his fanatical 
reduction of life in his maturity to the sole activity of thought, isolates 
him from human association and real experience, “predispos[ing] him 
to misread philosophical propositions as if they were identical with the 
complex realities of human life” (ringer 129). even though the narrator 
compares Sixte at one point to littré, the “lay Saint” (The Disciple 29), 
unlike Tallevaut, bourget’s philosopher is neither a laboratory scientist 
nor a practicing physician. bourget emphasizes this distinction by enti-
tling the first chapter of the novel, in which Sixte is presented, “a mod-
ern Philosopher,” not “a modern Scientist.” The narrator repeatedly 
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refers to him as a “metaphysician” (12); a “great abstract intellect” (67); 
one of those “singular minds” for whom “it is abstraction which is real-
ity, and the daily reality is only a shadow” (35); one of those “general-
izing minds, that never more than half verify the ideas upon which they 
speculate” (72). in a note dictated to his wife, bourget insisted that this 
disregard for practical realities was the most important characteristic of 
his philosopher (mansuy 498 n101, and 496 n95).
 Why, then, did even the best-informed readers, such as brunetière 
and France, invariably interpret the novel as an attack on science, and 
on positivism in particular? in one sense the answer is obvious: in the 
opening portrait of the philosopher, bourget links Sixte’s ideas—mecha-
nism, determinism, evolution, atheism, the divided self of ‘experimental 
psychology,’ the rejection of metaphysics even, despite calling Sixte a 
‘metaphysician’ elsewhere—directly to those of Taine, ribot, Spencer, 
and littré, and behind them to Kant, who denies the possibility of 
theoretical knowledge of God, and to Spinoza’s ethics of the individual’s 
submission to the universal order of things. Sixte recalls these same 
doctrines when, in the final sections of the book, he agonizes over the 
possibility that he and his teachings might somehow be responsible for 
Greslou’s evil deeds (318). moreover, bourget makes the connection 
between republican positivism and moral deterioration quite explicit in 
his preface to the novel. Starting from renan’s premise that universal 
suffrage is the “most monstrous and the most iniquitous of tyrannies” 
because based on the brute force of numbers (The Disciple x), he divides 
those who lack “ideals” into two groups: the cynical ‘nihilist’ intent 
upon success at all costs, who has borrowed from contemporary evolu-
tionary theory (“the natural philosophy of the times” xiii) the ‘law’ of 
the struggle for life (“la concurrence vitale” xiii); and the refined intellec-
tual epicurean, who, lacking all belief in religion or anything else except 
his own sensations, thinks of the ‘human soul’ as a mere ‘mechanism’ 
(xiv). indeed, the whole purpose of writing the book was to bring to 
light the villainy hidden beneath the total selfishness of this second type, 
among whom he counts all young people at some point in their lives, 
himself included (xiv).
 The guilty parties in the preface are positivism and sophism, which 
manifest themselves in the forms of universal suffrage, social Dar-
winism, and mechanism. but it is not at all evident how these banal 
complaints of the Catholic right square with the actual events of the 
narrative. Surely the abstract rationalism bourget embodies in the per-
son and teachings of Sixte were not restricted to proponents of modern 
science or democracy. as bourget well knew, it was positivism itself that 
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objected most violently to rationalist thought, for its deductive method 
and its lack of concern for empirical observation. in fact, he has Sixte 
not only reject the revolution because it was based on a false, Cartesian 
conception of mankind, but, going even further than his model, the 
Taine of Les origines de la France contemporaine (The Origins of Contempo-
rary France), he portrays Sixte as a monarchist in the lineage of bonald 
and de maistre.
 mansuy claims that, lacking an authentic scientist to balance out the 
image of Sixte, who constructs mere “philosophical romances” (romans 
philosophiques) on the basis of unproven hypotheses, the novel remains 
ambiguous in its judgment of science. it is highly unlikely that bour-
get would have composed Greslou’s confession according to the rigor-
ous methods of positivist psychology if he had intended the book as a 
frontal attack on positivism (mansuy 499 n102). moreover, in various 
notes, the writer remarked that he never accepted limitations on scien-
tific inquiry (499 n102) and that the aim of his work was not to assert 
that science was ‘guilty,’ but that it was ‘insufficient’: The fatalistic doc-
trine of Spinozan resignation to the inevitabilities of the physical and 
psychological universes prevents science from bolstering its proponents’ 
courage and healing their emotional wounds. Only the belief in free 
will, with the consequent possibilities of repentance and redemption, 
is capable of performing that task (498–499; 499 n103; The Disciple 
312).
 This is certainly a far cry from bourget’s indictment of modern sci-
entific philosophy in his preface and a much weaker claim than those 
pressed in Feuillet’s novel: Science is not directly responsible for crimi-
nal behavior, and the value of religious belief is in overcoming guilt 
rather than in making believers moral. For mansuy, the resolution of the 
apparent contradiction between the assertions bourget made in his pref-
ace and those in his unpublished diaries is to be found in the question 
of what herbert Spencer called “the Unknowable.” From the outset, 
the text emphasizes that Sixte’s thought is distinguished from that of his 
famous positivist contemporaries by his determination to destroy, in a 
kind of ultra-Kantian critique, what he considers to be the last illusion of 
metaphysics, the notion found in Spencer that this Unknowable is real 
and living, and contains both thought and feeling: in short, that it is the 
kind of mysterious but personal God whose disappearance baudelaire 
bemoaned in his poetry, according to bourget (Essais 16–17). mansuy 
concludes that salvation for Greslou would result from an “optimistic 
interpretation of the Unknowable” (500), belief in a God who would 
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be the source of morals and who would guarantee that “the world has 
a meaning analogous to our soul” (bourget, note on The Disciple of 
november 1, 1888; cited in mansuy 500). For bourget, then, belief in 
God’s existence answers society’s practical need for order and patriotic 
action as well as the sinner’s psychological need for redemption. his 
position differs from that of most of his contemporaries in that he pro-
poses a reconciliation of science and religion, neither sacrificing science 
to religious belief, as did most of the idealists, nor denying religion in 
the name of empirical observation, as did so many positivists (mansuy 
502).
 This explanation clarifies Sixte’s reaction after reading the mem-
oir Greslou has written while in prison—guilt at his complicity in his 
disciple’s depravity, even though the same doctrines could have led to 
entirely opposite actions in another person, and a sense of impotence at 
his psychology’s inability to furnish an adequate response to Greslou’s 
cry for help (The Disciple 311). but on this account, bourget’s novel is a 
failure when judged by the criterion he himself sets up in his critique of 
La morte: that there should be an undeniable relation between the prin-
ciples the writer defends and their alleged consequences, and that the 
author should provide a whole series of “little human details” to make 
the development of the pupil seem inevitable. moreover, just as there 
is no genuine scientist in the novel, so is there no representative of true 
Catholic morality, either. Sixte is the most ethical character in the novel, 
while the apparent ‘hero’ of the book, Count andré, commits the only 
actual crime in the story: murdering Greslou in cold blood. While this 
may be considered by some to be a justifiable act of loyalty, honor, or 
revenge, one that presumably represents monarchist revanchard patrio-
tism in the political arena,4 it hardly counts as an example of the moral-
ity supposedly instilled by Christian belief.
 Faced with the ambiguity of the novel’s position on science and the 
difficulty of finding a specific model for Sixte (as opposed to a few traits 
or ideas taken from this or that philosopher, such as Taine or ribot), 
or an identifiable philosophical problem at its center, Pierre Citti finds 
a solution that takes account both of Sixte’s role and of the effect his 
teachings have on Greslou. Sixte represents an attitude rather than a 
particular doctrine, namely, the position of the intellectual (Citti 61). 
The real target of the criticism is the “man of letters,” the writer, and 
especially the esthete of the new generation, such as barrès, as bourget 
indicates more or less explicitly in his preface (Citti 61–62; The Disciple 
8–9). bourget’s aim is not to destroy the authority of the philosopher 
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or thinker, but to ensure that the latter will weigh the possible effects of 
his teachings carefully (Citti 62).
 Citti’s most telling point is that the central situation of the novel, 
Sixte reading Greslou’s confession, is the image of the older writer read-
ing his disciples’ imitations and applications of his methods of writing, 
specifically that of bourget reading Chambige’s prison confession. The 
effect of the master’s teaching has been to turn his disciple, like larcher 
(the writer in bourget’s novel Lies) and the decadent writer in general, 
into a tortured modern ‘double consciousness.’
 in echoing the reproofs directed against bourget and barrès in the 
Chambige case, Citti implies that the radical change in bourget’s liter-
ary career marked by The Disciple, which formed a turning point in the 
conception and practice of the novel of the entire period, was primar-
ily the result of authorial self-criticism and self-correction. as bourget 
complains in his Essais, it is the fragmentation of the divided self that 
undermines the identity of the younger generation and thereby renders 
its members incapable of assuming responsibility for their lives. but 
of course this notion of the self is not the sole prerogative of decadent 
literature. On the contrary, it results both from the basic tenets of the 
experimental novel of naturalism, in which the human being is the pawn 
of instinctual and environmental forces, and from the new experimental 
psychology represented by ribot in France, which forms the backbone 
of the psychological doctrine that Sixte finds so wanting in The Dis-
ciple.
 There is no necessary contradiction, then, between the interpreta-
tion of the novel as a statement about the responsibility of the writer 
and that which sees it as a critique of a certain lack of responsibility 
on the part of science. in fact, Fritz ringer combines the two when he 
asserts that “the idealized homme de lettres [evoked in bourget’s preface] 
would presumably have succeeded where the narrowly ‘academic’ scien-
tist [Sixte] was bound to fail” (129). The good writer is better equipped 
than the abstract, metaphysical psychologist to fulfill his responsibilities 
to his public, precisely because the former deals in the concrete and thus 
knows how people feel, think, and act in real life.
 This reconciliation is tenable, however, only if we assume that bour-
get is tarring both realist fiction and positivist psychology with the same 
brush: he blames the tendency toward abstraction for the lack of moral 
responsibility found in both. as a matter of fact, critics from brunetière 
to the present have indeed lauded or lambasted The Disciple for reintro-
ducing morality into French fiction, in opposition to the reign of the 
morally neutral art for art’s sake and naturalist movements, with their 
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principles of objective observation and narration (cf. Wyzewa’s intro-
duction to the 1908 edition of Le disciple; autin; Citti; loué). in real-
ity, morality had always been the centerfold of mainstream, bourgeois 
fiction, and literary criticism during the Second empire (hauser 67). 
nevertheless, bourget did make morality respectable once again in high 
literature, by clothing Feuillet’s middlebrow writing with a veneer of 
patriotism and then wedding it to a clever interrogation of the philo-
sophical and social implications of the two basic tenets of the positivist 
education touted by the Opportunists as the source of morality and 
national unity—experimentation and disinterestedness. The key, then, 
is to recognize that in The Disciple bourget does not aim to incrimi-
nate science per se but the ideology of positivism (and naturalism) that 
remains independent of empirical observation.
 The central situation of the novel that Citti has isolated—the master 
reading his pupil’s application of his ideas—acts as a mise-en-abîme of 
both the writer’s relation to the public and the philosopher’s relation 
to his pupils, for, as we have seen, for bourget both are educators. For 
all their theorizing about the freedom of inquiry inherent in the experi-
mental method, their emphasis on the observable universality of the 
innate social sentiment and their polemics in favor of the pedagogy of 
experience and object lessons in the primary schools, the Opportunist 
politicians and educators never confronted head-on the relation between 
the ideology of experimentation and their own project of instituting a 
system of republican national education. in his critique of La morte, 
bourget had already formulated a definition of the novelist adopted 
from Zola’s theory of the experimental novel: “What is called a law 
in psychology or sociology is only the sum, the abstract expression of 
an experiment that is more or less extended. and what is a novel, if 
not the imagination of a human experiment?” (“réflexions” 116). his 
author of romans philosophiques in The Disciple extends that notion to the 
theory of positivist education in his replies to the magistrate investigat-
ing Greslou’s case.
 both the writer and the educator undertake experiments; the only 
difference is that the one conducts them on fictional characters in the 
realm of the imagination, while the other carries them out on real peo-
ple in real life. Sixte completes his theory of education by combining 
the positivist ideas of the child as tabula rasa and morality as a set of 
conventions arising from social need rather than a rational or transcen-
dent principle, with the early Taine’s claim that vices and virtues are sim-
ply the results of certain psychological laws. The logical conclusion is 
that we ought to run experiments with childen, varying the conditions 
    ~   C h A p t e r  
of their upbringing in order to discover those that will nourish the 
socially advantageous dispositions we call virtues and those that will 
eliminate the socially damaging tendencies we call vices. Unfortunately, 
it is unlikely that such experiments would be allowed (The Disciple 
58–60; the english translation consistently gives “experience” for the 
French expérience, a misleading rendition at best).
 experimenting on children may seem unworkable to the bookish 
philosopher and unthinkable to the virtuous reader, but those are the 
very words his more enterprising disciple echoed in describing the proj-
ect he undertook with the young Charlotte de Jussat. The action that 
motivates his anguished appeal for absolution from his master consists, 
he writes, of “the cold resolution . . . to seduce that child . . . from 
the pleasure of governing a living soul” (173; translation modified), 
a plan he later describes as “the programme of the experiment [expéri-
ence] which i proposed to attempt upon the mind of mlle. de Jussat” 
(187; translation modified). although his official task is to act as tutor 
to Charlotte’s ten-year-old brother, lucien, Greslou spends much of his 
time educating the girl’s sensibilities and stimulating her desire, first 
by telling her “a long, touching romance of false confidences” (188) 
devised according to the principles of Spinoza, ribot, and Sixte, then 
by reading balzac’s Eugénie Grandet aloud to her (and her family). he 
administers the coup de grâce by drawing up a list of other novels for 
her to read, based on his own fascination with books that satisfied his 
desire to assimilate emotions not yet experienced in life, as well as on 
Sixte’s theory of imitative emotion, especially in regard to literature: 
“the literary mind . . . this unconscious modeling of our heart to the 
resemblance of the passions painted by the poets” (204).
 Greslou’s fault, then, lies in overstepping the bounds of the writ-
er’s thought experiment by taking on the role of the educator. indeed, 
the tutor articulates his moment of no return in terms of the distinc-
tion between imaginary and real experimentation. in transgressing this 
boundary, Greslou commits the mistake that barrès had described in 
his article on the Chambige affair, letting his experiment loose on the 
outside world rather than containing it within his self.
 On the political level, it is thus the disciple who represents the real 
educational experiment undertaken by the Third republic, while his 
master, Sixte, represents the theoretical guidance the republic sought 
from the scientistic principles of Spinoza, Comte, Taine, ribot, and lit-
tré. it is in Greslou’s confession, therefore, that bourget formulates the 
specifics of his critique of the Opportunist reforms.
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Education as Seduction: 
‘Bestial Desire’ and the Ethics of Experimentation
as mansuy suggests, the target of bourget’s criticism was the insuf-
ficiency of scientific fatalism, but in his Memoir Greslou expresses two 
complaints against the ethics of science that, going well beyond the 
inability to provide a source of courage and redemption, strike at the 
heart of the ideology of experimentation: When applied to human 
beings, scientific objectivity becomes an excuse for callous indifference 
to the feelings and dignity of the individual, while the ethic of universal-
ity, far from liberating us from our passions, increases our enslavement 
to them.
 by the time he writes his confession, Greslou is appalled by the fact 
that he embarked on his project without loving the girl, as an intellec-
tual experiment calculated in advance to satisfy his psychological curios-
ity about the “mechanism” of passion, his desire to manipulate another 
person, and his greedy urge to acquire a new “expérience” (The Disciple 
173). “Tell me that i am not a monster,” he pleads with his mentor, 
for undertaking the seduction with no regard for his victim’s feelings 
and with no feelings of his own (293). yet when he first arrives at the 
Jussat’s house, he prides himself on his scientific goal of observing the 
members of the family and of taking apart, “cog by cog,” the mecha-
nism of their psychology, an aim he deems quite superior to the selfish 
ambition for riches and social advancement of other young men in situ-
ations similar to his, such as Julien Sorel at the rênals’ or lucien de 
rubempré at mme. de bargeton’s. Once he has decided to carry out his 
experiment, he even boasts that, like the great scientists louis Pasteur 
and Claude bernard, who vivisect laboratory animals, he will “vivisect 
at length, a human soul” (188). in short, he takes himself to be the 
model of the disinterested quest for pure knowledge and the careful 
attention to detail that define the scientific observer. When he moves 
from the stage of observation to that of experimentation, ostensibly in 
order to verify the accuracy of the psychological “laws” he has induced 
from his observations—or, more likely, has learned from his master—he 
therefore feels justified in claiming that he undertook his seduction of 
Charlotte not for personal motives but “dictated by pure reason [pures 
idées]” (210), a fact that ironically underscores the obtuseness of the 
examining magistrate and the male members of Charlotte’s family, who 
are convinced that Greslou seduced her in order to gain money and 
social status by forcing them to consent to a marriage.
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 if his experiment was not motivated by self-interest, why, then, 
does Greslou later find his actions so repugnant? Why does the lack of 
personal feelings toward his subject change from a sign of intellectual 
superiority at the beginning to the mark of base perversity at the end? 
What has provoked this complete about-face in his attitude toward sci-
entific objectivity between the time he arrives at the château and the 
time he is imprisoned? On one level, it is of course the end result of 
the experiment that arouses his horror, the simple facts of Charlotte’s 
death and his survival. behind that outcome lie the factors he considers 
responsible for his failure, the conviction that the universe is ruled by 
ineluctable laws and the attitude of scientific objectivity itself. When 
his inner voice asks him whether he has the right to treat Charlotte “as 
a simple object of [his] experiment” (236; translation modified), he 
resorts to the ‘scientific’ ethics of Spinoza and Sixte with their Darwin-
ian resonances, according to which our rights are limited only by our 
power, and which claim that in the moral world, as in the physical uni-
verse, it is a law that there are always predators and prey. in this context, 
the project of vivisecting a soul appears to be motivated by a sadistic 
lust to inflict pain and control the will of a powerless victim. indeed, as 
early as his opening portrait of Sixte, the narrator had already associated 
scientific psychology with cruelty by characterizing the latter’s method 
of critical analysis as being “keen to the point of cruelty” (24; transla-
tion modified) and remarking acerbically that the philosopher never 
gave charity, because he agreed with Spinoza’s dictum that “pity, for a 
wise man who lives according to reason, is bad and useless” (28). The 
vaunted objectivity of the scientific attitude is here equated with heart-
less unconcern at best, cold cruelty at worst; it becomes the antithesis 
of Kant’s moral law, treating people as objects and thus as mere means 
to an end, rather than as subjects, that is, as ends in themselves.
 in linking objectivity to objectification, bourget associates Greslou 
with the stock figure of the half-crazed and usually sadistic scientist 
prominent in the horror stories so widely circulated in romantic litera-
tures, as seen in characters such as Faust, Frankenstein, victor hugo’s 
Claude Frollo, and balzac’s balthazar Claës.5 Greslou’s cruel lust for 
power is demonstrated by his decision to use hypnotism in his experi-
ment, about which he learned in Sixte’s Anatomie de la volonté (Anatomy 
of the Will) as well as in ribot’s Maladies de la volonté (Maladies of the 
Will; 1883). like Faust with Gretchen, Greslou has recourse to this 
scientific equivalent of black magic in his effort to make his defenseless 
subject love him, especially in the chapter on the “singular phenomena 
of certain moral dominations” (The Disciple 192).
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 it is through his second line of attack, however, that bourget dis-
tinguishes himself from his predecessors and establishes his claim to 
originality. not only does scientific experimentation destroy rather than 
sustain human dignity, it also demolishes the very freedom it is supposed 
to guarantee. Whereas Caro, Feuillet, and the leading Catholic politi-
cians of the period contended that the lack of a transcendent guarantor 
of morality would leave society unprotected against the evil ‘instincts’ of 
the individual, bourget strives to demonstrate that this lack leaves the 
individual unprotected from his own worst impulses. Whereas Sabine 
revels in her lust and desire for power, Greslou is horrified by the pres-
ence of these urges in himself and looks to science to quell this enemy 
within his self.
 For Greslou’s sense of self-loathing does not originate in the qualms 
he eventually begins to feel when he is sure that before long Charlotte 
will yield to his seduction; they are a repetition of powerful emotions 
he had already experienced well before he undertook his experiment. 
in his seventeenth year, robert “ceased to be pure” (134), seduced 
by a working-class woman of thirty named marianne who was often 
called to his home to perform household tasks. This first sexual experi-
ence awakens “an inexpressible disgust” in the formerly pious boy, who 
has lost his faith in the religion he learned from his mother. yet he is 
unable to protect himself from “the shame of a new fall into the abyss 
of the senses” (135), at which time he experiences “a beastly frenzy” 
followed each time by the same “mortal disgust” (136). now he dis-
covers, alongside the pious boy and the imaginative dreamer within 
himself, a third personality, “a sensual being, tormented by the basest 
desires [bassement brutaux]” (134). and now he finds himself engaged 
in a violent struggle against ‘temptation,’ but no matter how hard he 
tries to resist marianne’s image, he always succumbs to the strength of 
his desire (136–37). in this painful initiation into adult sexuality, it is 
neither his self-interest nor his lack of sympathy for human suffering 
that arouses robert’s self-hatred but a more formidable adversary, his 
‘bestial’ desire (loué 50). (Unfortunately, the prudish english transla-
tion simply omits two pages of French text [135–36] in which Greslou 
describes in graphic detail his sexual initiation, his repeated inability to 
resist sensual temptation, and the powerful feelings these experiences 
arouse within him. all translations in this paragraph without page refer-
ences are therefore my own.)
 not until robert enters philosophy class in his last year of high 
school and discovers Sixte’s scientific psychology does he find a remedy 
for his disgust with himself. in Sixte’s Theory of the Passions, he learns 
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that his relapses into sensuality, like everything in life, are the necessary 
result of ineluctable laws of nature. Scientific knowledge becomes the 
liberating force that saves him from his feelings of “remorse so severe” 
(141). more specifically, it is the conviction that his individual experi-
ence could not have been other than it was, and that, in general, par-
ticular events are governed by universal laws, which eases his conscience 
and allows him to feel at one with himself and the rest of humanity.
 it is not surprising, then, that the same inner conflict should be 
provoked when he begins to realize that his experiment with Charlotte 
threatens to unleash the ‘impure animal’ within him once again. in striv-
ing to manipulate her by educating her desire, Greslou in fact falls prey 
to the vagaries of what the psychoanalyst would call countertransfer-
ence, for scarcely has he launched his experiment than he finds himself 
responding to the girl’s response to his manipulation. The loss of dis-
interestedness involved in the effort to redefine his identity is not just a 
reversion to self-interest but results in a powerful source of enjoyment.
 his original attitude of pure psychological curiosity and disinter-
estedness thus quickly gives way to one of implication in the situation 
he has initiated. at the height of his desire, robert loses the capacity 
of doubling, or looking at himself from the outside, so to speak, and 
playing a role outside his usual self, a talent on which he had prided 
himself as a means of avoiding the limiting of the self the philosophers 
call ‘determination.’ Despite his protestations of scientific detachment, 
Greslou becomes carried away, emballé, as barrès put it, apropos of 
Chambige and his experiment, and, like the sorcerer’s apprentice, once 
he begins to put his master’s lessons into practice, he can never again 
regain control of the situation or of himself. it is for that reason that, 
in complete contradiction to his repeated apologies for seducing the 
girl without loving her, Greslou reproaches himself most bitterly for 
the opposite, for having been unable to maintain his attitude of cool 
objectivity and, above all, his self-control.
 nor is it surprising that, as with marianne earlier, robert should 
turn to the scientific teachings of his mentor in the frantic attempt to 
shield himself from his sense of self-disgust. The two situations are not 
entirely comparable, however, for this time he looks to science not to 
justify the existence of his desire but rather to quell it, so that he may 
maintain his autonomy. he wants to think that “i was not in love [pris], 
that the philosopher ruled the lover, that myself . . . remained superior, 
independent and lucid” (235; translation modified). Science has taught 
him, after all, that “one ought to be able at will to direct the life of the 
soul. if he could exactly know its laws” (234). When Charlotte leaves 
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the Jussat mansion out of fear of her own love for Greslou, he desper-
ately tries to master his feelings for her and recapture the superior posi-
tion he had occupied before launching his experiment, by invoking the 
ethical teachings of Spinoza, Goethe, Taine, and of course Sixte. We can 
learn to detach ourselves from our passions by “evolving from the acci-
dents of our personal life the law which unites us to the great life of the 
universe” (246; Greslou referring to Goethe and to book 5 of Spinoza’s 
Ethics). in order to free oneself from bondage to the vicissitudes of life, 
Sixte recommends that one should “consider one’s own destiny as a 
corollary in this living geometry of nature, and as an inevitable conse-
quence of this eternal axiom whose infinite development is prolonged 
through time and space, [and] is the only principle of enfranchisement” 
(247).
 The fact that Greslou, the would-be scientist, becomes implicated in 
his own experiment indicates the impossibility of remaining objective 
when that experiment involves controlling the attitudes and feelings of 
human subjects. The disciple’s loss of disinterestedness, his surrender to 
the enemy within, functions as a critique of the Third republic’s claim 
that by applying the principles of positivism and Kantian universalism 
to educational reform, it can remain above the fray of interested parties 
struggling to assert their particular vision of morality and government. 
Without having to broach the question of the universality of secular 
morality directly, bourget succeeds in undermining the republic’s pre-
tensions to objectivity, impartiality, and universalism in its educational 
goals and policies by showing that however lofty the principles and 
intentions of the reform, once it moves from the abstract plane of theory 
to the practical world of action, it will inevitably become an interested 
party itself.
 bourget’s critique of republican education is not limited to this dem-
onstration of the inevitable loss of objectivity that ensues once it moves 
from the level of abstract principles to that of practical application. by 
focusing on the dialectic of desire between teacher and pupil, he chal-
lenges the most basic claims of the republic to provide its citizens with 
unprecedented autonomy, freedom, and self-determination. bourget’s 
choice of the plot of Greslou’s Memoir, however much influenced by 
the reality of the Chambige case, clearly indicates the accusation that 
the new education is a form of seduction. The aim of Greslou’s experi-
ment was to arouse his pupil’s desire, to make her love him, just as the 
Opportunists wanted to instill a love for the republican homeland into 
the pupils of the primary schools. in so doing, they or their representa-
tives, the schoolteachers of the new laic primary schools, must be drawn 
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into an emotional relation with the pupils they are trying to indoctri-
nate, thereby sacrificing the very autonomy the republic claims to offer 
its citizens, without being able to supply an effective means of regaining 
the freedom its own practice has forfeited.
The Enemy Within: 
Identity and the Motherland
The alien forces that threaten to take control of Greslou’s emotions and 
behavior do more than cast doubt onto his responsibility; they endan-
ger the core of his identity. in keeping with the latest developments in 
empirical psychology (which was called ‘experimental psychology’ at 
the time), the entire novel is strewn with allusions to dark powers that 
threaten to usurp control of the mind. Foremost among these Maladies 
of the Will was the current rage of hypnotism. When robert can no 
longer bear the paroxysm of suffering caused by his unsatisfied passion 
for Charlotte, he decides to commit suicide—or rather, as he puts it, he 
“hypnotizes himself ” and goes like a “sleepwalker” to the pharmacy to 
buy the fatal poison. in the ensuing pages he multiplies the fashionable 
terms designating uncanny powerlessness: he feels as though an alien 
force is operative in his mind, as though he is living a “waking dream,” 
a “lucid automatism,” and he diagnoses himself as suffering from a ner-
vous disorder similar to madness due to his “idée fixe” (266–67).
 moreover, it is not only his sexual desire that overwhelms his con-
scious intentions and governs his actions toward Charlotte; his determi-
nation to seduce her is motivated as much by his hatred of her brother 
andré as by his attraction to her, and he discerns at the bottom of that 
feeling “the probable trace of an unconscious atavism” (159). Greslou 
comes from lorraine farmer’s “blood,” while andré’s family is “of a 
pure and conquering race” (159). in attributing his hatred to uncon-
scious atavism, Greslou is espousing a system of interpretation wide-
spread in both naturalist and antinaturalist scientific, philosophical, and 
literary circles in the later years of the century. Zola, for example, who 
takes his cue from various supposedly scientific theories of heredity, 
accounts for the outbreak of violence during the miners’ strike in Germi-
nal in the same manner, and he uses the notion of atavism to rationalize 
the many stories of identity imperiled by ghosts (revenants) he models 
after hugo and the other romantics. Caro, as we have seen, couches his 
fear of the ‘hereditary ferocities’ that might overcome the moral force 
of positivism’s altruism in the same terms, as did bourget in his novel 
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Cosmopolis. as for the notion of the unconscious, Sixte and his disciple 
adopt the views of the english experimental psychologists and their 
French proponents Taine and ribot, according to whom the conscious 
will is not a faculty of the soul, as in traditional spiritualist psychology, 
but an unstable composite, the mere resultant of tendencies of which 
we remain largely unaware (cf. mansuy 493). inserting the pseudobio-
logical notion of atavism into an historical theory of the period, which 
claimed that the ancestors of the French peasantry were the peace-loving, 
bucolic Gauls, whereas the aristocracy descended from militaristic Ger-
manic invaders, bourget concocts a racialist, if not outright racist, con-
ception of class hostility to explain Greslou’s loss of control.
 With this theory, bourget rewrites the story of the ambitious young 
social climbers to whom Grelou compares himself—Julien Sorel, lucien 
de rubempré, and Jacques vingtras—and whose lives he had analyzed 
in his essay on Stendhal as a parable of nineteenth-century society: the 
young ‘plebeian’ who uses seduction as a means of penetrating the upper 
classes (Essais 319–27). in bourget’s updated right-wing version, this is 
no longer the tale of the legitimate aspirations of the new classes but, 
as in La morte, an example of the corruption of the purity of the race 
by a noxious alien invader (see borie, Mythologies de l’hérédité 197–98). 
no longer motivated by individual ambition and self-interest alone, 
in bourget’s interpretation the social climber is actually an unwitting 
revanchard, avenging the defeat of his ancestors; he is a helpless pawn 
in an age-old hereditary battle between hostile races that persists into 
the present day as the conflict of the ‘two Frances.’ On the one side, 
the virtuous nobility represented by Count andré, the true defenders of 
the homeland whose actions are motivated by honor and self-sacrifice; 
on the other, the ignoble lower classes empowered by the democratic 
principles of the republic, who act out of selfishness, envy, and base 
desire. in this narrative allegory, it is of course the women who repre-
sent the stakes of the battle, that is, the two competing versions of the 
homeland. it is certainly not by chance that robert is first seduced by a 
working-class woman driven by pure lust whose name is precisely mari-
anne, the symbol of the Third republic. her counterpart is the noble, 
pure, and innocent virgin, Charlotte, who acts out of true love.
 in turning to science for protection from his desire, Greslou is seek-
ing more than control over his emotions; he is desperately grasping at 
a life raft to save his very sense of self from the flood of unconscious 
forces he feels are about to swamp him. What he fears most is a kind 
of psychological death. For him, science was the object around which 
he had constructed his tenuous identity, the support of his existence 
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against the threat of dissolution into the void of madness. no won-
der, then, that he should take the teachings of science to task for the 
horrible failure of his experiment. behind those ideas stand the two 
paternal figures in his life, his actual father, the civil engineer who first 
initiated him into the world of scientific thinking, and then his mentor, 
Sixte, who replaced the Catholicism he had learned from his mother and 
saved him from his desire for marianne. (bourget insinuates the idea 
of Sixte’s paternity by having the gossips of his neighborhood intimate 
that Greslou is the philosopher’s illegitimate son.) For Greslou, as for 
michelet and so many other proponents of enlightenment progress, 
science represents the republican version of the patriarchal social order, 
whose primary aim should be to protect him from enslavement to the 
feminine, understood here as weakness of the will, instinctuality, uncon-
sciousness, and ultimately death. The alternative bourget proposes is an 
antidemocratic (but not yet explicitly monarchist) patriarchy that relies 
on a personal God (who is not yet the God of orthodox Catholicism), 
and whose protective strength is embodied in Count andré.
 by raising the character’s motives from the individual to the collec-
tive level, bourget gives the story a political twist (see loué 56, for a 
similar view), justifying the repression of the working classes—andré’s 
murder of robert—simultaneously as the legitimate defense of the 
honor of the noble homeland—Charlotte—and as the suppression of 
the nation’s base republican instincts—marianne. indeed, as in the new 
republican civics textbooks, bourget specifically equates the homeland 
with the mother in his preface, admonishing his young readers that, in 
twenty years’ time, “you and your brothers will hold in your hands the 
destiny of this ancient country [patrie], which is our common mother” 
(vii). While Charlotte may seem less appropriate as a maternal figure 
than the older and more experienced marianne, bourget places sufficient 
evidence in the text to allow the reader to understand that Greslou is 
trying to transfer his mother love onto the younger woman. her name, 
first of all, inevitably evokes that of the eminently maternal heroine of 
Goethe’s Werther. moreover, soon after robert’s arrival in the Jussat 
household, his pupil lucien informs the tutor that his sister has been 
asking whether he needs anything for his room. he is deeply touched 
by this mark of interest, if not affection, in a place that until then has 
seemed forbiddingly cold and utterly indifferent to his welfare, and he 
continues immediately with the thought that “i missed my mother so 
much, although i might not wish to confess it! and it was this act of 
simple politeness which made me regard mlle. de Jussat with more 
attention” (176–77; translation modified). even if one did not recall 
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that Greslou’s model, Julien Sorel, has the identical feelings when he 
learns of mme. de rênal’s motherly concern for the state of his ward-
robe, robert makes it clear that he would like Charlotte to fill the void 
left by his separation from his mother in this foreign milieu.6
 The fantasy of filling the void left by the disappearance of the 
mother—the lost object, in lacan’s terminology—forms the most 
explicit link between Greslou’s narrative and bourget’s solution to the 
tension between science and religion he sees as the source of the ‘two 
Frances.’ On the cosmic scale, it is Spencer’s Unknowable that plugs 
the noumenal gap behind the world of observable phenomena available 
to scientific investigation. in his cautions to the youthful reader of The 
Disciple, as in his piece on baudelaire, bourget raises the specter of the 
abyss, but here he lays it to rest immediately: “have the courage to 
respond to those who will tell you that beyond this ocean is emptines, 
an abyss of darkness and death; ‘you do not know that’” (xvi). Today, 
bourget protests, science recognizes that beyond its limits lies not the 
nothingness of the abyss, but the very real domain of the Unknow-
able, which forms the foundation upon which observable reality rests, 
thus reconciling the phenomenal with the noumenal. On the personal 
level, bourget indicates that belief in the reality of this Unknowable will 
preserve the life of his readers’ souls, for in the next sentence he urges 
them not to let their souls die before they themselves do. For Greslou, 
who in this respect is a small-scale model of French society, this armi-
stice between the religion of his mother and the science of his father 
could establish a peaceful and harmonious union between the warring 
maternal and paternal identifications threatening to tear his self apart. 
mansuy’s interpretation of the novel is thus vindicated, but with the 
crucial addition that, more than repentance and redemption, at stake 
is the guarantee of existence offered as a barrier against the abyss of 
psychological dissolution and death.
 in his warnings to French youth, bourget lists a second type of ideas 
dangerous to the life of their souls: those that diminish the ability to 
love. The prime example of the latter in the text is Sixte’s rationalistic 
atheism, one corollary of which is his rejection of the Christian prin-
ciple according to which the social order should be based on love. by 
doing so, Sixte argues, Christianity has opened the way for capricious 
and arbitrary rule. The political implication of this attack on love as 
social principle was no doubt clear to bourget’s contemporaries. in “le 
principe d’autorité” (The Principle of authority), an important article 
in one of the first numbers of renouvier’s neo-Kantian republican jour-
nal, La Critique Philosophique, Pillon, the coeditor, had made exactly 
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the same point. Catholicism is an authoritarian religion, fundamentally 
opposed to the concept of human rights based on reason due to its reli-
ance on charity and love as social principles (145–46, 150). basing the 
social order on a policy of love rather than on reason inevitably leads 
to inequality and unpredictability in its application, since it is the con-
tingencies of particular situations rather than established, universal law 
that govern the decisions of those who implement that policy. For the 
rationalist, love is in fact the antiprinciple par excellence.
 Greslou finds that out as he tries to fathom Charlotte’s feelings in 
order to control them. like Julien Sorel, he learns that the love he suc-
ceeds in arousing is not the result of his plans and calculations; on the 
contrary it is what Stendhal called the imprévu (unforeseeable), entirely 
spontaneous and unpredictable, beyond all rationalistic psychological 
laws. robert does not set out to stimulate the feeling of pity that acts 
as a wedge into Charlotte’s affection, nor can he control the drama of 
love and death that plays itself out within her. nor does he foresee that 
she will read his papers after he refuses to carry out their suicide pact, 
precisely because, in his rationalistic way, he reflects instead of observ-
ing. Furthermore, he realizes that she still loves him even after becom-
ing engaged to another man, not as a result of ‘analysis’ but of a sudden, 
inexplicable ‘intuition.’ he concludes that it is instinct, not the intellect, 
that rules us.
 The ideological significance of bourget’s imprévu differs, however, 
from Stendhal’s. For the author of The Red and the Black and The Char-
terhouse of Parma, in addition to indicating the limits of rationalism, it 
designates resistance to and superiority over the conformism that gov-
erns the conduct of the majority due to obedience to authority, fear of 
embarrassment, greed, self-interest, or simple lack of imagination. in 
The Disciple, as in the writings of boutroux and bergson, it signifies the 
reign of ‘instinct’ over reason, free will over determinism, the contin-
gent over the universal, and, above all, the intimation of littré’s ‘ocean 
of mystery’ beyond the ken of science, to which bourget alludes in his 
preface (10), a transcendent realm that can be plumbed only by the 
superrational power of intuition.
 in bourget’s text, there is a strict analogy between the relation of 
the subject to the Unknowable noumenon and that of the subject to 
other people. Charlotte’s thought and will are just as unfathomable to 
robert as the Unknowable is to science. The entire novel is in fact 
strewn with examples of the unknowability of the otherness of other 
people: robert’s mother does not understand him for lack of imagina-
tion; Charlotte fails to comprehend robert due to an excess of imagi-
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nation; andré and his father misunderstand Greslou’s motives because 
they judge them according to their own desires and fears; the examining 
magistrate understands neither Sixte nor Greslou because he assumes 
that everyone acts for the basest of reasons; Sixte grasps nothing of the 
magistrate’s strategies of interrogation because they do not coincide 
with his unworldly preoccupations; Sixte and mme. Greslou are com-
pletely deaf to each other’s needs and concerns, at least at the beginning 
of their encounter; and of course Sixte fails utterly to foresee his own 
influence on his would-be disciple.
 Greslou is so strongly attracted to Sixte’s theories because he sees 
in them a way out of the psychological isolation that results from the 
unknowability of the Other. The plot of the novel is meant to demon-
strate, on the contrary, that, far from providing a social bond as the pos-
itivists would have it, science condemns the subject to solitude, either 
as Sixte’s ideal and practice of cutting off all social relationships or as 
Greslou’s purely sadistic relationship with Charlotte. The predictability 
promised by the discovery of rational laws of behavior is exposed as a 
sadistic effort to coerce the will of the Other, an effort that proves to be 
illusory, moreover, since they do not really control the Other. belief in 
determinism does not liberate the subject from the desire of the Other, 
as robert hopes; it makes him even more dependent on the Other, 
because it is in reality the solipsistic attempt to understand that desire in 
terms of his own ideas, just as rationalism, according to the empiricists, 
is a futile attempt to understand independent nature in terms of the 
categories of the human mind.
 bourget’s polemic against the positivist ethic culminates in the quasi-
matricidal fantasy of Greslou’s confession. The question of responsibil-
ity broached in the preface concerns his implication in Charlotte’s death 
as much as Sixte’s liability for robert’s actions. it is certainly not by 
chance that it is precisely Greslou’s mother who blames Sixte for his 
incarceration, nor that it is she whose suffering for her son’s misdeeds 
the text depicts most graphically to the readers. The responsibility for 
which the man of letters must tremble is to save the mother from the 
son’s sadistic impulses.
 While science is unable to protect the subject from his own worst 
instincts, by the structure of his novel bourget implies that literature, 
and particularly the novel of ideas, can do so. The man of letters respon-
sible for The Disciple shoulders his moral responsibility by containing 
the potentially subversive ‘scientific’ fantasy of matricide recounted in 
Greslou’s Memoir within the two third-person narratives that frame it. 
The latter of these manages to gratify the reader’s presumed sense of 
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outrage while exhibiting the moral superiority of the nobleman’s code 
of honor over the scientific ethic, by first displaying Count andré’s 
moral probity when, after a bout of soul-searching, he brings himself 
to testify honestly in court that Greslou did not murder his sister, then 
showing its higher capacity for effective ‘action’ and defense of the fam-
ily honor, when, after robert is exonerated, the count shoots the com-
moner dead in the street.
 With the shot that excises the alien intruder from the land, the text 
repudiates the matricidal fantasy it had satisfied in its center. The moral 
responsibility touted in the preface thus turns out to be an act of self-
mutilation as punishment for that criminal fantasy. bourget thereby 
announces his break with his own criminal desires, which he associates 
with the philosophical and social experimentation of his comparatively 
liberal past. having already demonstrated through his portrayal of sci-
entific disinterestedness the supposed dangers of doing away entirely 
with the pathological object, as Kant recommends, he proposes instead 
an alternative maternal object of a political nature—the homeland. like 
the Opportunists he opposes, bourget advocates transferring maternal 
love to love of country, and like them he calls on the youth of France 
to make nationality henceforth the core of their identity. but in his 
preface it is not so much the love of the homeland inculcated by the 
secular republican schools that he urges, as total identification with 
her: The homeland is our common mother and your soul is her soul. 
Patriotism thus becomes entirely equated with self-love. moreover, he 
implies that these prospective disciples of his should also transfer their 
sadistic enjoyment from the field of sexual desire to the rooting out of 
the enemies of the motherland, cloaking this witch-hunt under the ban-
ner of morality rather than treating it as a matter of pride, revenge, or 
political and economic need. Through patriotism, they will be able to 
satisfy their aggressive impulses without feeling the guilt and remorse 
Greslou experiences. and in the novel, andré’s killing of Greslou is 
prefigured by his heroic exploits during the Prussian war, volunteering 
for the military and then killing a Prussian soldier. The implication is 
that his murder of the internal enemy—the ‘lower classes,’ who stand 
for their uncontrollable forbidden impulses, and their representatives, 
i.e., democracy—is as honorable and as heroic as his wartime defense of 
the homeland. it is this sinister twist to republican patriotism that will 
be elaborated and carried much farther by barrès and the right-wing 
nationalism just beginning to emerge from the boulangist movement.
Barrès without Kant
French fascists of the twentieth century such as Pierre Drieu la rochelle 
and robert brasillach were great admirers of barrès in their youth 
(Soucy 18, 162, 283–99), and Georges valois, leader of the first French 
fascist party, le Faisceau, looked on barrès’s nationalism as the major 
precursor of his movement, as did several others who slid from inte-
gral nationalism to fascism in the 1920s (e.g., Taittinger, renaud, la 
rocque, Doriot; Soucy 20). barrès’s son’s edition of his works proudly 
displays a photograph of adolf hitler’s ex libris and the dedication to 
the Führer of a book by Walter Frank, Nationalismus und Demokratie im 
Frankreich der dritten Republik, which hitler had in his library in berch-
tesgaden and which contained a lengthy study of barrès (L’oeuvre de 
Maurice Barrès, vol. iv, n. pag.). it was barrès, after all, who invented 
the term “national Socialism,” and his brand of nationalism included 
the “leader principle” along with a heavy dose of mob violence, xeno-
phobia, and anti-Semitism. For the same reasons, recent antifascist 
scholars, such as robert Soucy, Zeev Sternhell, and David Carroll, who 
takes his cue from Philippe lacoue-labarthe and Jean-luc nancy’s Le 
mythe nazi, have examined barrès’s writings in order to discover the 
roots of the later movement in the ideology of the virulent revolution-
ary nationalism he developed around the turn of the century, just before 
and during the Dreyfus affair (1897–1902).
The Novel of National Energy, 
by Maurice Barrès
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 Paradoxically, whereas Sternhell and Soucy contend that it was bar-
rès’s abandonment of rationalist humanism that made him the bridge 
between nineteenth-century conservatism and twentieth-century fas-
cism, Carroll takes just the opposite view, namely, that it is the persis-
tence and exacerbation of the philosophy of the autonomous subject that 
explains his fall into totalitarianism. From the one perspective it is his 
betrayal of the tradition of the enlightenment, from the other his fidel-
ity to that heritage, that precipitates him into the abyss of protofascism. 
While both these explanations have much to recommend them—there 
certainly was an important strain of irrationalism in barrès’s politics of 
cultural heredity, the strong leader and the masses on the one hand, the 
assertion of the prerogatives of the autonomous subject in his identifi-
cation with national heroes, the valorization of sameness evident in the 
insistence on national unity and totality leading to racism and xenopho-
bia on the other—each suffers from the flaw of overgeneralization. The 
major tenets of barrès’s ‘irrationalism’ were in fact commonplaces of 
the rationalist scientism of his times. Comte, Taine, Durkheim, Gabriel 
Tarde, Gustave le bon, Théodule ribot, and Jules-auguste Soury all 
believed in some form of hereditary determinism as well as in the subor-
dination of the individual to the group. like Schopenhauer, hartmann, 
Wilhelm Wundt, Sigmund exner, and Georg lichtenberg among Ger-
man thinkers of the period, the last three also upheld the anti-Cartesian 
view that affect and instinct take precedence over individual reason and 
that thought itself is the product of the impersonal forces of a collective 
unconscious, a stance they condensed in the pre-lacanian catchphrase Il 
pense en moi (it thinks in me). moreover, as discussed in chapter 1, the 
anti-individualist social theories of that same positivism were combined 
in a strange alliance with the philosophy of the subject derived straight 
from Kant and the enlightenment via Condorcet, Quinet, Proudhon, 
and renouvier, among others, in order to serve as the ideological basis 
of the very Opportunist republic barrès’s nationalism and later fascism 
were designed to overthrow. To put it bluntly, there was a republican 
irrationalism that nevertheless did not condone mob violence, and a 
patriotic subject of national unity that did not sanction legalized racism, 
anti-Semitism, and xenophobia.
 The problem, then, is that while each of these theories brings out 
aspects of barrès’s ideology that might otherwise remain hidden from 
view, neither distinguishes adequately between protofascism and repub-
licanism, since the very traits they emphasize, even those that appear 
to be mutually contradictory, were in fact constitutive of republican 
ideology. Such a differentiation can be effected, i would suggest first, 
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by examining barrès’s texts from the time of the Dreyfus affair in light 
of lacan’s notion of “extimacy,” his neologistic mode of escaping from 
the polar opposition of the interior and the exterior that so often haunts 
the discourse of identity at the heart of republican, nationalist, and fas-
cist ideology (see miller, “extimacy,” for a detailed explanation of this 
term).
 What makes barrès’s texts of this period especially interesting—and 
frightening—are his perceptions of the more or less covert fears and 
gratifications that constitute the emotional force of the striving for iden-
tity in fin de siècle nationalism beyond, and often against, the self-interest 
advertised in political campaigns and the rights and duties described in 
political philosophies. While barrès articulated the main themes of his 
program in the polemical prose of his Scenes and Doctrines of National-
ism, a collection of speeches and articles written between 1898 and its 
publication in 1902, i would argue—and this is my second thesis—that 
it is in the three novels of Le roman de l’énergie nationale (The Novel 
of National Energy), Les déracinés (The Uprooted; 1897), L’appel au sol-
dat (Appeal to the Soldier; 1900), and Leurs figures (Their Faces; 1902),1 
much more than in his political pamphlets, that barrès allows the full 
range and complexity of the tendencies that make up nationalist identity, 
and, above all, the contradictions within them, to surface and interact 
freely. it is likewise in the novels that what distinguished his nationalist 
solution from that of others and made it especially dangerous emerges 
most clearly.
 it was the pedagogical stance barrès assumes in these texts that has 
provoked critics from Gide to Suleiman to their harshest condemna-
tions of the writer and of the authoritarian genre he practices. The tar-
get of their objections is the didacticism of the nationalist roman à thèse, 
barrès’s narratorial pose as the schoolmaster who, like a teacher driving 
a lesson home to his pupils, defines and delimits the meaning of his fic-
tion and then constrains his readers’ freedom of judgment by imposing 
that univocal and unilaterally defined interpretation onto every episode 
and circumstance of his narrative. now while fascism certainly cannot 
be reduced to authoritarianism, both do involve a will to dictatorship, 
so that the criticisms leveled at the latter would also apply to the for-
mer.
 The equation between didacticism and authoritarianism in barrès is, 
however, not quite as straightforward as these criticisms would imply, 
for he did not wait until Les déracinés to assume the role of teacher. 
already in his first, outspokenly anti-authoritarian novels of the Culte 
du Moi (Cult of the Ego) trilogy, he had insisted on the edifying function 
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of his fiction (“examen des trois romans idéologiques” 17). From the 
start barrès considered literature to be in ideological competition with 
other forms of education. it is not the pedagogical impulse per se that 
gives Les déracinés its authoritarian aura but—and here is my third the-
sis—the specific, transferential role it confers on the educator that dis-
tinguishes it from other didactic works, including barrès’s own early 
fiction.
 in fact, the novel takes explicit aim at the ideology of the ruling 
authorities of its times, the Kantian doctrine the author claimed was 
the official State philosophy of the government of the Third republic 
and of the school system whose task it was to disseminate that system 
among future citizens. like its predecessors, the novel presents itself as a 
challenge to a certain conception of authoritarianism, personified in the 
character bouteiller, who goes from government scholarship student to 
lycée philosophy professor to politician and deputy in the lower house of 
the French parliament. in a sense, then, barrès pits his narratorial voice 
against the teachings of bouteiller. but Les déracinés is a novel of edu-
cation in every sense of the term, recounting the schooling and young 
adulthood of its protagonists, during which time they come under the 
sway of a series of potential masters that includes both fictional charac-
ters and real historical personages such as Taine, hugo, and napoleon. 
The question of the relation of education to authority, freedom, and 
interpretation is thus posed on all levels of the work, explicitly thema-
tized in character, plot, and ideological discussion as well as presented as 
a function of narratorial discourse; consequently, any attempt to evalu-
ate the political significance of the novel must take all its levels into 
account.
 as the title of the book indicates, personification is not its only 
rhetorical strategy; the plot is primarily designed to enact before the 
reader the concrete effects of the ‘uprooting’ produced by bouteiller’s 
tenets on the lives of seven of his pupils from lorraine who decide to 
seek their fortunes in Paris after completing their baccalaureates at the 
lycée in nancy. Two of them—racadot, grandson of a serf freed dur-
ing the revolution, and mouchefrin, whose father is a poverty-stricken 
photographer—end up very badly, murdering a beautiful young arme-
nian woman named astiné aravian for her jewels. a third, renaudin, 
son of a petty civil servant and a scholarship student like mouchefrin, 
engages in the most unsavory journalistic practices of the period, and 
in a later volume of the trilogy is nearly killed in a duel provoked by his 
betrayal of the cause of General boulanger. The four others, roemers-
pacher, Sturel, Saint-Phlin, and Suret-lefort, with higher social status, 
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some independent means, and greater intellectual ability, are successful 
in varying degrees, but only after suffering from their transplantation 
to the metropolis. moreover, they all share, to a greater or lesser extent, 
at least some complicity in racadot and mouchefrin’s crime. as with 
bourget’s Disciple, the question of the teacher’s responsibility is at the 
heart of this novel, and behind the issue of individual ethics is that 
of the ideology he teaches, but whereas bourget wanted to challenge 
the regime indirectly by attacking the system of ideas that, he claimed, 
undermined the bases of morality and identity, barrès’s primary targets 
were, as ringer has astutely observed (130), the social and political 
institutions themselves that promulgated the views he opposed. That 
is why bourget could tell his story in terms of the fates of a handful of 
individuals, while barrès must follow the lives of a whole group of char-
acters as they interact with each other and with the culture and society 
of the times.
 a cursory reading of the opening chapter of Les déracinés gives the 
impression that the ideological argument of the novel will consist of 
what was by the end of the century the standard right-wing attack 
against the universalism of the republic in the name of particularism. 
On the one hand, Kantian universalism, with its categorical imperative 
and rationalist abstraction (Les déracinés 504, 510); on the other, the 
empirical consideration of the particular conditions of real life, every-
thing that Kantianism allegedly ignores (502, 505). barrès uses the 
expression ‘members of humanity’ in Taine’s sense (which echoes that 
of de maistre and Tocqueville): paper constructs, “abstract men, empty 
simulacra, philosophical marionettes” (Révolution jacobine 9); while his 
‘citizen’ indicates people who have lost their selves, their ties to their 
ancestors, to the land where they were born and raised, and to their 
cultures; they are victims of synthetic theory and artificial law, imposed 
upon them by physical or mental violence. The “purity” of reason con-
sists, in the eyes of Kant’s adversaries, in turning one’s back on the 
natural, social, and cultural conditions of real life.
 There is of course a certain truth to these criticisms; Kant cer-
tainly did make the purity of reason consist of its independence from 
all empirical involvement. however, he did so not in order to ignore 
empirical reality but to discover its necessary basis for human cognition, 
what must be the case in order for it to appear to us as it does. One 
might be tempted to imagine that barrès, not being a trained philoso-
pher, would have overlooked this aspect of Kantianism, or at the least 
would have omitted it from a work of fiction meant to appeal to a wide 
public. not at all. in fact, bouteiller’s earliest lessons deal not with 
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the ethical teachings of the Critique of Practical Reason, but, following 
Kant’s own chronological and logical order, with the limits of knowl-
edge delineated in the Critique of Pure Reason. his pedagogical purpose 
in employing this stratagem is to impress upon his students that the cat-
egorical imperative alone can save them from utter skepticism. he sees 
Kant’s first Critique as an extension of Descartes’s radical doubt, and, 
like so many French neo-Kantians of the nineteenth century, treats the 
former’s ethics as the sole remedy for the disarray of total uncertainty.
 Unfortunately, while bouteiller’s pupils are completely persuaded 
by the demonstration of the limits of knowledge, they cannot appre-
ciate the compelling force of the categorical imperative. Perhaps that 
is because neither bouteiller nor the narrator bothers to explain the 
logic of the neo-Kantian argument, not even in the inaccurate but 
more accessible form Coignet gave it: namely, that human freedom is 
an undeniable fact of which conscience makes each of us aware; that 
this freedom consists in the ability to give to oneself and to obey one’s 
own law of reason, the expression of which is the categorical impera-
tive; and that the resulting autonomy conveys upon all human beings a 
dignity worthy of the respect of all others. bouteiller does summarize 
the conclusion of his course by reminding his class that he has shown 
them how Kant reestablished the principle of certainty by saying, “a 
reality exists, the moral law” (506), but there is no explicit mention of 
his reasoning in either dialogue or narration. be that as it may, to the 
pupils, universal moral rules are the sort of thing about which teachers 
tell their charges but which they don’t really believe themselves, since 
the idea seems to contradict everyday experience. in short, bouteiller 
has transmitted the malady but not the cure. Deracination, in the first 
instance, is therefore a matter not of physical or social displacement but 
of mental upheaval. like Socrates, the professor has undermined his 
students’ childhood beliefs, the cultural doxa of their social classes and 
family milieus.
 Strangely enough, this loss does not perturb the young men in the 
slightest. On the contrary, they look upon it as a heady liberation. They 
are much more impressed by the example of bouteiller’s career than 
by the ethical side of his teaching. For them, he is associated with the 
living symbol of the republic, victor hugo, and with the republic 
itself. Thanks to the republic and the new spirit of the École normale, 
bouteiller has risen from the obscure poverty of a provincial working-
class family to the rank of professor, first in nancy and then in Paris. 
With the support of the government, he is able to disregard the social 
hierarchy with impunity, mocking the school principal and the lycée 
T h e  N o v e l  o f  N aT i o N a l  e N e r g y :  p r o t o fA s C i s t ?   ~    
inspector when they visit his classes, and purposely slighting the grand-
mother of his noble pupil, Saint-Phlin. he seems to be living the mod-
ern-day version of Julien Sorel’s romance, and like him will no doubt 
soon be able to say: “my story is ended, and all the credit is mine.”
 but of course barrès does not see bouteiller’s story the same way. 
For him, the professor’s behavior toward the ‘natural’ social order is 
scandalous. in any case, his rise, even if it were to unfold according to 
the ideal model, entirely uninterrupted by setbacks or failures, is merely 
a grotesque parody of Julien’s struggles, just as the republican model is a 
debased pastiche of the glories of napoleon, or even of rousseau, which 
inspired the young Sorel. Following the style of conservative ideology 
of the 1890s, barrès repeatedly uses the term ‘nihilism’ to characterize 
the skepticism the young men derive from Kant’s critique.2 bouteiller 
teaches them that it is not possible to tell whether our sense of space 
and time or our idea of causality corresponds to anything real; what 
they receive from this notion is “the most acute sense of nothingness” 
(500). Feigning ignorance of the future, the narrator puts himself in 
the place of the reader and wonders whether this overdose of negation 
might not lead them to devise for themselves “a kind of cruel nihilism” 
(500). he reinforces this impression in a crucial scene later in the novel 
by attributing the same idea to a voice of authority, the philosopher 
Taine: “The philosopher took a few moments to meditate on the nihil-
ism or rather the void expressed in such simple terms by a young fellow 
[roemerspacher] who seemed neither base nor mediocre” (595).
 between Stendhal’s Julien Sorel, balzac’s lucien de rubempré, and 
barrès’s François Sturel comes Turgenev’s bazarov, the nihilist protago-
nist of Fathers and Sons: “[T]he nihilist is the man who bows down to 
no authority, who accepts no principle as an article of faith, no matter 
how much respect the principle is given” (vogüé, Roman russe 187; 
quoting Fathers and Sons).3 as bazarov demonstrates, nihilism is not 
a simple belief, nor even the lack of belief, but a critical attitude and a 
code of action. The worst effect of Kantianism on the adolescents from 
lorraine is that, in robbing them of their certainty, it also deprives them 
of all socially accepted goals and means of attaining those goals. The 
only meaningful motive for action that remains for them is therefore 
themselves, their own survival, well-being, advancement, ‘vanity.’ One 
will naturally object that this conclusion in no way follows from Kant’s 
or bouteiller’s teaching. barrès’s response is that bouteiller could have 
foreseen this outcome if he had paid attention to the particularity of 
his students and their backgrounds (Les déracinés 502), so that, albeit 
indirectly, it is universalism nevertheless which is responsible for their 
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nihilism. The cruelly paradoxical result of the Kantian universalism that 
ignores individuality is thus a renewed and reinforced individualism.
 bouteiller is himself the moldering fruit of the same educational sys-
tem he is foisting on his pupils. as such, he serves as the instrument of 
barrès’s criticism of that system as well as of the parliamentary govern-
ment that has created him and which he embodies, in his actions as in his 
doctrine. an orphan removed from his ‘natural’ milieu at an early age, 
he is literally the child of Third republic pedagogy, “a child of reason, 
foreign to our traditional local or family habits, completely abstract and 
truly suspended above the void” (503).4 his only ties of affection and 
gratitude going to the government that has raised and supported him, 
he interprets the universality of the categorical imperative to mean that 
the citizen’s duty to society overrides all conflicting claims to individual 
rights. like auguste burdeau, whom barrès quotes directly in the text, 
bouteiller asserts that the individual owes complete and entire allegiance 
to the State, in his fortune, his efforts, his thoughts, his blood, his very 
heartbeat (503). yet his own actions repeatedly betray his words: When 
his personal convictions or welfare are at stake, he has no qualms about 
ignoring or disrespecting the authorities of the State to which he is 
allegedly devoted, as we see in his contemptuous attitude toward the 
principal and school inspector. When called to teach in Paris, bouteiller 
cloaks his private ambition in a cloud of duty to society and has his 
pupils ratify his decision to leave in a sham vote determined by the 
false impression he gives them and by his personal prestige. Some time 
later, when he has the opportunity to apply the categorical imperative 
in practice to a real situation—his protector, Gambetta, wants one of his 
former students, renaudin, to accept a job with a socialist newspaper 
as a government spy—he caves in to pressure and advises renaudin to 
take the job. This moral failure is only a foretaste of the act that leads to 
his downfall, his involvement in the Panama Canal scandal that rocked 
the Third republic in the 1890s, which barrès describes in detail in the 
final volume of his trilogy of “national energy,” Leurs figures.
 The brunt of barrès’s assault is directed toward the potential for 
abuse inherent in the Kantian ethic. like the Catholic morality the 
Third republic sought to replace, it delivers the individual up, bound 
hand and foot, to the central power—only in this case, it is the State 
that has taken the place of the Church (cf., Taine, L’école 260). Once 
again barrès is following, in broad outline, the arguments of Taine, 
who, in his Origines, portrays a continuity among the throne and altar 
of louis Xiv’s absolute monarchy, the homeland of the Jacobins, and 
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the centralized empire of napoleon i. Wittingly or unwittingly, both 
are repeating hegel’s claim that Kant’s ethic is just as tyrannical as the 
dogmatic morality he wishes to supplant; he has simply replaced the 
external despot with an inner dictator, the moral law. according to both 
writers, the ultimate guilt for this subjection falls on the shoulders of 
universalization. barrès argues that bouteiller’s behavior toward renau-
din, oscillating between “respecting a soul” and “serving the State” (Les 
déracinés 522), shows up a fundamental flaw in the categorical impera-
tive, for the principle of making one’s conduct into a general rule does 
not provide a sure criterion for deciding between the welfare of the 
individual and that of the State. it therefore fails to supply any argu-
ment to defend the rights of the individual and makes it an easy matter 
for bouteiller to parse Kant’s absolute duty as a call for blind obedience 
to the State (505, 507). Once the individual has thus been made vul-
nerable, it is an easy matter for the actual State, or those who run it, to 
manipulate people for the benefit of the rulers, that is, the bourgeoisie 
of finance and industry who stood to profit from the Panama Canal deal 
and the members of Parliament who represent their interests, in every 
sense of the word. The allegedly universal ethic of society as a whole 
turns out in fact to promote the interests of a single segment of that 
society. via this route, barrès’s analysis of Third republic moral univer-
salism approaches Karl marx’s critique of the false universalism of the 
bourgeois class.
 endemic hypocrisy and nihilistic egotism are not the sole results of 
Kantian universalism. as an enemy of abstraction, barrès is equally con-
cerned with the positive actions that philosophy is likely to enjoin upon 
its followers. Judging by bouteiller’s conduct, it induces in its disciples 
a moral quietude that only increases the tyrannical potential of universal 
ethics (504), for the true believer need not cudgel his brains to find the 
right course of action, no matter how complicated or delicate the par-
ticular case may be. While this calm assurance may seem to contradict 
the assertion that the general rule cannot decide between the claims of 
the individual and those of society, in a chilling passage in which bar-
rès seems to foresee the “ethics” of an adolf eichmann, the narrator 
affirms that obedience to the rule in fact solves every moral dilemma by 
dictating a single acceptable choice, provided that choice conform to the 
principle of total responsibility to the collectivity (505). Knowledge of 
the universal rule, moreover, guides action in a second way, by inciting 
the knower to apply that standard to other people, ostensibly for their 
own good, in actuality in order to dominate them (505).
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Arboreal Ethics
barrès’s answer to what he finds most odious in bouteiller, according 
to the majority of scholars, is the fictionalized Taine who appears in the 
famous chapter vii of the novel titled L’arbre de M. Taine (Mr. Taine’s 
Tree). Curious about the author of an admiring newspaper review of his 
Origins of Contemporary France, Taine pays a visit to roemerspacher’s 
lodgings in the latin Quarter. in response to the older man’s inqui-
ries, the student advises him that the younger generation, informed 
by Kant’s critique, no longer believes in either the spiritualism that 
reigned in French schools during the July monarchy or the materialism 
championed by Taine and his generation during the Second empire. 
Untroubled on the level of epistemology, they are nevertheless disturbed 
by the lack of an absolute morality, unable to accept the categorical 
imperative that ignores the fact, which Taine himself, after Pascal, has 
demonstrated so well, that in varying periods and climates different laws 
and morals become just and necessary (Les déracinés 594). Taine replies 
to the student’s tacit request for guidance with his own declaration of 
faith. The key to moral life is sociability: everyone should act in accor-
dance with the customs of the social order (595). in consequence, he 
recommends that roemerspacher should join with his comrades from 
nancy to form an organized group (595).
 The text characterizes this ‘Goethean’ philosophy as the strongest 
possible contradiction to Kant and bouteiller, and as a viable alternative 
to the attempt to reorganize society on the basis of pure reason, which 
Taine criticizes heavily in his Origines (Les déracinés 596). The fact that 
barrès has previously neglected to mention human dignity in the novel, 
especially its glaring omission from his depiction of bouteiller’s lessons 
on the Kantian ethic, makes it plausible to assume that he approves of 
this defense of “the spontaneous vitality of regional and social ‘milieus’ 
against the deracinating influence of the republican administration” 
(ringer 133). all the more so, since Taine finds his ideal of human and 
social dignity embodied in the arboreal image of a plane tree growing in 
the Place des invalides. a product of the mysterious, unifying, creative 
forces of nature, it develops according to its own inner law, its destiny, 
without the need for any external direction or control. never having 
been uprooted, the tree has managed to preserve the autonomy that lies 
at the root of dignity. The “expressive image of a beautiful existence,” 
it is an organic unity bursting with health, a “rustling federation” of 
branches, leaves, and trunk, with no part dominating the others nor 
any artificial French symmetry. above all, it images forth the ethical 
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principle that has guided Taine in his philosophy and throughout his 
life, the acceptance of the necessities of life (Les déracinés 597). When 
confronted with external obstacles to its development, it adapts to those 
conditions as best it can. eventually, having attained its state of perfec-
tion, it will succumb to the same natural forces that had presided over 
its birth.
 The lessons roemerspacher draws from this living metaphor are 
evident. individuals have a humble, dependent place in society and in 
history. each person being like a leaf on the tree, it would be of divine 
nobility if each of these leaves recognized its dependence on the tree, 
and the limitations placed upon its individual fate by the destiny of the 
whole tree that controls it. People would profit from knowing that they 
are at first produced identical to their predecessors and successors by a 
natural force, and that they will later be detached from their branch by a 
similar force. Contemplation of these problems of universality and unity 
leads to a feeling of inner joy and religious tranquillity that derives from 
understanding the laws of nature that govern the lives of the individual 
and of society and from the satisfaction of submitting to those laws.
 From the time of the novel’s publication in 1897 to the present, 
most commentators have taken this fictional character Taine to be the 
representative of barrès’s views in the text. ringer, for instance, states 
that in Les déracinés the philosopher “is an intellectual counterweight to 
Kant and bouteiller, and a spokesman for barrès himself ” (132). already 
bourget’s review of the novel in Le Figaro of november 7, 1897, signifi-
cantly titled “l’arbre de m. Taine,” reprinted in “Théories politiques,” 
proclaims that barrès owed the philosopher his most essential ideas and 
the best aspects of his method (“Théories politiques” 168). indeed, it 
was in Taine’s L’école that the novelist found the fundamental idea for 
the entire book, the increasing discordance between school and life due 
to the excessive centralization of the French Université designed to elimi-
nate any trace of local tradition from school and lycée (169–70). above 
all, bourget sees in Taine’s tree the political lesson of the vital energy 
of thought (la sève pensante) “which causes the same spirit to circulate 
through many souls in the same era,” and which thus can provide the 
national unity that is so critical if France is to overcome its alleged state 
of ‘decadence’ (171).
 in the ensuing decades, ernst Curtius, Pierre-henri Petitbon, Soucy, 
and Sternhell also assumed that barrès endorsed Taine’s ethic of accep-
tance, often citing the unambiguous pronouncements in favor of accep-
tance barrès made in Scenes and Doctrines: “[W]e are enslaved by the 
transmissions of the past”; “our dead give us orders which we must 
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obey; we are not free to choose”; “nationalism is the acceptance of a 
determinism” (Scènes et doctrines 12–15). There is certainly much in the 
novel to support this view of Taine’s role. The philosopher is described 
in glowing terms and the narrator shows his ethic to be superior to that 
of Kant. moreover, like Taine in L’école (296–97), the narrator explains 
the errors of his seven students as the result of being subjected to a 
totally unrealistic education that has deceived them about the realities 
of the world, causing their imaginations and sensibilities to run wild. 
Unrealistic, they never think to consult and submit to “[the] conditions 
imposed by circumstances” (568).
 it is this same lack of realism, this same preponderance of imagina-
tion over evaluation of the particular empirical facts, inculcated by the 
schools in accordance with the neo-Kantian rationalism of the republic, 
that governs the two main plots of the novel and has induced many 
readers to see the work as an updated version of balzac’s Lost Illusions. 
inspired by Taine’s principle of association, roemerspacher incites 
Sturel and the others to join together in what turns out to be the disas-
trous decision to start a newspaper. because of the inadequate funds 
at the young men’s disposal combined with their lack of business and 
journalistic experience, this project eventually leads racadot, who has 
lost his entire inheritance in it, and his friend mouchefrin, for whom the 
paper represents the only means of escape from his life of dire poverty, 
to murder astiné.
 The author shields Taine’s teaching from potential blame for its fatal 
effect by maintaining that, without particular examples as a guide to the 
correct method for putting a general principle into practice, each person 
may interpret it differently, according to his own mentality (Les déracinés 
596). although roemerspacher senses that Sturel’s plan does not really 
correspond to Taine’s teaching, he nevertheless reluctantly gives in to 
his friend’s urging, carried away by the penchant for the marvelous he 
acquired as a child raised on fairy tales and crime stories, a taste he 
maintains through his habit of reading novels of the imaginary before 
going to bed each night (604).
 as it turns out, Sturel has received a similar education of the imagi-
nation, first as a child of four or five to whom were read stories of 
the “Orient,” and then, after his arrival in Paris, from his armenian 
lover, astiné, whose exotic tales of her life in russia and the Caucasus 
reawaken his childhood reveries (545). in Sturel’s case the narrator puts 
the blame for the corruption of the young man’s imagination squarely 
on the shoulders of the University rationalism that separates him from 
the realities of his native land and mentality (554). if his hereditary vital 
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forces had not been weakened by bouteiller’s teachings, he could have 
resisted these dreams of the Orient, “that cup of poison” (553).
 if Sturel fails to lift a finger to aid astiné in her time of need, watch-
ing motionless while racadot and mouchefrin drag her off to her death, 
if he avoids turning mouchefrin in to the police after the crime has been 
committed, it is because, swept up in the communal life he experiences 
during hugo’s public funeral ceremonies, he has finally learned the les-
son of Taine’s ethic of acceptance. hugo’s works and the crowd remind 
him of the mysterious unity of all the manifestations of life, which leads 
him to conclude that acceptance is the only reasonable solution (730). 
Only in view of the totality is each individual justified by his necessity. 
and that is precisely the Spinozan formula that Taine reproduces in his 
article on the philosopher in his Philosophes classiques. The postulation 
of absolute determinism guarantees the unity of the whole of nature, 
each and every part of it causally related to the rest. The universe is “a 
hierarchy of necessities” and therefore “a unique, indivisible being, of 
which all beings are members” (370).
 Finally, as Curtius, Soucy, and other critics emphasize, it is the lack 
of this sense of order and concomitant resignation which motivates the 
murder that racadot and mouchefrin commit. like their comrades, the 
two refuse to submit to circumstances, and after the killing the narrator 
wonders rhetorically whether the “educator bouteiller” and the spirit 
of their society “could have caused racadot and mouchefrin not to 
prefer a crime to the collapse of their ambitions” (Les déracinés 708). 
his conclusion, foregone, is that the government and its minions (like 
bouteiller) are indeed responsible for mouchefrin’s and racadot’s failure 
to be “transplanted,” delivering them up to “anarchy, a mortal disorder” 
(738). The University and the republic are thus found guilty of asti-
né’s murder, and all because, far from teaching their charges the proper 
sense of order and resignation, they incited them to aspire beyond their 
social, financial, and intellectual means.
Voluntary Determinism
not all readers are so firmly convinced of barrès’s complete adherence 
to Taine’s principles, however; nor do they necessarily accept the notion 
that barrès’s nationalism is the strict equivalent of Taine’s conservatism. 
moreover, while many critics, whether hostile (Suleiman) or favorable 
(Petitbon), see the trilogy as all of a piece, others claim to perceive seri-
ous inconsistencies in its ideology and fissures in its narrative surface. 
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virtually all the disputes turn on the question of the relations between 
determinism, ethics, and political action. To what degree does the 
author accept Taine’s ethic of acceptance? What is the latter’s relation 
to determinism? and to what extent are both doctrines compatible with 
an active political program of nationalism?
 ringer points out the inherent contradiction in Taine’s parable of 
the tree (133): how can the voluntaristic theory of sociability and the 
formation of associations, which leads toward the politics of regional 
nationalism that bourget took to be the primary message of the novel, 
be reconciled with the doctrine of causal environmentalism illustrated 
by the tree’s “acceptance of the necessities of life”? an expert on the 
development of ideology in Germany during the period, ringer notes 
that the metaphors of organic growth in the tree allegory bear only a 
superficial resemblance to the German conception of Bildung, for the 
diversity implied is that of “conditioning environments” rather than of 
“self-defining individuals,” with the result that the unstable equilibrium 
between voluntarism and social determinism is soon upset, the former 
giving way to the latter (133). Underneath this observation seems to 
lie the reproach several “humanist” critics (e.g., Curtius, Soucy, Stern-
hell), who correctly see barrès’s attacks on Kantianism as assaults on the 
humanist principles they hold dear—“the mental anarchy, called human-
ism, that the Université put into [Sturel et roemerspacher]” (L’Appel 
au soldat 775)—level explicitly at barrès: by denying the autonomy of 
the subject, he eliminates the possibility of free will and thereby of any 
genuine morality, which must of necessity be universal. in its place, he 
leaves only the relativist pseudoethic of nationalism: “resolve each ques-
tion in relation to France,” a grotesque parody of the categorical imper-
ative and formula for amoral intolerance at best (Curtius 168, who 
wrote before the rise of nazism), a source of xenophobia, racism, and 
brutality at worst (Soucy and Sternhell, writing after World War ii).
 The ethical and political stakes are high, then, in the controversy over 
what at first might have appeared to be the merely logical inconsistency 
involved in advocating both voluntarism and determinism at the same 
time. it is therefore essential to ascertain how barrès attempts to juggle 
these two disparate principles. now the very fact that roemerspacher 
and friends could, as we have seen, “misapply” Taine’s voluntaristic 
principle indicates that there is a clash between it and an underlying 
determinism. The proof of its erroneous use is not, after all, a matter 
of logic but of “empirical” consequences. it is the plot that gainsays the 
idea of the newspaper association. in other words, the issue in question 
is not the abstract dilemma of ‘determinism versus free will,’ but rather 
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the correlation between voluntary action and its outcome. The mistake 
in the utilization of the principle is that it went against the realities of 
the situation—the background, education, experience, social class, and 
financial status of the participants, and the conditions of journalism in 
Paris at the time. The implication is that, if associating in groups can 
be done poorly, it can also be done properly, where ‘properly’ means 
‘in agreement with the underlying determinism of the situation.’ Once 
again it is barrès’s empirical and historical particularism that unlocks 
the door to understanding the ideological and narrative structure of the 
novel.
 The specific facts and conditions, however (and in this respect barrès 
remains quite faithful to Taine and the entire tradition of French positiv-
ism), must be organized into a general ‘law’ in order to furnish a com-
plete explanation of phenomena. The name of that law is included in the 
title of the work, “rootedness.” it is the students’ deracination and their 
subsequent inability to achieve a happy ‘transplantation’ in the capital 
that prevents them from taking accurate cognizance of the situation 
and condemns their enterprise to failure. had they not been “detached 
from the soil, from all society, from their families” (512) by the lycée 
environment and by bouteiller’s teaching, which led to their ensuing 
immigration to Paris, they would presumably have been better able to 
implement Taine’s doctrine of assembly, for they would have remained 
in contact with the national consciousness, their land and their history 
(513).
 While the critics and the public of the late 1890s welcomed or con-
demned barrès’s shift from the earlier Cult of the Ego to the nationalism 
of Les déracinés as a radical break in his career, in fact, as the author 
himself protested and as several more recent critics have acknowledged, 
despite the obvious disparities, the major propositions of deracination 
form part of a theory he had been developing at least since the end of 
the previous decade. as early as 1891, in his retrospective “examen” of 
the Cult of the Ego trilogy, he had asserted that Philippe, the hero of Un 
homme libre (A Free Man), sees himself as part of a tradition that gives 
meaning to his life, and, by means of that tradition, plunges himself into 
the collective unconscious of humanity, of universal life. barrès refers 
the reader to Schopenhauer and, above all, to hartmann’s Philosophy 
of the Unconscious (translated into French in 1877; barrès, “examen” 
20–21).
 The way has been prepared for exalting the immersion of the indi-
vidual in the group, and it will only require a few reversals in order to 
arrive at the nationalist position: the ‘necessary law’ of positivism will 
    ~   C h A p t e r  
be redefined as the operation of heredity, and the group will become 
one’s ancestors. already in the third volume of the series, Le jardin de 
Bérénice (Berenice’s Garden), written just after his own election as député 
from nancy in 1890, barrès had conferred a political meaning onto this 
theme through the Platonic move of assimilating hartmann’s Uncon-
scious to the “soul of the people.” This popular soul acts as the condi-
tioning matrix of temporal evolution, since, by virtue of its function as 
the repository of the past experiences of the “race,” it contains the roots 
of the future as well (Le jardin de Bérénice 229). The word “race” is still 
understood here in the cultural sense of herder, equivalent to that of 
the english term “a people,” that was customary in the first two-thirds 
of the nineteenth century, especially among writers of the political left; 
but hartmann’s unconscious has provided a bridge between the psycho-
logical and the physiological realms which will soon facilitate the trans-
formation of the social being into the biological entity of barrès’s later 
racist ideology (230). it is instinct rather than reason that shapes the 
future, for the unconscious is the creative force of the world (229–31). 
nevertheless, for the time being at least, this creative energy remains 
an attribute of humanity at large rather than the property of a specific 
race.
 While there is no logical necessity for this idea to evolve into a 
theory of deracination, it does provide a natural connection to the later 
doctrine in that it implies the existence of a ubiquitous instance whose 
force must be either recognized and abetted or ignored and thwarted. 
Consciousness, and with it education, comes back into its own some-
what in the guise of guardian or gatekeeper. Keeping the genie in the 
bottle, failing to recognize the sense of the unconscious, can only result 
in disaster, whereas acknowledging its existence and framing one’s 
wishes in accordance with its inherent direction will lead to the out-
burst of creative energy. in sum, this soul of the people has become the 
dominating force in human affairs, the native soil in which alone the 
tree of humanity can prosper.
 The superior intuitive knowledge and creative force of the popular 
soul only emerge, however, when the members of the people are fused 
together in large gatherings, a crowd (Le jardin de Bérénice 236). Unlike 
Zola or Gustave le bon, who generally fear and distrust the mob, and 
in total opposition to Taine, who makes it the very principle of revo-
lutionary evil, barrès not only welcomes it but sees in it the sole path 
to political salvation. as individuals, the members of the people are 
just as dominated by reflective self-interest as those of the other social 
classes. Only by shedding one’s rational outer coating can one liberate 
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the instinctive core of “energy” imprisoned underneath that same “foam” 
of education identified with the “barbarians” in his first novel, and this 
effect can best be attained through the mutual influence le bon a few 
years later would call suggestive “contagion.”
 in reality, barrès had not simply abandoned the ethics of individual-
ity in favor of the politics of crowd passion; rather, he had dislodged the 
self from its position of mastery, displacing it within the psychological 
and social fields. Plumbing the depths of the collective unconscious will 
allow his “real” self to surface from behind the false ego of education, 
and thereby make it possible to act in accordance with the sense of 
history. While this theory may seem more fatalistic than deterministic 
in the scientific sense, hartmann’s instinct played a role homologous 
to that of Taine’s determinism, and the German philosopher went to 
great pains to give it a scientific, physiological basis. a similar tension 
reigns between it and voluntary action, and barrès resolves this conflict 
in a way not so different after all from hugo, Goethe, or renan, not to 
mention marx: The first goal of the Moi must be to attune itself with 
the determining force of the unconscious; the energy liberated can then 
serve to fuel voluntary group action, but this associative activity will 
be successful only on condition of taking account of and working in 
harmony with the underlying potential of instinct.
Toward Nationalism
Well before Les déracinés, then, barrès had found a modus vivendi that 
allowed voluntarism and determinism, rationalism and irrationalism, 
not only to coexist side by side but to reinforce each other, albeit at 
the price of endorsing the politics of the crowd that Taine feared and 
detested. as he moved toward the later nationalism, he felt obliged to 
distance himself from other Tainian doctrines as well. The promotion 
of a certain irrationalism and the politicization of the masses, the latter 
easily assimilated to the rapidly growing urban proletariat created dur-
ing the economic recovery of the late 1880s and 1890s, were compat-
ible with various forms of socialism and boulangist populism vying for 
power with the bourgeois republic in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century. lacking still were the specific elements that would shift barrès’s 
program from a variant of socialism to the virulent revolutionary nation-
alism of the turn of the century that recent scholars have portrayed as a 
kind of protofascism. Those ingredients were supplied by Jules Soury, 
professor of physiological psychology at the École des hautes études of 
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the Sorbonne and a violent anti-Semitic pamphleteer during the Drey-
fus affair. barrès attended his lectures from 1893 to 1897 and soon 
enjoyed numerous private conversations with him.5 indeed, as Sternhell 
has shown in great detail, “Jules Soury was barrès’s true intellectual 
guide when he wrote the Novel of National Energy” as well as Scenes and 
Doctrines of Nationalism and Bastions of the East (254). it was Soury’s 
scientific theories of physiological determinism, influenced by Darwin, 
haeckel, and Spencer, which transformed barrès’s long-standing anti-
Semitism into something approaching a biological racism, and it was 
those same notions that allowed the writer to amalgamate hartmann’s 
instinctual unconscious and Taine’s determinism into the principle of 
cultural heredity that reigns in his nationalist program.
 it would be a mistake, however, to see this shift as a change from 
scientific rationalism to protofascist irrationalism (cf. Sternhell, Maurice 
Barrès et le nationalisme français 16–20, 259–62, 269–71). even before 
the publication of Les déracinés, barrès announced publicly his rejection 
of Taine’s belief in the autonomy and power of individual reason, in 
“Taine et le philistin,” which appeared in Le Figaro of December 19, 
1896 (Taine et Renan 101). in that same article he already espoused 
Soury’s principle of the automatism of thought resulting from the invol-
untary reactions common to all those living in a given milieu (101). 
On the other hand, in L’Appel au soldat the narrator declares that both 
Soury and Taine embraced the same principle of natural and historical 
development (767). and in the text of Les déracinés barrès quotes with 
approval the expression that had come to symbolize the repudiation of 
autonomous reason that had become a commonplace in the German 
physiology of the period: “intellect, what a small thing on the surface of 
ourselves! Certain Germans do not say, ‘i think,’ but, ‘it thinks in me’; 
in our depths we are affective beings” (660).
 This is not simply an isolated assertion; the dynamic principle of 
the novel is the ruling force of the nonrational in human affairs. From 
the start, bouteiller’s students are influenced by his person, his style, his 
career, and the images of the republic with which he coalesces in their 
minds, much more than by the ideas he advocates. in accordance with 
the views of ignatius loyola or le bon, it is the nonrational image, as 
opposed to the idea, that plays the dominant role in the key national-
ist scenes of the work, when the students gather around napoleon’s 
tomb and when the country mourns the passing of hugo. likewise, 
during his conversation with Taine, roemerspacher discovers that the 
thinker is not just a set of ideas, methods, and abstractions as he had 
previously assumed, but a body, an animal (598). it is this physicality, 
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this animality, corporality, and mortality that inspire him and Sturel to 
form their association with the other students, for “the idea of death 
and their animality . . . like an aphrodisiac, injects into their blood the 
frantic desire to live right away” (605). most telling is the fact that the 
narrator introduces the passage quoted above about the feebleness of 
intelligence compared to affect in order to downgrade the power of 
roemerspacher’s rational analysis and to confirm the validity of Sturel’s 
intuitive assessment of the situation in France (660).
 note that barrès does not call into question the rationality, the intel-
ligibility, of the world but only the capacity of individual reason to 
attain knowledge of it. in this respect, he is simply following the lead 
of standard conservative thought. burke, for instance, says exactly the 
same thing in order to justify his dismissal of the rational principles of 
the revolution in favor of the policy of basing human (i.e., british) 
law on the “natural” principle of inheritance: “[T]his policy appears to 
me to be the result of profound reflection; or rather the happy effect 
of following nature, which is wisdom without reflection, and above it” 
(119; emphasis added). barrès’s repudiation of Taine in this passage 
could not be more evident, for, in “l’influence de m. Taine” (Le Journal 
march 6, 1893), the writer precisely singled out “analysis,” ascertain-
ing the causes of a series of phenomena, as the key to Taine’s “method” 
and therefore as one of the two elements of his success (Taine et Renan 
64–65).
 in short, it is clear that barrès had already been converted to Soury’s 
ideas by the time he wrote Les déracinés. yet this brand of irrationalism 
could not have been the motivating force behind barrès’s attempts to 
overthrow the republic, still less the justification of those efforts, since 
it was a widespread cliché of the scientistic thought of the times and 
even formed part of the official ideology of that very republic. as we 
have seen, Jules Ferry, following the positivist theories of Comte and 
his disciples as well as of Spencer’s On Education (translated in 1878), 
justified teaching secular morality in the schools with exactly the same 
“irrationalist” ideas as Soury. The heart is more powerful than the intel-
lect; the ‘instinct’ of sympathy, which is the basis of morality, is as natu-
ral an affection as selfishness; sentiments must be actively cultivated and 
developed; and the goal of ethical instruction in the schools is to teach 
the individual to subordinate himself to the group, and above all to 
national unity in order to combat “intellectual anarchy.”
 Champions of scientific rationalism and the republic such as Émile 
Durkheim argued that the individual is unimportant without the group 
(Weisz 292), and that society “lives and acts in him” (quoted in Weisz 
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294). alfred espinas, a philosopher appointed in 1894 to the newly 
created chair in the history of social economy at the Sorbonne and thus 
a quasi-official spokesman for the republic, announced in his inaugural 
lecture that “human action was largely based on irrational beliefs and 
desires” (Weisz 293).
 Similar “irrationalist” claims are found in the writings of ribot, le 
bon, and a host of others (see Sternhell, Droite révolutionnaire and nye, 
Origins of Crowd Psychology). They all show that not only is a certain 
anti-individualism and irrationalism compatible with a certain rational-
ism, and specifically with various types of determinism, but that the 
particular brand of irrationalism to which Soury and barrès adhered in 
actuality derives directly from rationalism itself. ribot’s first important 
work, La psychologie anglaise contemporaine (Contemporary English Psychol-
ogie; 1870), was a presentation to the French public of the psychologi-
cal theories of the british empiricists, from locke to Spencer, most of 
whom attacked the notion of free will in the name of determinism and 
attempted to separate it from morality. The arguments of John Stuart 
mill, whom one can hardly accuse of being a wild-eyed irrationalist let 
alone a protofascist, are characteristic: morality is independent of free-
dom; we judge someone moral if they are beneficent to others, immoral 
if they are not (ribot, La psychologie anglaise 143). moreover, necessity, 
in the literal sense, does not apply to human motives and causality (in 
mill’s conception of the term). even in a fatalistic view (which mill did 
not hold), responsibility subsists and so does punishment (143). This 
was precisely Taine’s position in response to The Disciple, and barrès’s 
in Les déracinés.
 but it is not only nineteenth-century empirical scientism that led 
to these principles. Spinoza, the rationalist’s rationalist, had long since 
derived similar conclusions about the unity of nature and the subjec-
tion of the individual to the totality from what he, and Taine after him, 
considered to be purely logical, a priori considerations. indeed, it is not 
by chance that rationalism leads to irrationalism—the denial of free will 
and autonomy—via determinism. The basic premise of Spinoza’s line 
of reasoning is, in a sense, reason itself, that is, the ultimate intelligibil-
ity of the universe. We can only understand that which we can explain 
causally, and there is no way to arrest the chain of causes before we reach 
the totality of the world. individuals are merely parts of the whole, so 
that the only sensible attitude for us to take toward life is to accept our 
role in the system of necessities. What appears to be irrationality from 
our individual perspective turns out in reality to be ultimate rationality 
T h e  N o v e l  o f  N aT i o N a l  e N e r g y :  p r o t o fA s C i s t ?   ~    
when considered under the aspect of eternity, as Spinoza’s famous 
phrase has it.
 We must acknowledge, then, that important elements of barrès’s 
irrationalism are, in the writer’s view at least, perfectly compatible with 
certain aspects of Taine’s rationalism, which in turn come directly from 
the principles of the enlightenment, such as the belief in the funda-
mental intelligibility of the human as well as of the natural worlds, the 
existence of general causal “laws” governing the various series of observ-
able phenomena, and the conviction that all are subject to the familiar 
Tainian determining categories of race, moment, and milieu; and that 
the hereditary determinism barrès took from Soury was in fact a com-
monplace of the scientistic doctrines of the era. in short, to admit that 
it is impossible to separate rationalism from irrationalism neatly and 
without overlap, and that, as a result, fascism cannot be explained as the 
consequence of antihumanistic irrationalism.
Dialogic Ethics
how, then, do these solutions to the tension between voluntary action 
and determinism, rationalism and irrationalism, affect barrès’s attitude 
toward Taine’s ethic of acceptance? The external evidence is unequivocal. 
in private barrès was quick to reject the claim, made by bourget in his 
Figaro review, that he was indebted to Taine for all the ideas espoused 
in Les déracinés (Oeuvres Xiii 138; entry of november 13, 1897). he 
had already made the same stand public in his response to a survey 
of opinions about Taine’s works published in La Revue Blanche in the 
summer of 1897, precisely at the time when the last installments of Les 
déracinés were appearing in the Revue de Paris. While generally praising 
the philosopher’s ideas, he had denounced the ethic of acceptance they 
implied as lacking energy and encouraging timidity (Taine et Renan). 
in fact, in an early draft of the novel, barrès had included a passage of 
commentary which explicitly condemned roemerspacher’s visitor for 
glazing “the fatalistic and cruel doctrines issued forth from Spinoza” 
with a patina of morality. although the logic of Spinoza’s ideas ought 
to condemn morality as a religious survival, for a novice like roemer-
spacher there is something intoxicating about the idea that necessity 
governs both nature and history (Romans et voyages 1377 n266).
 The fact remains, however, that barrès chose not to include this 
comment in the final version of the work, and we might well wonder 
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why not. it cannot be that he simply changed his mind, since his 
remarks in the Revue Blanche survey appeared after the completion of 
the manuscript of Les déracinés. indeed, his critique of Taine’s pusil-
lanimity does emerge within the novel, but not in the form he had 
first envisaged. While barrès was rarely shy about expressing his views 
directly in this work, in the case of Taine’s ethic of acceptance the writer 
chose to present them in dialogue rather than in explicit narratorial 
interventions. his brain overheated by the blaze of new ideas and the 
sheer excitement of Taine’s visit, roemerspacher cannot wait a moment 
to relay everything to his friend Sturel. The latter is genuinely happy 
for his comrade, but is less than enthusiastic about his message: “in 
what you are reporting to me and what i discern in m. Taine, there is 
something sad and humble; excuse me, maurice: something servile . . . 
it’s the doctrine of renunciation” (602). Sturel goes on to explain that 
of course he prefers Taine’s stoicism to the mentality of exploitation he 
senses in bouteiller, but his ideal is an “intellectual”—this was written 
before the Dreyfus case had become a cause célèbre—who is not afraid 
of life, who is willing to take risks and confront unexpected dangers; 
someone who would renounce nothing but rather “absorb” everything 
that comes his way and integrate it all into a new and unique unity. 
For Sturel, thought has value only insofar as it stimulates action, as it 
inspires and mobilizes his creative energy (602–4).
 There are several good reasons for thinking that Sturel acts as bar-
rès’s spokesperson here. The simplest is that, if anyone is the “hero” of 
this novel, it is Sturel. The main love interest involves him, astiné and 
a young woman named mlle. alison, who lives in the same boarding 
house as he does. it is he who, like barrès, becomes the champion of 
the boulangist cause in the Chamber of Deputies in the second volume 
of the trilogy and its would-be avenger via the Panama Canal scandal in 
the third. it is in his mind that the culminating scenes of Les déracinés 
are focalized, the mass funeral ceremonies for hugo intermingled with 
the condemnation and execution of racadot and a confrontation with 
mouchefrin and racadot’s mistress, léontine, after which he becomes 
the main actor and center of consciousness in the following two vol-
umes. moreover, Sturel’s ideal recapitulates barrès’s ideology of the 
“Cult of the ego” and the “energy” that gives its name to the trilogy. 
indeed barrès deliberately situates this dialogic conflict of “two con-
tradictory ethics” in the symbolic setting of the Place des invalides, in 
which Taine’s plane tree is juxtaposed to the tomb of that “professor of 
energy,” napoleon i (608), and the author dubs it “the dialogue of the 
Plane Tree and the Dome” (600).
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 There are equally good reasons, however, for thinking that, while 
Sturel may be the main character in the sense of capturing the limelight 
and acting out the writer’s inner conflicts, it is roemerspacher who 
represents the author’s ideal and receives his final approval. Petitbon 
points out that it is he who gets the girl from lorraine, mlle. alison, 
whom Sturel could not keep (90). Curtius mentions that it is Sturel’s 
misplaced enthusiasm for napoleon and Caesarism that leads to the 
founding of the newspaper and, indirectly, to astiné’s murder. To com-
plicate matters further, Soucy maintains that, while Sturel is the main 
character, the denouement of the plot proves that roemerspacher’s 
realism is right, Sturel’s idealism wrong. The latter’s heroic allegiance 
to boulangism come what may is admirable but ultimately misguided, 
leading only to disappointment and lost illusions, as the general’s fail-
ure amply demonstrates. in politics, only success has value, and success 
depends on a realistic assessment of the situation and the willingness to 
bring one’s wishes into conformity with that reality (257). yet barrès 
also continued to criticize roemerspacher’s overly passive determinism: 
“The perfect hero, barrès implies, would be someone who would com-
bine the best features of both men, the vigorous activism of Sturel with 
the social consciousness of roemerspacher, the dome of les invalides 
with Taine’s plane tree” (205).
 is it possible to harmonize these conflicting views with each other? 
must we conclude that barrès’s text is shot through with irreconcil-
able contradictions? a telling clue to an answer is provided by the fact 
that barrès chose to frame the debate about acceptance as a dialogue 
between the two major characters of the novel. This fact would indicate 
that a purely ideological reading of the work, one that ignores its narra-
tive character, will inevitably overlook important evidence of the degree 
of validity the text imputes to the ideas expressed. in this particular case, 
we know that barrès began with a single character modeled on a friend 
named audiat, but soon decided to split this prototype of Sturel into 
several independent personae in order, precisely, to be able to present 
“multiple points of view” (Germain 35, quoting from an early draft by 
barrès).
 it was the concept of the absolute ego, derived from his early read-
ing of Fichte, Feuerbach, and Stirner, that led simultaneously to the 
rejection of everything that was “not-I” and to the conviction that each 
person sees the world from his or her own individual perspective (Fran-
don, Barrès précurseur 51–54). barrès found the same idea expressed in 
bourget’s summary of the mentality reigning in the fin de siècle due to 
the “dilettantism” of renan and the “analysis” of Taine. The importance 
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of point of view combined with the deprecation of narratorial interven-
tion had of course been essential tenets of the discourse of the novel 
since Flaubert. but it was the symbolist reaction against the natural-
ist novel that led to the new conception of fiction that barrès helped 
to initiate in the first books of the Cult of the Ego (Ouston 55, and 
n37). if barrès decided to present the conflict over Taine’s doctrines as 
a dialogue between two sympathetically drawn characters rather than 
in narratorial commentary, it was precisely in order to leave the debate 
open, at least for a considerable time. by doing so, he could show the 
divergent views at work, not merely as an abstract dispute between 
opposing ideas but as dynamic forces that govern the way Sturel and 
roemerspacher understand the world and hence the way they live their 
lives.
 it is therefore not at all surprising that the question of the author’s 
acceptance of Taine’s ethic of acceptance should be open to so many 
conflicting appraisals. assessing the didactic import of these characters 
cannot be restricted to purely ideological considerations. as Suleiman 
eventually concedes (Authoritarian Fictions 205–8), mythos does not 
surrender to logos so easily. even in a roman à thèse, at least in this 
one, plot and character do not merely “illustrate” ideas, for the simple 
reason that any judgment of what the thesis actually is must take into 
account the literariness of the text, distinguishing the nuances of voice 
and focus, heeding the qualifications of statements and the complexities 
of tone, and, above all, examining the relation of the ideological posi-
tions claimed to the events recounted. in sum, it must scrutinize each 
relevant passage individually and carefully in light of the entire text if 
it is to determine accurately the political thrust of barrès’s explanations 
and their possible relations to the theory or practice of fascism.
 it is true that the narrator of the Novel of National Energy never 
wavers from his thesis on the evils of uprooting, but, as the conflicting 
interpretations cited above demonstrate, it is not at all clear what the 
implications of this thesis are in every case, and particularly in that of 
Taine’s ethic of acceptance. nor is it always a simple matter to determine 
which character acts as spokesperson for the author. a closer reading of 
the admiring descriptions of Taine in chapter vii indicates, for instance, 
that they bathe in the aura produced by the impressions of the young 
roemerspacher, who, quite obviously, is deeply honored and touched 
by the celebrated thinker’s visit to his room. in several passages of this 
chapter, the prevalence of the character’s point of view is indicated only 
by the use of the free indirect discourse perfected by Flaubert and Zola, 
in which it is difficult to distinguish between narrator and character, 
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since the narrative voice continues to be that of the narrator using the 
third person, while only subtle verbal or contextual hints attest that the 
feelings, ideas, or impressions are actually those of the character. When 
roemerspacher hears the knock on his door and cries, “Come in,” for 
instance, the text continues: “a stranger, almost an old man, rather 
short, with a serious and unaffected look, appeared” (591). Clearly the 
term “stranger” conveys the student’s impression, not the evaluation of 
the narrator (or author), and it is the young man who notes the philos-
opher’s “serious and unaffected look.” after Taine introduces himself, 
the text reads: “Obviously, the illustrious philosopher, interested by the 
work of this unknown writer, had gone to the newspaper’s office” (591). 
here again, the “obviously” introduces, in free indirect discourse, the 
student’s reconstruction of the process by which Taine was able to locate 
his residence. Similarly, the passage summarized above describing the 
lessons imparted by the tree image are placed under roemerspacher’s 
aegis in a kind of free indirect discourse typically introduced by a verb of 
perception or thought: “What he glimpses immediately is . . . ” (599). 
even the passage insisting that Taine’s “Goethian” morality of sociabil-
ity is the very antithesis of bouteiller’s neo-Kantianism may be taken 
either as the narrator’s voice or as free indirect discourse representing 
the student’s ruminations, since the paragraph in which it appears is 
introduced by a sentence indicating the impression of the character: 
“This point of view is so new that the young man doesn’t know how to 
relate to it” (595).
 Of course, the mere presence of free indirect discourse does not 
automatically prove that the narrator is distancing himself from the ideas 
expressed. indeed, some scholars maintain that the style always marks 
a fusion between narrator and character. moreover, not every passage 
in the chapter is in free indirect discourse. in certain cases the narrator 
speaks directly in his own voice; in others, the thoughts are explicitly 
those of the student alone. The only certainty to be deduced from the 
key passages in chapter vii, however, is that it is roemerspacher who 
admires and approves wholeheartedly of Taine’s ideas. insofar as it is 
reflected in the narrator’s expressed attitudes, the author’s stand at this 
point is not so much ambiguous as simply left open.
 after the explicit pronouncements of the narrator, a second major 
narrative criterion for determining the thesis is the account of the edu-
cation of the central characters, who can be expected to discover and 
expound the “truth,” espousing the “right” values and rejecting the 
“wrong” ones (Suleiman, Authoritarian Fictions 76–78). Whether or 
not the outcome is predictable because fixed in advance, this learning 
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entails a temporal process in which, under the test of experience, the 
characters’ beliefs and values undergo one or more changes during the 
course of the story. That even roemerspacher’s belief in Taine’s teach-
ing is deeply shaken is demonstrated by his experience as a student in 
Germany, in L’Appel au soldat. in speaking of the “law of continuity and 
universal determinism” in his letter to Sturel (L’Appel au soldat 771), the 
young man claims that it is the Germans who embrace Taine’s idea, in 
stark opposition to the French, who allegedly believe in free will. he is 
horrified to think that he was about to adopt principles which seem to 
justify the “thousands of Taine’s plane trees” he has come upon in Ger-
many (which he then decides to call “German oaks”) in their conviction 
of German supremacy and French inferiority (771). in other words, he 
recognizes that both the Darwinian idea of development in nature and 
history, which the narrator briefly evokes in introducing the letter (767), 
and the ethic of acceptance, imply an acquiescence in the status quo of 
political forces which contradicts his French patriotism and thus the 
very nationalism he, Taine, and barrès are supposed to be promoting in 
this novel. he manages to quell his misgivings only when he comes to 
the conclusion that each nation possesses its own truth derived from the 
facts of its history and inculcates its own ideal into its members, so that 
it is as natural for the Germans to believe in their own superiority as for 
the French to act to ensure the survival of their collectivity (774–75). if 
it is essential that the individual accept his role in the national collectiv-
ity, it is just as important that he not accept the claims of rival nations. 
in short, the ‘truth’ that roemerspacher discovers, the ultimate ethical 
principle, is national survival. even for this supposedly model Tainian, 
acceptance is good only to the extent and in the manner that it furthers 
the cause of nationalism. no wonder that in his letter roemerspacher 
ends up by revolting against the status quo and embracing revanchist 
claims to alsace-lorraine.
 roemerspacher applies this new understanding of acceptance to the 
Panama Canal scandals in Leurs figures, although it is difficult to decide 
at that point whether his principle is Tainian or anti-Tainian. While 
Sturel is intent on exposing those involved in the corruption and bring-
ing them to justice no matter what the cost, roemerspacher takes the 
view that his friend is a budding anarchist who is more interested in his 
own ideas than in the good of society (1197). This may be cynical Real-
politik, provoked by barrès’s resentment over the failure of boulangism 
and his subsequent defeats in parliamentary elections, as Soucy argues 
(112–13), or, just as likely, a coded justification for valuing the army 
over the truth, barrès’s basic anti-Dreyfusard stance during the Dreyfus 
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affair, but does it represent an unequivocal acceptance of Taine’s ideas? 
it will be recalled that in Les déracinés roemerspacher had played the 
same ‘good of society’ card in order to justify the rejection rather than 
the acceptance of criminality, labeling racadot and mouchefrin “ven-
omous dust,” and “wolves to be slaughtered” in order to protect society 
(725–26). if we take the signifier “Taine” to mean the good of society 
as opposed to the claims of the individual, then roemerspacher remains 
consistent in these two apparently opposed stances; if it signifies instead 
acceptance, then he has reversed his attitude from the first to the last 
novel.
 are we supposed to take him at his word, without second thoughts? 
earlier Sturel had expressed the strong suspicion that roemerspacher’s 
attitude toward justice in the Panama affair was the result of his own 
petty self-interest rather than of any broad concern for the well-being 
of society (1068). afraid that his career and his liaison with mme. de 
nelles (the former mlle. alison) might be compromised if he supported 
Sturel’s efforts to bring the truth to light, roemerspacher accuses the 
latter of anarchism, that is, of attacking the social order out of exagger-
ated individualism, in order to cover up his own egotism and cowardice. 
For barrès, Taine’s acceptance connotes careerism and pusillanimity as 
much as a genuine concern for the welfare of the body politic.
 roemerspacher’s final lesson in the trilogy is that intelligence does 
not have the importance he had previously attributed to it. about to 
be married to mme. de nelles, who has obtained a divorce from her 
husband thanks to Sturel’s last-minute agreement not to publish his list 
of chéquards (the members of Parliament who had taken graft in return 
for support of financing the Panama Canal) which included the name 
of m. de nelles, roemerspacher announces to him: “‘intelligence, bah! 
We are affective beings in our depths. emotivity is the great human 
quality,” without which intellect must remain sterile (1197). now, in 
these novels the signifier “Taine” stands precisely for excessive devo-
tion to intellect. it is certainly not by chance that his main philosophi-
cal treatise is titled De l’intelligence, as any contemporary reader would 
have recalled. more important, as Curtius emphasized from the outset, 
in the trilogy roemerspacher represents the primacy of the intellect, 
while Sturel exemplifies that of the life of feeling (81). Upon hearing 
his friend quote Soury to him in this way, Sturel indeed recognizes that 
roemerspacher has come around to the way of thinking that has moti-
vated his, Sturel’s, involvement in boulangism and the Panama affair.
 a recognition scene in the aristotelian sense, this moment marks the 
perception that the two aspects of life must be combined, the emotional 
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leading to heroism, the intellectual to determinism, as Soucy maintains 
(206). roemerspacher had declared (paraphrasing Soury): “every great 
discovery, every lofty and powerful thought, is always accompanied by 
extraordinary emotivity. That’s what i failed to recognize for years” 
(1197). and Sturel concludes that his own political commitments have 
resulted from high-minded reasoning about the nation’s destiny “pushed 
to a degree at which intellect joins and confirms the instinctive passions” 
(1197).
 Sturel’s development is no more conclusive a vindication of Taine’s 
ethic of acceptance than is roemerspacher’s self-serving collectivism. 
in L’Appel au soldat, Sturel makes a pilgrimage through his native lor-
raine guided by his friend Saint-Phlin, during which he and the narra-
tor wax sarcastic over the sluggishness of the German peasants in the 
moselle area of Trier and Koblenz, and their lack of any superior people 
who might stir up “disorder.” Sturel and Saint-Phlin are dismayed by 
the French-speaking tavern keeper, who has no sense of responsibility 
toward the war of 1870, the siege of Paris, or the occupation of his 
country, and they remark derisively that the fellow accepts all events 
with the “resignation of a serf ” (958). in a note, rambaud indicates 
sensibly that this episode betrays barrès’s hesitation between ‘order’ and 
the ‘disorder’ of genius and revolution, referring to the article in Le 
Journal (1900), “la maison natale de m Taine.” in sum, the trip does 
convince Sturel of the value of reverence for one’s ancestors, of “soil and 
the dead” nationalism, but by no means of acceptance.
 in fact, after the tour of lorraine he parts ways with Saint-Phlin, 
irritated at the latter’s smug willingness to settle for the mediocrity of 
everyday life, marrying the girl next door and raising a family rather 
than joining Sturel on the path of adventure fighting for the boulan-
gist cause. Of course there were still one and a half novels to go before 
the end of the trilogy, so barrès could hardly afford to complete his 
protagonist’s education so early. but beyond this practical consideration 
emerges the sense that the writer wants above all to preserve Sturel as 
the man of desire—the ‘enemy of the laws’ as the title of barrès’s earlier 
novel has it—by having him refuse to submit to any law, whether it be 
the social law of marriage or the intellectual law of a fixed ideology, 
even that of nationalism. indeed, throughout the last novel of the series, 
Sturel resists the sermons on nationalist acceptance he receives from 
roemerspacher and especially from Saint-Phlin. it is only at the very 
end of the book, when he has lost his father and given up his campaign 
against the chéquards out of love for mme. de nelles that he finally 
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acquiesces, grudgingly, to arboreal logic. Unable to bear the idea that he 
alone might be responsible for all his failures, “[he] saw the individual 
subjected to circumstances, attached to large groups, like the leaf to the 
oak shaken by the storm” (1199). but the admission that he is merely 
an extension of his parents and ancestors is a bitter pill for him to swal-
low, one that induces a kind of drugged torpor (1199). This hardly 
qualifies as a resounding endorsement of the nationalist politics of soil 
and the dead!
 as in Les déracinés, the final pages of Leurs figures are devoted to 
Sturel’s ruminations, about the past and the future. he goes for a walk 
in the parks of versailles on his thirtieth birthday in 1893, a year when 
the right lost heavily in the elections. now, contemplating the dying 
leaves, thinking of his friends’ successes and his own defeats, he begins 
to convince himself of the circumstantial interpretation of those failures, 
slowly reconciling himself to the idea of acceptance (1208). he does 
not do so, however, in the spirit of a roemerspacher or a Saint-Phlin; 
on the contrary, inspired by the poplars reaching toward the sky, he 
defiantly refuses to give up his desire, his idealism (1208–9).
 The last scene of the trilogy is an encounter between Sturel and 
bouteiller, both licking the wounds suffered in their parliamentary bat-
tles (bouteiller, compromised in the Panama scandal, has just lost his 
seat to Suret-lefort). Well before Derrida’s Glas, barrès juxtaposes their 
reflections about the future in two parallel columns on the same pages. 
Whereas bouteiller can think of nothing but appeasing the elite of his 
political party, Sturel’s soul-searching leads him to decide that he should 
not accept the definition of himself as a failure, which others want to 
attach to him like children tying tin cans onto a dog’s tail. here he 
reverts to the main theme from Sous l’oeil des barbares, in which the Fich-
tean ego of the protagonist takes on the divinity described by Spinoza 
as the lack of any limitation from outside itself, that is, of any definition 
(Barbares 73–77). The problem for Sturel is the same: if he accepted 
that definition, it would mean that he had taken his inspiration from 
outside not from within. he concludes by essaying a combination of 
autonomy and necessity, of individualism and collectivism: “my heroic 
resolutions have value only if they proceed from a deep inner necessity, 
from something ethnic” (1211).
i will give myself over to my inner necessity. if i maintain my tradition, 
if i prevent my chain from being unlinked, if i am the son of my dead 
ones and the father of their grandchildren, i may not bring the plans of 
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my race to reality, but i will maintain their potential. my task is clear: 
become more and more a man of lorraine, to be lorraine so that she 
can traverse intact this period when decerebrated and dissociated France 
seems to suffer from general paralysis. (1211)
Extimate Identity
Sturel’s tour de force in his final acceptance of acceptance, or perhaps his 
sleight of hand, is to harmonize the apparent contradictories that have 
plagued not only himself but the entire novel. he has accomplished, 
or at least talked himself into believing that he has accomplished, what 
barrès claimed in his “réponse à m. rené Doumic” (1900) as the 
major achievement of his writing to that point in his career: showing 
that “the individual ego was completely supported and sustained by 
society” (181). Far from contradicting his Cult of the Ego, the collec-
tivism of the Novel of National Energy represents the logical develop-
ment of the “constant opinions” he expressed in A Free Man. it is easy 
enough to poke holes in this argument: barrès’s attitude toward lor-
raine, its inhabitants, and his ancestors underwent a reversal from the 
early novel to the later nationalist period, from loathing to adoration, as 
he abandoned his former cosmopolitanism in favor of regional national-
ism (rambaud 1259 n235; Soucy 75). When confronted with this sort 
of objection, barrès responded that perhaps he did not follow the arid 
logic of the schools, but he did at least adhere to “the superior logic of 
a tree seeking light and yielding to its inner necessity” (“réponse à m. 
rené Doumic 179).
 This last statement sounds very much like an endorsement, or rather 
a repetition, of Taine’s tree parable, but it differs from the latter by 
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the single word “inner.” Taine’s tree followed its own internal law, but 
yielded to the necessities imposed upon it by the external environment; 
barrès’s, on the contrary, yields to an inner compulsion. When bar-
rès finally sings the praises of acceptance, as he does in his “réponse” 
(182) and in the contemporary Scènes et doctrines (19), he is accepting 
what he takes to be an internal pressure. This is precisely the same dif-
ference that Sturel insists upon in resisting roemerspacher’s notion of 
necessity, for in it resides the key to his—and barrès’s—sense of identity. 
barrès’s nationalism is the acceptance of a determinism (12, 13), but 
it is a determinism that aims to preserve the freedom of its adherents. 
The contradictory nature of these two requirements is evident, as Jules 
renard noted with glee (Soucy 208); yet they do have a certain hidden 
coherence similar to that already adumbrated in barrès’s exaltation of 
the collective unconscious in Le jardin de Bérénice. For the nationalist 
barrès as for Sturel or the nameless hero of Barbarians—but also for 
Spinoza, Kant’s pupil Fichte, or for Kant himself—the enemy is the 
Other, otherness in any form, like definition, constituting the negation 
of autonomy. in Kant the subject is free to the extent that it obeys rea-
son, giving itself its own law, determining its own action in competition 
with, if not in downright contradiction to, the external law of physical 
determinism. likewise for barrès in his nationalist phase, insofar as 
one’s ancestors are experienced as forming the core of one’s inner being, 
accepting their “determinism” is the ultimate expression of the freedom 
of the self. it is in this context that Carroll’s astute remark should be 
read: in this conception, the others which the self is, its ancestors or 
fellow countrymen, are not really other, for they are felt to be “affinities” 
(Réponse 181), that is, the same as the self (Carroll 27).
 When barrès protests in his response to Doumic that in the National 
Energy trilogy he has merely developed the tendencies laid forth in A 
Free Man, in this respect at least he is telling the plain truth. The social 
self that forms the base of the individual self resists domination by what 
it conceives to be the external just as strongly and in just the same way 
as the self of the Cult of the Ego. moreover, the social self is not the 
simple opposite, nor even the adamant antagonist of the individual, at 
least not in France, for, according to barrès, the individualism enshrined 
in the Declaration of the rights of man during the revolution forms an 
integral part of French historical tradition and therefore of French iden-
tity (1904 preface to Un homme libre 93–94). he is even open to foreign 
influences, of a sort: namely, he will take, and has taken, from foreign 
cultures that which can be divested of its otherness and “transformed” 
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into something compatible with the self, the way a plant assimilates the 
minerals with which it nourishes itself (93).
 What has changed is that formerly barrès’s protagonists believed 
there was an authentic, natural inner self hidden beneath the social self, 
waiting to be unearthed and cultivated, whereas now he claims to have 
discovered that, somewhat as in barthes’s image of the onion, when the 
various layers of the self are peeled away through continued analyses, 
eventually one finds nothing—absolutely nothing.
in The Uprooted, the free man discerns and accepts his determinism. a 
candidate for nihilism pursues his apprenticeship, and, from analysis to 
analysis, he experiences the nothingness of the ego. [1904 preface to 
Un homme libre 93]
 [i] observed that the “ego” is destroyed [s’anéantit], when sub-
jected to conscientious analysis. . . . but the “ego” is destroyed in a 
still more terrifying way if we can recognize our automatic reflexes. . . . 
We are not the masters of the thoughts that arise within us. They are 
ways of reacting that translate very ancient physiological dispositions. 
(“réponse à Doumic” 182)
at stake in barrès’s denial of the power of personal consciousness here 
is not merely the individual’s claim to independent reason, however cru-
cial that may be, but rather his hold on existence itself. it is this distress, 
this dread of the total loss of self, that imparts such dire urgency to that 
lust for being that barrès knew as the Spinozan desire to “persevere in 
our being” and that we most often call euphemistically the quest for 
identity.
 it was the shadow of annihilation that gave barrès’s long-standing 
nationalism its peculiar virulence at the end of the century. While he 
mentioned the cult of the soil and the dead as a possible solution to 
the disarray he claimed to perceive in himself and in his country at the 
time of The Uprooted, it was the demise of his father in the following 
year, 1898, that threw him into the turmoil which frightened him into 
fully embracing that ideology as the only viable life raft in the ocean 
of randomness and contingency (rambaud 1351 n48). reinforced by 
the death of his mother a few years later, this reaction was a kind of 
rejection of mourning, a desperate attempt to “save” his parents from 
the grip of death (Mes mémoires 26), just as the theoreticians of reaction 
in France, de maistre and bonald, wanted to rescue the ancien régime 
from the oblivion threatened by the revolution.
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 barrès explained his conversion to rootedness in his retrospective 
account of the motives that impelled him to champion the anti-Drey-
fusard cause: “i realized that i was they [my parents] and that it was 
my destiny, my necessity to maintain them as long as i could. . . . i 
didn’t give a damn [Je me foutais] about the universe as soon as i was 
in agreeement with their memory” (Mes cahiers, i 43). like lacan’s 
antigone in his Ethics of Psychoanalysis, during the Dreyfus affair barrès 
refused to sacrifice his parents, in all their undefinable singularity, to any 
universalizing law of truth or justice. and indeed, in his own analysis 
of the Greek tragedy, barrès praises the heroine for refusing to bow to 
the “foreigner” Creon, who applies the laws with his intellect, whereas 
she succeeds in reconciling her city by listening to her heart and obey-
ing her sense of veneration for her “profound heredity,” that is, her race 
(Scènes et doctrines 14). Unlike the lacanian heroine, however, barrès 
maintained his stance not through the acceptance of death, but through 
the denial of it.
 neither barrès’s novels nor the nationalist movement he led would 
have had the resonance they did, especially among the literati, if this 
had been a purely personal reaction to a private event. raoul Girardet 
cites barrès’s fears of annihilation along with Charles maurras’s dread of 
being the “last of the French” as evidence that the fear of death seemed 
to obsess the entire nationalist movement of the times (Le nationalisme 
français 17). The Dreyfus affair, of course, played a preponderant role 
in the spread of nationalism after 1897, but the nationalists were neither 
the first nor the only ones to suffer from this anxiety in the so-called 
belle époque. at the root of the decadent movement, whether considered 
as a positive or negative phenomenon, were the same fears of death and 
disintegration, that is, of castration both mental and physical. nor did 
they have confidence in the universalist humanism so closely associated 
with the quasi-official doctrine of the republic, which barrès attacked 
as Kantianism.
 For barrès the solution lay in “making his relativism absolute,” as 
rambaud pithily expresses the matter, by privileging the point of view 
of his forebears, the only one, the writer claimed, that makes things 
appear in their proper proportions to a Frenchman; otherwise, lacking 
any universal basis, our choice of ethics would be a matter of pure chance 
(Scènes et doctrines 15; rambaud 192). in order to negate the death of 
his parents while maintaining contact with the living, he adopted the 
ideological move typical of reactionary thought of the nineteenth cen-
tury (but by no means restricted to the right): assimilating society to 
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the ancestors, and both to the self. each time he insists on the annihi-
lation of the self, he adds that underneath its nothingness lies society, 
the collectivity that supports and thereby reassures the disappearing self 
(“réponse” 181–82; préface to Un homme libre 93). barrès found his 
barrier against death first through the dissolution of his individuality in 
the relative eternity of ancestral continuity (“réponse” 182).
 Unlike the earlier apologists for the monarchy, bonald and de mais-
tre, or the contemporary royalists, bourget and maurras, barrès refused 
to jettison what he considered to be the ideals of the revolution, a 
certain conception of democracy, individualism, and the rights of man. 
The populism of the collective unconscious he had proclaimed in Le 
jardin de Bérénice opened up a second avenue into the disintegration and 
subsequent rehabilitation of the self: merging with the all-encompass-
ing spatiality of the collectivity. in his reminiscences about his involve-
ment in boulangism, barrès reveals that, although the movement 
lacked a “great idea” to solidify its program, its strong appeal for him 
derived from the sensation of being a member of the herd (troupeau) 
(Mémoires 24). The “instinctive” character of this experience recalls the 
encomium to the national unconscious of mass meetings in Berenice’s 
Garden, but now it is a matter of enjoyment of the mob in the present 
rather than the emergence of an ideal for the future as it was then. not 
just the result of guilt or a cause of fear, then, the dissolution of the 
individual self has also become a source of jouissance. barrès promises a 
similar enjoyment to those who participate in his ideology of “the soil 
and the dead,” assuring them of the “delightful giddiness” aroused by 
the sensation of finding oneself again in the family, race, and nation 
whose continuity cannot be negated by death (“réponse” 182).
 in either case, whether fusing with the spatial or the temporal col-
lectivity, it is by reveling in the death drive that barrès’s nationalism pro-
fesses to nullify death. The death of the ego was thus only a provisional 
condition, a way station on the road to the total recovery of the self. 
Society served not only as a support underneath the nothingness of the 
conscious self but also as a kind of manhole cover shielding from view 
the even darker abyss of physiological heredity and processes whose 
ancient instinctual compulsion threatens to annihilate the ego “in a still 
more terrifying manner.”
 The barresian, then, must cling to his national identity for dear life 
because group identity was his dear life; the innermost core of his being 
was, at the very same time, outside of his self. ringer was therefore only 
half right to contrast barrès’s doctrine to the German idea of Bildung, 
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for the French writer does not simply abandon the ideal of the develop-
ment of the inner self; he concludes rather that the inner self is, at the 
same time, outer. Unable to endure the tension entailed by this confron-
tation with what lacan calls ‘extimacy,’ however, he immediately recu-
perates the otherness within by making it over into a new dimension of 
the same. This oddly Kantian conception entailed a new duty, designed 
to replace Kant’s categorical imperative. in Saint-Phlin’s words: “[e]ach 
of us must fall back on his hereditary reserves and seek his rule there” 
(Leurs figures 1172). This duty not only justified the xenophobia and 
racism typical of modern nationalism, it obligated its adherents to safe-
guard the purity of the nation by extirpating all foreign elements from 
the greater body of which they strove to be a part. Otherwise, as Sturel 
puts it in L’Appel au soldat: “Then i feel French nationality diminishing, 
disappearing; that is, the substance that sustains me, without which i 
would vanish” (901).
Enjoying Your Thesis
if there were nothing more to barrès’s nationalism than this recycled 
herder, burke, and de maistre, there would be little reason to believe 
that examination of his writings might provide fresh insight into fascism. 
Sternhell has accurately pinpointed its most important innovation on the 
political level: the populist use of anti-Semitism as a political concept, 
rather than a simple xenophobia or anti-Jewish reflex (Maurice Barrès 
231), making it an essential tool in the mobilization of the new urban 
masses against the republic, or at least against parliamentary democracy 
(Sternhell, La droite révolutionnaire 24–25, 80–81; see also Soucy, chap. 
4, “vitalism, Massendemokratie, and racism”; and viereck 62). Previ-
ously in France, from the revolution to the Commune, as Taine and 
le bon complained loudly, the working-class crowds had intervened to 
support the radical left, while in Germany the nationalist ideas of the 
Volksgeist, racism, and the cult of the land were put in the service of rural 
reaction against industrialization (see mosse chaps. 1 and 3).
 What barrès has added to that equation is the sense of enjoyment 
involved in identifying with the national ancestors and the nationalist 
herd, and it is this jouissance that he explores in his Novel of National 
Energy. On one level, belonging to the herd was a paradoxical reaction 
against the discourse of the republic, whose insistence on national unity 
through universalism both intensified the desire for local identity and 
heightened the craving for adherence to the group, whether crowd or 
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ancestors, and its power. On another, however, it was an ironic, popu-
list extension of the republican lessons in morality and patriotism. That 
most distinguished spokesman for republican values, michelet, asserted 
the solidarity of the living and the dead in the preface to volume i of 
his Histoire du XIXe siècle (1872): “[The dead] now live with us who 
feel ourselves to be their relatives, their friends. That is how a fam-
ily is made, a community of the living and the dead.” in “Qu’est-ce 
qu’une nation” (“What is a nation?”; 1882), the famous speech at the 
Sorbonne announcing his newfound support of the republic, renan 
proclaimed that “the cult of ancestors is the most legitimate of all: our 
ancestors have made us who we are” (quoted in Girardet 65). more-
over, the republic’s ethics of universality depended on and enforced the 
sameness of all citizens as of humanity in general, thus encouraging the 
dissolution of individuality. herd action became a kind of living parody 
of republican universalism, a theatricalized performance, for the benefit 
of the Other, of the inadequacy and persistent externality of republican 
identity for those members of the intelligentsia or of the proletariat who 
felt that in reality they were excluded from participating in it.
 The Kantian universalism of the republic instituted what lacan 
called the senseless obscenity of the superego on two fronts: first, by 
instilling a notion of duty unmotivated by any goal or purpose and 
thus incomprehensible (as the primary schoolteachers quickly discov-
ered—see chapter 1), and, second, by promoting a notion of individual 
rights that relied on the uniformity of all persons. if Freud was right 
to assert that morality results from the renunciation of aggression, that 
“the categorical imperative of Kant is thus a direct inheritance from the 
Oedipus-complex” (“The economic Problem of masochism” 264), and 
not the force that mandates that renunciation, then it makes sense that 
the imposition of the republican superego would increase citizens’ need 
to find substitute objects for their sadistic impulses. The herd mentality 
thus complies with the more or less covert lesson of jouissance taught in 
the schools, by the behavior of the pupils and the tacit encouragement 
of the authorities who embodied the democratic superego: Conform 
or suffer exclusion. in exchange for the renunciation of all particular-
ity, individuals received the sensation, if not the reality, of control and 
group identity, to compensate for their sense of impotence in the face of 
a distant, vast, and impersonal bureaucracy on the national level. Worst 
of all, this perception of actual powerlessness was magnified a thousand-
fold by the promise of power—the citizen as sovereign—held out in all 
the republic’s civics textbooks. hence the reveling in the sheer power 
of the mob (Soucy 117–18).
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 in the Novel of National Energy, the seductive power of barrès’s 
nationalism is not simply asserted or described as in his political and 
journalistic pamphlets; it is dramatized as scenarios of jouissance, espe-
cially in Sturel’s life. it is in Sturel’s development that barrès brings 
out the hidden implications of his nationalist program and its relation 
to the earlier Cult of the Ego: the threads leading from the extimate to 
the ambivalence toward acceptance, the giddiness of merging with the 
crowd, and xenophobia. his enjoyment of the crowd is nowhere more 
evident than in the mob scene around the lyons train station in L’Appel 
au soldat (786–87; see Soucy 118). Dismissed from his post as minister 
of war, forced to leave Paris and go into exile, boulanger is hailed by a 
crowd of screaming supporters and carried off in a whirlwind of human-
ity. in a description whose images and ambiguous focalization are remi-
niscent of hugo or Zola, but whose tone betrays a rapt admiration for 
sheer power alien to his predecessors, barrès metaphorizes the crowd 
into an “immense wave,” an “animal” with “formidable undulations,” 
and explains: “Obscure feelings, inherited from our ancestors, words 
these combatants could not define, but through which they recognize 
each other as brothers, have created this delirium . . . these . . . forces of 
the national subconscious,” while Sturel “took a few moments to enjoy 
the emotion that these torrents of humanity aroused in him” (Appel au 
soldat 787).
 This scene is the counterpart to the climactic sequence of The 
Uprooted, in which the public outpouring of emotion during victor 
hugo’s funeral ceremonies sends thrills running up and down Sturel’s 
spine, while he alternately represses and broods over his complicity in 
the crime of racadot and mouchefrin. in both scenes the narrator fol-
lows the young man as he observes the throngs surging around him, so 
that the thoughts, impressions, and feelings described can be attributed 
equally plausibly to the narrator or to the mind of the character. in 
both, the protagonist’s emotions lead him up the blind alley of follow-
ing a movement that has no grand idea to direct it. by its open evoca-
tion of death, however, both in the apotheosis of the national hero’s 
body at the foot of the arc de Triomphe and in the intermittent recalls 
of astiné’s gruesome murder, the chapter describing hugo’s memorial 
services, tellingly titled “The Social virtue of a Corpse,” elicits much 
more forcefully the delectation that constitutes the reward for those who 
allow themselves the luxury of dissolving into the mob. The exhibition 
of his corpse in front of that “door to the void,” as the arc de Triomphe 
was called in those days when the city ended there, brought home to the 
people of Paris the reality of death whose thought they usually try to 
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elude, for, they reflect, if even the great man can die, then so will i. Thus 
transformed into the gateway to “nothingness and mystery” (728), the 
arc becomes the visible image of that wintry fear of death and the 
unknown at the bottom of every effort to grasp at a solid identity. like 
roemerspacher when confronted with Taine’s mortality, in reaction to 
this dread the crowds of people flooding the Champs-Élysées from the 
Place de la Concorde to the arc de Triomphe soon become drunk with 
the furious desire to live; elevating the poet to the status of a god, they 
devote a veritable orgiastic cult to the product of their creation.
like all cults of the dead, these funeral ceremonies exalted the sense 
of life. The lofty idea the crowd had of this corpse . . . swept a strange 
ardor through their veins. The benches along the Champs-Élysées, the 
shadows under the bushes were the scene of a vast orgy that lasted until 
dawn. (728)
 The other death evoked in this passage is that of astiné. The chapter 
opens with Sturel’s mortal battle with himself over the guilt he feels for 
his implication in the murder and the sense of obligation he harbors 
toward his friend mouchefrin. after he decides he must turn the killer 
in to the police, he breaks out in a cold sweat at the image he con-
jures up of himself as a traitor dragging his friend down into the sewer 
(723). but he is even more horrified when, half delirious, he pictures his 
double turning his face away from the sordid spectacle of billancourt, 
where he witnessed the murder, in order to contemplate the beauties 
of nature (an indirect reminder of his feeling for Thérèse alison). The 
ostensible purpose for the juxtaposition of the two fatalities is of course 
to provide a determining reason for Sturel to conclude his otherwise 
interminable vacillation between loyalty to a former friend and the obli-
gation to denounce a criminal. The national grandeur and unity mani-
fested in the civil ceremonies of hugo’s funeral chase away his somber 
thoughts of death, replacing them with acceptance of Taine’s message: 
“after walking all day with organized France, with her elected powers, 
official celebrities and corporate bodies, he recognized the great spring 
of life, in which his own was just a tiny stream” (737). now able to step 
back from his individual predicament and see things under the aspect 
of eternity, feeling the mysterious unity of life that hugo displays in his 
poetry and the crowd manifests in its exhilaration, Sturel renounces all 
desire to seek remedies or wreak vengeance for “the atrocity committed” 
(la chose atroce accomplie): “There are ignoble moments, but together 
they add up to a noble eternity” (730).
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 Carroll discerns another function in this combination of plot ele-
ments: The assassination of astiné and the trial of mouchefrin and 
racadot, which surround the narrative of hugo’s burial, represent a 
purification of the nation, the eradication of the “foreign,” whether 
external or internal, being a necessary preparation for the exaltation of 
hugo as national hero (Carroll 39). “The logic of the novel is unam-
biguous and brutal; the elimination of the foreign and the construc-
tion of the nation-Subject justify any means used to accomplish them” 
(39). no “sacrifice,” as the narrator later calls the failure of the two 
criminals, is too great in the service of the noble goal of national unity. 
martine reid goes even further in this direction, arguing that barrès’s 
overt political explanation of astiné’s murder hides a series of repressed 
meanings. While barrès states that her death benefits the remaining 
students by bringing them face to face with reality, careful perusal of 
the text shows that it also serves the darker and more hidden purpose 
of slaying everything the author hates and fears: “admirable scene of a 
very personal ‘theater of cruelty,’ astiné’s murder brings together all the 
elements of barrès’s political unconscious” (reid 387). With the “eter-
nal feminine” that she represents must perish the entire “unthought” 
(impensé) of the novel, the whole textual chain of elements associated 
with her figure as foreign, starting with the subject matter of bouteiller’s 
teaching, the philosophy of Greece and Germany (385; Carroll notes 
the same connection between bouteiller and astiné).
 reid refers to the fact that the author’s long-standing anti-Semi-
tism finds revanchard expression in Sturel’s visit to his hometown of 
neufchâteau, now “invaded” by bands of Jewish refugees from alsace 
and the annexed portion of lorraine (see reid 386–87). They would 
have made a touching spectacle in the Frankfurt ghetto, he thinks, but 
their foreign gestures bring only ugliness to neufchâteau (Les déracinés 
660).1 The narrator then “clarifies” his character’s ideas about the psy-
chological defeat of France, adding that in previous times the country 
was strengthened by integrating foreigners into herself, whereas “nowa-
days these vagabonds are making us over in their image” (661). This 
interpretation is just the forerunner of the noxious anti-Semitism barrès 
will take over from Soury during the heat of the Dreyfus affair (Stern-
hell, Maurice Barrès 253), when he will trumpet the defamations later 
repeated by the nazis: “The Jews have no homeland in the sense that 
we understand the term. For us the homeland is the soil and our ances-
tors, it is the land of our dead ones. For them it is the place where they 
find their greatest self-interest” (Scènes et doctrines 72).
 lacoue-labarthe and nancy point out that hitler and alfred rosen-
berg extended this argument to conclude that the Jews, supposedly 
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living only in the world of abstractions such as philosophy, science, 
and democracy, were the ‘anti-type,’ destructive of all identity (Mythe 
Nazi 58). What they don’t mention is that barrès was merely repeat-
ing the ancient Christian attacks on the Jews: “They [the Jews] do not 
observe the Passover, for how can they? They have no place, but wander 
everywhere” (athanasius of alexandria, “Festal letter” of January 16, 
329). in fact, the Jew is not a human being at all, according to barrès, 
and therefore has no claim to be treated according to ethical or legal 
standards. being of a different species, Jews should be exhibited in an 
ethnology department as an ‘object lesson’ (Scènes et doctrines 153).
 according to reid, astiné acts the role of scapegoat as defined by 
rené Girard: through her the author violently purges the “substance” 
of the country of all difference, of every kind of alterity in the name 
of the self-identical (reid 387)—the foreign, whether Greek, German, 
or Jewish, but also the feminine that weakens men, and philosophy, 
literature in the form of stories, fiction, and, above all, exoticism, “his 
bête noire, romanticism along with the whole Orientalist hodgepodge” 
(386–87).
 While reid’s and Carroll’s observations are both accurate and pen-
etrating, there is one dimension of the crime they scarcely discuss: 
Sturel’s profound complicity in it and the enjoyment his vicarious par-
ticipation betrays. it is he who precipitates the bankruptcy of renau-
din’s newspaper, and in a most hypocritical way. Through a complex set 
of events designed to expose the corrupt underside of the newspaper 
business of the times and its hidden collusion with the powers that be, 
the author leads Sturel into the situation of traitor. by preventing the 
newspaper from receiving a government subsidy, allegedly out of fear of 
compromising its independence, Sturel destroys racadot’s last chance 
to recoup his money. as a result, racadot becomes desperate and per-
suades mouchefrin to help him kill astiné in order to steal her jewels. 
Sturel’s high-minded protestations cannot hide the fact that his primary 
motive is selfish: he reacts so violently to the news of this request pre-
cisely because he is embarrassed in front of mlle. alison, the woman 
he loves, or at least wants to impress. although Sturel is not present at 
the moment when the two men begin to rush astiné off into the dark-
ness, the author takes great pains to make it clear to the reader that he 
did witness another part of the scene without intervening on astiné’s 
behalf. That evening, he, mlle. alison, her mother, and the owner of 
the boarding house where he and Thérèse live are on an outing in the 
bois de boulogne when they notice a woman trying to hail a cab while 
two men lurk in the background. Sturel recognizes the three immedi-
ately, but refuses to acknowledge them or admit that he knows them to 
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mlle. alison. Despite the fact that he reads the “unutterable anguish” 
on astiné’s face, he does nothing to grasp the “hand of the drowning 
woman in the night” that she seems to hold out toward him (702–3).
 The message these scenes convey is that Sturel inadvertently but 
inevitably must do everything in his power to rid himself of astiné in 
order to be able to possess Thérèse alison. On the level of political ide-
ology, his behavior signifies, as the critics point out, the removal of the 
foreign and the return to the regional, the national, Thérèse being from 
lorraine. The accidental nature of his involvement in the motivation 
of racadot’s crime, the quasi-hypnotic character of his paralysis at the 
time of astiné’s need, and above all the fact that he never recalls either 
event during his anguished debate with himself in the aftermath of the 
crime—all this intimates the presence of an unconscious motive as well. 
a great part of astiné’s attraction for her young lover derives from the 
stories of her Oriental origins she recounts to him, and it is these tales 
that awaken in Sturel an insatiable desire that tears him away from his 
‘roots,’ indeed, from reality itself (Les déracinés 554).
 The names of the areas where her family had lived—the euphrates, 
mesopotamia, Persia—awaken deep stirrings within him, for when he 
was four or five, his imagination was created through listening to stories 
of these legendary places (545). in Mes mémoires, barrès reveals that 
it was his own mother who performed this service for him in reality 
by reading him Richard the Lion-Hearted in Palestine when he lay ill 
as a child. at that moment, “my imagination grabbed hold of a few 
delightful figures that would never again leave me; the angelic young 
women and the Orient would go to sleep in the depths of my mind 
along with the voice of my young mama and wake up at the time of my 
adolescence” (Mes mémoires, O. C. Xiii 8). astiné, the widow, the older, 
experienced woman who initiates Sturel into sexuality, the “Oriental” 
whose very exoticism recalls the most intimate memories of the child, 
is thus an avatar of the mother from whom Sturel must liberate himself 
in order to reach the emotional autonomy and sense of reality without 
which he will never attain the identity he seeks.
 The private oedipal situation is thus transposed onto the politics 
of nationalism, although it should be noted that this is not a neces-
sary connection, desire for the exotic woman having already served in 
L’ennemi des lois (The Enemy of the Laws) the contrary ideological aim of 
attacking “narrow” nationalism (307–8). The same motif of separation 
from the matrix, which seems so contradictory to nationalist immer-
sion in the group, recurs twice in the space of a few pages, the first 
time in the narrator’s commentary on the lesson hugo offers Sturel in 
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his poetry, the second in the narration of Sturel’s visit to mouchefrin’s 
room the night of hugo’s burial. On the one hand, the narrator casts 
the murderer outside the pale of the human race, describing him as 
“a reptile trying to attain full being, to differentiate himself from the 
mire, the fevers of chaos in which he moves” (733); on the other, like 
michelet, he exalts the power of the word, of hugo’s poetry, to make 
us participate in the fraternal communion of our common heritage as 
we rose out of the darkness of undifferentiated nature (720), just as he 
had admired michelangelo’s Promethean figures “who tear themselves 
out of their blocks of marble” (“Du sang, de la volupté et de la mort,” 
Romans et voyages 449). Fraternity in the collectivity is therefore the 
remedy to nondifferentiation, in the same way that belonging to society 
is meant to protect us from the abyss of pure nature that represents dis-
solution into the sheer nothingness which preceded the first glimmer-
ings of identity.
 The nationalist and oedipal themes of xenophobia and separation are 
not the only significant aspects of astiné’s murder, however. it becomes 
the proof par excellence of the immorality of the positivist education 
touted by the republic. ida-marie Frandon gives convincing evidence 
that barrès used several aspects of the barré-lebiez case as models for 
the crime: first of all, the gruesome murder of an older woman for her 
money by two well-educated young men in dire poverty; the use of the 
term ‘Caesarize’ in Sturel’s discourse to mean ‘dominate’; and, most 
important for the educational message of the text, the public lecture on 
Darwinism by the medical student lebiez and the use of the notion of 
the survival of the fittest in the pair’s legal defense (“Fait divers et lit-
térature”). barrès adapted these events in having racadot give a public 
speech attacking hugo and justifying his crime, before his involvement 
in astiné’s murder is discovered. racadot’s theory is a kind of parody of 
Spinoza, Darwin, Taine, roemerspacher, and Sturel combined, in which 
he states that hugo’s promise of making mankind happy through edu-
cation is false and that the “instinct” for survival should replace hugo’s 
idea of ‘duty,’ which in reality is just a rehash of every priest’s sermons. 
nature teaches us to live at the expense of others (Les déracinés 713).
 The other face of the crime is the mask of enjoyment. The entire 
murder scene is tinged with sexual overtones. mouchefrin especially, 
who has earlier tried in vain to make the armenian woman his mistress, 
is excited by frustrated desire, whipped up into a frenzy by astiné’s 
insulting sneer at his size as he pulls her along: “you can see very well 
that you’re still too little to hold onto a woman except by her apron 
strings” (704). “luxurious creature, with her contemptuous body she 
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has whipped up their blood with desires. She is being killed by two 
poor men who are also proud males. These two characteristics, when 
they don’t exclude each other, form an explosive mixture” (705). The 
narrator takes obvious delight in the detailed, sensual, and rhythmic 
description he gives of her dead body:
Ce beau corps, cette gorge de vierge qu’elle avait gardée, et que baigne 
le fleuve d’un sang encore vivant, ces jambes adorables. . . . Ce cadavre, 
ce sang et ces beautés découvertes . . . c’est l’éternelle hélène . . . qui . . . 
attise dans notre sein une ardeur que rien ne satisfera. . . . pour que soit 
complète l’atmosphère de volupté, il ne manque pas au tableau l’appareil 
du carnage. (706)
here is a literal translation of the passage that conveys its sense, if not 
its sensuality: “That beautiful body, that virgin’s breast she had pre-
served and which is bathed in a river of still living blood, those adorable 
legs. . . . That corpse, that blood and those uncovered beauties . . . she 
is the eternal helen . . . who fans in our breast the flames of an ardor 
that nothing will satisfy. . . . To complete the voluptuous atmosphere, 
not even the trappings of carnage are missing from this tableau.”
 in a word, astiné is desire: insatiable, unquenchable desire; the per-
petual desire for “something other,” as baudelaire once put it, the void 
at the center of the subject that can never be completely filled.
 at the same time, as Suleiman and reid have argued, barrès tries 
to exorcize the temptation of sadism and disorder by throwing all the 
blame, scientifically—“We are botanists” (708)—on the two allegedly 
primitive characters and the universalizing education that has deraci-
nated them from the social ties that prevent other men from acting out 
their violent instincts (738). yet the description of the act tells another 
story. “Frightful debauchery”; “[t]he profoundly horrible thing is that 
this spectacle is quite exciting! men love to bite, and desire makes their 
mouths run dry when they see frightful things” (705). no other char-
acters being present at the fatal moment, it must be to the reader that 
the narrator addresses his exclamation; barrès thus invites his public to 
participate imaginatively in the sadistic pleasure aroused in contemplat-
ing this sight. Despite the narrator’s overt disavowal of racadot and 
mouchefrin, then, he makes their act appealing to the reader in order 
to demonstrate the kind of covert gratification he can expect from par-
ticipation in nationalist pogroms designed to exterminate the foreign. 
as her decapitation testifies, astiné is the figure of the first, terrifying 
phase of imaginary “castration” in the lacanian sense of the term. The 
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graphic description of her murder represents a kind of sexual climax, 
a covert satisfaction of incestuous desire that combines the refusal to 
renounce the maternal object and to take on the mutilation of the self 
such renunciation entails, with the attempt to throw all the suffering of 
being onto the other, all of this staged for the benefit of the Other, a 
position occupied in this case by the politicized readers who together 
form the nation (see lacan, “Kant with Sade” 65).
 Suleiman makes the interesting suggestion that the strong emotional 
reaction evoked by these descriptions overflows, as it were, the didactic 
intention of the author manifested in the analytic tone of his scientific 
explanations (Authoritarian Fictions 209). Certainly, the charm astiné 
exercises on the reader as on Sturel is not dissipated by the narrator’s 
classification of her as the evil alien, the virus or poison (barrès’s terms 
for her, e.g., Les déracinés 554) that must be extracted in order to restore 
the national organism to health (reid; Carroll). as Suleiman points out, 
astiné’s influence on Sturel, like bouteiller’s, is mentioned in the later 
volumes of the trilogy, long after her murder (Authoritarian Fictions 
125). her argument is based on the premise that astiné is “a character 
whose value in the ideological supersystem of the work is strongly nega-
tive” (206), but there is good reason to wonder whether the appealing 
character of the armenian woman actually contradicts the narratorial 
value system. in fact, as strange as it might seem in light of her foreign 
ethnicity and exotic lure, each time the narrator mentions her linger-
ing seductive power over the young man, it is to support rather than 
negate the nationalist ideology he espouses elsewhere in the novels. it 
is not only the “text,” in Suleiman’s sense of the rhetorical play of nar-
ration, action, and description, that exceeds the narrator’s “reductive 
interpretation” of astiné’s significance, it is the narrator’s interpreta-
tions themselves that cannot be so contained. in short, the contradic-
tion, if contradiction there be, lies within the system of interpretation, 
not outside it between text and interpretation. For the lesson astiné 
taught Sturel is the same one he learns from the crowds at hugo’s 
funeral and from the poet’s writings, the very notion of acceptance that 
is supposed to constitute the heart of barrès’s nationalist doctrine, the 
ethic of acceptance (Les déracinés 730).
Nihil humani mihi alienum
it is true that the spirit in which Sturel decides to accept the “atrocity 
committed” differs from the attitude of the scornful voluptuary she had 
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inculcated into him (730), but the metaphysical distance he attains does 
not prevent astiné’s ghostly presence from reasserting itself years, and 
several hundred pages, later in the same manner. Sitting in a café, plot-
ting vengeance for the Panama scandal with the anarchist Fanfournot, 
Sturel ponders the similarity between the profiteering chéquards and 
the anarchists who steal Panama bonds to finance their political activi-
ties. The two groups use identical pretexts to justify their appetites. 
Overcome by the atmosphere of the place, Fanfournot’s stories, and 
too much absinthe, Sturel plunges into a kind of trance, in which he 
contemplates “this abject society of enjoyment” under the same aspect 
of eternity he had reached during hugo’s burial. individuality, how-
ever real, becomes irrelevant in this perspective; all people are united in 
their fundamental animality, in the very instincts the narrator invokes 
in describing racadot and mouchefrin attacking astiné: biting, grasp-
ing, tearing apart (1146). lurking beneath the pleasant glow that soci-
ety projects over life, Sturel muses, reign the “mothers” of Goethe’s 
Faust Part Two, and this idea inevitably calls to his mind the image of 
astiné with her “proud humility” and her “clairvoyant slave’s resigna-
tion” (1146–47). like her, the mothers, as mephisto explains to Faust, 
counsel total acceptance, and like Sturel, Faust resists this temptation: 
“Go; i do not seek my salvation in torpor” (Leurs figures 1147). With a 
shudder, Sturel pulls himself out of his stupor, but just as barrès never 
loses his fascination with and taste for the “Orient” or for romanticism, 
despite his sometimes violent criticisms of both (cf. reid 387), so he 
will memorialize the call of the earth in his political slogan of “the soil 
and the dead.”
 in this whole scene Sturel is described as a drowning man being 
sucked down into the depths of a whirlpool whose overwhelming force 
derives from the almost irresistible attraction of the sheer nothingness 
of the prehuman, presocial self attached to astiné and the earth moth-
ers. it is the surreptitious attraction of that nothingness, the love of 
death designated under the term “nihilism,” that unites the apparently 
disparate and unmotivated set of associations the text attaches to astiné. 
her assassination aims not only at eliminating everything foreign, as 
reid and Carroll observe; it also strives to eradicate that which is most 
intimate.
 For in fact, astiné never did die; the foreign element of desire lives 
on forever within the future nationalist hero. During the murder and 
again in the description of the hugo ceremonies, the narrator insists 
that astiné, “that foreigner . . . mixed into his thoughts and modifying 
all of them” (703), “still lived within him [Sturel]. She had deposited in 
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him elements forever amalgamated with the young man from lorraine’s 
own nature,” so that henceforth there exists “that intimate part of Sturel 
that is essentially astiné” (730). nihilism, the fascinating seduction of 
nothingness, is “astiné’s poison acting in his [Sturel’s] blood. Wherever 
he goes, he carries it within him” (703). it is this nothingness that 
forms the core of Sturel’s identity and constitutes at the same time the 
rationale for barrès’s “scientific” condemnation of astiné and the volup-
tuous charm that causes both the rhetoric and the ideology of the text 
to overflow the “reductive interpretation” of her.
 The internalization of the foreign via astiné is also not without its 
larger political significance. For the first time since the revolution, in 
barrès’s nationalism there was the perceived danger of an “inner enemy,” 
because in the Third republic everyone (every adult male, that is) was 
a citizen on an equal footing, a human being, at least officially, whereas 
in previous times the Jews, the Protestants, and other religious and 
ethnic minorities were clearly and officially (at different times) demar-
cated from the mass of the French. as a result, the inner enemy became 
still more important than the external enemy for nationalism and, later 
on, for fascism. The purification of the nation arose from the effort to 
define and delimit national identity in the face of this internal inva-
sion. ironically enough, the only previous direct parallel to this situation 
had occurred during the revolution. Fin de siècle nationalism was thus 
a repetition of the Jacobin Terror, whose revolutionary ‘energy’ bar-
rès refused to renounce, in its fight against the internal enemies of the 
republic, the “traitors in our midst.”
 When barrès links astiné’s “Oriental” poison to German thought in 
general and to Kant’s philosophy in particular, he is not succumbing to 
some impensé of the text; rather he is following a trajectory through a 
network of associations joining Germany, the Orient, and nihilism plot-
ted out by leading French thinkers of the nineteenth century. barrès need 
have looked no farther than bourget’s article on renan in the Essais de psy-
chologie contemporaine to find that the various strains of neo-Kantianism 
recalled “the magnificent hypotheses of ancient ionia” (Essais 51–52). 
in L’orient de Maurice Barrès, Frandon has traced the development of 
barrès’s thought on this system back to his reading of Quinet, who 
argues that there is an ancient connection between the Germans and the 
orient, since the language of the former shows that they are descended 
from the medes (Génie des religions 61), while their Protestantism led 
them to study the bible and thus Judaism and hebrew poetry (herder); 
from there it was an easy step to cultures farther east, like Persia and 
india (Goethe, ruckert) (Quinet, le génie des religions 63–65).
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 renan, bourget, vogüé, Taine, leconte de lisle, Soury—barrès 
connects them all in one way or another with the new French mal 
de siècle, as vogüé once called it, amalgamating the ideas of fatalism, 
nihilism, the orient, and Germany (Frandon, L’orient de Maurice Barrès 
39–42). The eastern religions of hinduism and buddhism form the 
major bridge between nihilism and German thought. in “l’oeuvre de 
leconte de lisle,” barrès describes the poet’s evocation of the useless-
ness of all feeling and effort, of the nothingness and nirvana in brahma 
(122–23). The novelist seems to have accepted vogüé’s contention that 
nihilism came to France from the hindu nirvana via the russians—
think of Kutuzov’s fatalism in War and Peace—and the Germans (41). 
anatole France reminds his readers of the link between buddhism and 
the thought of Schopenhauer, probably the best-known representative 
of German philosophy in France during the period (“bouddhisme” 
331). and many French commentators, from Charles de villers in the 
eighteenth century (munteanu 142) to the symbolists and decadents, 
often via a detour through Wagnerism, interpreted Kant’s doctrine of 
the forms of intuition and the categories of understanding as a kind of 
subjectivist skepticism or nihilism. The two major aspects of bouteiller’s 
teaching that barrès attacks, Kant’s universalism and those “Oriental 
perfumes of death” filtered through German thought the professor wafts 
over his pupils, are not unrelated, as it may seem at first sight (cf. Car-
roll 32). nothing could be more universalizing, indeed, than the utter 
uniformity of nondifferentiation at the instinctual level Sturel perceives 
in his hallucinatory descent into the chthonian realm of the mothers. 
The equivalence barrès establishes among bouteiller, astiné, and hugo 
is thus not at all far-fetched, once the notion, the dread, and the desire 
of nihilism are factored into the equation.
 The motto of the barresian nationalist (with apologies to Terence) 
thus could be: “i think the nothingness of humanity is the foreign within 
me.” This extimacy is not quite the same thing as the assertion that “the 
individual is nothing without the group.” like barrès and the national-
ists of those days and our own, the critics would like to make a neat 
division between inside and outside: between the others who are in fact 
the same (see Carroll 27)—barrès’s “affinities”—and the Others who 
are genuinely alien, foreign. The problem is that the enemy also resides 
within the self, not just outside it. and it does so due to the subject’s 
own desire. astiné’s murder aims at eliminating everything foreign, as 
the critics rightly observe, but to do so would be to eradicate that which 
is most intimate within Sturel. The nationalists’ bargain is the reverse of 
Faust’s pact with the devil: he was eager to sell his soul for one moment 
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of total fulfillment, while they are willing to kill their desire in order to 
acquire a solid identity (see lacan’s analysis of university discourse in 
The Other Side of Psychoanalysis)—willing, but, at least in the exemplary 
case of Sturel, not able. For to eliminate “that intimate part of Sturel 
that is essentially astiné” (730) would be to eliminate the desiring core 
of his self. Secretly convinced that the Other, the foreigner, holds the 
key to jouissance, the nationalist Sturel—the “true French”—cannot live 
with her, yet he (and they) cannot live without her. The nationalist 
solution to this paradox—which is the main paradox of present-day 
multiculturalism and its discontents—is instead to embalm her within 
him, to preserve her, but as dead.
 From this perspective, a third reading of the function of the juxtapo-
sition of the two deaths emerges: Sturel is able to exorcise the foreign 
only by making it an essential ‘part’ of himself. it is not simply that the 
nationalist subject defines himself by his difference from the other, as 
some postcolonial theory has it; rather, by the paradoxical logic of the 
extimate, the act of murder functions to immortalize the (m)Other, 
preserved in vitro, so to speak. as Sturel watches astiné about to be 
hauled off to her death, the narrator opines:
in truth, at this moment, if she has accomplished her inner [propre] 
destiny, she can enjoy an extension of her life in Sturel. and perhaps it 
is her appetite for self-destruction, her perpetual gift of herself in the 
midst of her debauchery, which will earn this rare woman the possibility 
of surviving herself. (703)
The permanent installation of astiné in Sturel’s mind is a refusal of 
mourning, in every way comparable to the institution of barrès’s nation-
alist identification with the race in reaction to the death of his parents, 
and to the intoxication with death that characterizes the jouissance of 
barrès’s nationalism.
 after her death, astiné is transported through her murder from the 
real to the symbolic, becoming the element of suture for the discourse 
of rootedness and nationalism. Once dead, she functions as the signifier 
of the excluded element—the foreign, the Other, the nihil—the signi-
fier that makes it possible to incorporate the alien into the nationalist 
system as that which is excluded from nationalism, and that, like Frege’s 
empty set in the realm of the logic of number theory, is required to 
allow that system to achieve closure (see miller, “Suture”).2 her use as 
suture constitutes the desperate attempt to assimilate the unassimilable, 
to guarantee the unity so obviously contradicted by her very existence. 
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Unlike a purely logical system, however, a political engine like national-
ism must constantly be fed and stoked in order to be maintained; hence 
the insatiable need, characteristic of fascism, for ever more victims to 
persecute and eventually to exterminate. an infinite series of human 
signifiers representing the Other, the foreign, the exotic must be lined 
up and purged, but not in order to purify the system totally, getting rid 
of them once and for all. rather, they must be inhumed and embalmed 
within the system, like dead butterflies skewered onto the pages of 
an entomologist’s album. For ultimately, the closure and the sense of 
autonomy achieved by killing desire are illusory: The sense of incomple-
tion and the recognition of loss inevitably return, to haunt the national-
ist and to reactivate the secret allure of nothingness. rootedness may 
very well have “provide[d] an intellectually respectable solution to the 
problem of nihilism and decadence which plagued so many intellectuals 
at the fin de siècle” (Soucy 113), but it did so by enshrining the very 
nihilism whose troublesome persistence it was meant to eliminate.
Readability and Transference: 
Barrès and the Fiction of Teaching
The choice of the roman à thèse genre was governed by the same dialec-
tic of nihilism and assertion. in a move typical of conservative political 
strategy (see Charle, Paris fin de siècle 169), the trilogy presents itself as a 
remedy for the anarchy resulting from the alleged loss of values and cer-
tainty produced by the Third republic’s adoption of Kantian universal-
ist doctrine and the practices of collusion and corruption in the alliance 
of “foreigners,” big capital, and parliamentary democracy that ideology 
supposedly favors. bourget had already depicted the fear of “intellectual 
anarchy” produced by the multiplicity of points of view simultaneously 
admitted in the fin de siècle. barrès did not simply reject this multiplic-
ity, however; on the contrary, he espoused it as the only notion of truth 
appropriate to the contemporary world and hence to modern literature. 
a major corollary of this perspectivism, which the humanist critics like 
to call ‘relativism’ and which barrès termed ‘skepticism’ or nihilism, is 
that, since all phenomena demand interpretation, they also therefore run 
the risk of receiving divergent interpretations. now, unlike the realist 
novel, which imagines that reality wears its meaning on its sleeve, and 
in contrast to the modernist novel, which supposes that meaning can be 
subverted, if not entirely avoided, the roman à thèse knows this problem 
exists but reveals its difference from its symbolist brothers in that, intent 
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upon promoting a specific ideological program, it sees that risk more 
as a danger than as an opportunity. The self-contradictory antidote for 
this peril adopted by the thesis novel, as andré Gide points out, is to 
attempt, through narratorial commentary, to restrict the very freedom 
of judgment it acknowledges by dictating the one “correct” interpreta-
tion of its stories (30). The special role of the narrator of the ideological 
novel is to enunciate the thesis and to communicate it to his readers; in 
short, it is that of the ‘master’ barrès always aspired to be, the teacher, 
the authoritarian instructor who tells his charges what to think.
 as with all exemplary tales, then, in order to bring home its les-
son and to support its call for action, the thesis novel must make “the 
interpretation . . . ‘superior’ to the story, as the general is to the particu-
lar, the universal to the singular, or truth to its manifestation” (Sulei-
man, Authoritarian Fictions 30). This result is always paradoxical, since 
it undermines the very purpose of employing stories in the first place, 
the supposed ease of understanding and more immediate appeal of nar-
rative over abstract ideas. but it is doubly paradoxical in the case of 
barrès’s trilogy, since the latter’s purpose is to discredit universalism: 
The general lesson its narrator sets out to impose is precisely the distrust 
of the general. indeed, that is one of the primary reasons for which 
The Uprooted takes on the structure of a novel of education. The good 
teacher has the duty to understand the diverse living conditions of his 
pupils, and to “distribute truth” in proportion to the individual truth 
of each pupil, which entails studying their biographies as well as the 
particularities of the lorraine character (502).
 biography is particularity, in both the temporal and the spatial 
dimensions. recounting the life histories of his protagonists is there-
fore not simply a matter of ‘illustrating’ his thesis by tracing the results 
of the ‘deracinating’ education bouteiller dispenses to his pupils, but of 
the obligation to respect and demonstrate the particularity of life the 
barresian narrator claims is trampled upon by the republican professor’s 
Kantianism.
 The more general function of barrès’s education novel is also a mat-
ter of particularity, in that it consists of the search for identity. as Georg 
lukács explains in his Theory of the Novel, in the contingency of the 
modern world there no longer exists an accepted source of transcendent 
meaning; hence individual identity is no longer a given but becomes 
the object of a quest. The hero seeks adventure in order to discover his 
own essence. barrès’s novels have gone a step further than the tradi-
tional Bildungsroman, however, for they presuppose not only the lack of 
transcendent meaning but also the absence of the inherent, immanent 
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meaning implied in the positivist position and entailed by the dominant 
forms of realist and naturalist literary representation. They participate in 
the general fin de siècle breakdown in representation that gives rise to a 
modernism much more radical than the mere distrust of the expressive 
capacity of language repeated by writers from rousseau through the 
romantics to Flaubert.
 Since we can never get beyond some particular point of view, it is an 
illusion to imagine that observation, no matter how careful, can arrive 
at an objective knowledge of things, that is, one in which they have 
the same significance for everyone. as a consequence, events, whether 
fictional or real, can never express their own meaning; each is always 
and unavoidably subject to a variety of interpretations. moreover, a 
person’s reactions to situations, events, and the actions of other people 
will depend on his or her understanding of those occurrences. although 
barrès oscillated between an individual and a collective subject, he was 
in basic agreement with the subjectivist notion of perception popular in 
antipositivist, symbolist, and decadent writers such as bourget, vogüé, 
and Wyzewa. While barrès’s first novels adhered to the decadent credo 
described by michel raimond, “For the novelist, the world is no longer 
a field on which to bring passions into conflict but a set of appearances to 
be elucidated” (76; emphasis in original), The Uprooted, with its wider 
ambitions than the Cult of the Ego novels, brought the two models of 
the novel together, recounting balzacian conflicts of passion and inter-
est with a social and ideological import, but showing that those clashes 
result from the opposing points of view of the multiple characters whose 
lives the story follows.
 The juxtaposition of these two strains in the same work throws into 
relief the fundamental crisis of fin de siècle narrative brought to light by 
the educational thesis novel. by underscoring the fact that the events 
in the world of fiction can no longer contain their own meaning, the 
genre threatens to expose the traumatic void lurking beneath the appar-
ently seamless surface of everyday life smoothed over by the ready-made 
meanings of the prevailing symbolic system. in order to counter this 
danger, the narrator must rush into the vacuum, supplying the mean-
ing from outside that world, transgressing the barrier between fiction 
and reality established in the realist and naturalist novels. There is thus 
an exact parallel between the situation of the genre, that of the barre-
sian subject unable to bear the knowledge of its own nothingness and 
therefore eager to cover it over as soon as possible by finding solace in 
the illusory warmth of mass existence, and that of the death of astiné, 
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whose lack of meaning becomes the kernel that allows nationalist mean-
ing to emerge.
 in responding to the potential encroachment of the real made 
possible by the crisis of representation, the thesis novel strikes out in 
opposite directions at once. On the one hand, it makes overt what the 
realist novel tries to hide, the fact that, as bakhtin has so convincingly 
demonstrated, the novel has always been a fundamentally ideological 
genre. in it, not only are form and ideology one (259), but every utter-
ance, whether of narration, description, or narratorial interpretation, is 
directed toward a reader who may have a different conception of the 
subject matter evoked (281–82). On the other hand, according to the 
same principle of detachable signification, the narrator will be unable 
to guarantee the reader’s acceptance of the meanings he supplies. For 
how can a teacher (read: ‘novelist’), however authoritarian, expect to 
control the lesson (read: ‘thesis’) she wants to transmit to her pupils 
(read: ‘readers’), if each of them necessarily interprets it in an individual 
way, according to his or her particular history, education, or ‘instinct’? 
indeed, the text betrays an awareness of teaching as an ‘impossible pro-
fession,’ as a result of the difficulties inherent in attempting to impose 
one’s preferred interpretation on people and events. like The Disciple, 
The Uprooted contains a kind of negative mise-en-abîme, staging the prin-
ciple of its own failure in the hopes of forestalling the failure of its 
principle. as the narrator tells us,
From a professor or a book we receive only what our instinct recog-
nizes as its own, and we take strange liberties with our interpretations. 
[bouteiller] would no doubt have been stupefied to observe the reper-
cussions of his words in these young brains. . . . he sows his grain with 
a bountiful motion but is totally unaware of what his seed becomes. 
(502)
if these words sound familiar, it is not only because of the irony directed 
against bouteiller’s (and barrès’s) idol hugo, but also because we have 
already listened to a similar invitation to contemplate the melancholy 
disparity between the saison des semailles (season for sowing) and that of 
the moisson (harvest), this time directed against the other model teacher 
of the novel, Taine (596).
 While the narrator’s comments about the unanticipated effects of 
Taine’s teachings on his prime pupil, roemerspacher, do not constitute 
a disavowal of Taine’s ‘thesis,’ they do call into question his capacity as 
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a teacher. it is, after all, Taine himself who fails to take into account “the 
mental constitution of those who interpret and apply” his principle. The 
philosopher is therefore guilty of the same crime of lèse-particularité as 
the professor he is, in other respects, supposed to counterbalance, for 
the responsibility of the teacher is to foresee the probable effects of the 
abstract ideas he instills in them. Taine has no better understanding of 
how his views on voluntary associations will affect roemerspacher than 
bouteiller does about the results of his exposition of Kantian critique 
and morality on his high school students. The novel thus draws a dis-
tinct parallel between bouteiller and Taine despite their genuine differ-
ences, for both contribute to the calamitous events of the story, even 
though it is not their doctrines per se (as contradictory as they are) that 
are responsible, but the students’ faulty application of those principles.
 moreover, the parallels between the two masters do not stop there. 
in his original description of bouteiller’s character and principles, the 
narrator takes him severely to task for blindly following his “categorical 
imperative” even when he was still a schoolboy, lodging a formal com-
plaint against a classmate who stole a watch and insisting the boy be 
dismissed from school, heedless of the circumstances—the transgressor 
had returned the timepiece and the victim had forgiven him—as of the 
disproportion between the offense and the consequences of his denunci-
ation. The reason given for his action is that “he had deemed it inappro-
priate for a careless pupil . . . to keep something rotten in the collectivity” 
(505). This is precisely the idea of Taine’s disciple roemerspacher, when 
Sturel asks him whether he should turn mouchefrin in: “Society ought 
to slaughter [racadot and mouchefrin], the way it slaughters wolves 
and wild boars in winter in the neufchâteau woods” (726). as if to 
remove any lingering doubts about the partial interchangeableness of 
the two doctrines, barrès has roemerspacher announce in his last meet-
ing with Sturel in The Uprooted that he has discovered the fundamental 
identity between bouteiller’s ethic and Taine’s:
after giving it a lot of thought, i’ve come to admit that the principle 
bouteiller gave us five years ago . . . 
 Oh! bouteiller . . .
 i’m speaking of his words, not his actions. “always act in such a way 
that you can want your action to serve as a universal rule.” act in a way 
that is profitable to society. . . . (744)
 if Taine is no more reliable a model than bouteiller, at least when 
it comes to the act of teaching, then it would appear that it is that act 
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the author is calling into question. Furthermore, if we are to accept 
roemerspacher’s change of heart, we must at the same time reject the 
earlier narratorial assertion of the radical opposition between Kant and 
Taine as false, mistaken, or deceptive. it would seem, then, that at the 
time of writing The Uprooted, barrès still harbored nagging doubts about 
his role as professor of national energy. all the more so, because the split 
between phenomenon and meaning tends to undermine political leaders 
as well as teachers. Contrary to the prevalent critical readings of napo-
leon’s role in the novel, and despite the praise the narrator heaps upon 
the emperor for his charismatic ability to “electrify” people, the author 
leaves no doubt that, in the last analysis, in choosing napoleon as their 
professor of energy, the students commit a serious error, succumbing to 
“napoleonitis” (610).
 The image of napoleon gives people energy but is incapable of giv-
ing them direction. as an imaginary entity, this figure fits into the same 
category as the stories Sturel and roemerspacher were told as children; 
it takes no more account of reality than the students’ other desires, ambi-
tions, and plans. but that is exactly the narrator’s criticism of bouteiller! 
“The education [that bouteiller gave them] . . . developed energy in 
them” (513). “Powers [the students from the nancy lycée] were going 
to move through the world, to whom [bouteiller] had given an impe-
tus, without succeeding in steering them [in the right direction]” (512). 
barrès explained the failure of the boulangist movement in the same 
way: The general’s defect as leader was that he was capable of arousing 
the energies of the masses but lacked any principle that could generate 
a specific political program for the nation.
 imparting force without controlling direction, all these teachers, 
models, imaginary figures, and charismatic leaders seem to show that 
the split between phenomenon and meaning, application and idea, event 
and thesis—that is, between the particular and the universal—is not 
only irreparable but potentially dangerous. real power resides in the 
concrete, and when the concrete escapes the limited domain of personal 
experience, it can be conveyed best in images and stories; the question is 
whether the energy thus awakened can be channeled in the right direc-
tion by the right idea.
 Consistent with this belief in the force of narrative is the fact, which 
Carroll notes with his customary acuity, that the tradition barrès extols 
as the source of identity is transmitted in the form of stories. Only a 
living link to the past can guarantee the nation against dissolution, the 
ultimate loss of self, and that link is supplied by narrative and aesthetic 
culture (taste) handed down from past generations (Carroll 31). These 
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stories, recounted by close relatives and contained within themselves, 
tell the young what they should be. The great danger, then, to the 
preservation of national identity, is foreign counternarratives. viewed 
from this perspective, the agon of the novel takes the form of a battle 
between native and alien stories. To a certain extent, bouteiller already 
manifests the peril by his eloquence and his poetic power to stir the 
imaginations of his pupils with ‘Oriental’ and Germanic tales of Kant 
and the ionian philosophers. his influence is continued and reinforced 
by astiné, whose attraction for Sturel is increased by the fact that she 
herself is ionian (as Carroll and reid point out; Les déracinés 545). it is 
the foreign names she invokes and the exotic stories she recounts that 
make her even more dangerous than bouteiller, for she represents the 
seductive threat of cosmopolitanism, “that is, ‘the dangerous faculty of 
borrowing the tone and the allure of each milieu’” (Carroll 34; inner 
quote from The Uprooted).
 although the thesis novel generally expends more energy in attack-
ing its enemies than in defending its friends, barrès does balance his 
assault on the universalist education of the Third republic in the first 
volume of the trilogy with a counterproposal for a new nationalist 
instruction in the last book. ironically enough, the overall structure of 
barrès’s trilogy thus adopts the same strategy that bouteiller employed, 
unsuccessfully, in his lessons on Kant: first destroy meaning via critique, 
then rebuild it through practical reason. except our author has substi-
tuted regional/national identity for universal ethics. in a letter to Sturel, 
Saint-Phlin offers a program of immersion in local culture designed to 
replace the allegedly deracinating universalism of bouteiller. Convinced 
that a nation is “a territory in which people have memories and mores 
in common and an hereditary ideal” (Appel au soldat 960), he attributes 
to education the task of safeguarding this national mentality against 
domination and eventual assimilation by any foreign people. it is more 
than a little ironic that this staunch French nationalist should here echo 
the declarations of herder in his struggle against French domination 
of the Germanic peoples, in asserting that the substitution of “their” 
language for “ours” is equivalent to replacing our mentality with theirs 
(Appel au soldat 960). it doesn’t seem to occur to him that this rationale 
for revanchard claims to lorraine at the same time would justify the 
German claims to alsace!
 be that as it may, the important point is that in contrast to virtually 
all previous pedagogical notions, his basic presupposition is that the 
primary goal of education is to develop and maintain individual and col-
lective identity (the two being equivalent for barrès, as we have seen). 
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Saint-Phlin emphasizes the value of regional identity, because for him 
national identity is the sum of the particular identities of the various 
regions rather than a universal synthesis in which regional differences 
would be submerged in a homogeneous whole. When he espouses the 
program of on-site visits and “object lessons” promulgated by empiricist 
educational reformers of the period, it is not for the purpose of appeal-
ing to the child’s interests, nor in order to overcome the latter’s lim-
ited ability to grasp abstractions. it is not to counteract the traditional 
authoritarian methods of lecture and dictation nor even for vocational 
training; no, for the nationalist concept of education the sole purpose 
is to promote regional and national cultural identity, by acquainting 
the pupils with “the particular conditions in the midst of which our 
little people of lorraine has grown up and participates in French cul-
ture” (Leurs figures 1173). as barrès himself, quoting Saint-Simon, had 
pointed out many years earlier, nationalism is simply narcissism on a 
broad scale (“examen des trois romans idéologiques” 1220 n12). in this 
sense nationalism is indeed the “Cult of the ego” writ large, as barrès 
protested to Doumic. The goal of education is not to bring something 
new to its charges, but to awaken within them the “subconscious” that 
contains everything past generations have accumulated “in order to cre-
ate a soul for us” (1174). in short, what children need to learn about 
above all is themselves, insofar as they are their ancestors and their terri-
tory. Knowledge of the regional history that constitutes their continuity 
with their parents will “regenerate” them, for the “human plant” grows 
to be vigorous and fertile only in the conditions that have nourished its 
“species” over the centuries.
 because the tradition of lorraine is not a series of inanimate asser-
tions but a way of judging life, of feeling and of reacting, Saint-Phlin 
conceives of this education, before Pavlov (but after Soury), as the acti-
vation of a set of conditioned reflexes that build upon innate predisposi-
tions (1175). Once the lothringers have acquired these automatic ways 
of feeling and reacting, they may leave their native region with impu-
nity, confident that their regional identity will allow them to master 
any alien influences rather than be dominated and thus deracinated by 
them. in fact, on the plane of european history, the role of lorraine has 
always been to protect the cultural identity of latin civilization, before 
and since the advent of the French nation, from being “denatured” by 
Germanicism (1175).
 Saint-Phlin’s program does retain one aim in common with the posi-
tivist plan of educational reform whose concrete methods it adopts: the 
goal of bypassing all commentary and interpretation, that is, all teach-
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ing per se. Pupils should come into direct contact with their subject 
matter without the intervention of the teacher’s explanations, just as 
the reader of realist fiction is supposed to apprehend the fictional world 
without having her vision obscured by the narrator’s commentary. This 
insistence on achieving the immediate presence of the concrete would 
seem to be the very antithesis of the thesis novel, which must rely on 
the mediation of the narrator/teacher in order to present the thesis. at 
this point the struggle between nihilism and certainty has reached its 
utmost paroxysm: the contradiction between using the universality of 
the thesis to instill in his readers the doctrine of the particular threatens 
to tear apart the very fabric of the work.
 it is here that Saint-Phlin invokes the one genuinely antirational 
aspect of barrès’s nationalism, itself an outgrowth of the reactionary 
scientism of the period. admitting that he lacks the expertise to for-
mulate specific pedagogical methods, he adds that, in any case, it is 
neither method nor curriculum that will determine the outcome of his 
program but a feeling (1173). The child intuitively senses, or fails to 
sense, the reverence for the race that should permeate every moment of 
the teacher’s lesson, and it is this intuition that makes the lesson effec-
tive or ineffective.
 in the last analysis, nationalist education has only one content—
love and respect for the soil and the dead—and this content cannot be 
conveyed through any amount of description, explanation, or commen-
tary alone (1173). like the subject matter of the object lessons and 
field trips, it must be experienced directly. in contrast to the theory 
of total immediacy, however, it not only leaves room for, but abso-
lutely requires the presence of an intermediary, a teacher or narrator 
who mediates between child and regional identity by transmitting to his 
charges, through his attitude rather than by the meaning of his words, 
his own sense of the value of local tradition and the continuity with the 
ancestors.
 Saint-Phlin is proposing, then, a system of ‘direct mediation,’ so 
to speak. Such a system had already been described by le bon under 
the name of “suggestion.” Today we would call it, thanks to Freud, a 
transferential theory of pedagogy.3 it was in fact transference that made 
bouteiller’s pupils into his disciples, at least for a time. his influence 
over them did not derive from the subject matter of his lessons but, as 
the etymology of the term indicates, from his presence in the classroom, 
his manifest aplomb and independence, his career, his ability to mobilize 
their “unused ardors” that made him appear to them as a “young god 
of the intellect” and enabled him to attract to his person all the prestige 
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of hugo and the republic (Les déracinés 495–99). it was his eloquence, 
the seductive power of his narratives that brought them under his spell, 
rather than his ideas about philosophy, which, it will be recalled, they 
absorbed only to the extent that they fit in with their own previous 
ideas, impressions, and desires. Similarly, due to the transferential effect, 
the result of bouteiller’s teaching is just the opposite of his intent to tie 
his students to the democratic State: The unforeseen consequence was 
that he bound them to himself instead (511).
 This whole description of bouteiller reads like a passage out of 
le bon’s earliest formulation of crowd psychology, in which ‘fascina-
tion’ plays the role of domination over the listeners he would later, no 
doubt under the influence of Tarde, attribute to ‘suggestion’ (L’homme 
i n396; quoted in nye 47). as a device for wielding the power of 
‘fascination,’ the poetic power to spin tales of the Orient constitutes 
one of bouteiller’s primary means of attracting his students’ “unused 
ardors”—Freud might have called it ‘free-floating libido’—onto himself, 
a significant aspect of the transference overlooked by le bon but not by 
barrès. Saint-Phlin expects that the nationalist teacher’s manifest love 
for ‘the soil and the dead’ will act as a lightning rod to captivate his 
pupils’ feelings, just as bouteiller’s intense admiration for victor hugo 
and the republic had done with himself and his comrades at the lycée 
in nancy. The ability to evoke the transference of his listeners is the one 
characteristic held in common by the teacher and the storyteller, as well 
as by the political demagogue.
 Transference is the antithesis of critique; it induces uncritical accep-
tance of the authority of the object by reducing the subject’s emotional 
and intellectual distance from it to zero. little does it matter if the recip-
ients fail to accept or even to grasp the specific content of the message; 
what counts is that they be united in a common identity based on their 
love for the authoritative figure and the resulting desire to become like 
that which he loves. if barrès’s novel is authoritarian, it is not because 
its narrator insists on attaching his thesis to every event, nor because 
it asserts in discursive form a simple ideological system in which good 
and evil are clearly demarcated, nor even because the plot and characters 
are simplified in order to reinforce that system; no, it is because it aims 
to impose the transferential prestige of the storyteller onto the reader 
and then to use that power for political ends. like exemplary tales and 
parables, the thesis novel aims not merely to use story and interpreta-
tion to teach a lesson but to arouse its receivers to action. but the rhe-
torical method of its narrative, at least that of barrès, is not persuasion 
but seduction. That is no doubt why the most successful teachers in the 
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trilogy are those whose pupils are motivated by love: roemerspacher 
indoctrinates his fiancée, Thérèse de nelles, and astiné, who gave Sturel 
his first lesson in sexual experience as well as in exoticism, maintains her 
hold over him long after her death. indeed, if Saint-Phlin has such a 
difficult time convincing his friend Sturel of the virtues of domesticated 
nationalism, it is no doubt that, being of similar age and social status, 
he lacks the prestige of an authoritative figure, and banking on mere 
friendship, argument, and even the object lesson of their trip along the 
shores of the moselle, he must grapple with the posthumous power of 
astiné’s ghost. even bouteiller preserves his influence on Sturel at the 
end of Their Faces, despite the two men’s intense hostility in the political 
arena.
 The barresian narrator does not, for all that, simply abandon all 
appeals to reason, logic, and evidence. On the contrary, he enlists them, 
alongside his stories, in his effort to elicit the hypnotic attention of the 
reading public. like the storyteller (‘narrate’ comes ultimately from the 
same root as ‘gnosis’; latin ‘gnarus’), the interpreter is the one who 
claims to know; in barrès’s case, this claim to authority derives from the 
assertion that he occupies a privileged point of view, the only standpoint 
from which reality, justice, and identity appear in their true proportions 
to the French (Scènes 15).
 authority has thus been transferred from the objective truth, open 
to any careful, unbiased observer, to the narrator, who no longer needs 
a transcendent inspiration in order to claim special privilege for himself. 
now his authority ultimately comes from his self, insofar as he is part of 
the “nation,” and therefore capable of seeing things from the perspec-
tive of the ancestors. according to this nationalist logic, it follows that 
if he really does occupy this privileged position, his French readers, who 
presumably share his history, ancestors, and way of judging and react-
ing to life, will interpret events the same way he does once he shows 
things to them from the proper vantage point, precisely because once 
he has succeeded in tearing down the misguided universalist system of 
meaning and has replaced it with the nationalist conception, they will 
rely on their instinctive, idiosyncratic point of view. like the pupils 
of Saint-Phlin’s good nationalist teacher, his readers will have changed 
themselves in order to conform to the model he proposes as worthy of 
reverence and love. in this overtly dialogic model of the novel, story and 
interpretation will dovetail perfectly in those whom the narrator holds 
in his spell.
 luckily for the novel and for France, only a minority of the public 
did so.
A Chronicle of Contemporary History
if barrès’s goal in his Novel of National Energy was to shape the crowd 
around the neatly embalmed corpse of the Other in order to merge 
with it all the more completely, anatole France’s aim in his Contem-
porary History tetralogy was to combat the indifference of the crowd 
on every level. it is not surprising, then, that although they shared a 
friendship and many convictions, including contempt for the Oppor-
tunist republic and a certain traditionalism and anti-Semitism, the two 
writers should have ended up as dire enemies, on opposite sides of 
the chasm opened up by the Dreyfus affair. The four volumes of the 
series—L’orme du mail (The Elm-Tree on the Mall; January 1897), Le 
mannequin d’osier (The Wicker Work Woman; September 1897), L’anneau 
d’améthyste (The Amethyst Ring; February 1899), and M. Bergeret à Paris 
(Monsieur Bergeret in Paris; February 1901)—published in the same 
years as barrès’s trilogy, record the shift in France’s political stance 
from right to left in response to the same “neurosis of national iden-
tity” (bancquart, “notice” to Amethyst) that inflated the Dreyfus case 
into a national affair. at the same time, and for the same reasons, they 
chronicle the writer’s movement from the position of the isolated intel-
lectual, “aristocrat of thought,” to the intellectual actively engaged in 
the clashes of public life (bancquart, “notice” to Bergeret 1210), or, as 
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Jean levaillant succinctly put it, from “politics as spectacle” to “politics 
as salvation” (441).
 France records these final steps in his long migration from his father’s 
royalism, to an epicurean anarchism, to a militant socialism close to 
that of Jaurès or the Clemenceau of this period, through the develop-
ment of the character who eventually emerges as the central figure of 
the series, the classics professor m. bergeret. his role in the story and 
his relation to his pupils, however, differ radically from those portrayed 
in the novels we have studied to this point. We almost never see him 
teaching, nor do we follow the careers of his pupils, who generally 
function only as more or less passive listeners to his ideas. This is not a 
roman d’apprentissage, or rather it is a kind of inverted Bildungsroman, 
in that it is the educator who receives an education in this novel, and it 
is the student who betrays the teacher rather than the reverse, as in so 
many education novels (Aliette, The Disciple, Truth), when m. bergeret’s 
prize pupil, m. roux, has an affair with his wife. neither the victims 
of a pernicious doctrine nor the hope of national renewal, his students 
represent one aspect of the ‘crowd,’ whose unreflective and stereotyped 
views the professor is constantly exercised to refute.
 Unlike the standard novel of education, Contemporary History plots 
the curve neither of the downfall of the wrongly educated nor of the rise 
to true enlightenment of the young hero(es). indeed, it plots no curve 
at all, having neither beginning nor end in the aristotelian sense: it is 
all middle. almost all the contemporary reviews of Elm-Tree and Wicker 
Work Woman, both favorable and unfavorable, wondered whether they 
were really novels at all. narrative action is supplanted by various dis-
crete short forms—dialogues, walks, essays, conversations, and so on. 
moreover, the plot, such as it is, gets lost among the plethora of digres-
sions, and in any case it is too disjointed. as for the contents, the social 
analysis and commentary outweigh the concern for realistic character-
ization and the representation of the passions expected in fiction (see 
Gier 227 and 239 for a summary of the critical reception of the two 
volumes). Typical of contemporary reviewers, Fernand Gregh, one of 
the most highly respected critics of the times, expressed his dismay over 
the novel’s many disparate aspects and ended up calling it a “chronicle” 
rather than a novel (review).
 in fact, France published the texts he would later patch together into 
his novel under the heading of the chronicle (chronique) rather than of 
the serial (feuilleton), as would have been expected for a novel, first in 
L’Écho de Paris, then, after taking his public stance as a Dreyfusard, in 
Le Figaro. The immediate occasion for the first of these articles was the 
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publication of brunetière’s piece “après une visite au vatican” (after a 
visit to the vatican), in January 1895. France read this proclamation as 
a confirmation of the “new spirit” (esprit nouveau) of republican concili-
ation with the Church announced the year before by Spuller, the min-
ister of cults, in response to Pope leo Xiii’s encyclical of 1892 calling 
for the Church to “rally” to the republic. While Spuller seemed to be 
genuinely concerned to heal the widening rift between the clericals and 
the anticlericals threatening to tear the country apart, anatole France 
was convinced that the new spirit of peaceful coexistence touted by the 
Church would remain peaceful only if the republic would kowtow to its 
authoritarian demands. Certainly, the text of the encyclical was enough 
to give any reader pause, expressing as it does the aim of combating 
the “progressive abuses” of republican legislation. moreover, shortly 
after brunetière’s article appeared, Félix Faure was elected president, 
and the new rightist government he shepherded in overtly opposed the 
Ferry laws, high on the list of “progressive abuses,” and allowed the 
Congregationist schools to reopen (bancquart, Anatole France 217–18; 
levaillant 467–69). While France held no brief for the various govern-
ing parties that had succeeded one another since 1875, he was even 
more vehemently opposed to the power of the clergy, which he feared 
would undermine the republic from within if the French were to allow 
themselves to be gulled by the new rhetoric of reconciliation.
 instead of entering into a polemical exchange with brunetière, as he 
had done with the dispute over The Disciple, France decided to respond 
to the policy of the esprit nouveau with a series of short stories, first 
titled “ecclesiastical Stories,” portraying Church types he considered 
dangerous to the republic (bancquart, Anatole France 218). right in 
the opening scene he sets the tone for the series, when with one stroke 
he indicts both the Church and the republic. archbishop-Cardinal 
Charlot is dictating a pastoral letter to his vicar-general, m. de Goulet, 
praising the ‘new spirit’ of peace, reconciliation, and submission to “the 
powers that be.” When the latter objects to the conciliatory language of 
his speech, due to the present “decline of parliamentary predominance,” 
the archbishop notes with satisfaction that the spirit of cooperation now 
works in both directions. after all, despite the Ferry laws, the prefect, 
m. Worms-Clavelin, looks favorably on the Congregationist schools 
(Elm-Tree 3).
 France strengthens the connection between ralliement politics and 
education by associating the two main ecclesiastics with a seminary, the 
one as director, abbé lantaigne, and the other as professor of eloquence, 
abbé Guitrel, who are competing for appointment as bishop of Tourcoing 
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(a purely fictitious post). Under the provisions of the Concordat, rein-
stated by the Third republic, candidates for bishop are nominated by 
the pope, but the final appointment is made by a government official, 
the minister of cults. The choice of this plot element thus affords France 
the opportunity to depict the relations, both official and covert, between 
the Church and the republic. This he does primarily through abbé 
Guitrel’s encounters with the local prefect and his wife. Opposite the 
churchmen France places abbé lantaigne’s principal interlocutor, the 
secular educator m. bergeret, professor (maître de conférences) at the 
Faculté des lettres of the nameless provincial town whose denizens and 
mores will provide the grist for France’s satirical mill in the first three 
volumes of the series.
 These portraits formed the contents of the chronicles France pub-
lished in the Écho de Paris starting on January 22, 1895 and ending 
abruptly on april 9 of that year (bancquart, “notice” to Contempo-
rary History, Oeuvres 2, 1321).1 a year later France resumed the series, 
now under the title “The ideas of abbé lantaigne.” The stimulus was a 
remarkable coincidence that gave new impetus to France’s antagonism 
to the ‘new spirit.’ For many years, he had been working on a study of 
the conditions that produced the mentality of Joan of arc, and he had 
published a series of articles about supposed visionaries in L’Écho de 
Paris during the latter part of 1895 and the beginning of 1896. Then, 
in spring of that year an enormous sensation erupted in the Parisian 
press with the announcement of the existence of an alleged prophetess, 
a mlle. Couedon who claimed she was visited by the angel Gabriel. For 
the writer, this was proof that the ralliement was reproducing in mod-
ern France the same noxious atmosphere of magic and superstition that 
had given rise to the visions of the maid of Orleans (1321–22). What 
better way to bring out the danger to the republic of the new spirit 
than to show the perplexity of the ‘positivist’ prefect Worms-Clavelin 
when confronted with this apparently inexplicable phenomenon? all the 
more so, since God has told France’s fictional seeress, mlle. Deniseau, 
through the voice of a saint, that misfortunes will befall the country as 
long as the republic exists; good fortune will return only when the king 
is restored to the throne.
 after the resumption of the episodes in 1896, the concept and struc-
ture of the work underwent a significant transformation, and in October 
of that year the series received its definitive title of Contemporary History. 
From then on, France purposely substituted the unforeseeable, chance 
occurrences of the daily news for any preestablished unity of charac-
ter or plot, and he introduced more and more allusions to political 
c o N T e m p o r a r y  h i s T o r y :  t h e  m e m o ry  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t   ~   1  
events into the story. it became an improvisation, full of l’imprévu (the 
unforeseen; levaillant 467).
 The tongue-in-cheek apology for the disorder of his story France 
placed as a foreword to the march 23, 1897, episode—the narrative part 
of which was included in chapter vii of Wicker Work Woman—bears 
witness to the fact that by this time he was purposely making a virtue 
of what had at first been a real problem for him. apologizing for hav-
ing ‘forgotten’ about mme. bergeret and therefore having to disrupt 
the chronological order of his story in order to pick up the strand of 
her ruminations where he had left her several episodes before, France 
confesses that his tale is not as strictly lined up as the columns of the 
louvre! but, he adds, neither are the homeric epics, which are, after all, 
just a bunch of folktales stitched together by a talented raconteur. and 
if his chronicles lack the orderliness of Remords d’un ange (An Angel’s 
Remorse)—a very long and very bad novel by one adolphe Dennery 
or d’ennery (real name adolphe Philippe), author of several hundred 
plays who was famous in the nineteenth century as a kind of poor man’s 
Scribe, the epitome of vulgar commercialism in the theater, and thus 
symbol of the facile organization known as the ‘well-made play’—they 
conform completely to the pattern of such lesser works as Don Quixote 
and Pantagruel! So there is no shame in having to go back to madame 
so long after the event. in fact, in all humility, he aspires to nothing 
more glorious than that his work be compared to that of the monk 
raoul Glaber, who chronicled the plagues and famines of his times in 
the year one thousand, in what France terms a childishly candid little 
book as poor in style as in thought.
 in the book version, France sustained his challenge to the narra-
tive conventions of unity and order in other ways. The title of the 
series announces a temporal dimension to the challenge by juxtapos-
ing past and present in the oxymoron of “contemporary history.” That 
there are generic implications to this temporal dimension can be seen in 
the definition of the newspaper chronicle given in the larousse Grand 
Dictionnaire Universel du XIXe Siècle: “certain articles or series, written 
day-to-day, published by newspapers, and which are, so to speak, the 
hour by hour reflection of everyday life. These hurried productions, 
forgotten as soon as they are born” (iv, 245–46). Dealing with the 
trivia of everyday life and thrown together in haste to meet a daily 
deadline, the newspaper chronicle is the quintessence of the ephemeral. 
it is the antithesis, therefore, of art as it was understood by virtually 
the totality of writers and critics in the nineteenth century, as is evi-
dent in the contrast implied between the disparaging terms used in the 
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definition and their contraries—careful choice, studied craft, significant 
events, longevity if not the downright eternity associated with the beau-
tiful. France distilled this quintessence in his novels by publishing them 
in book form with virtually no lag time, recounting the processes of 
change from the ralliement to the Dreyfus affair at the very moment 
they were happening.
 Disorder, randomness, transience, immediacy, insignificance: these 
qualities, or rather defects, make of the nineteenth-century newspaper 
chronicle the epitome of contingency. Why, then, attempt to force just 
these characteristics onto the apparently antithetical novel form? in 
joining his chronicles into novels, is France attempting to eternalize 
the random and ephemeral? Or is he striving to undermine the notion 
of timelessness, within and outside the domain of art? Does the oxy-
moron of ‘contemporary history’ mean that the literary purpose of the 
novel, as opposed to the original chronicles, was to develop a technique 
for treating the present as though it were past history (Sachs)? Or, on 
the contrary, does it intimate that the only genuinely historical mode 
of representation is that which eschews all attempts to find an eternal 
meaning in temporal events (masson)? and do these contradictions 
apply only to the parts of the novels drawn from the chronicles pub-
lished under the definitive title of Contemporary History?
 as stated above, France wrote the first episodes of Elm-Tree in order 
to combat the dangerous ‘new spirit’ heralded in brunetière’s 1895 arti-
cle about his visit to Pope leo Xiii. in that article, the dogmatic critic 
did more than simply endorse the pope’s new politics; he outlined a 
series of arguments designed to supply an intellectual justification for 
the call for political ralliement, by establishing a parallel between the 
reconciliation of republic and Church and a new agreement between 
science and religion. now it turns out that the rationale brunetière 
adduces for his truce between science and religion contradicts, on virtu-
ally every point, the ideological thrust of the chronicle.
 it is this rationale that France attributes to one of the churchmen 
who represent the danger of Catholic ideology for the republic, abbé 
lantaigne. in broad strokes, brunetière’s argument is that science has 
recently lost some of its prestige, a claim he summarized in the catch-
phrase “la banqueroute de la science” (The bankruptcy of science”), 
since it has now been proven that it will never be able to dispel the three 
major ‘mysteries’ of life (“a visit to the vatican” 99): the origins of 
man, society, and morality (100); the law of his conduct; and his future 
destiny (103). religion, on the other hand, has recovered some of its 
c o N T e m p o r a r y  h i s T o r y :  t h e  m e m o ry  o f  t h e  p r e s e n t   ~   1  
lost esteem, having proven its truth by the “continuity of its immutable 
dogma,” and can regain even more by doing good in the world, estab-
lishing peace and harmony in the land through its reconciliation with 
the government and through its benevolent policies toward the poor 
working classes (106). The tenets of religion are matters of faith, which 
can neither be proved nor disproved, but only affirmed or denied; there-
fore, science has nothing to say to religion on this score. likewise, 
religion can neither prove nor disprove scientific truths. hence there is 
no room for intellectual conflict between the two (111).
 all this peace and harmony, however, is only the hors d’oeuvre; 
the pièce de résistance of brunetière’s ideological feast is his treatment 
of the question that is obviously uppermost in his mind, the political 
implications of the ‘law of man’s conduct’; that is, the effect of this new 
harmony on social policy, or, what amounts to the same thing for him, 
morals. even while protesting his great respect for science, brunetière 
feels constrained to point out that the failure of science to solve the 
mystery of man’s conduct disqualifies it from providing that indepen-
dent morality so dear to the hearts of the Opportunist republicans. 
morals, duty, can never be induced from nature (the proper domain 
of science), for all morality, indeed all civilization, consists precisely 
in separating man from (his) nature (117). morals demand the sub-
lime, the transcendent, the absolute; in short, God, as their foundation 
(111–12).
 as the doctrine of original sin, reinforced by Darwinian science itself, 
teaches us, man’s nature consists in selfish instincts, the antithesis of the 
social bond and the social good (117). ergo, individualism, including 
the use of individual reason to criticize social institutions and to develop 
individual interpretations, especially of sacred texts (114), is a danger 
to society, no doubt the gravest danger (117–18). in Catholicism, all 
authority (the right to command) derives from God, and even though 
God has now changed his mind and decided, via the mouth of leo 
Xiii, that the republic is a legitimate authority, obedience to author-
ity is still the first duty of the individual (106–17). Q.e.D. brunetière’s 
final word, on the topic and in the article: “This is neither the time nor 
the place to oppose individual caprice to the rights of the community” 
(118).2
 like brunetière, abbé lantaigne criticizes the principle of individual 
interpretation of holy Scripture (Elm-Tree 21). like brunetière, lan-
taigne professes great respect for science—after all, human reason is one 
of God’s creations—as long as it doesn’t get in the way of Church doc-
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trine (77–78). all duties, even secular ones, come from God, the good 
abbé informs us (102). For him as for brunetière, the Church represents 
above all immutability and continuity: The unity and continuity of the 
patrie française derives from the institution of the bishops, whose power 
is spiritual and therefore stable; indeed, the homeland itself is “spirit, 
and completely contained in the moral and religious bond” (101–2). 
most important, and most ironic, is the fact that lantaigne too accedes 
to the pope’s call to live in peace with the republic (149), but he does 
so while openly proclaiming his adherence to the principle of monarchy, 
as though to say that the Church will accept the concept of democ-
racy only to the extent that it doesn’t infringe upon the interests of the 
Church. This impression is of course confirmed as the main thrust of 
the novel, when abbé Guitrel, who constantly protests his acceptance of 
the ‘new spirit,’ is finally named bishop of Tourcoing at the end of the 
third book and proceeds immediately to attack and insult the repub-
lic, refusing to comply with its tax laws in blatant contradiction to his 
repeated promises to obey the legitimate government (Amethyst, chap. 
26, 296–99).
 levaillant construes lantaigne as the quintessence of the rigid, 
systematic spirit of Catholicism in its most narrow-minded sense and 
applied with the blindest of logic to everything—the “unity of faith” 
that lantaigne declares to be the most important idea for a priest and 
the touchstone of true religion for all minds (Elm-Tree 14). he describes 
France’s bête noire in the very terms that barrès was using at the same 
moment to castigate the Kantian spirit of the republic, as a “theorem,” 
the epitome of “metaphysical unity,” “scholastic abstraction” and “verbal 
rationalism” (levaillant 474).3 how better to challenge this systematic 
spirit he abhorred than with its opposites, just as barrès was doing: the 
concrete, the individual, the transitory, the contingent?
 but for France, barrès’s arguments prove the case against the monar-
chical principles of the Church. he assembles all the themes associated 
with lantaigne in the final conversation between the priest and Profes-
sor bergeret in Elm-Tree. The clergyman considers that the republic is 
diversity incarnate and thus the principle of evil, for it is the very antith-
esis of the unity that characterizes true religion (150–51). in addition 
to its consequent lack of independence, permanence, and power, the 
republic’s lack of duration entails a lack of identity (Elm-Tree 808). For 
lantaigne, the republic is diversity, dispersion, discontinuity, weakness, 
transience, and dependency. and nonexistence, for the priest cannot 
restrain his vituperations, adding that the regime is a lack (of a prince), 
and an absence (of authority) (152). The republic is ‘essentially evil,’ 
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because it wants everything that God does not want: liberty, since he 
is the master; equality, since he established the hierarchy of dignities in 
heaven and on earth; tolerance, since evil is intolerable; the will of the 
people, since a multitude of ignoramuses should not prevail against the 
small number of those who act according to God’s will; and of course 
it is evil in its religious indifference (158–59). The pretender to the 
throne, henri Dieudonné, the Count de Chambord, last of the bour-
bons who died in 1883, would have restored the principle of authority 
and human order along with divine order, hierarchy, law, rules, true lib-
erty, and unity (155–56). in sum, for lantaigne the republic is every-
thing we group together today under the name of difference, Otherness; 
Catholic monarchism, everything opposed to difference, what we might 
call the principle of indifference.
 lantaigne’s condemnation of the republic is even more sweeping 
than the foregoing considerations would make it appear, for along with 
unity and identity the regime has destroyed meaning itself. in the good 
old days, the sufferings of the French nation made sense; they were use-
ful and even precious, because people recognized that they were punish-
ments sent by God that contained lessons, merits, salvation, strength, 
and glory (153–54). but now suffering has no meaning, because, once 
faith in God has disappeared, without the absolute, the understanding 
of the relative is also lost, and even the sense of history (154). God, 
that is to say, unity and continuity, in and out of time, is the principle 
of intelligibility, without which there is no meaning of any sort, neither 
of the eternal (whatever that might be) nor of the transitory. all that is 
left, presumably, is disorder, randomness, transience, immediacy, insig-
nificance—the realm of the meaningless that constitutes the bread and 
butter of the chronicle!
 The form of the chronicle was therefore perfectly adapted to repre-
sent the ideology of the republic France wanted to oppose to the prin-
ciple of unity he discerned at the basis of Catholic doctrine and of the 
Church’s new politics of ralliement. Still better was the novel stitching 
together a series of chronicles with varying focuses, changing charac-
ters, multiple levels, and unpredictable twists and turns of events that 
constantly belie the abstract unity and meaning lantaigne champions. 
in some cases, France resorts to a rather facile irony to bring out the 
contradiction between lofty ideas and contingent realities, as when he 
relates the story of little honorine, the poor thirteen-year-old orphan, 
miraculously cured of tuberculosis, who supposedly sees and hears the 
virgin, only to reveal that this model of innocence and purity spends 
most of her time rolling in the hay with a little orphan boy who presses 
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her to extract money and gifts from the rich brécés who find her reli-
gious ecstasies so edifying (Amethyst 37–45). Or when m. bergeret cites 
Jean de launoy, a pious seventeenth-century Sorbonne scholar who 
provided historical evidence that the Saint Catherine whom Joan of arc 
claimed to have seen in a vision never existed (Elm-Tree 103). France 
makes it clear that it is chance, not design, that brings about the most 
important event in the plot of Wicker Work Woman, when he has m. 
bergeret, contrary to his habit, enter the drawing room of his apartment 
before going into his study, “for no particular motive or reason, without 
thinking” (86), and discover his wife’s adultery. The tension between 
theoretical meaning and unforeseeable occurrence is compounded when 
mme. bergeret realizes, to her horror, “the entirely unforeseen results of 
such a trifling episode” (Wicker Work Woman 224).
 most directly related to the chronicle form, however, are the actual 
historical events that enter into the novel, such as the momentous fail-
ure, to which lantaigne alludes, of the Count de Chambord’s effort to 
restore the monarchy in the early days of Third republic, due to the 
relatively trivial cause of his refusal to renounce the white bourbon 
flag. even more telling is the americans’ defeat of the very Catholic 
and monarchical flotilla of Spain, blessed by the pope and carrying the 
names of the virgin and the saints, which, according to France’s fic-
tional reactionary military expert, General Cartier de Chalmot, goes 
against all the rules of military science recognized in the civilized world 
and is thus neither likely nor desirable (Amethyst 163–64).
 France and bergeret themselves became the victims of unforeseen 
circumstances when they were swept up in the unexpected torrent of 
events known as the Dreyfus affair,4 which would become a cause 
of national dissension belying bergeret’s sanguine assurances to abbé 
lantaigne of the country’s henceforth peace-loving nature and drag 
the writer along in directions he could have neither foreseen nor con-
trolled, forever changing his life while giving a new sense to the title 
Contemporary History. Starting in the first chapters of Amethyst, the 
affair encroached on the story of the competition to become bishop of 
Tourcoing, overshadowed that of mme. bergeret’s adultery, and eventu-
ally swallowed up the entire plot of M. Bergeret in Paris.
 France later confessed in a newspaper interview that the affair jus-
tified beyond his wildest nightmares his original hostility to the ral-
liement. When he started his chronicles, he had no idea that the danger 
was so imminent. During the affair, he witnessed the “black invasion” 
of “foreigners,” the “roman army” who “occupied” the homeland and 
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controlled all its intellectual venues (interview of 1903, quoted in levail-
lant 520). This sense of the danger stemming from the clerical enemy 
within the republic is increasingly present in the last two books of 
the tetralogy, rising in a frightening crescendo toward the end of Paris. 
in the penultimate chapter, m. bergeret vents his considerable spleen 
against his new bête noire, méline, an open anti-Dreyfusard and the 
politician who did most to confer an aura of respectability on the new 
right-wing nationalists in the eyes of bourgeois republicans (Paris 105). 
head of the government (Président du Conseil) from 1896 to 1898 and 
influential leader of the center-right thereafter, he owed the unusual lon-
gevity of his ministry to the coalition of centrist republicans and right-
wing parties, including antirepublican royalists, who supported him 
(see J.-m. mayeur, Vie politique 161–73). The catchword of his regime 
was ‘appeasement’ (appaisement), a slogan calculated as an appeal to 
national unity, but one that, in the aftermath of World War ii, inevitably 
makes us shudder today. The parallel between méline’s appeasement and 
Chamberlain and Daladier’s infamous visit to hitler in munich half a 
century later is in fact striking: his government would not prosecute 
the nationalists for their numerous illegal actions if they agreed not to 
disrupt the World’s Fair of 1900 and prevent the merchants of Paris 
from making a good profit.
 From the beginning of his ministry, méline had denounced anti-
clericalism, slowed the secularization of the schools to a snail’s pace, 
and closed his eyes to the return of the oulawed Congregations. in the 
novel, therefore, France presents his policies as the natural extension of 
Spuller’s new spirit, a revised version of the ralliement, which he had 
not foreseen when he started the series of chronicles, nor even when he 
wrote and published Wicker Work Woman. as a result, when the series is 
read from beginning to end in its present, definitive form, the events of 
Elm-Tree and Wicker Work Woman take on a meaning they did not have 
when those volumes were first published: The ralliement now appears 
to be the first step in the civil war that was to break out openly in the 
Dreyfus affair. later events thus conferred a sense on earlier occur-
rences that no one could have, or at least that France had not in fact, 
foreseen when they were taking place.
 For standard spiritualist criticism, the vice of the chronicle novel is 
that it is too shortsighted to allow accurate judgment of the meaning of 
the events it recounts. but this defect is just the obverse of the unique 
strength of the genre—its ability to stage the process of what Freud 
and lacan called Nachträglichkeit (retroactivity), whereby the meaning 
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of the past is periodically rewritten in light of the unforeseeable twists 
and turns of the historical present that no preconceived meaning can 
contain.
Desire or Unity? 
The World according to Epicurus
if Father lantaigne’s main role was to expose the hypocrisy behind 
Father brunetière’s call for the conciliation of religion and science, Pro-
fessor bergeret’s original function, even before France had made the 
decisive choice to follow the whims of the daily news, was to plead the 
case for the writer’s epicurean understanding of the contingency of the 
world (see his Jardin d’Épicure [1894]), in order to display the relation 
between theory and desire and thus to pry loose the veneer of intellec-
tual legitimacy that the editor of the Revue des Deux Mondes wanted to 
spread over the power grab of the Church. at first a mere foil designed 
to goad abbé lantaigne into expounding his ‘ideas’ for all to read, m. 
bergeret soon begins to take on an autonomous existence in keeping 
with his professorial role as general commentator, explicator, and theo-
retician of the world.
 bergeret launches his independent career by intervening in the con-
versation of his fellow habitués of Paillot’s bookshop. During the idle 
meanderings of their senseless chatter, Doctor Fornerol and m. de Ter-
remondre, the latter a local property owner who will soon come to 
represent the mentality of the average supporter of the Opportunist 
republic, discuss the old wives’ tales that explain the various shapes and 
colors of birthmarks, called envies (wishing-marks), which were consid-
ered to be the result of the pregnant mother’s sudden craving (envie) 
for raspberries, strawberries, or wine. bergeret takes them to task for 
suggesting that pregnant women have such limited desires; that view is 
incompatible with “natural philosophy,” which states that desire created 
the world, sustains it, and is its motive force. like all other animate 
beings, women have “secret fevers, hidden passions, and strange fren-
zies,” and the state of pregnancy “does not produce indifference, but 
. . . it rather perverts and inflames the deeper instincts” (Elm-Tree 142). 
Characteristically, m. bergeret’s first effort at interpretation is thus an 
exercise in disinterpretation, in removing the commonly accepted sense 
of phenomena.
 Updating epicurus and lucretius with an admixture of Darwin and 
the science of their times, bergeret and France oppose to the transcen-
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dent theological view of the universe an immanent and naturalist theory 
of the world that structures the professor’s ironic commentaries as well 
as the writer’s representation of the random course of events. its first 
principle is of course the extraordinary power bergeret attributes to 
desire here, in the inanimate as well as the animate world.
 later in Elm-Tree, France asserts the more general naturalist tenet 
that all human actions are motivated by the instincts of love and hunger 
(199). hunger, in this context, is another name for the desire to destroy 
the other in order to assure one’s own survival, and both he and the nar-
rator repeatedly remark on man’s instinctive lust for destruction. When 
old mme. houssieu, whose house is next door to Paillot’s bookstore, 
is found slain in her bed, bergeret argues that murder is completely 
natural, in man and beast (199). While on leave from his stint of mili-
tary service, m. roux explains that one of the reasons for the continual 
wars that plague humanity is the innate pleasure men take in shooting 
their rifles; he too enjoys this activity, even though he is a socialist, 
loves humanity, and believes in the fraternity of nations[!] (Wicker Work 
Woman 9–10). This pleasure is not restricted to army recruits and low-
life murderers. The narrator wrings his metaphorical hands in delight 
as he notes the “profound instinctive desire to kill” (Amethyst 19) in the 
Duke de brécé and his aristocratic guests when they see some pheasants 
in a clearing on his estate, and he then calls the duke’s noble ancestors 
a pack of murderers for their exploits as hunters (Amethyst 39). indeed, 
bergeret includes in his indictment all civilized men, who think that 
their first social duty is to learn to kill their fellow men according to the 
rules of combat and that their greatest glory is that of carnage (Wicker 
Work Woman 169).
 nor is m. bergeret himself, cultivated as he is, exempt from the 
enjoyment of destruction, for he too is the descendant of a long line of 
“men, apes and savage beasts” who have transmitted those same destruc-
tive instincts to the good professor (Wicker Work Woman 87). Upon dis-
covering his wife’s adultery, his first reaction—which lasts only a second, 
it is true—is that of “a simple, violent man and ferocious animal,” who 
thirsts for carnage and wants to kill his wife and roux (87). instead of 
murdering the couple, however, a few moments later, after leaving the 
room where he found them, he vents his rage on mme. bergeret’s poor, 
defenseless sewing form, crushing it with his bare hands, stomping on 
it, throwing the headless wicker work woman out the window, and 
watching it crash against the ground two stories below.
 The problem for any naturalist theory of human behavior is to 
explain the existence of apparently noninstinctive modes of action, and 
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first of all to show brunetière and company that morality does not con-
sist in setting oneself in opposition to nature; rather morality derives 
from nature. The positivists and their kin, as we have seen, responded to 
this challenge by asserting the existence of an innate “social feeling” that 
serves as the real basis of all forms of morality. m. bergeret espouses a 
more malicious theory. For him, morality derives directly from the rage 
for destruction. morality, in a word, is a form of cruelty. This deriva-
tion emerges in his second reaction to his wife’s adultery. immediately 
after his rather weak urge to kill has dissipated, his primitive instinct is 
replaced by ‘social’ ideas—a hodgepodge of religious and secular max-
ims, laws, and moral principles that fan the flames of his indignation 
and inspire in him notions of guilt, virtue, punishment, and justice: 
“after having wanted to kill madame bergeret and m. roux by mere 
bloodthirsty instinct, he now wanted to kill them out of regard for jus-
tice” (88).
 his real revenge, however, is subtler, more civilized, and more cruel. 
he simply treats mme. bergeret as though she does not exist, as abso-
lute nothingness (936): he takes away from her the management of 
the household, looks right through her when she crosses his path, and, 
above all, never listens or speaks to her. in this way he does not sim-
ply kill her, he “annihilate[s] her” (128). a very sociable being, mme. 
bergeret cannot stand this cruel torture and begins to feel totally empty 
in this new state that resembles solitude and death (131). euphémie, 
the bergerets’ servant girl, is not mistaken when she accuses him of 
being too mean. To her mind, all he had to do was beat his wife silly, 
then make up with her and continue as before. after mature reflec-
tion, bergeret is delighted to agree with the girl that he is indeed being 
mean, for he has retained his “primitive instincts” that tell him that “the 
mere power of injuring and destroying were the motive force of living 
things, their essential quality and highest merit,” and that life prospers 
only through murder, so that the best are those who wreak the most 
carnage (238). after some doubt, he concludes that he is indeed mean, 
because, while his enlightened principles make him theoretically indul-
gent toward a petty misdemeanor such as adultery, his actual conduct 
in punishing his wife as harshly as though he judged her guilty of some 
heinous crime, is “moral, but cruel” (241).
 m. bergeret is no more exempt from the power of love than he is 
from that of hunger. like the pregnant women he invoked in his first 
panegyric to desire, he too is subject to ‘secret ardors’ and hidden lusts, 
in the form of mme. de Gromance, an attractive and elegant young 
aristocrat who is notorious in the region for cheating on her husband. 
he sees her on new year’s Day and, grateful to her for bringing a ray 
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of beauty and grace into his day, smiles at her, whereupon she cuts him 
dead. nevertheless, he defends her to m. mazure, the local archivist 
who revels in airing other people’s dirty laundry, in exactly the same 
terms that he will subsequently utilize to excuse, in principle at least, his 
wife’s transgression. later in Wicker Work Woman, m. bergeret muses 
to himself about the necessity of lying to others, or at least of keeping 
your thoughts to yourself. his prime example is his own “salacious, 
perverted, and grotesque” sexual fantasies about mme. de Gromance.
 if France takes pains to demonstrate that his man of high culture 
acts on the basis of these ‘primitive instincts,’ it is not only in order to 
include him in the general irony of the book, but also to emphasize the 
polemical lesson that civilization is not a separation from but a con-
tinuation of our immersion in the world of nature—and a hypocritical 
continuation at that, since it cloaks its character beneath a veneer of 
high-mindedness. Well before Foucault’s Discipline and Punish, France 
takes aim at modern, humanitarian prisons. The day before lecoeur, the 
butcher’s boy who raped and murdered old mme. houssieu, is to be 
executed, bergeret is in Paillot’s bookstore with the usual cronies, dis-
cussing the death penalty and the penal system. Terremondre is proud 
of the new, progressive, ‘humanitarian’ cells in the local prison. bergeret 
replies that a barbarian could never imagine the cruelty of locking men 
up in single cells, totally isolated from all social contact; “it required 
a philanthropist to conceive the idea of killing them [prisoners] with 
solitude” (152).
 When mazure, the radical, chastises bergeret for turning against his 
own friends, the republicans, and espousing the cause of his enemies, 
the clericals—bergeret has just argued that both parties are equally 
desirous of freedom when out of power, because it strengthens the 
opposition, and just as despotic when in power, since nothing in the 
Constitution protects individual freedoms against national security—an 
allusion to the lois scélérates (black laws) passed after the recent anarchist 
bombings—the professor lays his ultimate trump card on the table, the 
argument France has designed to conflate and deflate the two parties 
simultaneously. Thrusting his stiletto through the very heart of the pub-
lic disputes over the Ferry laws, the professor pops the bubble of official 
bluster by demonstrating that if the clericals were to replace the republi-
cans in power, people’s lives would not be significantly altered, because 
there is no difference between the religious and the secular moralities 
(247–48).
 While it may at first seem as though bergeret is simply repeating 
the Opportunists’ protestations that there exists one single, universal 
morality, the reasons he adduces to support his assertion soon prove 
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that impression to be mistaken. The gist of his naturalistic argument is 
that our moral ideas are effects, not causes, of our behavior; they are the 
result, or, better yet, the representation of the habits, the customs, the 
mores of a given time and place (248). as a consequence, there cannot 
be two rival moral systems at the same time and in the same place.
 Poor m. mazure comes close to bursting out in a rage, when m. 
bergeret points out to him that he, a freethinker who believes that hap-
piness is the goal of life, and m. de Terremondre, who is Catholic and 
believes expiation as the path to eternal life to be the principle of earthly 
existence, nevertheless both have the same morality. both sides have the 
same traditions, the same prejudices, and are plunged in the same dark-
ness.
 indeed, if the (anti-)ideal republic was the epitome of diversity, the 
real French republic of the last years of the century adopted more and 
more the authoritarian principles of unity, command, and obedience 
dear to the hearts of its clerical opponents. nowhere is this more evi-
dent than in the practice of obligatory universal male military service 
(adopted in 1872, modified in 1889). That is why Wicker Work Woman 
begins with bergeret’s ironic assault on the military in his conversation 
with m. roux, on leave from his military service. The republic will 
never renounce conscription, m. bergeret informs his listeners, because 
the military teaches citizens obedience to authority, thus protecting the 
powers that be (23). General Cartier de Chalmot, the same shining 
light who confidently predicts the downfall of the american navy in its 
war against the Spanish, and who later asserts with aplomb, apropos 
of Dreyfus’s conviction, that an army tribunal cannot make a mistake, 
assures his friends at the Duke de brécé’s château that the virtue of the 
army is the “sovereign and immutable” unity of its “one, unique” will 
(Amethyst 50).
 in fact, the army is the perfect training ground for transmuting free-
dom-loving citizens into tyrants and slaves. in response to m. roux’s 
story of a Sergeant lebrec, who curses the mother of a new draftee 
who fails to line up correctly; bergeret comments, “[W]ere he dressed 
in the peasant’s blouse this hero [lebrec] would be thirsting for liberty, 
but clad in a uniform, it is tyranny for which he yearns, and to help in 
the maintenance of order” (Wicker Work Woman 25). moreover, as m. 
roux confesses at the start of their conversation, the lack of sleep and 
constant fatigue of boot camp make draftees incapable of entertaining 
general ideas and subtle thoughts, that is, of exercising the critical facul-
ties necessary for freedom of thought. The army operates on the basis of 
the fear it can inspire in its members, and the sadistic enjoyment it can 
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provide for its officers. The sergeant would have pitied the new recruits, 
“were it not that he thirsts to terrify them in order that he may enjoy his 
own sense of power”; “he is doubly perverted, both as slave and tyrant” 
(168–69).
 The entire military code of justice constitutes an exercise in tyranny, 
since it seeks to ‘maintain order’ among the troups by the rule of naked 
fear. a holdover from the ancien régime designed for mercenaries and 
victims of forced conscription, which the republic has neglected to 
amend now that it has citizen armies, bergeret calls it a remainder of 
barbarity, for it mandates whipping, branding, and other cruel physi-
cal punishments for various offenses, and the death penalty for crimes 
ranging from theft to armed insurrection. even before France became 
involved in the Dreyfus affair, then, he saw that the military embraced 
by the republic after the shock of 1870 contradicted the very principles 
that same republic claimed to uphold against the monarchists and cleri-
cals.
Meaning and Desire: 
An Essay on Indifference (in Matters of Politics)
The question France implicitly raises in the first two volumes of Con-
temporary History is: ‘What has made the ralliement possible?’ in other 
words, “how has it come about that the republic has betrayed its prin-
ciples and its very self?” The key to the answer he proposes is contained 
in m. bergeret’s speech on birthmarks: The state of pregnancy does not 
produce indifference; it stimulates the deepest instincts, the most diverse 
desires. The republic, on the contrary, suffers precisely from the lack 
of desire that entails the lack of diversity, both of which bergeret neatly 
combines in the one term—‘in-difference.’ indeed the words ‘indiffer-
ence’ and ‘indifferent’ are applied to almost every situation in the first 
volumes of the series, for indifference, the lack of desire, is the secret 
scourge of modern France under the republic. like the ‘decadent’ old 
men portrayed in works by Flaubert, huysmans, Gustave moreau, or 
Oscar Wilde, the Opportunist republic has acquiesced in the ralliement 
because it has lost its desire to be (itself). it remains to be seen whether 
it will find a Salomé or herodiade sufficiently stimulating to arouse that 
desire once again.5
 in his great diatribe against the republic, abbé lantaigne excoriates 
its policy of religious “indifference” (which Ferry and friends called 
‘neutrality,’ of course), a charge to which he returns with a vengeance 
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in the second volume, this time armed with lamennais’s Essay on Indif-
ference in Matters of Religion. even though France is far from approv-
ing either lantaigne or lamennais’s doctrine of expiation, he clearly 
prefers the abbé’s forthrightness and conviction to the hypocrisy and 
indifference of the republican of the ralliement par excellence, m. de 
Terremondre.
 indifference is so important because France saw it as the force, or 
rather the absence of force, which had allowed the republic to indulge 
in financial scandal after scandal with impunity. When m. Worms- 
Clavelin, the epitome of the republican official in the novel, learns of 
mlle. Deniseau’s antigovernment prophesies, he thinks back to all the 
attacks the republic has had to bear since the beginning of his career 
under President Grévy, who had to resign due to his complicity in the 
Wilson scandal. (Grévy’s son-in-law, Daniel Wilson, was a corrupt jour-
nalist involved in selling official State honors). having seen the Panama 
scandal come and go, and then come again (it was revived in 1895 with 
the arrest of arton); having seen most of the financiers and engineers of 
his party end up in prison; having one senator and two deputies from 
his department under indictment for corruption, all without losing the 
support of the population, he had learned to be indulgent toward his 
fallible compatriots. as France puts it with exquisite irony, “events had 
enlarged his naturally limited intelligence. The vast irony of things had 
passed into his soul, making it easy-going, mocking, indifferent” (Elm-
Tree 91–92). but, as an “honest civil servant,” there are some affronts 
even he cannot tolerate, namely, those that risk preventing the gov-
ernment ministries from “peaceably enjoy[ing] that common attitude 
of indifference which, by gaining over their friends as well as their 
enemies, ensured at the same time both their power and their repose” 
(92).
 in Wicker Work Woman, m. bergeret directs his ironic wit against 
the government as well as the Church, taking over the function that 
had been for the most part reserved for the narrator in the first volume. 
Seated once again under the elms of the mall, he discusses the latest 
government scandal with abbé lantaigne, the arrest and imprisonment 
for corruption of the ‘honorable’ Senator laprat-Teulier, leader of the 
Opportunist party in their town since the early days of the repub-
lic. bergeret’s pastiche of government style in his rendition of Worms- 
Clavelin’s reaction to this unfortunate event is as marvelous and as 
wicked as those France had given in Elm-Tree of Church style in the 
discourse of abbés lantaigne and Guitrel:
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[m. Worms-Clavelin] congratulates himself on the loyalty of their con-
stituents [ses administrés—those who are passively ‘administered,’ rather 
than electors who wield power], who remain true to the established 
system, even when it seems the general wish to bring it into disrepute. 
he declares, in fact, that [such] parliamentary episodes . . . leave the 
working-classes of the department absolutely indifferent (188).
 France’s portrait of the honest civil servant is viciously funny and 
unremittingly nasty, tinged by the kind of prejudicial stereotyping of 
Jews typical of the times, despite France’s public rejection of Drumont’s 
anti-Semiticism.6 With neither superstitions nor homeland, empty, col-
orless, and hence ‘free,’ Worms-Clavelin is the prototypical man without 
qualities, whose only motivating force is the desire to exist and who, a 
pure exterior bereft of any inner being, can only exist by virtue of what 
he can possess; in short, the negation of identity barrès and his ilk 
found so threatening in their phantasmagoria of the Jew. it is no doubt 
because he has no convictions and no imagination that he must hang 
on for dear life to the tangible facts that will make up for the identity 
he lacks. in Contemporary History this combination of nullity and factu-
ality represents the ‘rootless’ republic rather than a particular ‘race’ or 
the dangerous foreigner per se, and specifically the republic of the ral-
liement, which, being nothing in particular, having no desire other than 
to survive, can all the more easily strive to be all things to all people, 
under the reassuring banner of peaceful coexistence.
 The official counterpart to the public’s indifference is the govern-
ment’s policy of doing nothing, and France intimates that it is the com-
bination of the two attitudes that was making the ‘new spirit’ acceptable. 
m. Worms-Clavelin cloaks his selective inertia at first under the title of 
liberal tolerance in his discussions with abbé Guitrel, which form a kind 
of low-level parodic parallel to the genuine exchange of ideas between 
bergeret and lantaigne. The prefect claims that he has shown his liberal 
and tolerant attitude by closing his eyes when the Sisters and brothers 
returned to their convents and schools, and he offers this grotesque 
justification for his application of the new Faure policy of friendship 
toward the Church: “for if we vigorously uphold the essential laws of 
the republic, we hardly enforce them” (Elm-Tree 86)!
 The policy of doing nothing has in fact been the key to the successful 
survival of the Third republic thus far, according to Worms-Clavelin. 
nothing could be further from m. bergeret’s mentality, who had just 
a few pages earlier harangued Paillot about the “edifice” of the French 
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classical school curriculum, which has managed to withstand the test of 
time precisely because it has been constantly revamped, each period of 
history adding its own distinctive contribution. it would soon perish if 
people stopped changing it, repairing it, adding to it.
 in a later scene, Worms-Clavelin’s interlocutor is an artist and former 
Communard named Frémont, who translates his remarks as acquies-
cence in “fraud and iniquity.” Once the liberator of peoples, the only 
rights France now cares to avenge are those of the stock- and bond-
holders. The republic has supported the Turks in their battles against 
the Greeks in Crete and in their massacre of three hundred thousand 
armenian Christians, ostensibly because of the recent alliance with the 
czar, who is in turn allied with the Ottomans, but in fact due to the 
influence of high finance, Jewish finance, which has lent millions to 
Turkey and has directed France in these matters to protect its interests. 
in abandoning the armenians, “we have betrayed not only the interests 
of humanity, but our own” (Wicker Work Woman 145).
 in a sense, then, Worms-Clavelin does represent a foreign power, 
that of international finance and banking, which was closely associated 
with the Jew in the doctrine of the anarchist, socialist, and communist 
left of the period. bergeret considers this new “cosmopolitan” force 
present in all countries to have taken over where the Catholic Church 
left off. m. bergeret points out more than once that no one supports 
the Catholic Church more strongly than the Jewish financiers, who see 
in it both an avenue to respectability and acceptance and a convenient 
force of repression, against the people in general and specifically against 
the bourgoisie’s ultimate nightmare, collectivism. France emphasizes the 
cozy relation among government, Church, and Jewish finance through 
mme. Worms-Clavelin’s preoccupation with the Church, purchasing old 
Church vestments and objects used in mass, having her daughter bap-
tized and educated in a convent school, and donating money to Catholic 
charities.
 by doing nothing, the republican government is thus doing some-
thing, selling out the traditional identity of the French nation to the 
faceless power of big money that is as foreign to traditional French 
identity as to the political and physical nation, and it is the indifference 
of the people that allows those in power to do nothing without fear of 
reprisals. The result is the loss of identity that Worms-Clavelin symbol-
izes and that Frémont bemoans. The writer introduces another charac-
ter to crystallize this theme, Commander aspertini, an italian legislator 
and intellectual who maintains a scholarly correspondence with m. ber- 
geret and who represents the spirit of renaissance and enlightenment 
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humanism. The first time he appears, aspertini explains that, if France 
has lost some of its prestige among the nations, it is not due to the 
defeat in the Franco-Prussian War nor to a supposed lack of intellectual 
production, but to its abandonment of its role as “apostle of brother-
hood and justice,” as liberator of humanity (Wicker Work Woman 29).
 eventually, bergeret poses the question of popular ‘indifference’ and 
national identity explicitly, out of disgust with the venality and corrup-
tion of the officials of the republic, and provoked by abbé lantaigne’s 
disparaging remarks contrasting public acceptance of immorality under 
the current regime with the active voice of public opinion under the 
monarchy and the empire. Unlike barrès, however, bergeret does not 
indict parliamentary government per se. Unable to discern the cause of 
the phenomenon, he imagines a scenario drawn from a Chinese folktale 
to explain the transformation of the French people. by some magic spell, 
an evil genie has replaced the brains of the French with those of “some 
tame, spiritless people, who drag out a melancholy existence without 
rising to the height of a new desire, indifferent to justice and injustice” 
(Wicker Work Woman 189–90). he soon decides, like Frémont, that the 
real perpetrator of the lobotomy that has excised the nation’s historic 
desire for freedom and justice is “international high finance”; if the cur-
rent mentality of the country is conducive to peace within and without, 
it is because, for the moment, “financial europe is in a peaceful temper” 
(192).
Repetition and the Meaning of Meaning
This is not the first time the text has evoked the image of brain-dead 
people dragging out a dreary existence due to their lack of desire. non-
existence and unremitting monotony are linked together in the silent 
treatment mme. bergeret finds so unbearable. Well before either of 
these episodes, however, the narrator had used virtually identical terms 
in Elm-Tree to describe m. bergeret’s reaction to an event that had 
occurred to him many times in the past. in the bookshop he frequents 
as a refuge from his mistreatment at the university, the hostility of the 
town’s social circles, and his unhappy home life, bergeret idly opens a 
book he has opened a thousand times before in the past six years, and 
always to the same page, the place in the Histoire générale des voyages that 
recounts Captain Cook’s last voyage in search of the mythical north-
west Passage. in his diary, the captain observed that his failure allowed 
him to return to the Sandwich islands and make the most important 
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discovery by any european in the Pacific; to which the editor appends 
the sorry note that, unfortunately, the hopes aroused by Cook’s words 
were never fulfilled. The ‘fatal’ repetition of this occurrence symbolized 
to the professor, so the narrator informs us, precisely the monotony and 
uniformity of the academic and provincial life that provide a foretaste of 
death and the dissolution of the body in the grave (143–44). These are 
the characteristics of an existence that consists of the repetition of the 
same things over and over again.
 Significantly, this scene transpires just after bergeret has delivered 
himself of his panegyric to desire, as though to underline the absolute 
contradiction between that life force and the dreariness, monotony, and 
uniformity that characterize a life of repetition without desire. it is not 
surprising, then, that the most knowledgeable commentators consider 
this scene—the only one to be repeated several times in the succeeding 
volumes of the series—to function as an allegory of the entire novel, 
articulating repetition as its main theme, central goal, and principle of 
construction (levaillant 452–53; Sachs 120–22; bancquart, Anatole 
France; France, Oeuvres, vol. 2, 1330–31).
 These interpretations link repetition with two distinct concepts, 
fatality and chance. While the episode exists on two levels, that of Cap-
tain Cook and that of bergeret, the question of repetition arises only 
for the unhappy professor, in whose hands the book ‘accidentally’ keeps 
opening to the same page. Captain Cook’s fate may have been to fail to 
transmit his newfound knowledge to posterity, but it is not the result 
of repetition. he makes his great discovery by chance, as a result of a 
one-time occurrence, his failure to carry out his original purpose, and 
the discovery is also lost due to a single chance event, the unhappy fact 
that he and his men were murdered during their last visit to the Sand-
wich islands. The question, then, is whether there is some connection 
between the singular events that befell the voyager and the repetitive 
occurrences that afflict the professor. in what sense can either one be 
construed as fate, as something inherent in the plan of an individual 
life or in the nature of the world? The answer is that the sense in ques-
tion, the secret complicity between singularity and repetition, between 
chance and fatality, is that of non-sense.
 absurdity, futility, chance, all three are the others of that unity and 
continuity that constitute the theological version of truth and mean-
ing espoused by abbé lantaigne. repetition could, under certain cir-
cumstances, be construed as the manifestation of a fatality opposed to 
chance, because, due to the apparent improbability of the same unmo-
tivated occurrence happening repeatedly, it would seem to result from 
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an underlying order or plan. but the underlying ‘order’ in this case is 
the epicurean disorder of nature, according to which everything derives 
from the random collision of the atoms that form the primary building 
blocks of the universe. bergeret alludes to this theory later when he 
muses on the parallel imperfections of his wife and his dictionary! it 
took nature millions of years to form both out of the molecules floating 
around in the primordial nebular cloud—France has adapted the theory 
of the ancients to conform with the physical science of his times—and 
yet both are still far from perfect (Wicker Work Woman 11). The point of 
his pessimistic excursus is that the universe is not organized according 
to a divine plan, à la bossuet. it has neither direction nor meaning, as 
bergeret’s remarks later in the same chapter indicate, apropos of human 
history. in short, whether events are singular or repetitive, the fatality 
of epicurean nature is that life makes no sense.
 moreover, the text implies, it would be a fate worse than death, or at 
least just as bad, if life did make sense. bergeret’s reading of this passage 
seems to indicate that the realization of abbé lantaigne’s ideal would 
result precisely in the reign of a kind of living death, for it is uniformity 
and monotony, two synonyms for the theological categories of unity 
and continuity, that characterize the provincial and university existence 
to which he feels condemned and that describe the (non)existence to 
which he condemns his wife. it was death, along with horrible suf-
fering, that betrayed the meaning of the reign of meaning when the 
chance occurrences of real events led the writer to include a gruesome 
episode in his chronicles and in chapter Xv of Wicker Work Woman. On 
may 4, 1897, there was a fire at the Charity bazaar in Paris that took 
the lives of more than 100 people and injured more than 150, most 
of them high-society women. at the funeral services in notre-Dame, 
Father Ollivier gave a sermon in front of the president of the republic 
and other government dignitaries explaining that the calamity was a 
necessary expiation for a frivolous and perverted society (see bancquart, 
Anatole France n1408). m. de Terremondre, the very Catholic govern-
ment supporter, is horrified by this display of bad taste, whereupon abbé 
lantaigne asks him: “how can you, one of the leaders of the Catholic 
party in our province, reproach him for telling the head of state and 
his ministers that France was wrong to turn its back on the armenian 
Christians being slaughtered by the Turks, wrong to chase the true God 
out of its schools?” When Terremondre eventually retorts that Father 
Ollivier seemed to be making God responsible for setting the fire, lan-
taigne remains silent, but bergeret gets him to acknowledge that he 
accepts the doctrine of expiation expounded in lamennais’s Essay on 
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Indifference. When Terremondre protests that his cousin and his nieces 
who were burned in the fire did not deserve such a fate, lantaigne can 
restrain himself no longer and bursts out that God was neither cruel 
nor unjust toward them, and that Christians have unfortunately lost the 
sense (sentiment) of sacrifice and the use of pain.
 it would seem, then, that the living death of senseless repetition con-
stitutes only an ironic ‘progress’ over the excruciating pain of theological 
meaning, and in any case the alliance of big money and big religion that 
is the ralliement joins the two together in an infernal round of suffering 
and apathy. That is no doubt why contemporary readers, both middle-
of-the-road republicans and right-wing Catholic critics, found Elm-Tree 
unsettling. Despite its placid tone, they complained, it does away with 
all the prejudices that underlie the present social order (Gier 228). For 
the same reasons, Wicker Work Woman appeared even more threatening: 
in it France had undermined any basis for virtuous action (Gier 240); 
indeed, the book was nothing less than “a breviary of discouragement 
and a textbook on nihilism” (241).7
Liberation and Representation
it would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the alternative of fatal 
repetition or petrified meaning was France’s last word on history, past, 
present, and future. For, although chance and repetition are both others 
of divine order, a certain tension between them persists nevertheless. if 
the whole purpose of Contemporary History is to represent the present as 
the past, to demonstrate the futility of human striving in the face of rep-
etition, the absurdity of life in a totally deterministic universe, or human 
helplessness in the face of chance, why, then, adopt the chronicle form, 
whose special type of meaninglessness consists precisely in its openness 
to the unforeseeable vicissitudes of the present and future, as levaillant 
and especially masson argue persuasively?
 in fact, once m. bergeret emerges as the main character of the novel 
in Wicker Work Woman, the competition for the appointment as bishop 
of Tourcoing is pushed into the background. The main thrust of the 
series from then on, the plot behind its plot, becomes the struggle to 
break with the past, to escape from the tyranny of monotonous and uni-
form provincial life, to overcome senseless repetition without turning 
the events of history once again into a mere example of an eternal and 
immaterial meaning such as expiation (see masson 16). indeed, levail-
lant construes the underlying structure of the first two volumes as “the 
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contrast between the stifling universe of repetition and boredom and 
the hope for a distant opening, between the present truth of separation 
and the desire for participation” (492). but he points out that in those 
first two books, France’s drama consists in “the desire for something 
unknown that each time immediately deteriorates into something only 
too well known” (492). The question then becomes: “is it possible, in 
analogy with Kant’s determination of the beautiful, to conceive of the 
course of events as a kind of unknown, that is, as ‘meaningful with-
out [reinstating a specific] meaning’ (too well known)?” This, i would 
argue, is the central problem of France’s Contemporary History, and the 
writer’s attempt to come to grips with this seemingly insoluble conun-
drum on all levels gives the novel its special character and shape.
 Since the dreary existence of French life under the Third republic 
results from the indifference of its citizens, the only way to overcome 
that condition is to reawaken in them a new desire. indeed, she who 
says ‘plot’ automatically implies the existence of a desire trying to reach 
satisfaction. but before this text can tell the tale of such a desire, it 
must recount the story of a subject striving to attain its desire. at first, 
therefore, the plot takes the form of a struggle between the two hos-
tile forces of repetition and desire. before bergeret can form a positive 
desire, he must liberate himself from all the tyrannies, grand and petty, 
that imprison him in the worlds of meaning and repetition.
 France finds a supremely clever way to bring out the dialectic between 
freedom and repetition. after bergeret’s first reactions of shock, fury, 
reflection, and dismay at his wife’s adultery and the consequent loss of 
his home life, he wanders outside, and, after a visit to the shoemaker—
who is of course looking for a wife—he winds up in his customary 
refuge, Paillot’s bookstore. naturally he opens once again the Histoire 
générale des voyages to the usual page, and it is while he is reenacting the 
primal scene of repetition, rereading the familiar passage about Cook’s 
last voyage, that he hits upon the idea that will give shape to the rest of 
the book as well as to the rest of his fictional life: his wife’s transgression 
has given him his moral freedom. France’s text physically interweaves 
past and present, repetition and singularity, by interspersing the passage 
bergeret is reading from the book with the professor’s reflections about 
his current situation. although the narrator informs us that bergeret 
was not paying attention to what he was reading, the juxtaposition of 
the two textual threads confers an objective significance on the relation 
between the specific fragments of the book and the thoughts they seem 
to provoke. as bergeret reads the part about Cook’s failure to find the 
northwest Passage, he tries out his usual ‘philosophical’ maneuver—the 
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same one Sixte recommends to Greslou—of seeing his particular situa-
tion as a mere example of a universal law. it is only when he comes to 
the mention of the “discovery, albeit the last one,” that the idea of his 
moral freedom occurs to him. Perhaps most significant is the fact that 
this time, unlike the first occurrence in Elm-Tree and the later one in 
Paris, he does not read the commentator’s note about the disappointed 
hopes aroused by the explorer’s announcement of his discovery.
 as though to indicate his new optimism, bergeret closes the book 
immediately after reading the lines from Cook’s diary in which the 
explorer boasts of making his ‘greatest discovery.’ For reading about 
Cook’s accomplishment has somehow aided the professor to make his 
own great discovery: of liberty and a new life. in a kind of reverse sym-
metry, in each case it is chance that breaks the grip of repetition. Just as 
Cook’s failure led by chance to his greatest achievement, so bergeret’s 
failure, his chance discovery of his wife’s betrayal, has led him to his 
greatest triumph, the recognition of the possibility of freedom from 
mme. bergeret’s “despotic soul.” it is the ability to take advantage of 
an opportunity opened up in the present by chance, that is, the capacity 
to see his situation in an entirely new light, which allows him—after 
(only?) ninety minutes, as the narrator points out waggishly—to reach 
a state of relative calm and ‘wisdom.’ Wisdom, for bergeret, consists in 
the exact opposite of the traditional philosophical definition; it is the 
power not to see the present as a repetition of the past, not to reduce 
the singular to an instance of the universal. in this view, casting off the 
shackles of previously held ideas is the first step to liberation, emancipa-
tion is the first step to the formation of desire, and the pursuit of both 
becomes inextricably intertwined with the question of representation.
 Usually vacillating and weak-willed, m. bergeret is able to follow 
through on the resolution he forms, to free himself from his wife by 
‘extirpating’ her from his household, because he is now motivated by 
a powerful desire, the pure desire unadulterated by hatred, never to 
see his wife again. For the first time in the novel, we see him develop 
a desire that leads him to take a particular action to improve his situa-
tion.
 bergeret’s action is particular in that it is adapted to his wife’s spe-
cific character and to his individual temperament. at the same time, 
however, it is a new variation on the age-old theme of murdering the 
offending wife. Similarly, his reading of the passage from the Histoire 
générale des voyages is not a straightforward repudiation of the use of the 
past as prototype, for it is precisely Cook’s voyage in the distant past 
that serves as model for bergeret’s discovery in the present. moreover, 
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each time he reads the passage, this ‘repetition of the same’ is in fact 
slightly different.
 bergeret opens the book to the inevitable passage the second time 
just after lantaigne’s distressing dissection of the republic’s weaknesses 
and his own enumeration of all his failings and reasons for unhappiness. 
appropriately enough for his despondent frame of mind, this time he 
reads only the first few lines, highlighting Cook’s failure to find the 
northwest Passage (Elm-Tree chap. Xiv). The final occurrence, in the 
second chapter of M. Bergeret in Paris, is perhaps the most instruc-
tive, for that time he reads the entire text, diary entry plus commentary 
exactly as it was the first time, and the narrator accompanies it with 
a similar explanation of the impression it caused in bergeret. yet the 
sense of the passage is entirely different from all of the previous occur-
rences. here the context makes it clear that the cause of his sadness is 
a kind of nostalgia provoked by the thought of relinquishing a part of 
his own past, and thus of his self. he is about to leave town for Paris, 
to take up his new appointment as a professor at the Sorbonne, and 
has come to bid adieu to Paillot the bookseller. The narrator makes a 
point of informing us that after scanning the familiar lines once again, 
bergeret closed the book, never to open it again, as though to imply 
that, however gloomy it made him feel at the moment, the mentality 
of futile repetition it symbolized was a chapter in his life that he was 
closing forever.
 France had built up the context for this interpretation of m. berger-
et’s leave-taking in the previous volume of the series. Once his wife 
returns to her mother, bergeret has completed the first step toward free-
dom; although he is not happy, he is no longer sad, for now he enjoys 
true independence, which is inner freedom of the soul. That the next 
step in his emancipation consists in detaching himself from the town 
and renouncing his ties to the past is brought out in the penultimate 
chapter of Amethyst, just after he learns of his appointment to Paris. as 
bergeret looks around him on the street, all the familiar sights of the 
town suddenly appear strange. The city itself seems foreign, unreal, the 
mere image of itself. analyzing his impressions, as he habitually does, 
he realizes that the reality of the town existed for him only insofar as 
he related the people and things in it to himself. its sudden foreignness 
thus results from the withdrawal of his interest from this place where, 
as he remarks, he had spent the last fifteen years of his life.
 yet he still feels that he is tied to the things in town by invisible 
bonds, and he realizes that he also loves “his mother soil [la terre de la 
patrie] and the town” (Amethyst 289), so that he will feel a deep sense 
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of loss upon leaving. it is in this ambivalent state of mind that bergeret 
goes to say farewell to Paillot and Captain Cook, profoundly moved by 
the prospect of losing so important a part of his life, yet looking forward 
to a new phase of liberation in the metropolis where, in the last words 
of the chapter, he expects to find a few “minds which are sufficiently free 
to rid themselves of vulgar terrors and discover for themselves the veiled 
truths” (Paris 20).
 That separation from his past is a necessary step in the process of 
mourning that will lead to his emancipation is confirmed a few chapters 
later in the novel. looking for an apartment in Paris, bergeret and his 
sister Zoé find out that the one they used to live in as children with 
their parents is for rent. They go to visit it, with the apparent inten-
tion of taking it for themselves once again. as they walk from room to 
room together, they are swept up in a torrent of childhood memories, 
of the objects and people they once knew, and above all of their parents. 
Classics professor that he is, m. bergeret feels that, like Ulysses in the 
land of the Cimmerians, he is calling up the shades of his past. and yet, 
as masson observes, “against all expectations, [bergeret] tears himself 
away from the spell and resumes his search [for an apartment]” (171). 
The critic sees this turn away from the past as proof that France’s pro-
tagonist, unlike the heroes of conservative fiction, wants to live his own 
life in his own time rather than repeat the life of a predecessor. and in 
fact, after they have inspected all the rooms, with what must be a cold 
shudder, bergeret urges his sister to leave that realm of the shades. The 
land of memories, like the town in the provinces, is the realm of silence 
and death, as they perceive by the contrast with the noise and the bus-
tling activity of life they encounter in the busy Parisian street below. not 
for them, the barresian conception of the ancestors as the source and 
support of the self.
Commentary and the Subject
by inserting minor variations into the passage that serves as the paradigm 
of the repetition of the same, France seems to indicate that sameness 
is never total, difference never complete. it depends on the commenta-
tor—France, m. bergeret, the reader—whether to see a given event as 
sameness or as difference; better, as difference or in-difference. This is 
not a matter of free choice, however; in keeping with his materialist 
principles, France constantly insinuates that his characters’ interpreta-
tion of events, like a nation’s morality, is determined by the material 
conditions of their lives at the time, and, in the case of individuals, 
especially by their prospects for success or their fears of failure.
 and yet as early as Elm-Tree a chink appears in the armor of epi-
curean determinism. Just after proclaiming that all our actions are 
motivated by love and hunger, and bemoaning the fact that in their 
constant blood lust men are like wild beasts, m. bergeret adds: “but it 
still remains to inquire why i know this, and whence it comes that the 
fact arouses grief and indignation in me” (Elm-Tree 200). at this point 
he takes this knowledge and this reaction as proofs that there must also 
be goodness in the world, but a further implication is that this goodness 
must owe its existence to the possibility of separating oneself from the 
grip of nature, a theme that becomes explicit in the following book.
 From the beginning, then, France presents a dialectic of freedom 
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and determinism whose two poles are inextricably intertwined with the 
functions of commentary, meaning, and representation. With his ques-
tions, m. bergeret has come upon the standard theme of the subject, 
common in Western thought at least since Descartes: i exist as a subject 
to the extent that i can stand outside the natural world in order to rep-
resent it to myself. but how is it possible for the mind to contemplate 
the natural universe in its entirety if it is itself a part of that universe? 
being a fictional character, however, m. bergeret does not trouble him-
self with finding an answer to this question. he simply lives out the 
conflicted role of the subject, whose claim to freedom is founded upon 
his ability to look at the world from a distance. by ‘world’ here is meant 
both the physical world and the world of human society, which is lived 
as a (second) nature by the child and the adult who never questions his 
or her beliefs. in Contemporary History, the function of the professor is 
to be the personification of the subject; the novel of education tells the 
story of the development of the subject and the formation of his desire 
in relation to the world he experiences as his object.
 One of the basic functions of the nineteenth-century newspaper 
chronicle was in fact to subjectivize the reader’s world by furnishing a 
commentary on current events (levaillant 465–66), preferably one that 
was new, unexpected, and, if possible, amusing. The prevalence of this 
role forms the distinctive mark of France’s tetralogy, as contemporary 
critics observed when they pointed to the preponderance of ideologi-
cal discussions in the first two volumes. in the latter books, both the 
narrator and m. bergeret indulge in all sorts of more or less fanciful 
commentary on the sentiments and motivations of the professor’s new 
pet dog, riquet. Similarly, in M. Bergeret in Paris France introduces the 
character henri léon, son of a banker ruined in the crash of the Union 
Générale and thus from a somewhat different social circle than that of 
the majority of right-wing youth, into the royalist and nationalist circles 
from which m. bergeret is necessarily excluded. as skeptical and given 
to paradox as the professor, léon can exercise the same function of criti-
cal commentator of the ideas and ambitions of the movements France 
deplores, with the added irony that France makes his criticism seem 
more objective, coming from a member of the group criticized. indeed, 
virtually every event that occurs in the novels is immediately surrounded 
by a blanket of commentary supplied either by the various townspeople 
or by m. bergeret. The direct opposite of Saint-Phlin’s ideal in barrès’s 
novel, no event stands by itself; there is always a measure of distance 
between object and subject, between what happens and what people 
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make of it. The world of Contemporary History, as of contemporary his-
tory itself as it appears in the chronicles, is the product of collective 
or individual interpretation, and the real action of the novel is not the 
events that take place but the struggle to eliminate or assign meanings.
Focalization
as m. bergeret’s role in the novels takes on greater proportions, the 
narrative enhances this subjectivization of the world by supplementing 
the conversations with internal focalizations. France first takes us into 
the meanderings of bergeret’s mind after the professor discovers his 
wife with m. roux. Then, in the passage where he returns to mme. 
bergeret after supposedly having ‘forgotten’ her, the narrator shows us 
her thoughts as she tries to come to terms with her husband’s silent 
treatment. in order to present another manner of dealing with an adul-
terous wife by which to weigh the severity of m. bergeret’s civilized 
cruelty, he then briefly takes us into the mind of euphémie, the berger-
ets’ domestic, who looks at the matter from the peasant’s point of view. 
Starting in Amethyst, the narrator reports the ‘thoughts’ of riquet, m. 
bergeret’s new pet dog, who, acting first essentially as a more obedient 
replacement for madame, sees the world from a simple, reverential, and 
‘natural’ standpoint, then serves as an amusing caricature of the nation-
alist mentality.
 The most instructive of these focalizations recounts the husband’s 
various moves as he tries to cope with the trauma of his wife’s adul-
tery in Wicker Work Woman, for in it France deploys the technique best 
adapted to convey subjectivity as separate from the objective world pre-
cisely to display the entire panoply of methods m. bergeret uses for dis-
tancing himself from events. moving in the space of a few seconds from 
the ancient lust to kill to the civilized desire to punish the guilty parties 
with death, grabbing a brochure from the living room table to give 
himself a pretext both for entering and leaving the parlor, he retreats to 
his study. after a while he begins reading the brochure he picked up, 
but without comprehending its meaning. nevertheless, the writer takes 
the trouble to include the text, which happens to deal with the problem 
of language. and it is language, in the form of the word ‘adultery,’ that 
suddenly comes to his lips, which begins to crystallize his experience for 
him, and, by bringing to mind the many nasty ideas associated with the 
word throughout the ages, allows bergeret to see his situation as part 
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of a general law (levaillant 454), of which he therefore need not feel 
ashamed. Only then can he experience his pain, for the first time since 
the shock.
 From simple verbalization and rapid reflection, bergeret goes on to 
lengthy philosophical analysis, searching out the cause of the physical 
displeasure the sight gave him, and discovering what he takes to be 
the reasons for sexual modesty. as he sits in his study mulling over the 
question of sexual modesty, however, he is suddenly powerless to ward 
off the all-too-vivid image of m. roux and his wife in their excessively 
immodest position on the couch. The narrator spares not a single adjec-
tive in his zeal to convey bergeret’s painful impression at that moment. 
Then he explains that the cruelty of this representation is not that it is 
too real but that it is too realistic. by reducing the degree of distance 
to zero and prolonging the image (another translation of the French 
représentation) indefinitely, this type of representation threatens to anni-
hilate the subject entirely.
 m. bergeret’s frantic efforts to tear his gaze away from this hypnotic 
image should therefore be understood as the attempt to stave off a kind 
of mental death. eventually he is able to dissipate the fatal image and 
suppress it completely for the moment by the symbolic action of killing 
mme. bergeret in the effigy of her wicker sewing form. This second 
action soon proves to be as ineffectual as the first—picking up the book 
from the parlor table—for before long another visual image reminds 
him of his plight. While leaving the building, he notices for the first 
time a graffito of himself as cuckold that had been sketched long before. 
he deals with this new reminder by criticizing the quality of the draw-
ing, then musing about graffiti from the days of the roman empire and 
wondering whether scholars in the thirtieth century will understand the 
one of himself, should it be preserved that long. levaillant justly inter-
prets these thoughts as a new way for bergeret to distance himself from 
his situation by “submerging the present under the consideration of the 
past and the future” (455).
 The structural principle underlying this sequence is the dialectical 
alternation between traumatizing visual images and distancing ver-
balized thoughts, punctuated here and there by attempts at action, as 
though to indicate that regardless of its specific content, the reality 
represented by those images dear to barrès’s heart is a danger to the 
existence of the subject. it is Piédagnel, the shoemaker looking for a 
wife, who revitalizes the impression for the last time, before bergeret’s 
reading of the Cook’s voyage text finally lays it to rest. With each rein-
carnation the image becomes less vivid, the verbalization more detailed 
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and articulated, until the latter wins the final battle in this ironic war of 
attrition between images of raw reality and symbolic assimilation that 
constitutes liberation for the intellectual m. bergeret.
 For it is well not to lose sight of the fact that France’s tone is just 
as ironic here as in his caricatures of his adversaries, because his text 
is designed to make the reader keenly aware that bergeret’s intellec-
tual wriggling and squirming is in part a sustained effort to repress the 
memory of the present by denying the reality of that situation. like the 
critics of France’s novel, the professor wants to do away with contem-
porary history. The mocking tone ceases, therefore, when bergeret has 
his final revelation, for at that moment he is no longer intent on dis-
solving his awareness of his condition but has found a way to deal with 
it that reestablishes a certain subjective distance from the event while at 
the same time acknowledging its reality.
The Freedom of Fictionalization
Whether external or internal, however, commentary is only one com-
ponent of the more general category that both structures the work and 
constitutes its content—fictionalization. Why did France choose to 
respond to brunetière’s visit to the vatican with character portraits, sto-
ries, and then a novel, rather than with the expected polemical essays? 
if you are convinced that people’s opinions derive from their material 
conditions, then the most effective way of rebutting the ideologies one 
opposes and supporting those one accepts is to embed them within the 
specific situations of lifelike characters who truly believe in them. in a 
more fundamental way, however, in establishing that on some level all 
people are true believers whose beliefs believe them, fictionalization is 
paradoxically designed to reverse the tendency it enshrines. by showing 
that beliefs say more about the believer than about the object of belief, 
more about the mind than about the world, it arouses the suspicion that 
one’s ideas might be mistaken. France can then use fictionalization to 
attack the value of belief in general, making it the weapon of choice for 
the critique of religious faith that formed the original impetus in 1895 
for what was to become Contemporary History and then acted as the 
reason for its continuation the following year.
 The larger implication of the separability of belief and world is that 
human reality is, for the most part, a tissue of representations, of stories 
we tell ourselves—in short, of fictions. but if fiction thus inhabits our 
reality, it becomes possible to distinguish between the thinking subject 
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and her ideas, to disengage the identity of the believer from the beliefs 
she holds that constitute her identity in the social world. The true 
freedom m. bergeret seeks must therefore include both the ability to 
distinguish others from their ideas and a certain independence from his 
own representations. The dialectic of freedom and determinism thus 
turns on the question: ‘are we controlled by our representations, or is it 
we who determine them?’ no greater contradiction to barrès’s national-
ist conception of rooted identity can be imagined than France’s notion 
here of true independence.
 One effective technique for demonstrating the independence of 
thought from belief is to represent and bring together two or even a 
multiplicity of opposing views on the same topic without necessarily 
committing oneself to any one of them. That is, of course, the proce-
dure that France employs when he stages the many conversations that 
populate his novel. in the early books of the series, m. bergeret is thus 
able to dissociate ideas from the persons who hold them, so that, for 
instance, he can admire abbé lantaigne’s erudition and enjoy arguing 
with him, even though he execrates his views. a more radical method is 
to express contradictory positions about the same topic, as France did 
repeatedly. m. bergeret does likewise in the text when he explains, with 
gusto and at some length to m. Goubin, his new favorite pupil, that 
he deems the notion of life on mars quite plausible, whereas shortly 
before the professor had said just the opposite, that life was an anomaly 
in the universe, a kind of pustule fortunately limited to the planet earth. 
in flaunting this self-contradiction, France clearly indicates that what 
the critics take to be a flaw, he considers a virtue. This episode marks 
another step in m. bergeret’s emancipation, for it shows that he is not 
captive to his beliefs but has the freedom to look upon them as separate 
from his self.
 The double irony for which France is renowned likewise could not 
exist without a prior level of fictionalization, and by virtue of this char-
acter it imposes on the reader the heady but disquieting experience of 
the process of de-identification—remaining suspended, at least momen-
tarily, between two different views of the same object. as Jean-yves 
Tadié explains, France’s “irony consists in having [his characters] make 
perfectly plausible statements” and then leaving his readers in a moment 
of doubt as to whether the writer is for or against the ideas expressed, 
and especially as to whether they should react with indignation or with 
a smile (82).
 This offshoot of romantic imagination and naturalist doctrine is 
not the romantics’ suspension of disbelief, but the more difficult and 
more dangerous enlightenment suspension of belief, pushed to the 
f i l l i n g  t h e  e m p t i n e s s  w i t h i n   ~   1  
limit in its radicalized Cartesian form as the temporary suspension of 
all belief. The experience may be exhilarating because, for a fleeting 
moment, it confers on the subject the sensation of total freedom and 
therefore of completely autonomous existence, yet at the same time it 
can be fraught with anxiety because, during the instant of hesitation, it 
empties out the subject by obliterating all its specific contents. in sum, 
it is the exact reverse of m. Worms-Clavelin’s positivism: clinging to 
material facts in order to establish some kind of identity for himself.
 it is not m. bergeret, however, but the real lieutenant-Colonel Pic-
quart, the only military officer who defended Dreyfus’s innocence, who 
comes to embody France’s highest ideal of freedom in the novel. at the 
height of the Dreyfus affair, described in the last volume of the series, 
the professor reads a newspaper editorial about Picquart to his pupils, 
an encomium that France had in fact published in Le Figaro august 
16, 1899. Picquart was able to see and tell the truth about Dreyfus’s 
innocence and esterhazy’s guilt, because he had a lively inner life and 
was therefore independent, free, in contrast to the crowd or the military 
conspirators.
 This freedom has its price, however, as the destruction of Picquart’s 
hitherto brilliant military career amply proved. in bergeret’s more hum-
ble case, separation from his self may lead to painful self-criticism and 
discontent, as the narrator points out in an early sketch of his charac-
ter. even in passages where the tone remains lightly ironic, as when 
bergeret subjects himself to the same kind of scrutiny to which he sub-
mits his acquaintances, the process can lead to troubling results. Secretly 
flattered by euphémie’s accusation that he is a cruel man, m. bergeret 
decides to apply his critical principles to his own ideas in order to verify 
his initial impression that she is correct, at which point he goes through 
a series of mental gyrations obviously motivated by his desire to prove 
what he wants to believe. The supposedly privileged understanding of 
the self provided by introspection controlled by the wary suspension of 
belief turns out to be as much a fictional construct determined by the 
very earthly desires of the thinker as the religious and political catch-
words the naive believer accepts as truths.
Fiction and Idea
as these examples show, in France’s tetralogy the relation between story 
and idea is infinitely more complex and interesting than in theories of the 
thesis novel as parable. at once a meditation on the problem of identity, 
an exploration of the paths to freedom, and a quest for the optimum 
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distance to one’s self as to the Other, fictionalization here is as much a 
matter of determining the share of narrative within general representa-
tions as it is of examining the relation of commentary to narration. as 
in all the more sophisticated novels of education, Contemporary History 
is in great measure a mise-en-abîme of the process of education through 
fiction: that is, of the relation among story, idea, teller, and listener. The 
characters in the novel are constantly telling or reading stories. These 
include the account of Cook’s voyage, of course, but also the tale of 
one Philippe Tricouillard, the doctor’s reports of the pregnant woman 
whose baby had a birthmark and of an injured peasant, the naval stories 
from the Aeneid that figure in m. bergeret’s research, and the episode 
of the sergeant and the recruit recounted by m. roux. There is also the 
rumor of bergeret’s alleged cruelty, bruited around town by his wife, 
the fire at the charity ball in Paris, the tale of the evil Chinese genie, or 
the story of the first bishop of Tourcoing, one Saint loup, that abbé 
Guitrel tells mme. de bonmont in chapter iii of Amethyst while she 
pretends to listen but really thinks about her relation to rara, i.e., m. 
raoul marcien, France’s fictional version of esterhazy (the man who 
actually committed the treason for which Dreyfus was condemned to 
Devil’s island), whom she loves passionately—a man who always has 
money troubles and makes love to all sorts of women.
 nor is m. bergeret’s role restricted to that of passive listener or 
reader. in the early volumes he accepts the priority of general ideas 
over particular events, so that when he tells a story about napoleon 
iii in Elm-Tree, he apparently follows the simple pattern so reviled by 
critics of the thesis novel, using the anecdote to illustrate an idea: even 
absolute power has its limits. yet on closer view it becomes apparent 
that the purpose of this story was not so much to ‘prove’ his idea as it 
was to criticize the accepted beliefs of his times. elsewhere in Elm-Tree 
he often uses stories for the purpose of critique, as when he recounts 
the research of the pious scholar Jean de launoy, who disproved the 
existence of the saint whom Joan of arc claimed to have seen in one of 
her visions. in chapter i of Wicker Work Woman, he relates the tales of 
the battle of marathon and of roman military campaigns in order to 
support his idea of the source of heroism. but that idea is controversial 
to say the least, since his claim is that heroism emerges only among 
the defeated and in routs, a point of view that was hardly popular in a 
period when the French were still smarting from the collapse of their 
armies in 1870–71, and when it was considered a patriotic duty to sup-
port the military. Once again, then, the thrust of the tale is to debunk 
received ideas more than to ‘illustrate’ a theory.
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 in the latter volumes of the series, once the Dreyfus case had become 
a national affair, m. bergeret has increasing recourse to stories he 
recounts to his pupils; these stories, more clearly marked as texts within 
the text and lengthier than the generally brief references found in the 
earlier volumes, are designed to provide indirect representations of, or 
commentary on, the events and parties involved in the affair. bergeret’s 
first appearance in Amethyst is as storyteller and educator teaching a 
lesson to m. Goubin about the figure of hercules. The introductory 
passage to this interpretation of the hercules myths makes it clear that 
the professor has made the Greek hero over in his own, at this point 
still pessimistic, image, lending him his own fatigue and doubts about 
the value of his work. moreover, as though to express his own regrets 
about his new-found activity in ridding himself of his wife, m. bergeret 
attributes to hercules a heightened epicurean sensitivity that makes 
him aware that, as bergeret had phrased it in Wicker Work Woman, “to 
live is to destroy. To act is to injure” (190).
 but it is also clear that bergeret is using this story to counteract 
indirectly the versions of heroism circulating among the people of his 
town and the ethos of the anti-Dreyfusard aristocrats of the neighboring 
châteaux, which form the immediate context for his story. The towns-
people have swallowed the myth of the ancient Gauls as virile, heroic, 
and civilized peoples who resisted the evil roman invaders (Amethyst, 
chap. i), a widespread legend in the nineteenth century developed in 
plays, fiction, and sculpture especially since the defeat of 1870 (see 
bancquart’s bibliographical note on the topic, Oeuvres, vol. 3, 1166). 
The others have inherited the ancestral love of killing manifest in their 
taste for hunting and in their joy in punishing alleged evildoers.
 m. bergeret returns to the legends of hercules once more, in one 
of the last chapters of Amethyst. This time, however, the adventures 
he ascribes to the hero correspond to nothing in Greek legend. he 
claims to be translating a newly discovered Greek manuscript from the 
alexandrian period, a sure sign to the reader that the story is purely of 
France’s invention. in fact, the tale is a transparent fable, a transposition 
of the Dreyfus affair as it was unfolding when France composed this 
episode. m. Goubin remarks that it is a shame that the end of the story 
is missing, and m. bergeret agrees, winking ironically to the reader once 
again: “[O]ne must have a change sometimes from present-day [présen-
tes] affairs” (282; translation slightly altered).
 This is a pattern France will increasingly follow in the final vol-
ume of the series. There, in chapter viii, bergeret reads to his pupil 
a chapter from a ‘unique’ sixteenth-century book that recounts the tale 
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of “The Trublions, who arose in the republic,” a flagrant parody of 
the nationalist movement written in a droll pseudo-sixteenth-century 
French style imitated from rabelais. ‘Trublion,’ as France explained in 
an article in L’Écho de Paris, is a Greek word meaning gamelle, a mess 
kit dish, the sarcastic nickname given to Philippe, Duke of Orléans, the 
new pretender to the throne of France in 1894, after he offered to enlist 
as a private in the French army. an ardent supporter of the nationalists 
and the action Française in 1899, Philippe Gamelle sealed the unholy 
alliance of royalists and nationalists by intervening publicly in the Drey-
fus affair, as an anti-Dreyfusard, of course. The second leader of the 
Trublions is one Tintinnabule (= bell), famous for his carmes mirifiques, 
easily recognizable as Déroulède, author of the enormously popular 
Chants du soldat and exiled from France for his conspiracy to overthrow 
the republican government in the abortive coup of 1899; robin miel-
leux is méline, the noted anti-Dreyfusard and quiet supporter of the 
nationalists; Gelgopole is General mercier, the leader of the anti-Drey-
fus movement; and so on. Together, they make such a horrible racket 
banging their metal dishes to attract the crowds to their movement that 
poor minerva, the goddess of wisdom, must plug up her ears with wax 
in order to avoid having her eardrums shattered. Once again, France 
puts the allusive icing on the allegorical cake by having m. bergeret 
end his reading with the comment: “‘These old books,’ he said, ‘amuse 
and divert our minds, they make us forget the present day.’ ‘That is 
true,’ replied monsieur Goubin. but he smiled; a thing he seldom did” 
(Paris 77).
 Toward the end of the novel, France varies the parodic formula by 
having the professor tell his disciple a parable about the loudmouthed 
Jean Coq and his docile friend Jean mouton, apparently a sly allusion 
in this Shandyan context to Uncle Toby’s cock-and-bull story. They 
noisily proclaim their adherence to the republic, even while voting 
at every election, one for the bonapartist candidate, the other for the 
royalist. nationalists, imperialists, and warmongers, their prescription 
for foreign and civil war is “France to the French.” The next time m. 
bergeret speaks of them to his pupils, mm. Goubin and Denis, he drops 
all allegorical pretense and explicitly includes them, along with their 
friends Jean laiglon and Gilles Singe, among the Trublions. They had 
reproached m. bergeret for making them out to be bellicose, when 
they are merely military. They protest that they are in fact peace loving, 
although the peace they intend to establish once they become the mas-
ters will not be quiet and soft like the peace presently imposed on the 
nation; it will be a “terrible, clanking, spurred and booted, equestrian 
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peace! We shall make a pitiless, savage peace . . . more frightful than the 
most frightful war” (235–36).
 in chapter XXvi, m. bergeret mysteriously discovers a second chap-
ter in his sixteenth-century volume about the Trublions. after itemizing 
and exaggerating the various acts of street violence perpetrated by the 
nationalists, it tells the story of the “great fair held at Paris France,” i.e., 
the World’s Fair of 1900, the occasion of robin mielleux’s great dis-
course on appeasement. as his family name indicates, mielleux’s words 
are designed to give a saccharine coating to a policy of tacitly encour-
aging the nationalists’ brutality. The ones he intends to ‘quiet down’—
another possible meaning of apaisement—are the police and members 
of the justice system who obviously represent a threat to the land, along 
with anyone else who opposes the Trublions. may the latter receive, as 
soon as possible, the apaisement of eternal peace (144)!
 While France had already used the same distancing mechanisms in 
the earlier volumes of the series, he greatly increases their frequency, 
especially that of parables, in Paris. The stories bergeret now concocts 
are a type of action marking his transition from the position of lofty 
observer of the world to that of active participant in it. They serve 
not merely to try out ideas but to manipulate events through repre-
sentation, giving the latter a character they would not otherwise have. 
The extensive use of far-fetched and transparent parables to narrate the 
history of the present highlights the fictionality of political representa-
tions, by exaggeration so to speak. no doubt a practical way of avoid-
ing lawsuits, its main function is to point up the apparent arbitrariness 
of the nationalist’s interpretation of the affair. Specifically, the use of a 
specious sixteenth-century context and language to tell the tale of the 
Trublions emphasizes the grotesque anachronism of an ancien régime 
movement in the last years of the nineteenth century—royalism become 
nationalism. at the same time, the mocking humor of these tales forms 
a kind of criticism without violence, not even verbal violence, a gentle 
subjectivization that contrasts starkly with the brute force that, accord-
ing to France, characterizes the nationalists.
Bergeret and the Crowd: 
The Education of Anatole France
readers have often criticized France for abandoning the stance of 
Olympian distance he had adopted in the early volumes of his tetralogy 
in favor of partisan attacks directed solely at his political opponents 
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in M. Bergeret in Paris, when he had become personally committed to 
supporting Dreyfus (bancquart, Anatole France 1223). in fact, as with 
determinism and contingency, a dialectic of distance and involvement 
is present from the beginning of the series, and if France paints total 
immersion within reality as a threat to the self, he is no less wary of the 
opposite extreme. While m. bergeret ever prides himself on his supe-
riority over the people around him as on his ability to draw abstract 
ideas from concrete experience and to engage in self-reflection and self- 
criticism, he constantly takes others to task for that other form of dis-
tance he calls “indifference,” the total lack of desire. The danger of 
this state when pushed to the extreme emerges in the episode of his 
departure from the provinces for his new post in Paris at the end of 
Amethyst. as m. bergeret is about to leave, he experiences the eerie 
impression that his town has lost its reality, has become a mere image. 
When, taken aback by this strange sensation, bergeret indulges in self-
observation, France cannot refrain from adding in his customary dash of 
irony, describing bergeret’s narcissistic reaction to himself in terms that 
exactly define his own relation to the fictional world of his novel: “[he] 
provid[ed] himself with an inexhaustible subject for surprise, sarcasm 
[ironie], and pity” (Amethyst 286).
 The result of m. bergeret’s self-analysis is precisely to make him 
aware that he is the author of his world: “[The town] only existed 
in reference to myself. . . . i never knew that my mind was subjective 
to such a mad extent” (287). excessive distance poses just as great a 
threat to the existence of the subject as does the stifling proximity of 
the object, for the reduction of the object to the status of mere image 
divested of its symbolic context propels the subject into the world of 
sheer madness as surely as the latter’s occultation by an uncontrollable 
image of reality. This episode is both a ratification of Schopenhauer’s 
contention that the world is my representation—and the ‘i’ of this ‘my’ 
is the product of the desire (‘will’) that determines me—and a caution 
against total capitulation to that notion, which France had formerly 
espoused and which was so widespread in the last third of the century. 
a counterpart to his critique of realism, bergeret’s unsettling experience 
condemns the exacerbated subjectivism of symbolist art as just as seri-
ous a menace to sanity as extreme realism.
 The problem that confronts France and his protagonist is the modu-
lation of distance rather than distance itself, and the distance in ques-
tion is always that of the subject’s relation to the Symbolic of his social 
world. Whenever that relation is disturbed, reality is reduced to one or 
more isolated images. in fact, m. bergeret’s relation to the Symbolic 
f i l l i n g  t h e  e m p t i n e s s  w i t h i n   ~   1  
is always more or less troubled, because the assertion of distance from 
that world forms a crucial part of his identity as a subject. if the clas-
sical subject must prove its existence by separating itself from physical 
nature, the post-enlightenment subject has the additional task of sepa-
rating itself from the symbolic world of his society, which the majority 
of its inhabitants experience as though it were purely natural, a set of 
truths so evident as to escape all examination. in short, most people live 
in their Symbolic as though it were a nature.
 it is logical, then, that the main thrust of m. bergeret’s efforts to 
affirm his independent existence should be to unmask the arbitrariness 
of his townsmen’s and countrymen’s beliefs, undercutting their preju-
dices and pretensions through a variety of verbal manipulations. When 
Doctor Fornerol, mimicking the claims of the Positivists and Oppor-
tunists, asserts that Christianity gives the people moral and human 
sentiments they would otherwise lack, m. bergeret replies: “Popular 
opinions hold good as a matter of course, without analysis, and if they 
were inquired into, generally speaking they would not pass muster” 
(Amethyst 158). Similarly, m. bergeret presents his great speech on the 
origin and significance of birthmarks as a correction of the popular 
superstitions of his times. it is one of the first indications of the role m. 
bergeret will increasingly play in the novel, that of the outsider whose 
distance from society turns his world with its received ideas into a sad 
but droll spectacle and allows him to append a bemused and amusing 
ironic commentary onto every aspect of his environment, exposing “the 
emptiness of society, the inanity of a certain form of existence” (levail-
lant 449). more generally, m. bergeret uses irony and commentary to 
pry the accepted meanings loose from current events and then to assign 
them new ones of his own devising. Just as the professor must first 
detach himself from the tyrannies of his past involvements before trying 
to discover his desire, so he feels it incumbent upon himself to destroy 
the meanings that constitute the world of repetition in his provincial 
town. in this respect, as in so many others, the character is only doing 
within the novel what France is doing, or rather undoing, with the 
novel: dismantling one by one the presuppositions and conclusions of 
the authoritarian system of brunetière, the ralliement, high finance, the 
monarchists, and ultimately the nationalists.
 The role of outsider is, however, inherently unstable. m. bergeret 
finds himself in an apparently inextricable dilemma: he cannot accept 
the ideas of the majority of the people around him, but he cannot bear 
to be cut off entirely from the human community he repudiates. more-
over, he needs the symbolic system he refuses, for he can assert his 
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identity only by rejecting its terms. Starting from m. bergeret’s earliest 
appearances in Elm-Tree, France depicts him as persecuted by his family 
and his superiors at the university, and as unpopular with the members 
of his society, who, ironically enough, take him to be both clerical and 
anticlerical at the same time. Furthermore, he is the only person in 
town, other than abbé lantaigne, who is interested in general ideas. 
hence his refuge in antiquity, in books and in bookstores, as well as in 
his conversations with the learned abbé. but even lantaigne does not 
share the “critical imagination” the professor uses to take his revenge on 
the society that excludes him.
 m. bergeret’s famous irony is of course both the instrument and 
the proof of this capacity to observe, judge, and criticize everything 
in the world, including himself, as though he were not part of it. This 
is his strength but also his weakness. by his canny dissection of the 
views accepted in his society, he sets himself above his fellow townsmen, 
with the unfortunate but predictable result that he is quietly ostracized 
by many of those same worthy citizens, to whom his aloofness often 
appears as indifference to ordinary human concerns if not a lack of basic 
human feelings. in short, by setting himself apart, he makes himself 
different, and, as Stendhal observed, before Friedrich nietzsche, “dif-
ference engenders hatred.”
 it is not just any difference, however, not singularity in itself that 
cuts m. bergeret off from his fellows, but the particularity of a subject 
who reflects on the world and himself. Just how suspect this unfor-
tunate propensity to think renders him in the eyes of at least a large 
and powerful segment of his society becomes evident in comparison to 
bossuet’s definition of the ‘heretic’ as “one who holds an opinion of his 
own; one who acts according to his own ideas and his own feelings” 
(Amethyst 22). in other words, it is all right to think, provided you think 
the same as everyone else, and everyone else thinks what they are told 
to think by the authorities. The context in which bossuet’s explanation 
appears is especially laden with irony, for its main theme is the justifica-
tion of exclusion. The aristocratic elite of the town has gathered at the 
Duke de brécé’s mansion and, for the first time in the series, they men-
tion the Dreyfus case, taking it as the pretext for violent anti-Semitic 
remarks. abbé Guitrel explains that the Church has never considered 
the Jews to be heretics, because, never having accepted the divinity 
of Jesus or received his teachings, they cannot have rejected them. he 
quickly squelches any appearance of broadmindedness this theological 
quibble may have engendered in his listeners, when he points out that 
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the proper term is ‘infidels’ and that God uses the Jews’ ‘obstinacy’ as an 
example of what not to do, as a way of affirming Christian doctrine.
 France emphasizes the tight connection between the religious dog-
matism used to justify persecution of the heretic and the politics of the 
Dreyfus affair by putting bossuet’s words into the mouth of bergeret’s 
old nemesis, the irascible, self-centered archivist, m. mazure. mazure is 
a Jacobin, which, in France’s eyes, means that he is a staunch republican 
but also that he favors a strong central government; as a result, he is 
more than willing to renounce the republican claim to individual liberty 
in the name of ‘patriotism.’ he therefore eagerly joins the nationalists 
“for the unity and indivisibility of the republic,” parroting barrès’s 
assertions during the affair that it makes no difference whether or not 
Dreyfus is guilty; the Dreyfusards are definitely guilty of betraying the 
nation by substituting their individual judgment for that of the legal 
system (Paris 79).
 Good romantic that he is, in the early volumes m. bergeret sees 
only the defects and disadvantages of the society he nevertheless longs 
to join. The shabby black suit he must wear for the traditional new 
year’s Day visits makes him wish he were a man of the world. but then 
he wonders whether there really is a ‘world,’ inhabited by real ‘men of 
the world,’ and concludes, in chapter iv of Wicker Work Woman, that 
‘good society’ is just a gilded mirage, like a rainbow. in fact, there is 
no such thing as a real community: People group together according to 
their prejudices and tastes, but the two often conflict, and chance mixes 
everything up. The community of good society depends on old money 
and leisure and consists merely of shared habits. Our real self is within 
us, closed off from the world. Society, that is, true human communion, 
is impossible because of its very nature, for humanity depends on an 
inwardness that contradicts the basic prerequisite of community, which 
consists of that which is shared with others, with the outside. and that 
which can be shared is precisely that which is external to the subject, 
namely, brute materiality. in short, here again, society has taken on the 
role of a second nature that, like the first, must be negated and surpassed 
in order for the subject to exist.
 m. bergeret is not alone in this judgment. France’s narratorial voice 
also equates sociability with materiality, attributing mme. bergeret’s 
need for social as well as sexual intercourse to her potbellied soul (âme 
ventrue), that is, the combination of her excess flesh and lack of inner life. 
The exact opposite of his ideal, Colonel Picquart, her total dependency 
on others contrasts with the officer’s complete autonomy and resultant 
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independence of judgment. it is for this reason that m. bergeret’s silent 
treatment is so well adapted to his goal of reducing her to nothingness. 
The perfect barresian subject, she is nothing other than the others to 
whom she is attached. and it is for the same reason that her counterat-
tack takes the form of attempting to persuade public opinion that she 
is the victimized party in the marriage. Since her identity consists solely 
of the image she sees of herself reflected in the eyes of others, mme. 
bergeret can restore her sense of existence only by rehabilitating herself 
in their thoughts and words.
 The pervasive misogyny of the book—and Contemporary History is 
a terribly misogynistic novel—derives from the stereotyped equation 
of women with ‘nature’ in the two aspects defined above: materiality 
conceived as the drive for ‘physical’ pleasure coupled with the absence 
of ‘spiritual’ life, the latter specified in particular as the lack of thought 
that characterizes the second nature that is society—the tyranny of a 
public opinion dominated by a hodgepodge of mindless clichés. mme. 
bergeret is just one among a troop of unscrupulous women who betray 
husbands, promises, and principles for sexual pleasure, financial gain, or 
the ambitions of their lovers, from the teenage orphan honorine to the 
octagenarian mme. houssieu, whose nineteen-year-old lover, lecoeur, 
ends up strangling her in her bed one night. in between fall mme. 
Worms-Clavelin, who gives up her courtesan past to marry the future 
prefect and seek the approval of the Church; mme. de Gromance, “la 
belle ralliée” (in the words of m. loyer, minister of cults), who takes on 
a parade of young lovers whose only distinguishing characteristic seems 
to be their right-wing political convictions; and, the prize of them all, 
mme. de bonmont, the converted Jewess whose affair with rara sym-
bolizes the ménage à trois of capitalism, church, and army.
 While mme. bergeret is not directly associated with a specific politi-
cal stance, all the others in the above list epitomize the views and actions 
of the right-wing parties the writer is at pains to caricature. indeed, 
even mme. bergeret finds her staunchest defenders among the society 
ladies of the town, such as mme. Dellion—whose son Philippe (France 
sometimes calls him Gustave) becomes mme. de Gromance’s lover in 
the last volume of the series—as though to intimate the coalition of 
false rumor with rightist convictions. Once the Dreyfus affair enters the 
novel in Amethyst, France embellishes his caricatures of the women as a 
key part of his all-out attack on the unholy alliance of anti-Dreyfusards, 
the main butt of which is the hypocritical cloak of nobility they cast 
over their base motives. While amusing, these exposés would be rather 
trite and conventional, were it not precisely for the fact that the words 
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France puts into their mouths are direct quotes from the political and 
religious slogans of the times, and that he has the characters use these 
empty public clichés to justify their private transgressions.
 mme. de Gromance returns to the scene with m. Panneton (brother 
of a ‘patriotic’ supporter of the army who tries to get a deferment for his 
son), who is running for the Senate and promises to make her husband 
a deputy if he will run on Panneton’s ticket and if she, needless to say, 
will come see his etchings. She agrees, on the pretext that if she shows 
up at the rendezvous, “it will be for the sake of the country and the 
army. We must save France” (Paris 194). even mme. Worms-Clavelin 
takes her turn with a certain maurice Cheiral, head private secretary 
of the minister of cults, in an effort to ensure that abbé Guitrel will be 
named bishop of Tourcoing. all of this hanky-panky is of course meant 
to illustrate the selfishness and ambition, the lack of scruples and of true 
passion of the upper crust of society that provides the leaders of the 
royalist and nationalist parties, who cloak their petty self-interest under 
the guise of ‘saving France.’1
 The social self is thus at worst a cipher, a naught, the sheer absence 
of an inner life; at best a tissue of political slogans and convenient fic-
tions. The fact that m. bergeret nevertheless feels rejected by the human 
community shows that he needs to be a part of the symbolic world 
he spurns, just as his disinvestment of the provincial town is counter-
manded by his nostalgic sense of piety toward his homeland. Combin-
ing the ironic stance of the enlightenment with the painful alienation of 
the romantic hero, bergeret refuses to renounce the distance that makes 
him what he is, even while he seeks to overcome the separation his irony 
produces. his problem, then—and it was of course France’s as well—is 
to find a way back to the human community without compromising the 
critical thinking that constitutes the core of his singularity.
 The author finds an ingenious way to combine these two apparently 
contradictory requirements by introducing riquet, the pet dog, into m. 
bergeret’s life after his wife has left him. and it is not by chance that 
it is his new maid, angélique, a member of the popular classes, who 
comes up with this answer to his isolation. riquet shares the views 
and the subservience to authority of the masses—at least m. bergeret 
imputes them to him in a most amusing way—but he does so in such a 
naive and endearing fashion that his master cannot find it in his heart to 
resent them as he does with the humans who surround him—especially 
since, unlike m. bergeret’s fellow citizens, the authority riquet reveres 
most is precisely m. bergeret. With his customary irony, the professor 
identifies with the little animal from the start, since he looked like the 
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dog when he was a toddler; both have the same claim to immortality; 
and both have the same quantity of knowledge, compared to the infinity 
of absolute knowledge. moreover, riquet comes to bergeret’s aid and 
sympathizes with his pain when he falls off a ladder reaching for a book 
in his study, instead of laughing at him as a human being would have 
done. bergeret concludes that despite the enormous difference between 
them, he and his dog are united by a sense of “universal brotherhood” 
(Amethyst 137).
 riquet is not m. bergeret’s only newfound friend. in the very next 
chapter of Amethyst, France unearths an unexpected comrade for his 
hero, a fellow whose only connection to the canine world would seem 
to be his name, m. leterrier, the rector of the university. a philoso-
phy professor and author of a textbook in which he judges all systems, 
leterrier was previously anathema to m. bergeret, who was repulsed by 
the fact that, bolstered by the certainties of official doctrine, he had no 
doubts about the beautiful, the true, and the good, while, for his part, 
leterrier thought of bergeret as a dangerous person. now, however, 
much to bergeret’s surprise, the Dreyfus affair has thrown the two of 
them together. Precisely because of his doctrinal spiritualism, leterrier 
believes that the truth will win out and that Dreyfus’s mistaken convic-
tion will therefore be overturned. in addition to the basic fraternity of 
all living beings that ties m. bergeret to riquet, it is the communion of 
those opposed to the community of the compact majority that allows 
the ironic professor to overcome his isolation, for in each case he can 
maintain his distance from the dominant crowd, while joining with the 
oppressed minority of those who suffer.
 Once he has found this new anticommunity of the excluded, m. 
bergeret no longer needs to maintain his former attitude of universal 
aloofness and criticism, for now he has discovered a group whose ideas 
he approves. instead of mocking the republic and himself along with 
his personal and political antagonists, as he did before, he can turn his 
critique solely against those who oppose his views, or, rather, against 
those whose views he opposes—the Church hierarchy, the royalists, 
the financiers and industrialists, and the nationalists who unite them 
in opposition to Captain Dreyfus and the cause he represents to his 
defenders, a democratic and social parliamentary republic.
 having reached this point in his development, however, m. bergeret 
finds himself in a terrible dilemma: how can he support such a republic 
when in fact the vast majority of his fellow citizens are violently hostile 
to Dreyfus? his quandary is all the more acute since his earlier opposi-
tion to the republican regime was based in great part on his conviction 
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that international finance and banking had taken over from the Catholic 
Church as the foreign power responsible for dissolving the traditional 
identity of the French people, the very argument deployed by barrès 
and company to justify their hostility to Dreyfus and the Jews in gen-
eral. and if the thinking that separates bergeret from the crowd defines 
his very being, how can he align himself with the principles of majority 
rule and the welfare of the greatest number without risking the dissolu-
tion of his self?
 From the beginning, during his opposition to the ralliement, the 
question that has plagued m. bergeret is why the masses, or the ‘crowd’ 
as he often calls them, fall for the slogans that to him seem so blatantly 
hypocritical. his explanation at that time, as we have seen, was their 
‘indifference.’ but now, in the midst of the Dreyfus affair, that expla-
nation no longer holds water, for the crowd, thoroughly convinced of 
the Jewish captain’s guilt, has acquired both a passion—their hatred of 
Dreyfus and those who champion his cause—and a concomitant desire 
to silence or eradicate all those who dare to oppose their view. Thus, 
while the nationalist crowd shouts army slogans and calls for the heads 
of leterrier and bergeret, the professor concludes his discussion with 
Doctor Fornerol about the moral value of Christian belief by stating 
that the most pressing concern of people united by a common faith is 
to exterminate those who think differently.
 France calls upon both leterrier and riquet to present his solution 
to m. bergeret’s quandary. Several chapters after protesting about this 
hostility toward truth and justice, leterrier returns to express his dis-
may at the public abuse he has been receiving as a result of his support 
of Dreyfus. Under the stress, he has begun to suffer from a series of 
physical maladies, and while he and the professor converse, the crowd 
not only screams its hatred but manifests its fury by throwing stones 
and breaking one of the professor’s windows. meanwhile, riquet has 
greeted the rector with a fusillade of barks that seem to echo the howls 
of the mob outside. m. bergeret obligingly explains that the little fellow 
is just obeying the indoctrination their human ancestors have given the 
canine race: namely, that the stranger is automatically the enemy. The 
pet dog has now become the image of the anti-Semitic mob,2 convinced 
that the alien Jew is the enemy and therefore incapable of understand-
ing the proofs of Dreyfus’s innocence, but riquet is the crowd with an 
appealing face, because it is clearly not his fault that he cannot discern 
the truth. he has been corrupted by the ignorance of our prehistoric 
ancestors, combined with his respect for authority and his love of his 
masters. in like manner, m. bergeret explains that the average member 
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of the masses, whom he jestingly calls Pecus (= ‘herd,’ or ‘cattle’), like-
wise accepts what he is told uncritically and without malice.
 The implication here is that the masses are divided into a good 
people and an evil, because corrupted, crowd.3 it might seem that, in 
attributing all virtue, beauty, and glory to the people, bergeret is repu-
diating everything he had implied about “nature” in the criticism of 
his wife and that the writer had presented in his depiction of women 
in general in the series, not to mention the repeated assertions of man-
kind’s alleged innate aggression. but there has been another, rous-
seauistic strain running through the tetralogy as well. bergeret’s maid, 
euphémie, was much less cruel than her master in her peasant idea of 
punishing the adulteress, precisely because she lacked his ‘civilization.’ 
her replacement, angélique, has no need of sophisticated reflection to 
find the right remedy for m. bergeret’s loneliness; her basic sense of 
humanity tells her that he needs a pet dog. The cobbler’s son, Piédagnel, 
is the image of youthful innocence when he is unjustly expelled from 
the seminary by the learned but dogmatic abbé lantaigne. For every 
lecoeur, the butcher’s boy who murders old mme. houssieu, there is a 
Pied-d’alouette (nickname for an old vagabond named Seurin), who is 
wrongfully accused of a crime. even the honorines and mlle. Deniseaus 
owe their duplicity to the enticements offered by the wealthy and the 
powerful whose prejudices they flatter with their visions of the virgin 
and their predictions from the other world.
 France’s early apolitical attitude toward the people appears most 
clearly in bergeret’s encounter in chapter iii of Wicker Work Woman with 
Pied-d’alouette, whom the investigating magistrate has finally released 
from jail after holding him for six months without filing charges, on the 
vague hope that he might eventually come up with something against 
such an obviously dangerous character. m. bergeret admires Pied-
d’alouette’s resilience, his resourcefulness, his humility, and his appar-
ent tranquility in the midst of genuine suffering. above all, he feels 
drawn to him by his fellow feeling for “the unfortunate [les misérables]” 
(50), the same profound and painful sympathy that he expresses several 
volumes later in his encomium to Pecus. it is this rousseauistic sense 
of sympathy for the poor, the downtrodden, and all those who suffer, 
that, running through the entire tetralogy, ties together m. bergeret’s 
attitudes toward the people and motivates his political evolution from 
the early to the later volumes.
 France depicts the process that leads to bergeret’s changed attitude 
through his analysis of the professor’s motivations. in the chapter fol-
lowing his conversation with Pied-d’alouette, as m. bergeret contem-
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plates the threadbare condition of his Sunday suit and muses on the 
superficial reasons that bring people together in communities without 
communion, he feels the same pity and sympathy for himself as he does 
for the unfortunate. he identifies with those who are unhappy, because 
he is convinced that no one loves him. This feeling is only increased 
when bergeret discovers his wife’s adultery, so that the self he contem-
plates at that time becomes, as we have seen, an “inexhaustible subject 
of pity.” it is this sense of exclusion, misunderstanding, and persecution 
by the powers that be that forms the bridge between himself and Pied-
d’alouette and will continue to connect him in his thoughts to riquet, 
Pecus, and, no doubt, Captain Dreyfus himself. here, in sympathy for 
shared weakness, suffering, and lack is the only true communion, the 
only true social bond. The ultimate irony, then, is that it is the lack of 
thought of the people—the root cause of their poverty and weakness—
that forms their bond of solidarity with the intellectual, whose isolation 
and consequent weakness are due precisely to his excess capacity for 
reflection and critique.
 This ability to feel sympathy, the source of morality in enlighten-
ment ethics that is present in m. bergeret from the start, will constitute 
the basis of his subsequent political evolution toward socialism. not by 
chance, then, does m. bergeret’s sense of sympathy become most acute 
after his discovery of his wife’s betrayal, at the moment of his greatest 
suffering, at the same time that he decides to take action against the tyr-
annies that have previously ruled his life. having overcome his attitude 
of ironic distance toward himself, he no longer approves of the resigna-
tion of the people, either. While in Elm-Tree his sympathy and admira-
tion for Pied-d’alouette led him to hope that the poor man had become 
reconciled to his state, renouncing all desire, in chapter Xii of Wicker 
Work Woman, m. bergeret now envisions a fresh workers’ revolution 
that will soon usher in an era of socialism, “for there will be a socialistic 
europe . . . if indeed that unknown power which is approaching can 
be rightly called Socialism” (193). Just as he is now ready to seek his 
own private desire, so he imagines that those oppressed by the capitalist 
system that supports the Opportunist and radical republic will throw 
off their shackles and find their own political and economic identity.
 This somewhat vague hope reaches the intensity of an almost physi-
cal need when the ralliement morphs into appeasement, and the Dreyfus 
affair changes the indifferent populace into a blind and violent mob. 
now, as he is about to move into his new apartment in Paris, bergeret 
agrees with lamennais, who charged that the present order of society 
rests on the resignation of the poor. no longer does he think of the 
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people as the refuge of mindless prejudice and superstition alone. in 
the following chapter of Paris, m. bergeret calls in a carpenter named 
roupart, a member of the working classes who is clearly superior to 
all those depicted in the earlier volumes. here it is the artisan who 
plays the role of teacher, the professor that of student, as the former 
answers his questions about the finer points of building shelves. Then 
the carpenter avows his admiration for m. bergeret, for he knows that 
he has abandoned his ‘caste,’ the army and the clergy, and has taken 
up Dreyfus’s defense. roupart bemoans the split in the socialist camp, 
between the hard-line position of Guesde—take no stand on the affair, 
rather let the capitalists kill each other off, starting with the Jews—of 
which he disapproves, and that of Jaurès, whose arguments in favor of 
Dreyfus he paraphrases, to the effect that true socialism can exist only 
when justice and goodness reign. Therefore, we socialists must fight all 
tyrannies, hate war, and ignore religious differences, loving the whole 
human race.
 now the professor has a mission that will mark him for the rest 
of his days, that of aiding the masses to free themselves from violence 
and blindness, helping to transform the crowd into the people, and 
the example of roupart proves to him that it is possible to do so. in 
order to accomplish this task, m. bergeret must combine the two oppo-
site elements personified in riquet and leterrier: riquet, the simple 
people whose lack of critical thinking makes them susceptible to being 
led astray; leterrier, the honest intellectual whose respect for evidence, 
logic, and truth override class interests and group prejudice.
 if the French people have strayed from their historical mission in 
recent years, it is because they have been misled, at times by people as 
ignorant and fearful as themselves, lately by a handful of ill-intentioned 
manipulators intent on consolidating wealth and power in their own 
hands. and they have been misled so easily because, respectful and lov-
ing but also ignorant and unreflective like riquet, they have lacked 
the inner life that makes critique and distance possible. in this logic, 
the vacuity of the social self embodied by mme. bergeret derives from 
another, complementary nothingness, that of ignorance. in the words 
of a socialist named bissolo who takes part in a counterdemonstration 
against the nationalists: “in the brain of the working-man, in the place 
where the bourgeois carry their inept and brutal prejudices, there is a 
great cavity.” armed with this conviction, bergeret does not scruple to 
repeat the catchword of reactionary intellectuals opposed to universal 
(male) suffrage since the Second republic: “a stupidity repeated by 
thirty-six millions of mouths does not for that reason cease to be stupid. 
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majorities, as a general rule, display a superior capacity for servitude.” 
but unlike the Flauberts of the world, his remedy for the empty self is 
to fill the cavity with knowledge (Paris 118).
 France’s answer to the trauma that the affair was for bergeret was 
to deploy the force of the secular logos, a desire consistent with his 
profession and his earlier ironic stance, yet utterly different in practice 
from his previous attitudes of lofty amusement and sad resignation. On 
new year’s Day, 1900, m. bergeret welcomes the brand-new century 
by unfurling before the eyes of his daughter Pauline his vision of the 
new society, governed by speech and reason (Paris 174). bancquart, in 
her “notice” to M. Bergeret à Paris, points out that France broke with 
Jaurès over the issue of granting amnesty to all parties, including the 
military men who had framed Dreyfus and then lied to cover up the 
frame, in order to calm the public waters. France joined Clemenceau, 
arguing that education was the instrument both necessary and sufficient 
to effect progressive social change,4 whereas political appeasement, for 
whatever reasons, meant abandoning truth and justice halfway, throw-
ing the guilty in with the blameless, with no official acknowledgment of 
Dreyfus’s innocence, and all in the name of an expedience that played 
into the hands of the bourgeoisie, making the affair into the culminat-
ing repetition of the politics of the ralliement.
 it was of course unthinkable for France to accept such a policy, since 
his very existence as a subject depended on the possibility of avoiding 
repetition, the repetition of mindless clichés, and, still more important, 
the repetition of historical events that imprisons the nation in the status 
quo. The entire thrust of the two final volumes of his novel was the 
effort to overcome repetition, to construct a present and a potential 
future that would not be the simple copy of the past. Contemporary 
history must neither recount nor relate but construct the contingent, 
the unpredictable, the hitherto unknown power. That is why, when m. 
bergeret foresees the victory of socialism after the demise of the reign 
of capitalism in Wicker Work Woman, he adds the clause, “if indeed that 
unknown power which is approaching can be rightly called Socialism” 
(emphasis added). That is also the sense of the numerous parables and 
indirect representations of contemporary events m. bergeret narrates to 
his pupils in those last books of the series. Those are the words that are 
designed to “change the world,” as bergeret puts it to his daughter, who 
is no doubt his main hope for the future. henceforth, as a result of the 
Dreyfus affair, the intellectual has become an actor in public life. The 
novelist, having taken on the role of historian of contemporary affairs, 
now tells stories that give new and unexpected meanings to current 
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events, without predetermining their future course. France purposely 
avoids the closure of a definitive meaning by ending the final volume of 
the series in the middle of the story, as it were, when the outcome of the 
affair was still very much up in the air. in the last scene, the nationalist 
leaders are eagerly awaiting the end of the truce of appeasement called 
in honor of the World’s Fair, so that they can unleash the crowd once 
again against the government. France allows henri léon, the voice of 
skepticism, to prevail, however. Citing the socialist bissolo, his former 
companion and archrival in street demonstrations, léon cautions his 
coconspirators that it is not easy to control the people and warns them 
that Paris will not rise up against the republic. To be continued.
 The one factor capable of uniting all m. bergeret’s variables into a 
single equation is indeed education. Through education he can over-
come his isolation by bringing the crowd to him, rather than dissolv-
ing back into it, as the nationalist program urges. instead of trying to 
impose national unity by castigating those who think for themselves, 
as bossuet/mazure/barrès recommend, France proposes establishing 
national harmony by enabling all to think for themselves. Through edu-
cation the malicious and bloodthirsty ‘crowd’ created by the coalition 
of Church, capitalists, royalists, and nationalists can be liberated from 
its corrupters and returned to its original state of being the ‘people.’ 
Perhaps most important, through education the people will acquire that 
inner life that is the sine qua non of a substantial identity, as opposed 
to the ‘nothingness’ of the social self that is a mere mirror image of 
others. moreover, this mode of identity-formation is not dependent on 
opposition to what is considered to be alien or foreign. The stranger 
need no longer be automatically taken for the enemy. in what we might 
call ‘educative socialism,’ France felt he had found a means of answering 
the need for identity without falling into the nationalist trap of identity 
politics. (See Joan W. Scott’s excellent article on the dangers of this 
snare in our contemporary world, “multiculturalism and the Politics 
of identity.”) The socialist revolution that m. bergeret calls upon is no 
longer a matter of unseating the foreign power of capitalism; it is not 
its foreignness but the regime of ignorance, injustice, and inequality it 
inflicts on its people that must be overthrown.
Education and the New Republic
The question remains, however, how exactly education will lead to the 
establishment of the “new republic,” and specifically how it will bring 
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about the realization not only of m. bergeret’s desire, but of that of 
the people as well. Can a genuine society arise out of an assemblage of 
people who define themselves as outsiders? Or will their identities col-
lapse and their communion turn into the aridity of bland conformity, 
once there is no inside, no leaders who oppress them nor a crowd that 
excludes them? if all their demands were met, if everyone worked for 
the community and each received the fruits of his own labor, would 
some at least be impelled to rebel out of ‘spite,’ as Dostoyevsky’s man 
from underground protests, in order to preserve their autonomy, their 
desire to be subjects?
 it is clear that the goal of education for m. bergeret is not simply 
the inculcation of the capacity for sympathy and independent, rational 
judgment, in accordance with the enlightenment principles of truth and 
justice, although it is certainly partly that. Despite his earlier protesta-
tion that socialism is the unknown future that will follow the downfall 
of capitalism, in chapter Xvii, on the first day of the new century, m. 
bergeret does give some content to his hopes. To be sure, he contin-
ues to insist that the future must remain an unknown quantity, forever 
invisible to those who nevertheless work to bring it about. he does not 
recant his objections to the idea of a transcendent meaning of history. 
history will have the meanings that people give to it through their 
efforts, whose effects and success are never predictable.
 in their conversation, bergeret’s daughter Pauline becomes the 
spokesperson for the objections he himself as well as his political adver-
saries bring to his new republic. When she exclaims, with perhaps just 
a touch of irony, that in this brave new world everyone will be happy, 
he scotches that idealized hope, noting that physical and psychological 
suffering are part of the human condition and will therefore continue to 
exist no matter how society is reorganized. moreover, without suffering 
the most important human quality, sympathy, would atrophy, and with 
it our humanity as well. What bergeret does aim to accomplish is the 
elimination of the needless, artificial evils that result from specific social 
arrangements. This will arise in part due to the advances of science and 
technology that will make life easier for everyone. more significant, but 
infinitely more difficult to achieve, will be the voluntary transformation 
of the bosses of the world into simple workers who demand no special 
privileges nor take any more of the common wealth for their intellectual 
labors than those who work with their hands. Since the community is 
the necessary precondition for the existence of private property, there is 
no inconsistency in extending it to society as a whole and entrusting it 
to the State.
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 Pauline remarks without undue alarm that this is a prescription for 
collectivism, and before her father can answer his own rhetorical ques-
tion, “What is the State?” she chimes in with the objection that the State 
is a pitiful, boorish fellow sitting behind a counter, to whom no one 
would willingly give up his property. m. bergeret attempts to counter 
this most telling critique of communism with the theory of the dis-
appearance of the State once collectivization is completed. here, in a 
move reminiscent of Spinoza’s pantheism,5 the dialectic of the universal 
and the particular that subtends the arguments of both the nationalists 
and the republicans finds its resolution. To the liberal objection that the 
freedom of the individual vis-à-vis the State depends on the possession 
of private property, m. bergeret replies that once the State has become 
everything, has been universalized, it will no longer need anything more 
and will therefore have no reason to oppress the individual. To the bar-
resian nationalist who protests that those who want to reshape society 
according to an abstract plan ignore the realities and necessities of the 
historical life of diverse communities, he retorts that by dissolving the 
State into social activity, it is he, not they, who replaces abstraction with 
that which is most concrete, the very life of the community the nation-
alists claim they want to protect. Finally, bergeret comforts all those 
anarchists (like himself!) who fear that the power of the State will crush 
all individual identity in a sea of mindless conformity, with the thought 
that once it becomes everything, the State will lose its independent 
existence, and having become a nonperson, will no longer be able to 
threaten anyone.
 in this, his version of the end of history, the professor describes at 
the same time the endpoint of the trajectory of his desire. The key-
stone to this whole edifice is the disappearance of the desire of the 
Other, and it is that disappearance which makes possible the fulfillment 
of m. bergeret’s desire along with that of the members of the soci-
ety he envisions. Only if in becoming everything the State really does 
become nothing, only if it becomes a nonperson, losing its identity as 
an independent source of will and power, will it cease to limit and con-
trol the desires of its citizens. m. bergeret will have rid himself of his 
greatest burden throughout the book, the sense of being excluded from 
the group, both willingly and unwillingly, once the group no longer 
exists as such. indeed, from the beginning, m. bergeret’s desire has been 
defined in terms of his relation to the desire of the Other, which itself 
consists in the collusion of two others: on the one hand the mass of his 
fellow citizens, and on the other the powers that be, which maintain 
themselves in being by manipulating the desire of the populace. as the 
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leaders of the bourgeois republic guide the crowd from selfish indiffer-
ence to fear and violence to appeasement, m. bergeret moves from lofty 
distance to involved concern to educational commitment. if education 
will allow each member of society to form his or her own desire, only 
the vanishing of the desire of the Other will allow those individual 
desires to flourish.
 Starting from the first volume of the series, m. bergeret’s ideal had 
always been stoic ataraxia,6 the attempt to reach total autonomy by sup-
pressing all desire, for desire depends on the Other for its fulfillment. as 
lacan points out, this is therefore a specific desire, namely, the desire 
not to desire (Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis 235). The 
professor’s misogyny no doubt derived from the same source, for to 
desire a woman is to make oneself dependent on the woman’s response, 
or lack thereof. in the later books, having freed himself from bondage 
to his wife and his provincial town, confronted with the Dreyfus affair 
and the rise of nationalism, m. bergeret had developed the positive 
desire to intervene in public affairs by educating the people. but he can 
imagine succeeding in this enterprise only by giving an ironic twist to 
the theme of ataraxia, transferring it from himself onto the Other, the 
State.
 The basic fantasy that undergirds France’s politics and structures 
his perception of the world—on the face of it, the exact opposite of 
barrès’s—consists of a system of mutual sacrifice: ataraxia for the State, 
and total abnegation for the subject: “We truly give only when we give 
our work, our minds, our genius. and this splendid offering of one’s 
whole self to all men enriches the giver as much as the community” (M. 
Bergeret in Paris 172). The secret of communism, according to France, 
is not that it’s going to satisfy all the desires of the people, the subjects, 
but that it’s going to satisfy all the desires of the community taken as a 
whole, the State, the Other—at which point the Other will no longer 
make incomprehensible or impossible demands on the subject. Ulti-
mately, then, France’s recipe for utopia boils down to killing the Other 
with kindness. his socialist society is going to fulfill every possible desire 
of the State, in the frantic effort to fill up the frightening nothingness of 
the social self and thereby assure its absolute plenitude. France’s ideal is 
totality, the impossible jouissance of the Thing, as opposed to that of the 
partial objects that constitute reality (see Copjec 38–40). The hope is 
that this satiation will prevent it from sapping the being of its citizens.
 it remains an open question as to whether in this situation every-
one wins or everyone loses. if the State becomes nothing by becom-
ing everything, what then happens to the subject? Ultimately, France’s 
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construction, which of course derives from Jaurès’s reading of marx, 
will rise or fall with the validity of the supposition that under the void 
of the social self there lurks, or can be formed, a substantial inner self. 
but if desire is the desire of the Other, as lacan maintains, then the col-
lapse of the desire of the State would cause the collapse of that of the 
individual as well. The outcome would be the dissolution of the subject 
into the State, with virtually the same result as in the nationalism France 
despised.
 The enemy within the people is thus the emptiness within them, the 
great void of ignorance nourished by the education in superstition and 
resignation they receive in the Congregationist schools of the Church 
and the lack of critical thinking and inner life imparted in the secular 
schools. in his capacity as university professor, m. bergeret would ordi-
narily have little opportunity to influence the masses. his only direct 
contact with them would be to participate in the new popular uni-
versities being organized around the turn of the twentieth century, in 
large part as the intellectuals’ response to the Dreyfus affair.7 The main 
vehicles for implementing the project of educating the masses under the 
Third republic, however, were the newly reformed primary schools. 
it is for that reason that Zola, France’s comrade-in-arms and the most 
outspoken of those intransigent Dreyfusards who refused anything that 
smacked of appeasement, took schoolteachers (instituteurs and institu-
trices) as the subject of his education novel, Vérité (Truth).
From the Dreyfus Affair to the Simon Affair
When Vérité (Truth) was first published, reviewers immediately read 
the novel as a fictional transposition of the Dreyfus affair, in which the 
Jewish schoolteacher Simon lehmann, who is twice falsely convicted 
of a heinous crime, plays the role of Captain Dreyfus, while his fellow 
instituteur and defender, marc Froment, plays that of Zola. The plot is 
launched by the discovery of the crime: the rape and murder of Simon’s 
nephew and ward, Zéphirin, who lives in the public schoolhouse where 
his uncle teaches, in the village of maillebois, a town whose govern-
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Truth, by Émile Zola
i
Zola’s Daymare and the truth of Vérité
Larbin de la juiv’rie,
Zola jusqu’à sa mort
Gueulait contr’ la Patrie
Criait tant et plus fort
et pour Dreyfus le traître,
(Ce fameux bout coupé)
Il allait fair’ paraître
Le roman Vérité . . . 
Flunkey of Jewry
Zola up to his death
Mouthed off against the homeland,
screamed so much and so loud
and for Dreyfus the traitor
(that well-known capon),
he was going to publish
the novel Truth
—song sung by anti-Dreyfusards at Zola’s 
funeral; Bedel 83
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ment, in symbolic fashion, is evenly divided between republicans and 
reactionaries (V 49).1 it is Simon who is soon accused of the crime, 
although, in deference to Zéphirin’s Catholic mother, the boy attended 
a Congregationist school. (The Congregations were loose organizations 
of brothers [and sisters] attached to the Church but not ordained priests 
[or nuns]).
 marc hears of it while visiting his in-laws in maillebois and soon 
suspects that the allegations against his colleague are specious, the result 
of a conspiracy instigated by the local Church hierarchy, who manage 
to turn the townspeople against Simon by playing on their ignorance, 
their self-interest, their fears, and, above all, their anti-Semitic prejudice. 
after convincing himself of Simon’s innocence, marc speaks out on the 
latter’s behalf, thereby exposing himself to vilification by the clerical 
party and its followers in public, and estrangement from his religious 
wife, Geneviève, in private. he then devotes his life to waging a cam-
paign to overturn Simon’s conviction and to preventing a future out-
break of the same madness by teaching respect for truth and justice to 
the children in his primary school, the future citizens of the republic. in 
the latter part of the book, Zola imagines that Simon has been exoner-
ated (whereas Dreyfus was not acquitted until 1906, four years after the 
publication of the novel and Zola’s death) and that the ideal republic 
has been established, thanks in large part to the efforts of marc and his 
colleagues around the country in spreading enlightenment among the 
people.
 but this reading raised serious questions about the scope and valid-
ity of the work. in an otherwise highly laudatory review in La Raison, 
may 10, 1903, Gustave Téry wondered whether Zola had betrayed the 
national significance of the affair by reducing it to a private matter. by 
replacing a case of treason with a crime of passion, had he not sacri-
ficed the political themes of patriotism, militarism, and nationalism that 
played such an important role in the actual affair (mitterand, “notice” 
1499)? Working from Zola’s preparatory notes for Truth, recent com-
mentators have sought to respond to these criticisms by tracing the 
evolution of Zola’s thinking as he mulled over his plans for the novel. 
henri mitterand quotes the writer’s statement that “the entire story [of 
the crime] is only secondary. it is the point of departure, the incident 
that shows marc the need for truth, so that the people may become just” 
(1496). Citing further passages from the Preliminary Sketch (Ébauche), 
mitterand argues that Truth is not in fact a paraphrase of the Dreyfus 
affair; its subject is the ideological battle between clericals and secular-
ists in 1901–1902. The affair was included simply because it was the 
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most recent example of the effects of the ignorance that formed the 
greatest obstacle to justice. Uppermost in Zola’s mind were problems of 
morals and sociology rather than the history of the Dreyfus affair. after 
the ralliement, the Opportunist politicians had pushed their opportun-
ism to the extreme of welcoming the prodigal back into the fold, relin-
quishing their original policy of relentless combat against the Catholic 
educational system, and had used the Church and the army as support 
for a moderate political program. hence their fall from power after the 
Dreyfus affair, and the rise of the radicals. in Zola’s view, national 
institutions such as the army, the judicial system, and Parliament were 
doing the opposite of what they should. The moral and intellectual 
bases of the country remaining fragile, the only solution was to uproot 
the causes of these evils from the national mentality. From this perspec-
tive, the history of the struggle between the lay and Congregationist 
schools was more important than the affair itself, especially since the 
latter led to a revival and intensification of the battles that had taken 
place in 1880–81, when the anticlerical Ferry educational reforms were 
first promulgated.
 Citing the same passage from Zola’s notes, Jean-Claude Cassaing 
agrees that the Simon affair is just a “pretext”: the novel “is not a 
rewriting of the Dreyfus affair, but the political history of the Third 
republic” (308). The main target in Truth is not the Church per se, but 
the self-styled republicans who, once in control, have allied themselves 
with the Church in order to maintain themselves in power and to enjoy 
their wealth without having to fear the people’s demands for social 
and economic justice. The Dreyfus affair, and especially the amnesty 
granted to all parties in December 1900, showed most clearly that the 
republic had abandoned its own principles and with them the enlight-
enment of the people that had been the goal of the Ferry educational 
reforms in 1880–81.2 in the novel, therefore, the school will not be the 
site of propaganda or knowledge, but the guardian of the moral princi-
ples—freedom, truth, and justice—that the bourgeoisie has abandoned 
in its selfishness, greed, and fear of socialism. Cassaing recalls Zola’s 
contention in his letter to President loubet that Dreyfus was an alle-
gory of the disinherited, the oppressed, the sacrificed. The affair could 
have been a powerful leçon de choses, an exemplary demonstration of true 
republicanism for the people, had the bourgeoisie not encouraged their 
infection with the lies, calumnies, filth, and insults that were driving it 
mad.3 Cassaing concludes that the Dreyfus affair simply offered Zola a 
model of judicial error, while the real subject of the novel is the struggle 
of the primary schools with the Congregationist schools to shape the 
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popular way of thinking, a struggle used as a means to conduct the 
political battle of the true, social republic against the compromising, 
and compromised, antidemocratic bourgeois republic of the radicals 
and Opportunists.
 Zola’s transposition of the Dreyfus affair into the Simon case in 
Truth was thus meant to supply the object lesson the republic had failed 
to provide, by detecting and exposing the reasons for the popular accep-
tance of injustice condoned by the false republic of la défense nationale. 
in the broadest sense, that cause was the perpetuation of the mental-
ity of the ancien regime resulting from the persistent influence of the 
Catholic Church with its training in irrationality and its insistence on 
the believer’s subservience to unquestioned authority, which facilitated 
the exploitation of the credulity of the ignorant. The remedy was there-
fore the spread of enlightenment among the people through the secular 
education in the experimental method to be provided by the primary 
schools. but while Zola considered the dissemination of knowledge and 
the observational method necessary for the establishment of the social 
republic, he did not think it was sufficient by itself. The selfishness of 
the well-educated bourgeoisie was convincing proof of the need to com-
plement knowledge with morality.4 in the language of the times, it is 
éducation (upbringing) even more than instruction (education) that pre-
occupies Zola, because, as laville concludes from the fact that he rarely 
describes classroom activities in the novel, school interests him only as 
“the place where future citizens are trained” (laville 272). The empha-
sis on political morality that mitterand and Cassaing discern in Zola’s 
notes derives ultimately from the writer’s concern with the revamping 
of French national identity, from monarchical subject to republican citi-
zen (see Chaitin, “Transposing the Dreyfus affair” 430–32).
 The irrationality of religion that plagued the country thus was not 
just an external threat to morality and justice; it was a parasitic enemy 
within the self of the nation, menacing its identity and its sanity. here, 
as so often, art was an improvement over life. Spying for a foreign coun-
try, as the case of esterhazy showed, would have been motivated by the 
rational self-interest of monetary gain; the crime of passion Zola chose 
for his fictionalization of the Dreyfus affair allowed him to make the 
crime itself into a dramatic figure of the madness infecting the people 
of France which was responsible for the subsequent miscarriage of jus-
tice masterminded by the leaders of the army and the Catholic teaching 
orders, with the collusion of the press and the officials of the courts and 
the government. although his novel does not embrace the themes of 
patriotism, militarism, and nationalism explicitly, as Zola’s notes show, 
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the involvement of the Church hierarchy in the Simon affair serves as 
an analogue of the military’s involvement in the Dreyfus affair, while 
the “confidentiality of confession” invoked by Father Philibin in his 
(false) testimony before the court replaces the “secrecy of national secu-
rity” General de boisdeffre cited at Zola’s trial in refusing to divulge the 
details of the (nonexistent) letter General de Pellieux claimed proved 
Dreyfus’s guilt (V 151, and n2). Father Philibin plays the roles of major 
henry and General de Pellieux (see V 43 n2), brother Fulgence that of 
Du Paty de Clam (V 149 n1), and brother Gorgias is the esterhazy of 
the affair (folio 421; quoted in V 43 n2). moreover, Zola’s very choice 
of crime implicitly challenged the nationalists’ explanation of the prob-
lem in France, replacing the contention that French identity was being 
undermined by Jews and foreigners who had infiltrated the nation with 
Zola’s own anticlerical view that the inner enemy was the irrationality 
promoted by religious education, and that it was this foe that was vio-
lating the identity of the republican citizen.
The Detectie’s Nightmare
as important as Zola’s preparatory notes are for the understanding of 
this complex novel, they only tell half the story unfolded in the actual 
text. The Simon affair is not just an example of the ignorance that made 
injustice possible nor a mere pretext for a narrative of recent politi-
cal history, although it is clearly both of these. in the process of writ-
ing the novel, Zola fused the fantasy scenario of the rape and murder 
with a network of ideas, metaphors, and narrative links that crystallize 
the writer’s conception of the Dreyfus affair as a traumatic event that 
threatened the roots of identity, both individual and national. in fact, i 
would suggest that it is precisely the relation between narrative, fantasy, 
and ideology that forms both the texture and the principal topic of the 
novel.
 Zola begins Truth as a detective story, a genre whose conventions 
had been more or less codified by the end of the nineteenth century 
with the publication of arthur Conan Doyle’s Sherlock holmes mys-
teries in the 1880s and 1890s.5 The text starts with the account of a 
crime that seems inexplicable. at the end, the detective always manages, 
nevertheless, to solve the mystery and put together a coherent narrative 
of the crime. in lacanian terms, the crime constitutes the trauma that 
tears asunder the fabric of everyday reality, that is, the real of desire 
that interjects itself into the Symbolic, while the solution represents 
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the restoration of the Symbolic to its previous state of apparent whole-
ness by cordoning off desire in the single individual who committed 
the crime (see Žižek, “Two Ways”). according to the standard critical 
view, the detective is the embodiment of bourgeois scientific rational-
ism, who applies to the human world the same methods of objective 
observation as the scientist does to the determination of the facts and 
laws of nature. he does this generally in victorious competition with 
the police, whose methods are too mundane to penetrate the mysteri-
ous circumstances surrounding the crime. Given Zola’s long-standing 
commitment to positivism and his desire to demonstrate its exceptional 
status as sole conduit to the truth in this novel, we should expect that 
marc would assume precisely the role of objective, scientific observer in 
his investigation of the crime against Zéphirin. and indeed, to a certain 
extent marc’s inquiry into the crime does conform to this code. The 
detective story thus forms the perfect vehicle for the presentation of 
the wider themes of the novel indicated in its title: The search for the 
truth of the crime quickly evolves into the general problem of distin-
guishing truth from falsehood. in ever-widening circles, marc’s inquiry 
becomes an attempt to expose the lies spread by the Church, which in 
turn leads to an inquiry into the credulity of the people that allows them 
to accept that deception, which then opens out into the even larger 
question of the social ills that make this possible, and ultimately to the 
means for correcting those problems. Combining the roles of detective 
and schoolteacher, marc becomes the perfect allegory of the naturalist 
writer turned social reformer.
 in order to solve the crime, exonerate the innocent Simon, and 
remove the causes that made his conviction possible, marc must delve 
into the “détraquements” (breakdowns) of society and humankind. This 
investigation will inevitably force him, in imitation of the Zola of The 
Experimental Novel, to “work on spoiled subjects, descend into the midst 
of human misery and folly” (Roman expérimental 133), which in this 
novel are condensed into the vicious crime against Zéphirin and the still 
more vicious repetition of the crime in the mad persecution and cruel 
punishment of Simon that reveal the hitherto secret folly of the nation. 
and, again like the experimental novelist, Zola’s goal will be to “pre-
sent the documents whose knowledge is necessary to control good and 
evil” (133), that is, to correct the miscarriage of justice and establish 
the reign of the utopian republic in France. by connecting the Simon 
affair to the theme of scientific inquiry, the detective story format thus 
allows Zola to unite the three main plots of the novel: the investigation 
of the crime and its cover-up; the struggle between the Catholic and 
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secular primary schools for control of the minds of the French; and the 
duel between marc, the positivist freethinker, and mme. Duparque, the 
ultra-Catholic matriarch, for the love and allegiance of Geneviève (bory 
1002).
 There is one significant difference between the scientist and the 
detective, however, which seems to elude Zola, no doubt because his 
positivist principles prevent him from seeing it. as Slavoj Žižek points 
out in his compelling article on the detective story, in a sense the detec-
tive is always faced with a kind of deception, for the scene of the crime 
is usually a false image, arranged by the criminal in order to mislead 
those who would try to track him down (“Two Ways” 53). Unlike the 
natural scientist, the detective is involved in an intersubjective relation, 
and his primary role in reestablishing the truth concerns the field of 
meaning rather than that of natural phenomena. he “unmask[s] the 
imaginary unity of the scene” (53), rearranging its details in order to 
undo the deception and restore their true significance.
 in the standard nineteenth-century detective story, it is the criminal 
who attempts to cover his tracks by creating a false impression of the 
crime scene, but while there is something similar in Truth—the top 
edge of a handwriting model found in Zéphirin’s room has been torn 
off—in Zola’s text it is the authorities of the Church and the republic 
who attempt to perpetrate the deception. in addition, the ineptitude of 
the police typical of Poe’s or Conan Doyle’s fiction is replaced here by 
the corruption of the Church that cooks up the false scenario and of the 
government officials who go along with the cover-up and frame-up of 
Simon. To make matters worse, in addition to the deceiving Other of 
the Church, the hero is subjected to the intense pressure of the deceived 
Other, the masses who are both the victims and the collaborators of the 
Church.6 Unlike the standard detective, then, marc is not faced with a 
simple rent in the fabric of the Symbolic that can be stitched together 
by the solution of the enigma posed by the crime. he is confronted with 
a symbolic system that has gone haywire; the nightmarish quality he 
senses from the start derives from a distortion of the entire structure and 
leads him into a fun-house hall of horrors. his role is not simply that 
of the guarantor of meaning but rather that of producer of a substitute 
system of meaning (see Chaitin, “le cauchemar de [la] Vérité”).
 Zola’s detective thus takes on the role of the modern subject, like m. 
bergeret, a lone seeker after truth whose path to knowledge is opposed 
not only by the inherent difficulty of the task but also and mainly by 
the obstacles placed in his way by the self-interest of the people and the 
powers that be, as well as tradition and social convention represented 
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by a corrupt legal system and the government behind it. Once he makes 
his decision to pursue his mission of truth, his story becomes one of 
increasing isolation: detested by the clericals, rejected by the towns-
people of maillebois, left to fend for himself by the republicans who are 
his supposed allies, given only verbal support by the school hierarchy, 
regarded with contempt or fear by his fellow teachers, forced by public 
opinion to sever relations with the girls’ teacher and kindred spirit mlle. 
mazeline, and, his most painful ordeal, abandoned by his wife. These 
trials, which echo those of Florent in Le ventre de Paris or of Étienne 
in Germinal, resonate with the isolation from the human race that Zola 
took to be the most severe punishment of Captain Dreyfus (La vérité en 
marche 18).
 in his article, Žižek points out that this type of situation is charac-
teristic of the “hard-boiled” detective of the 1930s and 1940s. For this 
new breed, it is the identity of the detective himself that is jeopardized 
by the “dialectic of deception”: “caught in a nightmarish game whose 
real stakes escape him . . . the detective himself . . . undergoes a kind of 
‘loss of reality,’ . . . finds himself in a dreamlike world where it is never 
quite clear who is playing what game” (63). now while marc is very 
far from the heroes of raymond Chandler or mickey Spillane in most 
respects, once he becomes involved in the Simon case, he is indeed 
drawn into a dreamlike world that imperils his identity. The night the 
crime is discovered, marc is unable to sleep. haunted by the thought 
of the crime and the feverish craving to know what happened, he finds 
himself enmeshed in what he calls a waking nightmare (V 68). Zola inti-
mates that more is at stake here, for the protagonist and for his society, 
than a simple crime, when from the start he has marc sense behind the 
murder “threatening murky depths, an entire dark abyss” (V 67). The 
young teacher’s train of thought moves from his own pangs of doubt 
and the anguish of ignorance to his wife’s family when, hearing Genev-
iève laugh in her sleep, marc is somehow reminded of her grandmother, 
mme. Duparque, the martinet and religious fanatic who had admon-
ished him earlier that day not to get involved. now he thinks of his 
wife’s Catholic upbringing and her latent tendency to revert to absolute 
ideas, superstitions, and the Catholic “God of selfishness and cruelty” 
(V 68). The crowd’s reaction at the Congregationist school that after-
noon forms the bridge between what he thinks of as “that monstrous, 
mysterious, enigmatic crime his intellect must grapple with” (66) and 
the God of cruelty and selfishness, for the rumor immediately spreads 
among the townspeople that one of the teaching brethren must have 
committed the deed. The broader thesis of the novel—that is to say, its 
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truth—is thus discreetly evoked without the need for any commentary 
by the narrator or pontificating by marc as the spokesperson character 
of the novel.
 Zola makes it crystal clear that marc’s very existence is at stake in the 
investigation of the crime, for the inability to discern the truth causes 
him acute physical and mental anguish. The question remains, how-
ever, why he becomes so involved in this particular search for the truth, 
instead of remaining at a cool distance, like a Sherlock holmes or the 
objective scientist he professes to emulate. That marc should feel hor-
ror at the brutality of the crime and that he should sympathize with his 
former schoolmate and fellow schoolteacher Simon at the loss of his 
nephew is not surprising; nor is it surprising that he should want to 
find out who did it and why. in themselves, however, these reactions 
do not explain the nightmarish quality of his brooding that first night. 
To be sure, he uses the word ‘nightmare’ only after waking the next 
morning, astonished that before falling asleep he had had “nightmares 
wide awake [des cauchemars tout éveillé]” (68), an expression that echoes 
the standard term for a daydream (rêve éveillé), as though to dismiss his 
nocturnal worries as an insubstantial fantasy, unworthy of serious con-
sideration. but even if his anxieties were just fleeting will-o’-the-wisps, 
our understanding of the protagonist and his function in the novel is 
considerably enhanced by discovering the precise nature of the fears 
capable of throwing him into such turmoil. in fact, we soon find out 
that marc’s worst nightmares become realities, so that whether we take 
his ruminations as an insight into the psychology of the character or as 
an authorial device designed to unify the text by planting the seeds of 
future events in the mind of the reader, it is apt to say that this ‘mere 
fantasy’ structures the entire text.
 in his richly evocative exposition of the major themes of the novel, 
Zola describes several events of the previous day capable of turning 
marc’s daylight concerns into powerful and apparently unrealistic anxi-
eties about the murky implications of the crime (see Petrone). mme. 
Duparque’s warnings give him a perfectly legitimate reason for fearing 
that his attempts to clear up the mystery will bring him into conflict with 
his wife’s family and thus destroy the peace and “perfect understand-
ing” (V 68) he has had up to then with Geneviève. but this unpleasant 
anticipation is also intensified by several indirect intimations of what 
is to come. When Geneviève is upset by the insinuations and threats 
of violence against the brethren, she asks marc, “Will there be a fight? 
[Est-ce qu’on va se battre?]” (V 65). he reassures her, but, given the 
hostile atmosphere already dividing the members of mme. Duparque’s 
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household along religious lines, the wonderful ambiguity of the little 
word on, which could mean ‘they’ or ‘we,’ at least suggests the possibil-
ity that Geneviève is worried as much about dissension between herself 
and marc as about the danger of street-fighting between clericals and 
anticlericals in the town of maillebois. To ambiguity is added denega-
tion. marc’s half-conscious suspicion that he will find himself opposed 
to the Church in this affair must have increased in intensity when that 
afternoon he heard mme Duparque’s servant Pélagie, the faithful echo 
of the clerical rumor-mill of maillebois, loudly proclaim that in any 
case brother Gorgias could not be the culprit, since on the night of the 
assault he walked her nephew Polydor to his home far outside of town 
and thus could not have returned in time to attack Zéphirin in his room 
at the schoolhouse in the center of town.
 For these reasons, it is understandable that when his thoughts turn 
to his wife and her family, marc should review his relationship with her 
and recall the “revivals of her lengthy Catholic education, ideas of the 
absolute that clashed with his, superstitions, relinquishments of her will 
to the hands of a God of selfishness and cruelty, which sent a chill to his 
heart” (V 68). although he tries to set his mind at rest by reminding 
himself of the harmony in which they’ve lived together until then, marc 
nevertheless foresees the possibility of having to oppose the ideas of his 
in-laws and the consequent disruption of his marriage. marc’s anxiety 
that night thus derives in part from the rift he foresees in his marriage, 
which symbolizes the greater division between Catholic and freethink-
ing France.
 The marital discord marc anticipates is not only a foreshadowing 
of the future; it is also a repetition of the past, namely, of the diver-
gence between Zéphirin’s parents, the Jewish Daniel lehmann and his 
Catholic wife, marie Prunier, at least as the latter interprets their life. 
When the child was six years old, his father died in a horrible industrial 
accident, which marie understood as divine punishment for falling in 
love with a Jew. When the boy later began to develop a hunchback, his 
mother took this as further evidence of “the implacable vengeance of 
heaven” hounding her, because she could not tear the memory of her 
beloved husband out of her heart (V 39). To add to marc’s discom-
fort, when mme. Duparque learns that local workers and peasants are 
accusing one of the brethren teachers of the local Capuchin school that 
Zéphirin attended, she repeats her admonition to marc and caps it off 
with the threat that God will exact vengeance on the enemies of his 
faithful.
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 These ominous words, the last ones marc hears before he goes to 
bed, confirming the message of divine vengeance Zéphirin’s mother 
read into her boy’s nascent hunchback, cannot help but mobilize the 
enlightened teacher’s most irrational fears, precisely the ones he has 
rejected as a freethinker and so cannot acknowledge within himself. 
This effect is all the more probable because one of the most promi-
nent themes of his reflections about his relationship to Geneviève is 
that, like Zéphirin’s parents, he too is part of a ‘mixed’ marriage—not 
between Catholic and Jew, to be sure, but between Catholic and mili-
tant, anticlerical freethinker, which may be even worse in the eyes of 
mme. Duparque’s God. The similarity between the two couples is rein-
forced by the fact that Zéphirin’s terrified mother too is “won back by 
the religion of her youth” (V 39), much as Geneviève will be pulled 
inexorably back to the faith of her childhood. in a belated attempt at 
reparation and repentance, from then on marie sends the boy to the 
Catholic school. after her death, when Simon takes him in on behalf of 
his wife’s family, the Jewish teacher allows his nephew to continue with 
the Capuchin brothers. indeed, when mme. Duparque first hears of the 
murder, she has trouble understanding how God could have permitted 
such a thing to happen to a good Catholic boy, but then she decides that 
some families are just “accursed” (des familles maudites; 29).
 in marc’s ear, as in that of any Frenchman of the period, this expres-
sion must have echoed the epithet the Catholics used to describe the 
Jews, “accursed people” (peuple maudit).7 mme. Duparque made the 
theme of Catholic anti-Semitism explicit later in the day, when she 
recalled an event that took place in her youth: The body of a kidnapped 
child was found in front of the church, cut in four, “and only the heart 
was missing. . . . They accused the Jews of needing it for their Passover 
matzoh” (60). marc tries to shake off the suggestion that Zéphirin was 
the victim of a ritual sacrifice, by calling the story despicable nonsense 
(ces stupidités infâmes), but he surely understands mme. Duparque’s tacit 
allegation that Simon the Jew is the guilty one. he is all the more 
ready to perceive her insinuation because he has just heard a similar idea 
expressed by Férou, the anarchist teacher in the neighboring village of 
le moreux who minces no words about what will happen. The “dirty” 
crew of priests will blame the “dirty Jew” schoolteacher in order to beat 
up on us schoolteachers, “the laic perverters, poisoners” (57). They will 
not scruple to accuse Simon of violating and strangling his nephew. 
marc has a thoroughly plausible reason for dismissing these dire predic-
tions, for they are issued by a fellow who is intelligent but embittered by 
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his life of privations and therefore given to violent rancor and extreme 
ideas. he reproaches Férou for ‘going too far,’ and exclaims, “you must 
be out of your mind!” but when the other snickers at marc’s naïveté and 
insists that the clericals will not care a fig for the truth, marc feels an 
icy shudder (V 58). Férou’s remarks had thus already planted in marc’s 
mind the admittedly irrational idea that since Simon’s Jewishness and 
marc’s secularity put them both in the same guilty category in the eyes 
of the Church, marc’s mixed marriage would be just as likely to suffer 
God’s vengeance as Daniel lehmann’s. at the same time, his colleague’s 
comments arouse the apprehension, equally unfounded at the time, that 
the Church will use these attributes to mount a case against Simon in 
the court of public opinion.
 marc’s nightmare, then, is not only irrational fear but also fear of 
the irrational, in the form of the “despicable nonsense” of anti-Semi-
tism, for he senses that he will have to battle against it if the Church 
decides to launch a campaign against Simon. as with his anxiety about 
the disruption of his marriage, these fears of course prove to be entirely 
justified. The day after his restless night, marc learns from Pélagie that 
“people” are accusing Simon of the crime. having neither families nor 
homeland, Jews commit evil for the sheer pleasure of it, in league with 
the devil, and marc realizes, in the free indirect discourse typical of this 
text, that the people are resuscitating the ancient accusation of ritual 
murder.
 after Simon is convicted, his name becomes “the accursed name that 
brought misfortune” (170), and the pious ladies of maillebois broadcast 
the idea that “education without God was the cause of all stains [of sin] 
and all crimes” (169), exactly like de broglie, bourget, Caro, and Feuil-
let, while the general populace, represented by the peasant bongard, the 
worker Doloir, and the office worker Savin, wallows in the mud of anti-
Semitism. bongard is convinced that the Jews go around poisoning the 
wells in the area in order to sicken the peasants’ animals; Doloir explains 
that those citizens of nowhere (sans-patrie) are determined to destroy 
the army, so they can sell France to the Germans. Savin is just as delu-
sional (délirant) as the others, but his madness takes a different form; 
he knows that Simon was a scapegoat, sacrificed in order to hide the 
corruption of all French schools, public and parochial (V 170–71). Zola 
thus offers a pastiche of the propaganda of the anti-Dreyfusards, spread 
by the newspapers—Le Petit Beaumontais and La Croix de Beaumont in 
the novel—but ultimately traceable to the teachings of the Church. Le 
Petit Beaumontais is a takeoff on Le Petit Journal, the paper with the 
highest circulation during the Third republic, while La Croix de Beau-
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mont is a representation of the various local versions of La Croix, the 
organ of the Catholic Congregation of the assumption which, with Le 
Petit Journal and Drumont’s La Libre Parole, was the most anti-Semitic 
newspaper of the last decades of the nineteenth century.8 its main accu-
sations against the Jews were that they are a deicide people, murder-
ers of Jesus; a people cursed forever by God for that crime; a people 
that has signed a pact with Satan; a people that practices ritual murder 
of Christian children; a people that persecutes Christians [!] and that 
aims to pillage France and destroy all Christians; the internal enemy of 
France and the enemy of religion and the homeland (Sorlin 138–58).9
 Several of these themes, especially those of the deicide people 
and the accursed people, were not limited to the assumptionists or 
the nineteenth century but have been parroted by Church dignitaries 
and historians from bossuet (Discours sur l’histoire universelle, chaps. 
XX–XXi to lamennais (during his orthodox period, in his Essai sur 
l’indifférence) and beyond, and have their source in the writings of the 
Church Fathers. They had been drummed into the heads of the faithful 
through their repetition in the easter liturgy and the textbooks used 
in Catholic schools for centuries (isaac, Jésus et Israel 360–82), just as 
Zola portrays the transmission of prejudice and superstition through 
the concept of the hereditary flaw (tare héréditaire) in Truth. (happily, 
the Catholic Church began to change its teachings about the Jews in the 
1950s [Démann 18–19]; unhappily, not everyone has gotten the mes-
sage yet.) in the text, marc describes this process as “a continuous sup-
ply of the stupidities currently circulating, the deep, overlapping layers 
of popular prejudices, the viruses of superstitions and legends amassed 
over the years, which destroyed all reason” (V 171).
The War of the Wor[l]ds: 
Madness and Interpretation
marc’s fears that first night thus adumbrate the wide-ranging and funda-
mental battle that saturates every aspect of the text, the constant clash of 
two irreconcilable symbolic systems, that is, two patterns of intelligibil-
ity couched in two separate languages pitted against each other. This 
structure is already visible in the account of the circumstances leading 
up to Zéphirin’s murder, which juxtaposes two parallel but contradic-
tory explanations of events, the one ‘rational’ and ‘scientific’ according 
to the discourse of the novel, the other ‘irrational’ and ‘religious.’ The 
latter, presented in the ideas of the boy’s mother and mme. Duparque, 
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makes subjectivity, the personal God of authority and vengeance, the 
basis of the causality that rules life and the entire universe. its principle 
is obedience and reward or transgression and punishment, so that the 
individual must attempt to put himself into accord with divine will by 
adhering to Church doctrine. in this system, the repetition that plagues 
the lehman family, then the Froment clan, curse of the atrides style, 
results from the cycle of transgression and vengeance: marrying outside 
the faith brings on the father’s death and his son’s hunchback, while 
the ritual murder of Catholic children by treacherous Jews causes the 
demise of the son. The first system, championed by marc and, of course, 
Zola, puts impersonal objectivity at its center, with the determinism 
of natural law as its causal principle. here the wise person must use 
observation and logical deduction to discern the truth, generalize from 
it, and use the laws so discovered to enhance the fraternal solidarity and 
material progress of humankind. Daniel lehman’s death must then be 
explained as the result of the social milieu, namely, his dangerous work-
ing conditions, combined with chance perhaps; his son’s hunchback is 
the result of an “hereditary flaw” (V 39); and the hereditary ‘instincts’ of 
cruelty and “the madness of passion” at work within the murderer lead 
to the boy’s death (cf. “a sudden burst of madness” [une folie brusque] 
[V 305], “his old madness” [sa folie ancienne] [V 602], etc.).
 marc’s nightmare is that the irrational system should prove to be 
the true explanation of phenomena, so that the crime against Zéphirin 
would be justified as retribution for disobedience to the divine law. it 
would then be repeated endlessly, unless everyone involved, and mark 
first of all, were to bow down to God’s will. but for the freethinking 
subject, such obedience would itself amount to the repetition of the 
crime, with himself in the role of victim and God the Father in that 
of aggressor, a kind of spiritual violation and murder involving passive 
submission to an overwhelming authoritative and personalized force. 
For mark this would be subjective death, the overthrow of all autonomy 
and rationality—in short, madness (see Chaitin, “le cauchemar de [la] 
Vérité”).
 it is not marc alone who is thus threatened. ‘madness’ and its equiv-
alents—la folie (madness), fou (crazy), la démence (insanity), le délire 
(delusion), délirant (delirious/delusional)—haunt every aspect of life in 
the France Zola conjures up in this text, whenever the crime or the 
religious system of explanation is at stake. it is the nation driven mad 
by the Dreyfus affair Zola envisions in his letter to President loubet 
after the grotesque outcome of Dreyfus’s second trial in rennes: “[a]s 
long as this frightful act of iniquity [the repeated conviction of the 
T r u T h :  Z o l A ’ s  d Ay m A r e  A n d  t h e  t r u t h  o f  v é r i T é   ~    0 
innocent Dreyfus] has not been rectified, it will continue to plunge 
France into the delirium of horrible nightmares” (V 154). marc describes 
the new worship of the relics of Saint anthony of Padua as the epitome 
of stupidity, cupidity, and laziness depending on the “caprice of a god of 
irony and iniquity” (V 183). and he adds that it is “complete insanity, 
an irresistible stampede of the faithful” (V 185). When Geneviève feels 
she can no longer live with marc but must return to the Catholicism of 
her youth, he tells her, “Then go to your madness, follow it until it is 
exhausted, since there is no other way to cure you of it” (V 344). and 
shortly after Simon’s conviction, when a conspiracy of silence about the 
case reigns, the text characterizes it as society’s hidden insanity.
 The common thread running through these various manifestations 
of la folie is a capricious, irrational subjectivity: that of the fearful, cred-
ulous, and often self-centered members of the unenlightened people; 
that of the furious erotic and aggressive impulses that overcome the 
criminal in a moment of sudden and uncontrollable passion; that of the 
capricious God of cruelty and selfishness who cares more for his own 
grandeur and his believers’ subservience than for truth or justice. This 
same subjectivity forms the bond between religion and the politics of 
the Third republic. as early as the versaillais slaughter of the Commu-
nards, Zola had insisted on the distinction between the idea and official 
ideology of the republic, and the reality of political action. This criti-
cal analysis reached its culmination in the articles he published in the 
antirepublican Figaro in 1879–81 and later collected in Une campagne, 
the gist of which was to elevate letters to the level of the eternal while 
relegating politics to the dustbin of ephemerality and irrationality. as 
roger ripoll has cogently observed, Zola assimilated politics with hun-
ger, aggression, and sexual desire, the domain of the irrational instincts 
(48). literature and science are at the summit of human accomplish-
ment, because they confer life and immortality; literature is the eternal 
and the absolute, while politics is merely the fleeting and the relative of 
human affairs (Pagès 49–50, quoting passages from “la haine de la lit-
térature” and “adieux”). but that is only true of the objective artist; “the 
personal feeling” of the artist, unless it is a simple ‘hypothesis,’ a starting 
point for the work of art to be checked by objective knowledge, is, on 
the contrary, the source of madness. and Zola gives the example of an 
artist who might be ‘crazy’ enough to represent people walking on their 
heads, simply because that was his ‘personal idea’ (Roman expérimental 
94, 96).
 if the country concedes too much importance to the politicians, it 
will risk breaking down; Zola uses his favorite verb, se détraquer (to 
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break down), to indicate both physical and mental breakdown (“adieux” 
873). and that is just what he claims has happened during the Dreyfus/
Simon affair. The ultimate cause of the potential collapse is the utter 
void at the center of unleashed subjectivity (“adieux” 321). marc’s vio-
lent rejection of the religious system stems from the same icy dread, that 
the Other upon which it depends has no substance at all, that at bottom 
it is mere nothingness. The faith to which Geneviève reverts, the super-
stition that moves the faithful in maillebois and enriches the Capuchin 
monks, the creed that brother Gorgias avows in his final confession, all 
are characterized as being totally empty. in art as in politics or religion, 
for marc as for the republic, the supreme peril is subjectivity gone 
wild, that is, the danger that the outside world has the void at its heart, 
for in that case the individual subject would lose the connection to the 
phenomenal world on which identity and sanity depend. The emptiness 
around which the irrational system is built threatens madness because it 
dissolves the object which alone can serve, in the positivist perspective, 
as the firm foundation necessary to the life and equilibrium of the self. it 
is the vacuity of God the Father that dominates the French society marc 
comes to know and makes it possible for the people to believe anything 
whatsoever, no matter how irrational or hateful. and it is dread of this 
same emptiness that explains why marc is convinced he must, at all 
costs, eradicate this system and replace it with positivist objectivism.
 marc’s efforts to find the truth and to make his conception of it 
prevail thus become part of the wider confrontation between secular 
education, with the positivist notion of truth and the neo-Kantian doc-
trine of secular morality and justice that supported it, and the religious 
education of the catechism, Catholic dogma, and moral training based 
on divine authority. “The struggle appeared terrible and immediate to 
marc, who had never felt with such strength the need for France to kill 
the Church, if France did not want to be killed by it” (V 191). Ceci 
tuera cela (This will kill that), in the phrase Zola had already adopted 
from hugo’s Notre-Dame de Paris in Le ventre de Paris (see Zarifopol-
Johnston, “Ceci tuera cela”), a fight to the finish between secularism 
and Catholicism that was necessary, in Zola’s eyes, to establish the true 
republic. On this level, the novel is a manichaean battle between two 
diametrically opposed and mutually exclusive forces that is played out 
in the novel’s three plots. in the dispute about the Simon case, the com-
peting theses are tested by their ability to discover factual information, 
the true identity of the criminal. The touchstone in the competition 
between the secular and parochial primary schools is the capacity to 
establish justice in the nation. The struggle between marc and mme. 
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Duparque for Geneviève’s heart measures the power of the two systems 
to foster love and thereby life, peace, and harmony. in each case, of 
course, the scientific method wins out.
 The goal in these plots is not simply to outdo the competitor, but, as 
in many a political contest, to eliminate the rival at any price. This mur-
derous urge becomes all the more imperative the more the two com-
peting forces resemble each other, and it is remarkable to what extent 
Zola’s conception of marc’s endeavor mimics the system he is trying 
to oust. in this respect, however, he is merely following the lead of 
the anticlerical campaign undertaken by the journalists of l’Aurore, who 
accused the Church, especially the Jesuits, of exactly the same misdeeds 
as the latter did the Jews: organizing a secret “syndicate,” pumping mil-
lions of francs into its campaign to seize control of the nation, doing the 
insidious work of a foreign power, plotting nefarious crimes designed 
to bring about the death of the ‘true France.’ This specularity is just as 
apparent in the religious vocabulary and the narrative framework of the 
novel, which, as the title of the series proclaims, imagines the promo-
tion of science and the social state as a latter-day gospel replete with 
missions, myths, and martyrs. indeed, Zola did aim to create a new reli-
gion of science capable of killing off Christianity (laville 345, 463–64). 
here again he was simply embracing the strategy of the Opportunist 
republic, which from its inception had adapted the ideology of Catholi-
cism to its own purposes by replacing the God of the catechism with the 
republican homeland in its primary school textbooks.
 Discerning the meaning of events becomes the principle that under-
lies the structure of the last book of the novel as a series of rereadings of 
the past. The narrative flow is interrupted while the principal characters 
look back on their lives and those of their communities, recapitulating 
their main events and meditating on the significance of their experi-
ences. as evelyne Cosset (Les Quatres Évangiles d’Émile Zola) points 
out, these moments of deliberation allow the author to assess the pre-
sent situation in light of the past events of the novel, making that past 
intelligible while conferring plausibility on the lesson of progress that 
forms the writer’s thesis. according to Cosset, these recalls of the past 
serve the rhetorical purpose of making believable the utopian future 
Zola envisions, by showing precisely how it has evolved from the his-
torical reality of the country he has depicted realistically in the first three 
sections.
 marc’s project of spreading enlightenment, however, is not just a 
matter of reviewing preexisting meanings. like all genuine educational 
undertakings, it involves forming new meanings or replacing those that 
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already exist. in short, it is a matter of changing people’s minds, and, as 
marc soon finds out, changing people’s minds quickly entails changing 
their identities. The fundamental purpose of the Ferry school reforms 
that marc strives to put into practice was in fact the performative func-
tion of making meaning, since, as we’ve seen, they were designed to 
create the new national identity of the loyal republican citizen. For Zola 
and marc, as for the republic, the objectivism of Opportunist ideology 
was just the starting point for the process of identity formation; it is 
the subjective processes of inculcating and altering belief, and thus of 
controlling the subject’s adherence to the symbolic systems of his or 
her society, that comprise the core of their endeavor as of the novel as a 
whole.
 yet it is apparent that even in Truth—especially in Truth—Zola is 
not willing to concede this point where his own positivist discourse 
is concerned. marc’s truth must remain untainted by the virus of per-
formative language; it must be the rock-solid bed of objectivity com-
pared to which the other systems of interpretation are flimsy vapors of 
insubstantial subjectivity. The text is thus pulled in opposite directions, 
riven by the tension between mimetic realism with its premise of an 
objectively given nature to which it refers, and performative art with 
its constructivist notion of the power of language to create its own 
object—the ideal citizen of the ideal republic.
Saing the Republic, from Nothing
The battle of interpretations reaches a dramatic climax in each of Simon’s 
trials, but it pervades the entire novel and finds its most vivid expression 
in the disunion of marc and Geneviève. in fact, the two plots are artfully 
intertwined, for Geneviève’s return to her grandmother’s home and reli-
gious influence and her subsequent departure are precipitated by marc’s 
involvement in Simon’s case. The local representatives of the Church 
and mme. Duparque, who slavishly follows their lead, want to coerce 
marc into abandoning his defense of Simon by persuading Geneviève 
to leave him if he persists in broadcasting the Jew’s innocence. Genev-
iève eventually does leave marc soon after he discovers new, damning 
evidence against the real culprit, brother Gorgias, and begins clamoring 
for a new trial. likewise, Geneviève’s return to her husband results from 
Simon’s second conviction in the fictional town of rozan, a transparent 
allusion to Dreyfus’s second trial in rennes. The evidence produced 
there causes Geneviève to recognize Simon’s innocence, and it leads her 
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mother, mme. berthereau, to realize that religion, in the person of the 
Church authorities behind Simon’s conviction, is responsible for his 
inhuman suffering on Devil’s island. Sensing a parallel with the living 
death she suffers through religious renunciation of earthly happiness, 
she defies mme. Duparque and warns her daughter not to allow the 
same thing to happen to her.
 The married couple’s relationship represents the theory of the “two 
Frances” promoted by l’Aurore at the turn of the century but already 
widespread in the 1870s in the notion of the “two groups of youths” 
(deux jeunesses) being created by the two parallel but opposed educa-
tional systems (mona Ozouf 19; Prost 37). Just before Geneviève walks 
out on marc, the only thing the two agree on is that they no longer 
agree about anything!
—“What troubles me the most is that we can no longer get along with 
each other [nous entendre]” she concludes, and he continues:
 —it’s true. . . . we can no longer understand each other [nous enten-
dre]. Words no longer have the same meaning for us, so everything i 
reproach you for, you reproach me for. (V 281)
So wide is the cleft between them, that is, between the positivist and 
the Catholic notions of the world, that they now speak two different 
languages; or, what is worse, they speak the same language, but it has 
a different meaning for each of them. To make the lack of understand-
ing more poignant, when marc repeats Geneviève’s very words in this 
exchange—nous entendre—he gives this seemingly last remnant of their 
“perfect understanding” (entente parfaite) of former days a different 
sense from his wife. For him it bears its more literal, material, we might 
say positive(ist), meaning, of understanding words spoken, whereas she 
meant it in the more figurative, psychological sense of mutual under-
standing and harmony.
 The main lesson that emerges from the drama of marc’s troubled 
relation to his wife is that it is a battle between something and nothing, 
presence and absence, fullness and lack. Zola turns this abstract conflict 
into narrative action, portraying it in terms of contradictory emotions 
and conflict among characters that develop over time. The bridge fig-
ure between the older and younger generations of women in her fam-
ily, Geneviève’s attraction to religion and to nature is evenly balanced, 
leaving her to vacillate at different moments between the faith of her 
childhood, embodied in mme. Duparque and her house in maillebois 
opposite a former Capuchin monastery now used as a Catholic school, 
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and her love for her husband, marc, and his dwelling in the secular 
republican schoolhouse. book Two ends with Geneviève’s departure 
from her husband to return to her grandmother and to the Catholi-
cism of her youth; in the climactic scenes that end book Three, spurred 
on by her mother’s urging to take advantage of life while she still can, 
Geneviève renounces both and is reunited with marc, soon to become 
a schoolteacher herself.
 From the start, Geneviève is caught between her grandmother and 
her husband. mme. Duparque had always been violently opposed to the 
marriage on religious grounds, accusing marc of “stealing her grand-
daughter’s soul” (V 31). less than a week into their annual summer 
visit to her childhood home in maillebois, Geneviève urges marc to take 
her away from the influence of her grandmother’s devoutness, sensing 
that “the ideas and feelings of her childhood were coming back to her 
[lui revenaient]” (V 106). Geneviève’s faith thus acts as the revenant, 
the gothic element, so frequently present in Zola’s earlier novels, which 
manifests the return of a nighttime past that refuses to die, haunting the 
daylight world of the present.
 Two years later, the rift between the spouses becomes manifest, when 
marc, now the teacher in the maillebois primary school, feels firmly 
entrenched enough to brave the local clericals by taking the crucifix 
down from the wall of his classroom. (The executive order [circulaire] 
of november 2, 1882 forbade the display of all religious emblems in 
the public schools.) Geneviève catches him in the act, and when she 
reproaches him, it seems as though an alien personality has taken over 
her identity, as though she is literally not herself. as marc watches this 
transformation, he is seized with gothic horror. like the victim of a 
demonic possession, Geneviève is being slowly dragged back toward 
her “pious youth,” a return to the past that estranges them ever more 
(233–34). as marc later realizes, Geneviève is “possessed by another, 
filled with an indestructible past” (274).
 it is as though mme. Duparque has stolen back the soul of her 
granddaughter. in fact, marc does identify this alien presence as mme. 
Duparque, who threatens to take his daughter louise back as well, but 
the text notes that he had caught a glimpse of a more sinister presence 
in his wife’s eyes, a presence which is really an absence, “the mystical 
darkness of the beyond” (V 233). For the positivist Zola, the dark-
ness of mysticism derives from its invisibility, itself a consequence of its 
nonexistence, and the basis of all religious belief is ultimately mystical. 
he repeatedly equates it with emptiness, nothingness, and the imagi-
nary when analyzing Geneviève’s religious aspirations and their conse-
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quences for her identity: She insists on proclaiming her happiness with 
the “void of her chimera”; refuses to admit “the nothingness” of her 
prayers (V 477); and, in her parting speech to her grandmother, asks, 
“[W]hy God has not filled the frightful nothingness of my being?” (V 
488). For Zola and his protagonist, the nothingness of the mystical is 
the essence of the irrationality the Church implants in its followers (see 
Chaitin, “le cauchemar de [la] Vérité”).
 The disillusionment Geneviève expresses to mme. Duparque is in 
fact that of a frustrated lover whose “mystical” desire is never fulfilled. 
When marc begins to sense that he is losing his wife, he reconstructs 
her life story in an attempt to determine the causes of her disaffec-
tion. The crucial moment, he decides, was the preparation for her first 
communion, combining darkness, mystery, perverse desire and mystical 
curiosity, which disturbed her reason forever. The Church exercises its 
sway over women, and through them over their children and husbands, 
by manipulating and perverting their sexual desire, seducing them into 
a precocious sexual initiation, displacing the object of their desire from 
mere human beings to the divine lover, and promising them a jouissance 
beyond all earthly satisfactions from which they will never be able to 
free themselves (272).10 in short, behind mme. Duparque lurks a much 
more powerful agent calling Geneviève back: the lure of divine love.
 as the rift between marc and Geneviève widens, like so many divorc-
ing couples they play out their hostility in disputes over the education 
of their daughter, louise. Until this point, marc has allowed her to 
attend catechism class, despite his atheism, in large part to keep the 
peace with his wife. but now that louise has reached the age of twelve, 
the priest insists she must begin going to confession if she is to continue 
with her religious instruction. Geneviève is adamant, but marc categori-
cally refuses to allow it, not only because he does not want to risk his 
daughter confessing to one of the small number of disturbed priests 
whose vow of chastity might lead him to all kinds of sexual aberration, 
nor even because such a colloquy is a kind of moral violation of a young 
girl whose senses are just awakening; no, the prime reason is that con-
fession is a kind of rape, a trauma whose aftereffects will enslave the girl 
throughout her life. From then on she remains her confessor’s thing, 
marc goes on to say (in free indirect discourse), an obedient instrument 
of servitude.
 marc’s fears for his daughter are justified by Geneviève’s experience, 
torn between “the reality of her love for her spouse” and “the deceit-
ful nothingness of her mystical education” (V 482) that incites her to 
desire the impossible. The nothingness of Geneviève’s “mystical” desire 
 1    ~   C h A p t e r  
is thus its ultimate lack of object, the longing for union with a beyond 
that does not exist. When she finally does leave marc and return to her 
grandmother’s house, she is never satisfied; her hopes of finally feeling 
in her flesh Jesus’s blood and flesh are always disappointed.
 Still more perverse than the attraction of the beyond is the insidious 
effect Zola discerns—and here he goes beyond both the pleasure prin-
ciple and the analyses of michelet and his other anticlerical predeces-
sors—in the mental violence the rigid practice of Catholicism exercises 
on women (and therefore on the men they marry and the sons they 
raise). by first criminalizing sexuality to awaken guilt within its vic-
tims, then imposing blind obedience to the authority of the Church, it 
actually creates a specifically feminine sensual enjoyment that cements 
the bond between women and the Church. mme. Duparque not only 
enjoyed the caressing words and unctuous gestures of her confessor, she 
received a thrill of delight from his harsh reproaches, his threats of hell 
with its horrible torments of the flesh. The Church’s hold over women 
is no longer the result of ignorance, dis-education and fear of the devil 
alone. as a consequence of centuries-long experience, subservience to 
authority has become a source of pleasure, enslavement the object of a 
love that makes the task of liberation all the more formidable.
 Zola’s diagnosis of Geneviève’s condition—and by implication that 
of women in general—is simple: She has abandoned “the only natural 
human pleasure possible” (V 477). For Zola, human sex is the only real, 
because “natural,” fulfillment of desire. The “mystical” teaching of the 
Church is perverse in that it arouses desires that can never be satisfied, 
because they have no real object. The ultimate goal of marc’s crusade 
of enlightenment is thus to stamp out insatiable desire, the desire for 
“something other.”
 Zola’s method for achieving this aim is to allow the adult Geneviève 
to compare the imaginary pleasures of her youth to the mature sexual 
and emotional fulfillment she knew with her husband during the happy 
years of their marriage. by enacting rather than resisting the return 
of the repressed indicated by the gothic overtones of these episodes, 
Geneviève manages to free herself from the iron grip of her first lover, 
the one who “deflowered” her.11 it is precisely because she has tried 
to recapture the intoxication of the pious practices of her childhood 
that those practices have lost their charm and their hold over her, dis-
persed, one by one, like so many mirages. as Geneviève learns that 
the mystical beliefs of her “chimerical” youth can no longer fulfill her 
desire, her dreams grow pale and weak. The clear implication is that 
“mystical” passion for the beyond could have exercised a hold over her 
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and the women of the nation only because the Church instilled it into 
them before they had any concrete experience capable of satisfying their 
desires for happiness and sexual union, and the memory of that passion 
can continue to hold them in thrall only if its vacuity is not exposed to 
the light of day.
 now, as David baguley has observed, all the heroines of Zola’s Évan-
giles (Gospels) represent the republic that the apostolic hero must save 
from “the harmful influences that endanger the country” (“l’evangile 
républicain de Zola” 109). Geneviève’s story is thus an allegory of the 
nation’s attempt to achieve freedom by expelling the “poison” of the 
irrationality, the love of ignorance, and the lure of imagined satisfactions 
inculcated into its citizens by Catholic education, the shackles of Church 
teachings. marc characterizes the irrationality of her religious faith as 
the “ancient flaw” that comes back to haunt her (V 476), thereby com-
bining the gothic theme of the return of the repressed with the natural-
ist concept of the “hereditary flaw” that determines so much of human 
behavior in the writer’s earlier novels. Unlike in the Rougon-Macquart 
series, however, the flaw is understood here in an historical and textual 
sense as the inscription of Catholicism into the nation’s psyche through 
the long ages during which it was dominated by that religion, and its 
return is described as an atavism: that is, the recurrence in the present 
of an ancient primitive trait.12 Zola reinforces the connection by having 
mlle. mazeline, who has become marc’s primary interlocutor during his 
wife’s stay in mme. Duparque’s home, console him with the argument 
that Geneviève is the victim of the heredity of Catholic education that 
goes back countless generations beyond her grandmother.
 Geneviève’s liberation from the influence of Catholicism, and, by 
implication, the emancipation of the nation from the covert interfer-
ence of rome, consists in chasing away the alien personality that had 
regained its hold over her body and mind in the scene of taking the 
crucifix down from the schoolroom wall. Through this exorcism, as the 
critics are fond of putting it, Zola thus implies that there was something 
potentially salutary in the national trauma of the Dreyfus affair, if it 
could shock the country into reliving its past and thereby make it capa-
ble of surmounting its hereditary flaws. book Three and the “realistic” 
plot come to an end when Geneviève and the two children rejoin marc 
and reconstitute the family that had been torn apart the way the nation 
was divided into the “two Frances.” her return signifies the reunifica-
tion of the nation that prepares the way for the final, utopian section of 
the novel. book Four begins with marc succeeding in having Geneviève 
appointed teacher of the girls’ school in Jonville, the town of his own 
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new assignment, so that they would be completely united, in “perfect 
understanding” once again (V 500, 507–8).
 The text treats the healing process made possible by this catharsis 
as a matter of nature taking over once the “poison” of mysticism has 
been extracted.The parasitic identity having been cast out, the “true” 
identity of the republic is free to emerge and prevail. no longer warped 
by the irrational teachings of Catholicism, the people will be automati-
cally attracted to truth and justice, the positivities of concrete evidence, 
mutual solidarity, and the pursuit of happiness, in accordance with their 
nature. Zola’s formula for healing the nation, his solution to the prob-
lem of creating national unity and identity, is thus the exact opposite of 
those of burke, Taine, renan, or barrès, for it consists not in identify-
ing with the past but in mourning, reviving and then disengaging one-
self from one’s past attachments. To paraphrase Santayana, one might 
say that, for Zola, those who cannot repeat the past are condemned to 
live it.
The Sins of the Fathers
marc must verify his positivist system of interpretation and disprove 
that of his Christian adversaries, because the greatest threat to his iden-
tity and sanity is the possibility that the nation is in the grips of a capri-
cious and malicious Father who condones Simon’s frame-up, one who is 
an updated version, with nineteenth-century anti-Semitism thrown in, 
of Descartes’s evil genie (malin génie). like the Cartesian subject, the 
hero’s being depends on his ability to find a certainty that the existence 
of such an Other would render impossible (V 66). his first inklings 
of the relation between the father and the world gone berserk were 
aroused the day of the crime. his colleague Férou’s contention that the 
Church will accuse Simon echoes the fleeting suspicion that must have 
crossed his mind a few moments earlier, when he had the “rapid intu-
ition” that Zéphirin must have known the killer, since he didn’t cry out 
when the latter entered his room (50). For it takes no great imagination 
to conclude that the murderer must therefore have been either one of 
the brethren or Simon himself.
 marc’s worst nightmare, an irrational and entirely unfounded accu-
sation, is that the brutal criminal is the boy’s own protector, indeed his 
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Truth
i
true treason, or the rape of the republic
you senators are traitors
the ministers are traitors
the President of the republic is a traitor.
and when you have voted in this law [of amnesty]
you will have done the work of traitors.
—Zola, La vérité en marche 141
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surrogate father. earlier in the day, during the judicial inquiry, Simon 
had consoled his wife, rachel, in public by first kissing her “as a lover 
and a father,” then reminding her that they have treated Zéphirin like 
their own child (55). as in earlier passages, negation is used to suggest 
and then reject an idea, or rather two: first, that the boy’s death was in 
some sense the responsibility of his guardians; that, as several witnesses 
more or less imply or deny, it was due to their negligence in letting the 
child sleep in a room with a window opening directly onto the street 
that the crime could have been committed; and second, as a response 
to the first, that they were indeed his substitute parents, that Simon 
therefore in practice was tantamount to being his father.
 Of course, marc’s horror can be accounted for by his sympathy for 
the victim of such vileness and injustice rather than his suspicion that 
Simon is the killer, and there is no direct textual evidence prior to the 
nightmare scene that he ever had the thoughts i impute to him. it might 
be more accurate, then, to say that they exist in the text and, as a result, 
in any reader familiar with the Dreyfus case. but the following day, 
when marc first gets wind via Pélagie of the smear campaign the Church 
and the newspapers are beginning to pump up against Simon, this very 
doubt does enter his mind: “Could Simon be guilty?” he asks himself 
feverishly (75). at this point he rethinks all the evidence presently avail-
able about the case and tells himself (in free indirect discourse) that 
reason, deduction, and observation have made him certain that Simon 
cannot have committed the crime (75–76).
 yet the only serious argument he adduces, and it is a negative one, 
is that Simon had no motive. The really telling evidence against the 
Congregationist (Capuchin) school and brother Gorgias—the hand-
writing model, the torn-off corner, the precise manner in which it came 
into Gorgias’s possession that night—will not come to light for several 
years. marc’s unshakable certainty is all the stronger precisely because 
it is not based on evidence—which can always be interpreted in various 
ways and therefore inevitably leaves at least some room for doubt—
but almost entirely on plausibility (vraisemblance) and deduction. The 
only place observation enters marc’s review is in his own evaluation of 
Simon’s character, situation, and demeanor while recounting the story 
of the fatal night. but Zola himself knew very well from his own mis-
takes concerning the roles of major Du Paty de Clam and major henry 
in the Dreyfus case how misleading such appraisals of character and 
testimony can be. later in the novel, he will have marc and Delbos, 
Simon’s lawyer, repeat that error with regard to brother Fulgence and 
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Father Philibin. even though marc turns out to be right about Simon, 
if he protests the latter’s innocence so loudly and with so little justifica-
tion, it must be that he feels it imperative to exclude at all costs what he 
dreads the most, the possibility of the father’s complicity in the crime 
against the child.
 That conclusion becomes even more compelling when the crime 
is repeated at the end of the book. This time it is marc’s great-grand-
daughter, rose, who is assaulted by a would-be kidnaper right in front 
of Zéphirin’s old room, but she manages to escape with only a broken 
arm and emotional shock when the protagonist happens along to save 
her (619). Unhesitatingly, marc sees this event as an uncanny reprise of 
the earlier crime, as though the gothic repressed he thought had been 
laid to rest forever with Geneviève’s return had come back to haunt his 
utopia (620). but when, to complete the resemblance with the past, 
the girl’s father, François, is mistakenly accused of the crime, like Simon 
previously, the townspeople, having been trained in the interim to com-
munal solidarity and the love of truth by marc and his battalion of insti-
tuteurs, come forward this time to provide the eyewitness reports and 
evidence that soon lead to François’s exoneration and the identification 
of the real criminal, the brother of the young woman he had run off 
with.
 Once again (strange coincidence!), it is precisely the father who is 
accused, only this time it is the child’s ‘real’ father, and all the evidence 
points in his direction—the material evidence of his handkerchief found 
at the scene of the attempted kidnapping and, above all, the eyewit-
ness testimony of his own daughter, the intended victim. Once again 
the theme of the nightmare is evoked, only this time there can be no 
mistake about its cause, the guilt of the father: “but it was her father, 
she was haunted by that nightmare, born perhaps from the suffering she 
saw in her mother since the departure of the unfaithful husband” (623). 
moreover, it turns out that François really is involved in the assault, 
although indirectly, because it is his lover, Colette, who cooks up the 
scheme, and her brother, Faustin, who carries it out, or rather bungles 
it. The text insinuates that the secular educational system is once again 
succumbing to the seduction of the Church, perhaps unwittingly this 
time, for Colette is reputed to be the illegitimate daughter of Father 
Théodose, one of the fieriest preachers and most predatory confessors 
of maillebois. in fact, the whole episode is attributed to a last, desper-
ate effort of the Congregation to smear the secular schools, and even 
though there is no evidence to support this hypothesis, ‘everyone’ is 
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convinced of it (633). none of that, however, has the slightest effect 
on marc, the devotee of factual truth, empirical observation, and logical 
deduction. like the neighbors of a mass murderer interviewed on televi-
sion the day after his conviction, who regularly express their disbelief 
that such a nice, quiet, respectable fellow could do such a thing, marc 
is once again unshakably convinced that his grandson could not have 
committed the act, since he had no motive and was always such a loving 
father (père tendre; 624), the very idea Simon had used to protest his 
innocence of all responsibility for the calamity that befell Zéphirin: “‘it’s 
impossible, it’s crazy!’ marc repeated” (623). “‘no! no!’ Despite rose’s 
assertion, despite the handkerchief recognized as his, François was not 
the guilty party; it was a moral impossibility, there were arguments 
[raisonnements] stronger than evidence” (625). The townspeople may 
have learned a greater respect for empirical truth in the interim, but it 
seems that marc has not. he has his preconceived idea and he will stick 
to it, no matter what.1 Of course, once again marc is right. but what 
does that mean other than that Zola was as concerned as his character to 
prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that it was just a waking nightmare, 
that the father could not possibly be guilty? (See Chaitin, “Transposing 
the Dreyfus affair” 439–41.)
 he had good reason to be so concerned. One of the smear tactics 
the army used just before his libel trial for the charges he roared out 
against military officers in his “J’accuse” article was to release apparently 
damning papers from François Zola’s military file to a certain m. Judet. 
Judet used them to publish a malicious article about Zola’s father in Le 
Petit Journal, asserting that François’s request for permission to resign 
his commission in the Foreign legion in 1832 was denied so that he 
could be held in military prison for stealing from his company’s funds. 
Zola immediately expressed his outrage in an article in L’Aurore of may 
28, 1898, titled “my Father” (Mon père), later collected in La vérité 
en marche (169–76). he followed this up in January 1899 with three 
articles designed to clear his father’s name, also republished in La vérité 
en marche, simply called “François Zola,” written after he had gained 
access, by dint of prolonged and difficult maneuvers, to his father’s 
military dossier. There would be little point in rehearsing all the details 
of the case here, but one passage shows the same inclination that we’ve 
seen in the text of Vérité, to value reasoning above factual data when it 
comes to absolving the father: “[W]hile i was copying the important 
documents in the dossier . . . a conviction [of his innocence] formed 
within me. it is obviously my personal [belief] and is based only on 
reasoning [raisonnement]” (194).
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 but Zola’s desire to save his father’s reputation does not explain why 
he chose these particular crimes for his transposition of the Dreyfus 
affair, although the theft imputed to François would have been a 
betrayal of trust. There is certainly an enormous gap between Dreyfus’s 
alleged crime of spying for a foreign country, on the one hand, and rape 
and murder, on the other. Some have suggested that Zola simply took 
over the stereotyped attacks on the morals of monks and clergy spread 
by anticlerical propaganda since the restoration (and dating back well 
into the middle ages), recently brought into public view by the 1899 
government survey of conditions in the monasteries and the subsequent 
campaign of leftist publicists and newspapers such as l’Aurore and La 
Petite République, which circulated charges against Church officials of 
sadistic punishments and sexual abuse of children (laville 195–96). no 
doubt there is a good deal of truth in this theory, but a more prob-
ing interpretation, while not contradicting the first, relates the charge 
of treason brought against Dreyfus to the dimension of betrayal so 
prominent in the novel: “The capital offense—treason [trahison] for an 
officer—for a schoolteacher is violating one of his pupils: scandalous 
‘betrayal’ [trahison]” (bory 1002). The verb violer being just as ambigu-
ous as trahison, we can surmise that Zola chose a viol (rape) as crime to 
intimate as graphically as possible that Catholic education was violating 
the trust of its pupils as of the country at large. and, as his notes explic-
itly state, Zola wanted an exemplary crime that would act as a leçon de 
choses for the people of France to bring home the point that ignorance 
and an inability to think rationally inevitably lead to the miscarriage of 
justice (see Cassaing 302; mitterand, “notice” 1495–96).
 These explanations, true as far as they go, do not, however, account 
for the specifically traumatic effect of the crime, the abhorrence marc 
feels for the repeated implication, however quickly repudiated, that the 
fault may lie with the father. This crucial element of the transposition, 
i would argue, derives from Zola’s experience of a trauma in his own 
life that could act as a refractor for the larger trauma of French life 
that was the Dreyfus affair. like rose’s father and accused kidnaper, 
Zola’s father was named François. like Zéphirin, Zola was the child of 
a ‘mixed’ marriage, between a French woman and a foreigner, the italian 
Francesco Zolla (a fact barrès did not neglect to emphasize in his xeno-
phobic witch-hunts during the Dreyfus affair). That victim of the first 
crime, Zéphirin, is marked with the letter Z that inevitably calls to mind 
the famous name of Zola. moreover, the original name of the criminal 
in Zola’s notes also began with a Z, Zacharias (although this name was 
probably an allusion to esterhazy as well). all these little clues point 
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to the fact that, according to police archives, Émile Zola was sexually 
molested at the age of five by a twelve-year-old babysitter whom his 
father, François, left in charge of him at a hotel in marseilles where he 
was staying while on a business trip (mitterand, Olympia 93; brown 
23–25). in this novel called Truth, in his effort to depict the crisis of 
the republic with which he identified, Zola came closer to articulating 
his personal truth than anywhere else in his long career.2
 The repercussions of this traumatic experience could be traced 
through virtually all of Zola’s life and fiction, and, i would argue, it 
supplied one important motive for his decision to intervene so deci-
sively in the Dreyfus case as well as furnishes a key to understanding 
Truth. What makes an event a trauma is not what actually happens, it 
is the disruption it causes in the subject’s symbolic world after the fact. 
little Émile was not murdered, he did not have his arm broken, he 
probably was not raped—the legal term attentat à la pudeur covering 
a multitude of sins when exercised against a minor—and the assault 
was certainly not committed by his father (or a churchman), but these 
must have been some of the fantasies he wove around the actual occur-
rence, like a dark pearl crystallizing around an intrusive grain of sand. 
he probably did suffer the mental shock he attributes to little rose in 
the novel, and he must have asked himself the questions, “how could 
father have allowed this to happen?” “Was he not the one who chose 
this servant to mind me?” “if father let this happen, even wanted it to 
happen, then anything is possible, even the worst.” Zola transposes the 
agonizing conflict between the conviction that the father is guilty and 
the desire to believe such guilt impossible into the experience of little 
rose, who accuses her father and then is horrified by her apparent mis-
take. When François learns of her attempted abduction, he immediately 
returns home, all the more easily because his lover, Colette, has left him 
in the interim. rose compares her father’s appearance to that of the man 
who attacked her, realizes that his beard and the shape of his body are 
different from those of her assailant, and retracts her accusation (632).
 as grave as the teacher’s ‘treason’ toward his pupil may be, a much 
greater betrayal of trust is that of a father turning on his child. it is so 
great that it threatens the fundamental intelligibility of the world, for, 
like the detective who solves the crime, the father acts as the guarantor 
of truth. The end-of-the-world scenarios of Germinal and La débâcle 
are there to attest to the cataclysmic effects of this loss of the subject’s 
confidence in the system of representation that sustains his mental life. 
For Zola, the Dreyfus affair was already a repetition—of his childhood 
trauma.
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The Rape of the Republic
The symbolic system at stake in Truth is of course the political ideol-
ogy of the Ferry educational reforms in their attempt to secularize the 
schools and wrest control from the Catholic educational system run 
by the so-called Congregations, loose organizations of brothers (and 
sisters) attached to the Church but not ordained priests. as mitterand 
and others have shown conclusively, this struggle for control of the 
minds of the young had abated in the following decade, but was revived 
with a vengeance by the Dreyfus affair (mitterand, “notice” 1492, 
1494). The renewed strife led, on the one hand, to the 1901 law that 
for all intents and purposes outlawed the Congregations, and then to 
the official separation of Church and State in 1905; on the other, to 
a deep rift among the Dreyfusards, between Jaurès and the socialists 
who supported the government of Waldeck-rousseau in celebrating 
the victory of the republic over the authoritarian enemies of parlia-
mentary democracy, and Clemenceau and the journalists of his news-
paper, l’Aurore, who insisted that there would be no real republic until 
the people were educated to understand and respect democratic values 
(Cassaing 304; mitterand, “notice” 1493–94). Zola came down on the 
side of Clemenceau, concluding that secular education designed to turn 
the ‘crowd’ into the ‘people’ must come first if social, economic, and 
political reforms were to be feasible.
 The keystone of the republican ideological edifice was, as we have 
seen, the claim that there exists a universal secular morality capable 
of taking the place of the Christian moral system and replacing the 
believer’s subservience to unquestioned authority with the promotion 
of the citizen’s freedom of inquiry. Zola’s choice to begin his novel 
with the commission of a crime presented a subtle challenge to that 
claim, beyond the obvious parallel to the false accusations and anti-
Semitism of the Dreyfus affair, and the equally obvious attempt to 
tar the religious right with the same brush of immorality the latter 
used in politics and in fiction to attack secular education. by locating 
the crime within the walls of a public school, Zola seems to hint that 
although the crime was committed by a Catholic teacher, a share of the 
guilt belongs to the republican school system. The idea that the secular 
schoolteacher is partly to blame is made explicit when the townspeople 
suggest that Simon allowed the crime to happen by housing his nephew 
on the ground floor, almost inviting intruders to enter the boy’s room. 
The very fact that he, an instituteur in the reformed primary schools, 
should permit his Jewish ward to continue attending the Catholic school 
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indicates a certain degree of complicity between the secular and the reli-
gious schools. Far from promoting the universal morality at the heart 
of the theoretical definition of republican identity, as the new primary 
schools were supposed to do, in reality they cooperate with the Church 
education that makes the crime and its cover-up possible, and this col-
laboration is the source of the mal social that marc senses from the 
start.
 When, nonplussed by the people’s refusal to acknowledge the evi-
dence of Simon’s innocence, he reflects on the reasons for their obtuse-
ness, marc asks himself how that is possible in a republic a third of a 
century old. Shouldn’t the wise reforms of the primary schools have 
produced “a conscious democracy, freed at last from the age-old errors 
and lies” and “a freer and freer people, won over to reason and logic, 
capable of certainty and justice” (179)? as expected, at first he puts 
all the blame on the shoulders of the Church, its recognition of the 
importance of controlling popular education, and especially its latest 
stratagem, the ralliement, “using free laws in order to keep locked in the 
jail of its dogmas the millions of children whom those same laws were 
supposed to liberate” (179). but the real culprit is not the ralliement in 
itself; no, it is the founders of the republic who have fallen for the esprit 
nouveau and appeasement (180).
 The result of the ‘new spirit,’ as Zola saw it, was that the irrational 
mode of thinking not only persisted in France but was allowed to flour-
ish in the very bastion of secularism, the new Ferry primary schools. 
among the articles Zola clipped out while preparing his novel was one 
titled “le cléricalisme est au coeur de l’école laïque” (Clericalism is in 
the heart of the laic schools; V 41, n2), and he announces this theme in 
his initial description of mlle. rouzaire, the institutrice of maillebois’s 
supposedly secular girls’ school at the time the crime is committed, who 
has her pupils recite the catechism and is completely at the service of the 
local priest, abbé Quandieu (41). after Simon is convicted, when the 
influence of the Church is at its peak in maillebois, marc’s replacement, 
a weak fellow named méchain, gives in to mlle. rouzaire’s pressure and 
institutes daily morning and evening prayers for the boys. in order to 
put a stop to that practice and to reassert republican principles in the 
school, marc’s mentor, Salvan, the director of the departmental normal 
school he attended, invites him to take over the job of instituteur in 
maillebois.
 méchain is not the only member of the public educational hierarchy 
to bow to the Church’s pressure. as the campaign to dishonor Simon 
reaches a fever pitch just before his first trial, there is a mass defection 
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of hitherto reliable anticlerical teachers, whose patriotic zeal and love 
of the military after the defeat of 1870 make them easy prey to the 
nationalist anti-Semitic propaganda spewed forth by Le Petit Beaumon-
tais (123). more dangerous than the instituteurs are mauraisin, the pri-
mary school inspector, who, in Salvan’s words, becomes a “traitor to 
the Université, won over to the Congregation . . . in the certainty that 
the Church would be victorious,” and Depinvilliers, the principal of the 
lycée in beaumont, the departmental capital, who delivered the republi-
can school over to the Jesuits (125).
 The fight to the finish between science and religion that Zola depicts 
in Truth is therefore not merely a face-off between two external enemies, 
each determined to eradicate his adversary. The target of the educational 
crusade that mark undertakes as his mission is an internal foe, the reli-
gious system that already holds the nation in its grip through its control 
of education. now the language Zola uses to describe this situation that 
he is at pains to oppose is highly significant:
in sum, i’m taking the moment of the apparent failure of the repub-
lic. Republicans who helped to found the republic, who counted on the 
schools to found it yet who unwittingly allowed themselves to be penetrated 
by scheming clericalism, the much vaunted new spirit. (Ébauche folio 413, 
V 649; emphasis added)3
 The traumatic plight of France that Zola takes as the main subject of 
his novel is none other than an ideological rape, the insidious penetra-
tion of the republicans, and the republic, by scheming clericalism. at 
the origin of the novel there is thus a parallel between physical and men-
tal violation, and in both cases the ultimate danger is the incursion of 
what one would like to consider the external enemy into the interior, of 
the body, of the mind, of the nation. and of woman. Zola attributes the 
growing disunion between marc and Geneviève to the machinations of 
the clerical party, who want to prevent the teacher from proving Simon’s 
innocence and brother Gorgias’s guilt, which would of course discredit 
the Church and transfer authority and power to the public schools. it 
is just when he has discovered new evidence against Gorgias that the 
clericals provoke the physical separation of the couple. as we have seen, 
they employ the age-old tactics of the Church to dominate women and 
thereby to control their husbands and sons. Their chief maneuver is to 
use the first confession and communion of a young girl as a kind of 
spiritual penetration, a defloration whose effects are designed to last 
throughout life.
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 The fundamental fantasy of the novel derived from Zola’s personal 
experience thus acts as the link between the crime that launches its plot, 
the anticlerical tradition, the fight to extricate religion from the secu-
lar schools, the theme of women’s enslavement and liberation, and the 
political situation at the time of the affair. in each case, it is a matter of 
a literal or metaphorical rape, by a religious or secular father.
 now, as Cassaing astutely points out, Zola divided the characters in 
Vérité into three groups in his fiches-personnages, rather than the two that 
would be expected in a purely manichaean confrontation between cleri-
cals and republicans: the clericals, the bourgeois republicans who have 
permitted the Catholic invasion of the republic, and the socialist repub-
licans who are genuinely committed to driving Catholicism out of the 
republic and replacing it with the secular faith (Cassaing 311). in the 
text Zola repeatedly stresses that it is the bourgeoisie whose complicity 
in iniquity has allowed the crime and the false conviction of Simon to 
take place. nelly Wilson points out that it is “the silent majority, the 
ignorant masses, the cowardly politicians, the fearful good citizens [bons 
bourgeois] [who] are responsible for widening the Simon case into the 
Simon affair” (“mise en fiction” 489). She notes that marc calls the 
policy of the republican authorities “the hidden will to do nothing,” an 
apt description of the official world of the novel. Darras, the mayor of 
maillebois, avowed republican, anticlerical, and friend of Simon, com-
plains that if only he had a more solid majority in the town council, he 
would certainly have acted courageously “instead of being reduced to 
the most diplomatic opportunism.” The local deputy, lemarrois, former 
friend of Gambetta, a good radical and firmly ensconced in power, is 
nevertheless afraid to do anything to jeopardize his position as a com-
mitted defender of the republic in the department in the upcoming 
elections. not surprisingly, after he is reelected, he is unwilling to bring 
up the affair, for fear of compromising important legislation and the 
survival of the republic itself. The mélinist prefect, hennebise, like so 
many of the officials of the Third republic, denies the very existence of 
an “affair,” while the young careerist deputy marcilly makes it a policy 
to please all his constituents by playing the Simonist with the teacher’s 
supporters, the anti-Simonist with his opponents (Wilson, “mise en fic-
tion” 490–91).
 That the ignorant masses should be easily duped or stirred to hatred 
does not surprise marc, however much it saddens him; but how is it, 
he wonders, that whether out of fear, hypocrisy, naked self-interest, cau-
tion, or political savvy, the inaction of the entire clan of republican 
officials cooperates with the Church in perpetrating a conspiracy of 
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silence about what has become the Simon affair? in his response, marc 
uses the same words, ‘iniquity’ and ‘crime,’ earlier applied to Zéphirin’s 
tragedy and Simon’s conviction, thus linking the complicity with the 
Church and anti-Semitism to the bourgeois’s desire to oppose the rise 
of the workers and socialism at all costs.4 it is this denial of social justice 
that belies the politicians’ declarations about the universal morality of 
their republic. The Simon affair thus serves as the ‘object lesson’ that 
illustrates this general state of injustice.
 The bourgeoisie and its political representatives are therefore both 
the victims and the perpetrators of a trahison infinitely more pernicious 
than anything Captain Dreyfus was accused of, let alone did in reality. 
The true treason, Zola implies, was not the sale of some minor military 
secrets to the Germans, nor even the conspiracy mounted by the army 
and abetted by the Church, but the betrayal of the republic by its 
French political fathers. in this sense, the reviewers who saw the novel 
as a failed attempt to transpose the Dreyfus affair into fiction com-
pletely missed the point. and the critics who rely almost exclusively on 
the preparatory notes give some of Zola’s remarks too literal a reading, 
not taking into account the fictional transposition of the ideological 
themes into the novel form. While it is true that Zola thought of the 
Simon case as the pretext for his portrayal of the political and social 
situation of the republic at the turn of the twentieth century, in the text 
Zola plays on the ambiguity of the word trahison, making the crime and 
the ensuing affair act as the metaphor of the treason committed by the 
republican authorities that made the Dreyfus affair possible.
 Truth is all about the Dreyfus affair, for it is trahison, treason and 
betrayal, that forms the bridge between Zola’s personal trauma, the 
national trauma of the Dreyfus affair, the disintegration of marc’s mar-
riage, and the primary ideological conflict of the text. in Zola’s eyes, 
the general amnesty the government granted participants in the Dreyfus 
affair was itself a betrayal of the republic. in his “letter to the Senate” 
during its debates on the amnesty, he accused the entire French govern-
ment of treachery (La vérité en marche 141). Why? because, for the sake 
of appeasement, the amnesty was designed to “save the skin” of the real 
enemies of the republic: the nationalists who call Jews traitors because 
they have no country and call their defenders traitors because they put 
truth above the army; the Church that exploits anti-Semitism to bring 
the nation of nonbelievers back to Catholicism by arousing ancestral 
hatreds based on the claim that the Jews betrayed Jesus and can never 
be forgiven for that crime (138–41). Worst of all, the amnesty will close 
off the last opportunity to bring the truth out into the open (145). but 
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that public betrayal was also a personal trauma for Zola, the individual, 
for, he charged, the amnesty was designed to silence him and the oth-
ers who were defending justice by putting them in the same bag with 
the true criminals. That was the ultimate lie (équivoque; 135). Colette 
becker and véronique lavielle assert that healing this “deep wound” 
was one of Zola’s principal motivations for writing the novel (“Préface” 
10; see also Cassaing 302–4).
 What infuriated Zola most about the amnesty was that it deprived 
him of the opportunity to clear his name. For him personally it was a 
denial of justice (134). it was himself as well as the fathers, then, whom 
Zola was anxious to vindicate through his text, a desire apparently mag-
nified by his own sense of guilt. it seems as though he felt that he too 
shared some responsibility for the crimes he attributed to the fathers, his 
own and those of the Opportunist republic, for he ascribed a degree of 
complicity in the policy of apaisement that made the rape of the repub-
lic possible to even the most exemplary educators in the novel. Simon 
was guilty of allowing the Catholic teacher to intrude into his nephew’s 
room, and he sent Zéphirin to the Congregationist school, even though 
he and the boy’s father were Jews. While the critics tend to exempt marc 
and his mentor, Salvan, from the general condemnation of the charac-
ters who renege on their obligations to the republic (see, for instance 
becker and lavielle’s “Préface” 17), in fact they too compromise with 
the Church. During the period when Geneviève has left marc, Salvan, 
the one who first introduced him to Geneviève, confesses his complicity 
openly, reproaching himself for his action “in consenting to marry free 
thought with the Church” (428). Salvan thus represents the retrograde 
republic that has invited the enemy into the fortress by arranging the 
unholy matrimony of big money with big religion, bourgeois State with 
monarchist Church.
 moreover, marc himself is guilty of the same “treason,” since he not 
only consented to the marriage but fell in love with the very Catholic 
Geneviève! Was he not attracted to her, in truly specular fashion, pre-
cisely because she was the object of desire of the Other, of her Catho-
lic family and of Catholicism in general? is that not the secret of his 
struggle with mme. Duparque for Geneviève’s allegiance? right from 
the first night, as marc ruminates over his relation to Geneviève, he 
admits that his “tolerance” of her convictions in allowing their daughter 
to be baptized is an act of appeasement, stemming from his desire to 
“live in peace with the ladies [Geneviève’s mother and grandmother]” 
(67). (Zola of course did the same with his daughter, although perhaps 
for different reasons; i.e., allowing the girl the freedom to choose, care 
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for her future.) This small hint is amplified enormously once Geneviève 
has left him. marc bitterly regrets his fear of ruining the “sweet peace 
through love” they enjoyed (273), he, the committed republican teacher 
who has educated everyone in the area except his own wife. Thus he 
castigates himself for doing nothing to combat her religious faith, the 
source of their discord: “if he was suffering now, it was from his pride-
ful illusion, his laziness and his selfishness in not acting, through cow-
ardly fear, at bottom, of spoiling his happiness in love” (275). even 
now, although he is resolved to fight, the respect for the other’s freedom 
and sincere beliefs prevent him from using any weapons other than per-
suasion, discussion, the example and the logic of life (275). but are they 
sufficient to prevent his daughter louise from falling onto the “mortal 
error” of Catholicism (275)?
 Zola makes the connection among the corruption of the republic, 
Geneviève’s defection, and marc’s inactivity explicit when he has marc 
include himself in the guilt for the injustice done to Simon: “it was a 
pain, a shame from which he could not recover, which haunted him 
as though it were a crime in which he had participated” (165). Zola 
makes marc’s identification with Simon explicit by having him literally 
take the Jewish teacher’s place, as the instituteur in maillebois’s primary 
school.5 here, then, is added impetus for marc’s desperate need to quell 
his doubts by unearthing the truth of the crime: he himself has abetted 
the betrayal of the republic on which his identity depends. in Truth as 
in the stories Žižek analyzes, there is a dialectic between two different 
truths, the objective truth of the facts of the case that point to the one 
perpetrator, and the subjective truth that everyone is guilty of the mur-
der in their unconscious desire. The detective thus “discharges us of all 
guilt for the realization of our desire” (59).
 That marc does harbor murderous desire is evident from his unceas-
ing efforts to eradicate the Church. he can allow himself to indulge this 
urge openly, because he considers it a matter of survival, the republic’s 
and his own. What he cannot admit is the existence within himself and 
his colleagues, the proponents of secular rationality, of a seemingly gra-
tuitous drive to rape and kill that has no ‘rational’ basis, that is acted 
upon for mere enjoyment. marc’s ultimate nightmare is that such an 
irrational impulse should function within him the way the Church now 
operates inside the republic, destroying it from within. This is the truly 
devastating fear that turns the detective’s world into a hall of horrors. 
now if his fellow instituteur Simon could have had such a concealed 
desire, then so could he, marc, especially since the two share the guilt 
of propitiating the Church. marc must shift all blame from Simon to 
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brother Gorgias, from the rational republican to the irrational church-
man, for the same reason he must dedicate himself to eliminating the 
Church from the education of the children of the people. in both cases 
it is a matter of expelling from within the hidden desire to enjoy the 
rape that is undermining the mental integrity, of marc as of the French 
nation.
Utopia and the Trauma of Desire
marc’s mission, as he understands it, is to undo the betrayal that has 
authorized the rape of the republic, by expelling the enemy from its 
stronghold within the gates of the nation in order to restore the integrity 
of the symbolic system upon which its identity and that of its citizens 
depend. Convinced by the Simon affair that the bourgeoisie is rotten 
beyond all redemption, he sees the only hope for the regeneration of 
the nation in the people (498). it is this conviction that justifies marc’s 
mission as a schoolteacher and explains Zola’s reason for choosing an 
instituteur as his hero (498). Only by breaking the link between the 
bourgeois government and the Church can marc prevent the continued 
reign of injustice in the nation (204).
 but is he right? Does the spread of education prevent the repeti-
tion of iniquity? it would seem so. The first three books of Truth paint 
a rather grim picture of the divided France of the Dreyfus affair era, 
while book Four depicts the ideal republic of the future, in which the 
goals of liberty, equality, truth, and justice are realized. Zola marks the 
transition from the present to the future partly through the progress 
made in women’s liberation. The theme permeates Zola’s novel of edu-
cation, first, because he was convinced that education was both the root 
of the problem of women’s dependency and its solution, and second, 
because, as marc comes to realize (338–39), he believed that indepen-
dent and enlightened women were the key to a free, healthy, and unified 
republic.
 One of marc’s closest collaborators in his campaign of educating 
the French people is mlle. mazeline, the enlightened schoolteacher 
appointed to the girls’ school next to marc’s in maillebois. She illus-
trates both the progress and the limits of Zola’s notion of liberation, 
which is, in most respects, identical to that of the Opportunist authori-
ties such as Ferry, Sée, or Félix Pécaut, for whom the ultimate goal of 
women’s liberation was to prepare good republican mothers and wives 
(161). however independent she herself may be, mlle. mazeline agrees 
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with michelet that the most important goal of women’s education is to 
overcome the disunity of French families in which progressive repub-
lican husbands are estranged from their pious and reactionary wives 
(353).
 While mlle. mazeline has sacrificed her personal desires for love and 
maternity in order to devote herself to her mission, women of succeed-
ing generations aim to reach the promised land that she can only gaze 
upon from a distance. Zola brings this evolution to life for the reader 
by producing a snapshot of the four generations of women in the fam-
ily of marc and Geneviève, at the moment when her mother is on her 
deathbed, pleading with Geneviève and louise to leave the house of the 
family matriarch, mme. Duparque. The younger each is, the closer she 
is to health, life, and liberty. mme. Duparque, seventy-eight years old, 
the incarnation of intransigent, authoritarian Catholicism in the novel: 
She is gaunt and yellowed with age, with rigid features matching the 
narrow Catholic piety that stifles all impulses toward warmth, light, and 
life. mme. berthereau, aged fifty-six, is softer and more supple than her 
mother, but unable to free herself from her religious training. Geneviève 
herself is caught in the conflict between her love calling her back to her 
husband and her Catholic upbringing that prevents her from return-
ing to him. eighteen-year-old louise, “freed at last, having escaped 
from the priest’s stranglehold on women and children,” has returned to 
“happy nature, to the glorious beneficence of the sunlight, with a cry 
of youth and health” (482–83). louise remains a transitional figure, 
nevertheless, who is allowed to make up her own mind about taking 
catechism lessons and first communion, but who, by virtue of this very 
choice, is not free to avoid following the wishes of either her Catholic 
mother or her freethinking father.
 it is louise’s daughter, Thérèse, who represents the truly emanci-
pated woman of the following generation in the utopian future Zola 
imagines to conclude his gospel. liberated by law (in the fictive world of 
Zola’s utopian republic) as well as by upbringing, Thérèse is also finan-
cially independent, for, like her mother and grandmother, she is herself 
an institutrice who earns a generous salary from the grateful republic 
of Zola’s dreams. as a result, she really can act on her own initiative, 
refusing to take back her adulterous husband despite her grandparents’ 
desires and advice to the contrary.
 This record of progress is measured according to a system of simple 
binary oppositions, cold versus warmth, darkness versus light, author-
ity/obedience versus individual will/freedom, and, ultimately, life versus 
death. all these are exemplified, and in fact controlled by one other 
     ~   C h A p t e r  
dichotomy, sexual love versus Catholic faith. a kind of reverse emma 
bovary, mme. Duparque turned to religion at the age of thirty, because 
her husband was unable to satisfy her sensual needs or her desire for 
love. Too strict to take a lover, she gleans whatever sensual pleasure 
she can from her “mystical rendezvous with the blond Jesus” (478). 
her daughter did know love with her husband, but he died suddenly, 
and, forced by poverty, at the age of twenty-nine mme. berthereau 
moved back in with her mother, now a widow herself. always pious, 
she becomes as strict a Catholic as mme. Duparque, but with a certain 
gentleness due to her awakening to love and life. her devoutness cannot 
erase the memory of her husband’s love, however, and she suffers from 
the despair of lost happiness (30). it is this sentiment that motivates her 
on her deathbed to implore her daughter and granddaughter to leave 
mme. Duparque’s house before they too succumb to the living death of 
a sexless and loveless existence.
 Other proofs of France’s “renewal” (532) some thirty years after the 
affair abound. Geneviève resumes her profession as schoolteacher, a 
role she had abandoned before the opening of the story because she was 
unable to find a job in the same community as her husband. Simon’s 
rehabilitation begins when his son Joseph is named as assistant (adjoint) 
to Joulic, the instituteur in maillebois after marc and Geneviève have 
moved back to teach in the town of Jonville, where marc began his 
career. now Simon’s socialist lawyer, Delbos, who had been virtually 
ostracized after his defense of the Jewish teacher, finally wins an elec-
tion as deputy, a sign that the times have changed, “like an annuncia-
tion” in the prophetic discourse of this gospel text, that the people are 
becoming strong and will soon overthrow the bourgeoisie (533). The 
narrator takes obvious pleasure in enumerating the good fortunes of 
each of the pupils of the secular schools, before concluding that each 
succeeding generation lives more happily than its predecessors, thanks 
to the improved education they receive (537).
 eventually, in Zola’s ideal world, the Cour de cassation (analogous 
in this function to the United States Supreme Court) revokes Simon’s 
conviction, and the townspeople agree to finance a monument to him, 
a house to be built for him facing the newly constructed public park, 
as reparation for the guilt of maillebois (564). Chapter 3 combines 
Simon’s official exoneration and triumphant return to maillebois with 
another exorcism (Cassaing 314); that is, brother Gorgias’s public con-
fession of his crime, this time with all the sordid details of his mad, 
‘unnatural’ passion (603). The implication is of course, as proponents of 
enlightenment have argued since the eighteenth century, that perverse 
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desires flourish and drive men mad when their ‘normal’ sexual desires 
are frustrated. like the mystical desires the Church fosters in women, 
the ascetic teachings and practices of Christianity will inevitably pro-
duce intolerable sexual frustration in the faithful. The vow of celibacy 
and the isolation from the community at large are as noxious for men as 
first communion and confession are for women. The difference is that 
men will act out their frustrations.
 as in a standard detective story, at last the various strands of evi-
dence, intuition, and logical surmise are rewoven into a coherent nar-
rative in Gorgias’s confession. as though to confirm the cathartic effect 
of this restoration of meaning, Simon makes his appearance just as 
the monk is finishing his speech, causing the mood of the crowd to 
swing from hatred to joy. even the mitigated repetition of the crime 
that opened the story, the assault on rose outside Zéphirin’s old room, 
seems to confirm the efficacy of marc’s action, for this time, it will be 
recalled, the townspeople put into practice the lessons in truth and jus-
tice marc and his band of instituteurs have taught them. They refuse to 
believe the “accursed family” theory the Church tries to revive concern-
ing François, Simon’s grandson, and they speak up to identify the real 
offender. Thus, as laville argues, the episode is designed specifically to 
confirm the thesis of the novel, that secular education of the people in 
the primary schools of the republic leads directly to the reign of truth 
and justice in the nation and thence to an increase in the happiness and 
general well-being of the populace (laville 247–48).6
 With the source of the evil so thoroughly uprooted, it would seem 
that little remains for marc other than to inventory his successes and his 
succession. yet in fact the novel does not end with this happy denoue-
ment, and the utopia Zola imagines is not quite so tidy as some critics 
would have us believe. There is one loose end that is not tied up by 
the progress of enlightenment: When François returns home after the 
kidnapping attempt, Thérèse must decide whether to take him back. 
Ostensibly in order to help her make up her mind, but actually to ensure 
that the peace and harmony of his utopia will remain unbroken, marc 
calls a great family reunion in the schoolhouse. This meeting quickly 
degenerates into a session of gloating about the progress accomplished 
since the Simon affair, with special emphasis on the recently accom-
plished—in the fictional world of the story—legal and moral emanci-
pation of women that leaves Thérèse free to make up her own mind 
about her husband. marc’s indulgence in self-congratulation is brought 
to a sudden halt, however, when Thérèse’s deliberations bring her into 
direct conflict with his vision of utopia. not at all certain of loving her 
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husband still, Thérèse exercises her newfound equality and autonomy 
by refusing to take François back. her choice thus exposes the inher-
ent contradiction between two aspects of the republican utopia: the 
assertion of individual autonomy and the institution of social harmony 
through unity.
 now it would have been easy for Zola to maintain that this fly in the 
ointment of utopia was simply the result of its as yet imperfect estab-
lishment, and that after a sufficient number of generations, such defects 
would vanish. instead, he offers quite a different explanation, through 
the mouth of Thérèse, who thereby complements her legal emancipa-
tion with the assertion of her intellectual resistance to marc’s version 
of the perfect society. When marc advises her to take François back in 
order to spare both of them needless suffering, she replies that suffer-
ing will always be with us, especially that caused by thwarted passion 
(638).7 This final episode, the direct aftermath of the repeated crime, 
constitutes the declaration of independence of woman, but also of suf-
fering and irrationality, from patriarchal laws and customs but also from 
the enlightenment reason and unity those laws represent in the modern 
world of Zola’s ideal republic.
 even before the attack on his great-granddaughter took place, marc 
was forced to acknowledge that the frustration of celibacy is not the 
only cause of men’s irrational behavior, when he learned that François 
had run off with Colette (617–18), a deed whose similarity to Gor-
gias’s behavior Zola underlines by having marc call it an “act of pas-
sion-induced madness” (624). Thérèse reiterates the idea that man’s 
irrationality is ineffaceable when she attributes François’s “folly” to the 
“eternal madness” of the human heart (637).
 here Zola is harking back to a major theme of the Rougon-Macquart 
series, emphasized notably in Nana: Desire is that aspect of human life 
that refuses to obey the rules of rationality, self-interest, ambition, for-
tune, and even physical and mental well-being. in her probing analysis 
of truth in L’Assommoir, Françoise Gaillard brought out the fact that 
the role of irrational, antisocial desire was often attributed to the peo-
ple, precisely because they remain outside the pale of bourgeois norms 
(23).8
 The social order not only tries to erase the heterogeneous; once the 
difference is erased, society wants to ensure that this Other will be for-
gotten entirely by creating in its members a desire not to know. in the 
days of L’Assommoir and Nana, because the bourgeois republic identified 
both its own particular social order and literary truth with universal 
morality (Gaillard 18), it desired not to know about the promiscuity, 
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alcoholism, and despair endemic to the Parisian working classes. Zola 
of course insisted on bringing these very things to light in his work-
ing-class novels. The parallel situation in Truth (170) as in reality at 
the time of the Évangiles consisted in the efforts of the government 
of appeasement to “bury” the Dreyfus affair, to “dig a deeper hole 
and throw the amnesty in on top” as Zola puts it in his “letter to the 
Senate” (140), coupled with the writer’s determination to unearth the 
truth about it.
 but there the parallel stops. in Truth it is not only the powers that 
be who want to hear nothing about the social wound, it is the people’s 
desire not to know that allows the original crime to be blown up into 
an affair in which the fate of the nation is at stake (see Cosset 107). in 
Truth, it is precisely their heterogeneity, their unenlightened ignorance, 
superstition, and irrationality that Zola aims to eradicate through edu-
cation. Given his treatment at the hands of the mob during the affair, 
it is not surprising that the image of the people in the early parts of this 
socialist novel should be highly unsympathetic, especially in contrast to 
L’Assommoir or Germinal, because this time they are in connivance with 
the oppressors. yet in a sense they are also portrayed as victims, of Cath-
olic education and nationalist newspaper propaganda. but whether vic-
tims or oppressors, the path to utopia necessarily means that they must 
not only be instructed in the experimental method but also divested 
of their irrational hatreds. Whereas the heterogeneity of the people 
(and of women, as the example of nana demonstrates) in the Rougon- 
Macquart novels corresponded nicely with Zola’s empiricist stance at 
the time, according to which the observational facts of human behavior 
were expected to remain independent of preconceived idealist notions 
of human nature, it no longer squared with the thrust of Truth, where 
knowledge is often attained by pure logic, and facts merely confirm the 
truths of reason.
 The goal of republican education for utopia is to eliminate hetero-
geneity, if at all possible. nowhere is this ideology of universalism more 
apparent than in the solution to anti-Semitism proposed in the text. 
Zola’s utopia is the ultimate melting pot, in which everyone will be 
the same. in order to end sectarian prejudice and ensure national unity, 
he makes a special point of marrying the two Jewish Simon children, 
Sarah and Joseph, to two non-Jews, Sébastien milhomme and louise 
Froment (see 529 n1). after several generations of this practice, the 
result is that there remain neither Catholics nor Jews nor religious dif-
ferences. The paradoxical result of this plethora of mixed marriages is 
that eventually there can be no more. however satisfying this outcome 
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may be to marc or Zola, both of whom suffered in one way or another 
from their involvement in mixed marriages, it is ironic that, in the end, 
the enlightenment solution is not so different from that of the bigot.
 but stamping out all difference is no simple matter. The very struc-
ture of the novel indicates the nagging presence of a residue that refuses 
to permit utopia to reach completion. no matter how many times the 
ghosts of irrationality are exorcised, they still come back to haunt the 
world of the living. book Three would seem to achieve narrative clo-
sure: Simon has been pardoned; Geneviève has been freed from her 
ghosts. yet Zola felt compelled to add a fourth book, in order to rep-
resent the new generation completely imbued with enlightenment 
values, Simon’s triumphant return to maillebois after his official acquit-
tal and the narrative closure of Gogias’s confession revealing the com-
plete truth of the crime. These loose ends are knotted up at the end of 
chapter 3 of book Four, yet once again Zola felt it necessary to add a 
fourth, antiutopian chapter, in reverse symmetry to the utopian fourth 
book he appended to the three realist books of the text. The three parts 
plus one composition of the fourth book of the novel is thus itself a 
repetition in miniature of the structure of the entire text, as though no 
matter how much the novel displays, there will always be something 
that lies beyond its capacity for representation.
 Changing people’s minds, remaking their identities, eliminating the 
ghosts of the past, nothing is sufficient to eradicate irrationality, for 
it inhabits the rational symbolic system as such. as marc admits, if it 
is a pity that people will always be ‘mad’ enough to suffer from their 
irrational passions, then it would be truly mad to try to eliminate mad-
ness altogether (617). The goal of republican education, in Jules Ferry’s 
original plan or in Zola’s revised socialist version, reaches its limit in the 
nonnaturalness, or excessive naturalness, of human “instinct,” passion, 
madness.9
 in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, lacan explains 
this insistent residue as a trauma that repeats itself until it can gain full 
recognition. in particular, the beyond of representation indicates the 
secret connection between a father and his son’s dead body, namely, as 
Kierkegaard argues, the father’s sin (34). lacan goes on to claim that 
in Shakespeare’s tragedy, hamlet’s father cannot find rest in the other 
world because he was killed in the flower of his sinning. The play is not 
about the prohibitions the father imposes but about the son’s profound 
doubt of this “too ideal father.”
 in any given real instance, those ‘sins’ would be specific actions or 
omissions in the life of the father, and there is good reason to believe 
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that in Zola’s case, it was the boy’s molestation and the father’s untimely 
death experienced in the unconscious as an abandonment. but there is 
a trauma that no one can escape, because it is built into the structure 
of every symbolic system: the message from the beyond, the beyond 
of representation, that is, is that the particularity of the subject’s being 
cannot be spoken (lacan, Le désir et son interprétation 266), especially in 
the universalizing system of the enlightened republic. The neo-Kantian 
system, with its universally human person, and the positivist system, 
with its self-effacing subject of scientific objectivity, both exclude the 
individualized subject. in his role as support of the symbolic system, 
the “father” has successfully “stolen the soul” of his “offspring.” This 
threat to the very existence of his children is the fundamental assault and 
murder.
 as we have discussed, the nemesis of marc the positivist is empti-
ness, that which is omitted from the logos. in all logic, then, his project 
must be a more or less frantic attempt to plug up the holes in the signi-
fying system guaranteed by the fathers of the ideal republic, for that is 
the only way he can consolidate his own identity. as lacan explains, the 
manque à être is not only the lack of being, it is also, as in the english 
translation lacan himself proposed, a “want-to-be.”
 marc’s solution to the problem of the gap in the Other is to assume 
the role of father himself. Unable either to accept the passivity necessary 
to joining the social order as an obedient citizen, or to identify with the 
power of that order to subjugate its subjects as do the authoritarians, 
the good republican must take on the fantasmatic role of the fecundat-
ing father who sows his seed to create a new world in his own image. 
as baguley observes, Zola’s utopian solution in the Évangiles is the 
narcissistic proliferation of his self in the form of the many descen-
dants he confers upon his protagonists (“Du récit polémique au dis-
cours utopique” 118). i would simply add that he resorts to this remedy 
because the danger he is striving to overcome is the grave injury to that 
same narcissism represented by the initial trauma. Truth in fact repeat-
edly evokes the imagery of hugo’s “Saison des semailles” to describe 
marc’s pedagogical activity, advertising the fantasy of paternal creation 
as antidote to the dread of filial helplessness in a rhetorical appeal to 
potential educators of France. Zola thus grants to the instituteurs and 
to those who support republican enlightenment the vocation of author, 
in the strong sense of absolute creator given the term by the romantics, 
and which he had always attributed to himself as novelist. This is the 
fantasy incentive designed to compensate for the alternating fear of the 
fathers and the attempt to clear them of any guilt.
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 The text thus acknowledges what it nevertheless denies, that since, 
like the rumors and legends it aims to supplant, it too produces its 
own object of reference, its system of artistic and political representa-
tion comes from and is imposed by a particular subjective stance and is 
therefore as violent as the one it seeks to discredit. if Zola nevertheless 
insists on grounding his utopian republic in a universal scientific truth 
allegedly independent of any human will or idea, that is due to his need 
of an imaginary community of the enlightened that can safeguard his 
identity against the threat of pure nothingness.
 it is in the context of this dread of the beyond of representation 
that the choice to end the novel on the topic of women’s liberation 
takes on its full significance. From the start the theme of nothingness 
gravitates around the female figures of the novel. The mystical object 
of Geneviève’s childhood education and desires is le néant (nothing-
ness), as we have seen. but in addition, in accordance with the most 
traditional patriarchal ideas, women, at least those who have been raised 
in the traditional manner, are themselves conceived as having no inner 
shape or personality, as being a kind of ‘nothing’ waiting to become 
something thanks to the form-giving masculine (and artistic) principle, 
as in the aristotelian tradition. both marc and Salvan take it for granted 
that it is the husband’s paternalistic duty to ‘form’ his new wife in his 
own image, an ‘artistic’ duty marc reproaches himself more than once 
for neglecting to carry out due to his complacency, inertia, and fear. 
Salvan expresses this fantasy of paternal omnipotence when he “con-
cludes” with his student that in a loving marriage the man is the god 
who recreates the girl he marries (274), and Geneviève agrees that she 
is the “work” (œuvre) that he has begun (492).
 ventriloquized first by mme. Duparque and Catholicism, Geneviève 
still remains a puppet after returning to her husband, only now it is the 
positivist line that she follows in her role as institutrice (508) and par-
rots in her final words to her husband at the family reunion (635). The 
threat of nothingness is its allure, the almost irresistible attraction that 
the mystical beyond exerts, along with its promise of the enjoyment 
of total subjection. in making Geneviève into a copy of himself, marc 
is striving to repudiate the ultimate danger to his identity, feminine 
desire, especially the desire to acquiesce in passive enjoyment. as long as 
“woman” is the name of the traumatic nothing that haunts the positiv-
ist imagination from the beginning of the novel to its end, Geneviève’s 
emancipation from the one father, the Church, can only lead to the fill-
ing of that void with the seed of another, her husband, the artist, the 
(re)producer. as long, that is, as Zola equates subjectivity with nothing-
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ness, nothingness with femininity, and femininity with rape, madness, 
and annihilation, the liberation of women and of the republic can only 
mean turning them into the opposite of all that, that is, into replicas of 
men. That is equality with a vengeance.
The Truth of Vérité
Due to Zola’s overt aim of passing judgment on the contemporary 
political situation, critics have generally categorized Truth as a thesis 
novel, saddled with many of the notorious defects of that genre. even 
enthusiastic and well-informed Zola specialists, such as baguley, Cos-
set, and laville, feel they must first acknowledge the typical flaws of the 
thesis novel in Zola’s Évangiles and apologize for them, before show-
ing that the novels nevertheless have some strong redeeming social or 
literary value. like Zola’s other Gospels, they argue, Truth departs from 
the canons of the naturalist narratives of the Rougon-Macquart series, 
in which it is the objective facts rather than any subjective idea that 
structure the story; observation and documentation precede all general 
conclusions; and in any case the narrator abstains from interpreting his 
story, leaving it to the reader to draw her own conclusions about its 
meaning and its potential implications for action.
 The trouble with this neat dichotomy is that its two sides simply 
cannot be held apart. While the distinguishing traits of the roman à 
thèse are indeed to be found in Truth, it would be an easy matter, space 
permitting, to show that, with the exception of the narratorial pro-
nouncements, every one of them is also present in Zola’s naturalist fic-
tion. it is not just the continuity of themes or the preoccupation with 
education that link the later novel to Zola’s earlier works, as several of 
the best scholars have pointed out (e.g., mitterand, borie, laville); nor 
is it only a matter of returning late in life to the method of his begin-
nings, when he illustrated the theses of michelet and Taine in Madeleine 
Férat and Thérèse Raquin (borie, Mythologie de l’héredité); nor even 
the use of isolated familiar techniques such as the introduction to the 
milieu of the novel through the eyes and the free indirect discourse of 
a ‘stranger’—marc in Truth, like Florent in Le ventre de Paris, Denise 
in Au Bonheur des Dames, or Étienne in Germinal (Cosset, laville). as 
the preface to the Rougon-Macquart series attests, in the heyday of his 
career, as before and after, Zola conceived of the novelist’s task as didac-
tic through and through, a fact that has not entirely escaped the eyes of 
the critics either.10 moreover, the actual structure of Truth appears to be 
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a direct application of the procedure Zola outlines in his well-known 
description of the naturalist novel in Le roman expérimental: “We seek 
out the causes of social ills [le mal social]; we perform the anatomy of 
classes and individuals in order to explain the breakdowns that occur in 
society and in people” (133). What is bothering marc the night after 
the rape and murder of Zéphirin are discovered, if not the mysterious 
mal social he senses behind the crime committed against a defenseless 
schoolboy? What stimulated Zola to change the subject of his projected 
novel from a portrait of his “ideal republic” to an analysis of the pre-
sent-day society that produced the Dreyfus affair and its temporary 
conclusion in amnesty for all parties, if not his determination to unearth 
the causes that made these ‘breakdowns’ possible? in Truth, the crime, 
the ensuing Simon affair, and the rampant anti-Semitism that feeds it 
are presented as symptoms of a wider social evil, the infiltration of the 
Third republic and its educational system by the Church, just as the 
plots of L’Assommoir and Nana are arranged so as to demonstrate that 
alcoholism and prostitution are symptoms of the general plight and the 
vengeance of the working classes under the Second empire.
 even the use of marc as spokesperson for the writer’s theories is not 
a radical departure from Zola’s practice in the naturalist novel: Étienne 
in Germinal, Denise in Au Bonheur des Dames, Claude in L’oeuvre (and 
in Le ventre de Paris), Pascal in Le docteur Pascal (and already in La for-
tune des Rougon), to name just a few prominent examples, all serve a 
similar purpose. The crucial difference between the Rougon-Macquart 
series and the Évangiles consists in the textual consequences of Zola’s 
avowed aim in the latter not only to identify the causes of the social evil 
that forms the heart of his ‘experiment,’ but also, as he puts it, to ‘heal 
the wound.’ Whereas previously Zola had been content to let his experi-
ments speak for themselves and to leave it up to society to continue or 
to alter the conditions producing the situation described,11 in Truth he 
takes matters into his own hands and actually represents the process of 
the ‘cure’ and its results. To paraphrase levaillant’s characterization of 
anatole France’s political development, Zola moved from ‘narrative as 
spectacle’ to ‘narrative as intervention.’
 The most obvious divergences from the earlier works resulting from 
this modification are the depiction of an imagined, utopian future state 
of the nation, and the unambiguous identification of Catholicism as 
the root of the evil with the consequent overt, single-minded and vio-
lent battle waged against it in word and plot. in order to bring about 
the desired end, a third change becomes necessary: Zola must have 
his protagonist attain his own truth at an early stage. in the climactic 
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moment at the end of book One, much like Étienne lantier deciding to 
stay and fight after his first day in the mine in Germinal, marc receives 
the ‘revelation’ that determines his mission and his identity (188–89): 
rome has divided France into two warring factions in its battle against 
enlightenment, and the most noble mission in a new democracy is to 
educate the people (194). but, unlike Étienne, marc has once and for 
all overcome all hesitations and doubts about the causes of the evil, the 
proper remedy, and the means of effecting the cure. although Zola’s 
schoolteacher does undergo a harsh process of political education in the 
first part of the novel, in which growing insight is matched by personal 
suffering, much like the living nightmare Zola endured as a result of 
his intervention in the Dreyfus affair, Truth abbreviates the period of 
qualms and indecision that plague Étienne throughout Germinal, the 
array of mutually contradictory social and political theories he must 
strive to assimilate and sort out, the vagueness of the enemy he wants 
to combat, and the difficulty of formulating an effective plan of action 
against it—in short, all the ambiguities and complexities that constitute 
the intellectual component of that book’s lasting appeal.
 looking beyond the customary debates about Zola’s use of uto-
pia to criticize present-day France and the desirability of the image he 
projects of the nation’s future, baguley puts his finger on a problematic 
aspect of utopia that escapes most of the critics. The defect of Zola’s 
narratorial interventions is not simply that they are fundamentally sepa-
rate from the story and attempt to control its interpretation, as the 
standard criticism of the thesis novel would have it, but that they are 
themselves utopian in that they create a world totally independent of 
reality (“l’evangile républicain de Zola” 121). The critic thus condemns 
in one stroke two of the favorite bêtes noires of realist writers like Flau-
bert and henry James, authorial intervention and utopian imagination. 
but it is only according to the standards of realism that the relation 
baguley so shrewdly discerns constitutes a fault. in fact Suleiman, the 
most widely recognized authority on the genre to whom baguley, Cos-
set, and laville all refer for their critiques and apologies, uses this very 
argument to claim that Truth is not a genuine thesis novel. Thesis novels 
are by definition realist texts that give themselves out as pure, that is, 
as innocent renditions of reality (Authoritarian Fictions 72), whereas 
Truth contains prophetic speech and utopian situations and calls atten-
tion to its fictional status by referring to an absent text, that of the actual 
Dreyfus affair. The result is that the novel requires a double reading 
whose discovery depends on the reader, unlike the standard canonical 
novel, which, in authoritarian fashion, imposes an explicit and univocal 
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interpretation of the story in the primary text (“Passion/Fiction” 97–98). 
Suleiman classifies Zola’s third Gospel as a “transposition,” a genre she 
invents in order to describe narratives that employ the indirect speech 
typical of allegory, yet represent traumatic historical events in more real-
istic style than is found in most satirical and allegorical texts (96).
 Suleiman admits that only a fine line demarcates the transposition 
from the allegory, and we may add the same qualification about the 
distinction between the genre she defines and the thesis novel. The 
important point is that Truth has many of the characteristics of allegory, 
not the least of which, as baguley noted, is the national significance 
of Geneviève’s story. in The Language of Allegory, maureen Quilligan 
endorses the view that “allegories do not need [exegetical interpreta-
tion] because the commentary is already indicated by the text” (31). 
here is one more respect, then, in which the thesis novel resembles alle-
gory and other parabolic narratives. but, Quilligan adds, “[the author’s] 
‘commentary’ of course is not discursive, but narrative . . .” (53). by 
that statement she refers to her theory that the key to allegory is “the 
generation of narrative structure out of word play” (22). The action of 
the first book of Spenser’s Faerie Queene, for instance, is built around 
the polysemy and homonymy of the words ‘error’—errant, wandering, 
sin—and ‘despair’—dis-pair, pair, em-pair, re-pair (33–42).
 now, although Zola does not indulge in the complex, extensive, 
and often exuberant verbal play found in Spenser’s masterwork, he 
does generate the main actions of his novel out of discursive signi-
fiers. The gothic element that plays so important a role in Geneviève’s 
story is a narrativization of the verb ‘ramener’ as used in the following 
commentary: “execrable anti-Semitism, this revival of religious hatreds, 
this Catholicism exacerbated and masked, with which they hoped to 
bring back [ramener] to the priests the non-believing people, who had 
deserted the churches” (191). Geneviève is literally, that is to say, meta-
phorically, dragged back involuntarily to the Catholic faith, and along 
with her, the nation at large. That action is, in turn, a metaphor of the 
political policy of the esprit nouveau. moreover, the connection estab-
lished in the passage between being pulled back and the anti-Semitism 
that ensures Simon’s conviction is mirrored in the concordance between 
the alterations in Geneviève’s beliefs about his guilt and the changes in 
her relation to marc. On a larger scale, it is the words trahison, traître, 
and their meanings of treason, betrayal, and treachery that govern the 
three main plots of the novel. Finally, the most general and the most 
particular metaphorical dramatization is that of the word pénétrer, which 
generates the original crime, undermines the claim of universal morality, 
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embodies the fear of feminine passivity, and makes palpable the rape of 
the republic.
 it makes no sense, then, to assert that the idea distorts the story, or 
that the story is a mechanical application of the idea. in fact, the text 
is a far-reaching exploration of the various meanings and implications 
of the key signifiers that generate its action. in this context, it is worth 
noting that the passage baguley cites, in apparent condemnation of the 
Évangiles, comes from a book by louis marin in which the latter argues 
that the ability of utopian discourse to reveal the constructive power 
of language is a virtue rather than a failing. The utopian text opposes 
the mimetic notion of realism in that it overtly designates itself as the 
intervention of the Other into reality. it is performative in that, while it 
forms part of a signifying system and denotes a being outside language, 
as does the realist text, the being it designates is the product of its own 
operation (marin 122). Quilligan’s theory of allegory explains exactly 
how Zola’s utopia, and his entire text, manifest the creative power of 
language.
 This power, too, is transformed into narrative action: The entire 
mystery of the Simon affair turns on a bit of text, the torn-off cor-
ner of the handwriting sample found in Zéphirin’s room. This piece 
of evidence is of course Zola’s transposition of the bordereau (memo) 
that played such a key role in Dreyfus’s conviction, but that is all the 
more reason to believe that fictive language is as powerful in historical 
as in textual reality. in fact, the intertext for Truth, the traumatic his-
torical event at its origin, is not the Dreyfus affair in itself, whatever 
that might mean, but its textual representations, the discourses of the 
Church, the government, and the various political factions, the newspa-
pers of his enemies—Le Petit Journal and La Croix—and of his friends—
especially the Aurore—and his own writings—his articles, letters, and 
preparatory notes (not to mention his Bête humaine). likewise, Zola’s 
mode of operation as a writer, and marc’s as an educator, are purely ver-
bal—persuasion, discussion, and examples drawn from life as marc puts 
it during his struggle against mme. Duparque, a stark contrast to the 
exploitation of personal seduction that defines the barresian educator’s 
power. moreover, although marc’s identity is at stake in his search for 
the truth, it is by intellectual effort, not immediate experience, that he 
attains his goal. The allegorical structure of the text works against the 
overtly didactic aspects of the text, inviting the reader to imitate the 
hero’s learning process by exploring the implications of its generative 
terms in order to understand, to penetrate, the true sense of trahison. in 
this respect, Truth functions as an ‘analytic’ rather than a transferential 
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novel, a text in which the subject is forced to find her own way through 
the labyrinth of signification in her search for her truth. like the other 
major novels of education of the period, Truth is a mise-en-abîme of the 
novelist’s didactic role, in this case that of the naturalist writer.
 yet Truth is not a wholehearted work of allegory. From the positivist 
perspective espoused by Zola and the ideologists of the Third republic 
at the turn of the century, any such performative use of language vio-
lates the tenets of the experimental method and of realist representation 
that define Zola’s naturalism and form the basis of marc’s project of 
education. The key to the fundamental contradiction between what the 
text says and what it does lies in the naturalist conception and function 
of desire in its relation to subjectivity. Zola certainly made no secret of 
the fact that in his Gospels he gave free rein to his dreams and desires. 
Utopian discourse, narratorial interventions, the interpretation of the 
story included in the text, all these traits associated with thesis novels 
bear witness to the operative force of authorial subjectivity in Truth. yet 
this open avowal of the role played by authorial desire blatantly con-
tradicts the positivist ideology expressed in the text, in marc’s thought, 
and in the events of the plot. as Geneviève’s struggles show, the most 
formidable adversary of the hero’s project of enlightenment, because 
the antithesis of realism on every level, is precisely the irrational desire 
for something other, for that which is lacking in reality, exemplified for 
the secular republic by the mystical union with Jesus that cannot be 
consummated.
 The contradictions in Truth are strictly analogous to those in the 
political project of creating new republican citizens. The text thus 
unwillingly exposes to view a trahison still more fundamental than all 
those discussed so far: it is not only that enlightenment universalism 
leaves no room for difference or dissent, as baguley, among others, 
observes (“l’Évangile républicain de Zola” 119), but that in using lan-
guage to remake people it cannot help contradicting in its practice the 
principles, of universal cognitive objectivism, of positivism, or of the 
equally universal neo-Kantian subject of cognition and morality, which 
define its justification and its objectives.
 The peculiar virtue of Zola’s thesis novel resides precisely in these 
contradictions. What baguley calls the “fantasmatic character” of repre-
sentation in the novel is not restricted to its utopian aspects. all repre-
sentation in the novel is fantasmatic, not in the sense of the imaginary, 
the unreal, but in that every major plot line branches out from a set of 
fantasies understood as particular relations of the republican subject to 
the symbolic system and the fathers who support it. The overarching 
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plot of the novel consists in the battle to expose the treachery of one 
set of fathers who undermine certainty and identity, and the effort to 
replace them with another who will guarantee the subject’s being. These 
are the fantasies designed to attract Zola’s readers to the political posi-
tion he champions. Truth thus brings into the light of day a truth that 
is purposely repressed in the practice of more traditional realist and art 
for art’s sake narrative as well as in political literature and philosophy, 
the inextricable bond between fantasy and ideology in real literary and 
political movements.
The Crisis of Authority
The republic of the republicans staked its legitimacy on the universal-
ity of the democratic principles it claimed to uphold, and the avowed 
goal of its program of educational reforms was to transform the identity 
of its citizens by inculcating those same principles into their minds. 
although mandated by the government rather than a disenfranchised 
group, this program followed the lines of populist politics analyzed by 
ernesto laclau in his book On Populist Reason (2005): isolate an inter-
nal enemy in order to undermine the latter’s claim to govern and even 
to be a legitimate member of the populus; promote one demand to 
the status of general representative of all discontents in order to unite 
various, often incompatible factions; and thereby produce a political 
identity claiming to be the legitimate representative of the entire popu-
lation.
 From the start, opponents on the right challenged that program pre-
cisely because of its dependence on universal principles, which, by virtue 
of their generality, were alleged to be too abstract to inhibit the perverse 
natural “instincts” of mankind, and, due to their objectivity, to ignore 
the concrete feelings that prevent people from acting cruelly toward 
their fellow human beings. at the end of the nineteenth century, the 
new, right-wing nationalism renewed and modified these attacks with 
the claim that republican universalism ran roughshod over the historical 
and regional particularity that constitutes the real core of human iden-
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tity, both of individuals and of the communities they form. moreover, 
harking back to vallès’s criticisms in his Jacques vingtras trilogy, they 
blamed the republic for creating a group of alienated déclassés, people 
who had profited from the opportunity for upward social mobility the 
regime offered to all citizens in the name of universal equality, but who 
had thereby lost the secure identity of their origins without obtaining 
an alternative sense of belonging and empowerment in its place.
 meanwhile, in the wake of the Dreyfus affair, critics on the left 
chided the republic both for being too universalist and for not being 
universalist enough. For many moderate socialists, the republic betrayed 
its own principles by condoning the violation of truth and justice in 
its prosecution of Captain Dreyfus, by shirking its duty to educate the 
populace at large in the methods of objective inquiry, and by ignoring 
the economic bases of the freedoms it promised its citizens. anarchists 
on the left accused its educational system of robbing its pupils of their 
spontaneity and individuality by imposing upon them a universal moral-
ity that utterly neglected the real particulars of their conditions and their 
lives. Some made the still more radical argument, similar to that of the 
right in this respect, that parliamentary government, through its sys-
tem of representation that reduces individual voters to mere numbers, 
deprived the members of society of their right to self-government.
 The ideology of the Third republic was composed of two appar-
ently incompatible doctrines, positivism and Kantianism. Their fusion 
was made possible by the fact that each was more or less consistent with 
the liberal principles of 1789; each proposed a program of education 
and politics consonant with the interests of the new industrial and finan-
cial bourgeoisie; and, above all, each was a reaction to what has been 
variously called the crisis of authority, of legitimacy, or of government 
that the new republican leaders faced. The crisis of authority has been 
attributed to a variety of factors both by participants in the ideologi-
cal battles of the times and by later commentators. For Comte it was 
the lack of social consensus, the mental, social, and political anarchy 
fomented by the revolution that, from the beginning of his career as 
a follower of Saint-Simon, his doctrine of sociology was designed to 
rectify by producing a unity of ideas among the population that would 
restore the social coherence necessary for the establishment of order. 
in this respect at least, virtually all Comte’s disciples remained faithful 
to his thought until the end. The neo-Kantians renouvier and Pillon 
looked to both the social and intellectual upheavals of the century that, 
in uprooting traditional French customs and beliefs—by which they 
obviously meant Catholicism—had undermined the nation’s spiritual 
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authorities, and to more proximate political and historical causes, espe-
cially the military defeat at the hands of the Prussians and the brutal 
suppression of the Commune, which had discredited the country’s tem-
poral authorities. Clarisse Coignet argued that the political instability of 
the nineteenth century had arisen because of the disparity between the 
democratic secular institutions of the country and its mores, which had 
remained for the vast majority monarchical and religious (De l’éducation 
dans la démocratie v). like michelet, Ferry, and Sée, she saw the struggle 
between these two forces dividing the family, with progressive husbands 
confronting traditionalist wives. and in accord with the positivists, she 
deems that societies need strong convictions and a common ideal in 
order to form a strong social bond (viii). That is why Coignet concludes 
that, with religion no longer serving this function, modern society needs 
a morality that arises from within the experience of the individual con-
science, which can thus serve as the basis for self-rule (viii). and, of 
course, for Gambetta and Ferry, it was the dogma and temporal power 
of the Church that undermined the intellectual and political authority 
of the secular state.
 To these perceptions of the proponents of liberal ideology must be 
added those of its critics, for opposition pressure also contributed to 
compressing Kantianism and positivism into an ostensibly cohesive 
amalgam. by the middle of the century, according to some historians, 
the administrative centralization started by napoleon i, along with 
accelerating industrialization, had led to the demise of the local organi-
zations and customs that had previously made up the texture of people’s 
lives. now they faced only the impersonal, modern, anonymous, cen-
tralized State (Tison-braun 42–43). While this description echoes the 
reproaches brought against the Third republic itself, especially by con-
servative critics like Taine, bourget, and barrès, and while more recent 
data tend to prove that these effects did not become widespread until 
the last two decades of the century (see Weber 41–42, and throughout), 
it is not far-fetched to imagine that they had already become visible in 
the more advanced regions of the country during the Second empire. 
Others, with an interest in political history, add that the state had lost 
prestige due to the repeated changes of regime during the century and 
the stinging loss of face resulting from the defeat in the war. These 
effects were compounded by the fact that the republic was voted in by 
a very slim majority and by the ensuing internecine battles among the 
factions during its first years of existence. in the eyes of the masses, the 
State had lost its aura of sacredness with the demise of the monarchy 
and the disappearance of a prince who sat on the throne by the grace of 
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God (arendt 46). in the early years of the republic, monarchists and 
conservatives saw the defeat by the Prussians as a punishment from God 
for the luxury, excesses, and corruption of the empire and called for a 
regime of penitence and moral austerity in order to regenerate France 
and its army (mayeur and reberioux chap. 1). many intellectuals—one 
might think of Zola in this context, as well as the Kantians—repeated 
the same reproach and the same call for moral renewal, but instead of 
begging God for forgiveness through processions, miracles, and pil-
grimages, on the contrary they identified Catholicism with the decadent 
empire and blamed it for the defeat (Digeon 333–36).
 beyond their differences, however, all agree that the crisis derived 
in large part from the aftereffects of the revolution and the disputes 
between secularism and religion, whose most evident manifestation in 
the nascent republic were the Ferry reforms of education. in The Dis-
ciple bourget put his finger on the fundamental problem that gave rise 
to these political and ideological clashes: it was the advent of mod-
ern science embedded within the enlightenment theory of the subject 
that destabilized individual and national identity. The ultimate meaning 
of scientific objectivity is the desubjectification of nature, that is, the 
refusal to admit the existence of a personal presence operating within 
the universe. The paradox of the science taught in republican schools 
was its basic presupposition that the world is intelligible yet devoid of 
intelligence, design without a designer; and Kant’s mere “postulates of 
reason,” as he calls them in the Critique of Practical Reason—God and 
the afterlife—do not satisfy most people’s craving for a guarantor of 
existence.
 The void in the heavens gives rise to several traumatic themes, the 
first of which is the inadequate or treacherous father-educator of the 
republic. in Sixte and his philosophy, robert Greslou seeks a surrogate 
father who will protect him from the overwhelming sexual desires that 
threaten his identity, but the master of republican psychology proves 
inadequate to the task. as in a typical Bildungsroman, Sturel, roemer-
spacher, and their comrades from the nancy lycée leave home hoping 
to find the leader who will solidify their identities by replacing their 
roots—bouteiller, Taine, hugo, napoleon, boulanger—only to find 
that their true fathers are the ancestors they had a left at home. in 
Contemporary History it is the prefect Worms-Clavelin and the corrupt 
republic he represents, along with the fathers of the Church and the 
aristocracy, who fail in their duty to uphold truth, justice, and equality. 
The subtext of Truth is the hidden and disavowed guilt of the fathers: 
the republican fathers, who are too weak to resist the penetration of the 
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Church into their ranks; Simon, who lets his ward attend the Congrega-
tionist school and allows the crime to be committed on school grounds; 
François, who is falsely accused of attacking his daughter; Gorgias and 
the Church, of course; and even marc’s mentor, Salvan, who encourages 
him to marry a good Catholic girl.
 The same attacks and counterattacks on the Other’s Other under-
mined the stability of representation, for it too cries out for a firm 
basis on which to stand, and it was this crisis that formed the context 
for the flourishing of the novel of ideas at the turn of the century. i 
would suggest that the primary thrust of the newly codified genre was 
to present both the predicament opened up by the lack in the Other 
and its remedy. bourget articulated the problem in his Essais: reading in 
the modern world leads to mental confusion because it is overburdened 
with a multiplicity of points of view, a welter of interpretations, and the 
sheer weight of previous literature. according to bourget, “each of us 
perceives, not the universe, but his universe; not naked reality, but what 
his temperament allows him to appropriate from that reality” (Essais 
i: 130; emphasis in original). Jean moréas, for his part, announced 
that “objectivity is nothing but pure semblance, empty appearance” (Le 
Symboliste 7 [October 1886], quoted in Ouston 55 n37). “reality varies 
with each one of us, since it is the sum of our habits of seeing, feeling 
and thinking,” barrès informs us in Sous l’oeil des barbares (29). mansuy 
sums up the prevailing view among these and other fin de siècle symbol-
ist and antipositivist writers, such as vogüé or Wyzewa, as follows:
The world as we perceive it, the outside world no longer appears as 
supreme reality, but as a subjective creation, for it reaches us through 
the senses and the categories of the understanding. The ultimate truth 
must not be sought in phenomena but in the thinking subject, in the 
organizing intellect. (431)
 While there are significant philosophical differences among these 
antiobjectivist views—Kantian formalism, Schopenhauerian vitalism, 
something approaching nietzschean perspectivism, and a more or less 
naive subjectivism—they all concur that every notion of reality is the 
result of human interpretation. Whether this plethora acts as the impe-
tus to an exhilarating liberation, as for many symbolists, or leads to 
mental confusion and despair, as bourget would have it, the literary crit-
ics of positivism were united in rejecting the claim of a single, objective, 
and therefore innocent reading of the world.
t h e  e r o t i C s  o f  p o l i t i C s   ~     
 armed with this conviction, the novelist now conceives of her task 
in very different terms from that of the realist writer. no longer a matter 
of representing reality, the goal of the fin de siècle novel will be the self-
reflexive task of exploring the process of representation itself, the ways 
in which the variety of particular points of view, including the one that 
gives itself out to be objective and universal, are constructed as specific 
interpretations (raimond 76). but, if that is the case, then it is equally 
impossible for any narrative, no matter how it is recounted, to be totally 
idea free. an innocent narration is just as unthinkable as an innocent 
reading, for it must be recounted from a narrative stance that entails 
specific ideological—although not necessarily political—presupposi-
tions. The main corollary of this position is that the radical distinction 
between narrative and idea or thesis, on which virtually every criticism 
of the thesis novel is based, is untenable and is, in fact, the result of 
the so-called realist illusion. by its very simplification of the relation 
between story and idea, the genre makes visible the fact that meanings 
inform reality and it forces its readers to recognize the fundamentally 
ideological nature of all fiction. if the critics justifiably perceive many 
thesis novels as authoritarian, that is because such texts magnify the 
ever-present but more hidden coercive force of every symbolic system 
that functions within or like a language.
 neither the novel of ideas nor novels dealing with education origi-
nated in the Third republic, but the Ferry reforms precipitated a new 
combination of both these traditions in the form of the novel of educa-
tion. From the earlier novels with a thesis it drew the techniques the 
genre had developed to hone realist fiction into a trenchant weapon of 
ideological polemics. it called upon the many prior works of satirical 
fiction devoted in whole or in part to taking potshots at the teachers 
and institutions of French education for a series of standard themes and 
characters to adopt, adapt, or attack. it often appropriated the form of 
the Bildungsroman, in which a young hero is brought to maturity, usu-
ally through the influence of one or more mentors who instruct him or 
her in the ways of the world and reveal the ideas that give shape and 
coherence to his or her experience.
 in their form and structure the novels we have studied counter the 
pretensions to autonomy of l’art pour l’art and the claims to objectivity 
of positivist realism, which imply either that the text contains its own 
meaning or that it has none. The genre lays bare the inevitable process 
of making meaning through the self-reflexive inclusion of an educator 
figure within the text, who mirrors the act of didactic interpretation 
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performed from a specific point of view by the narrator or the spokes-
person character and the similar act of reading by the younger character 
and the audience. as Suleiman observes, in the thesis novel the action 
of the hero most often consists in learning how to interpret, how to 
discover the ‘right’ meaning of experience (Authoritarian Fictions 78). 
Whether the reader makes meaning or meaning makes the reader, in 
either case it becomes evident that there must be such a process, that 
meaning in narrative is neither automatic nor avoidable. The pertinent 
questions are not, therefore, whether ideas have infiltrated, contami-
nated, and perverted the story, but which ideas are in bed with which 
stories, and what is the relationship between the two in a particular text 
or genre.
 Unlike the contemporary decadent and symbolist movements, the 
novels of education take the potential multiplication of ideological 
points of view, with no transcendent standpoint from which to deliver 
the unvarnished truth of the world, as a wound to be healed. Just as 
the republic was striving to confer transcendent status onto its par-
ticular ideology by claiming for itself the prestige of universal morality, 
so the thesis novels attempt to legitimize their right to assume the role 
of pedagogue by defining for themselves a privileged, if not necessar-
ily objective, point of view which the narrator or spokesperson loudly 
asserts to be the one correct meaning of the narrative. For bourget it 
was the logical necessity of proper induction from observation to law, 
for barrès the French national standpoint, for France the autonomous 
judgment provided by a rich life of the mind, and for Zola the eternal 
truth of science.
 These assertions of privilege correspond to the disavowed performa-
tivity made evident in Truth. each of these claims to truth is a polemical 
attempt to produce the transcendent social unity to which the propo-
nent aspires, rather than to express a preexisting, inherent, factual, or 
potential unity (laclau 29). in laclau’s terms, this is the beginning of 
the process of naming the demand one wants to promote as the object 
of social desire. naming allows one demand to take on the role of rep-
resenting the social goal as a whole, the totality of society and its unity 
through a metonymic process of association, and this always involves 
affective investment (26). This object, lacan’s objet petit a, or a-object, 
as i translate it, is supposed to fill the lack that is undermining national 
and individual identity and unity.
 laclau goes on to point out that, because of the logic of the a-object, 
there is always a “mutual contamination of universality and particular-
ity” (25). a specific, limited object takes on the role of the totality, 
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becoming what he calls, after antonio Gramsci, a “hegemonic forma-
tion”: “history is . . . a discontinuous succession of hegemonic forma-
tions” (25). Only the signifiers of particular demands can become the 
representation of the fulfilled society, of universality; there is nothing 
else, no ideal perfection, as in Kant or marx; no hegelian teleology 
toward which society strives or moves; no universal ground in being, in 
the way things are, or in the existence of a specific set of characteristics 
(25).
 We have seen that neither our novels nor the republic itself were 
able to escape this mutual contamination of the universal and the par-
ticular. as noted in chapter 1, the contradiction between the republic’s 
theoretical universality and practical particularity existed on multiple 
levels. barrès, and to a lesser extent bourget, reverse this process, mak-
ing particularity into a universal value for individuals, regions, and the 
nation. Zola follows the lead of the republic, taking its official pro-
nouncements literally and using them to impose a particular ideology 
onto the public at large. France is the most interesting case. m. bergeret 
prides himself on his appreciation of general ideas, and his conception 
of truth requires abstraction from the real for the purpose of making 
disinterested judgment possible. yet he lauds the concern for particular-
ity of the republic, in opposition to the monolithic universality of the 
Church’s ideology, and combines the two in his vision of communist 
society in which the State disappears and the totality of society becomes 
nothing more or less than the activity of its individual members.
Culture Wars and National Identity
as early as 1927 Julien benda recognized that in the modern era, politi-
cal wars would entail the new phenomenon of culture wars, as every 
nation “hugs itself and sets itself up against all other nations as superior 
in language, art, philosophy, civilization, culture” (14). What benda 
failed to appreciate was that the exacerbated promotion of national cul-
tures was a response to the undermining of the traditional guarantor 
of existence, due in large part to the very enlightenment principles he 
was defending.
 Just as the enlightenment depersonalized the universe, so scien-
tific objectivity desubjectified the individual. yet disinterested objectiv-
ity is, paradoxically, a subjective stance in itself. each of our novels 
enacts one of the dilemmas of the modern subject by posing a varia-
tion on the question: What would happen if people were to apply the 
     ~   C o n C l u s i o n
principles of the enlightenment subject taught in the republican schools 
to the realm of human affairs and interpersonal relationships? bour- 
get’s disciple takes this question literally, attempting to live by disinter-
ested observation and experimentation alone. France wonders what it is 
like to live the life of the Cartesian subject, a being abstracted from the 
world and thus isolated from his fellow human beings yet obliged to 
live and develop a desire within his society. in keeping with his Deca-
dent beginnings, barrès asks what life is like for those who, denying the 
existence of any overarching, objective, point of view, must settle for 
what is just one of a series of apparently equal, specific, limited points 
of view. by pushing universalism and objectivity to their outer limits, 
Zola’s hero unwittingly posed the republican subject’s dilemma in its 
most acute form: how can he be both the abstract Cartesian subject 
and an agent for change in the world?
 The enlightenment subjects of the nineteenth century suffered from 
these dilemmas because without the guarantee of Descartes’s god of 
truth, the abyss of nothingness opened up beneath them—and within 
them. The fantasy scenarios in all four texts indicate that it was the 
glimmering suspicion of the otherness within the self that motivated 
people to reject with all their might what they felt to be the enemy 
within.1 For writers on the right, the contingencies of history, region, 
and family were the bulwark against the ravages of universalism and 
the incursion of governmental power into the life of the subject, but 
also against the presocial instincts that threaten to expose the void at 
the heart of the self. So much for the fear. The lure was the more or less 
surreptitious gratification of sadistic impulses in eradicating the hated 
foreign element that had infected the body politic, which represented 
the simultaneous elimination of their own, otherwise uncontrollable 
desire.
 both writers on the left agreed that the Catholic Church was the 
enemy inside the republic and the minds of its citizens, but their con-
ceptions of the nothingness it fostered and the remedies they proposed 
were different. For France the danger was authoritarian rule and the 
emptiness of the externally controlled social self that renders the masses 
indifferent to principles, incapable of finding the truth, and vulnerable 
to hate campaigns. his solution was twofold: to fill the void in the 
individual’s mind with education, with the promise of a satisfying inner 
life that would guarantee individual judgment and the ability to develop 
one’s own desire; and to fill that of the Other by satisfying its every 
desire, thereby freeing its members from the psychological and eco-
nomic pressure of society and the State. The nothingness the positivist 
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Zola feared was that of the ‘mystical’ because nonexistent supernatural, 
that which exercises uncanny attraction and power precisely because 
its functioning and the enjoyment it holds out to its believers allegedly 
escape observation and reason. For him, contingency represented the 
arbitrary capriciousness of a senseless world, in which the dark forces 
of the passions run wild. The remedy was therefore the establishment 
of universal intelligibility, so that all mysteries could be solved. To do 
so required replacing the inadequate, deceitful, or corrupt fathers of the 
Church and the Opportunist republic. The new schoolteachers, starting 
with Zola’s persona marc, would be compensated by the opportunity to 
become the fathers of the new republic of truth and justice.
 Ultimately, it was the dread of nothingness provoked by the chal-
lenge of science to the Symbolic that paved the way for culture wars by 
producing the need to rely on society or culture, and hence on politics, 
for a guarantee of existence, even as it opened up the possibility for 
literary texts to play a major role in the battle to define and determine 
those conflicts. The political strategy of identifying a noxious internal 
enemy can no doubt be traced back through history in various civil 
and religious wars, and it was certainly present during the revolution, 
with the attempt to root out alleged counterrevolutionaries. What dis-
tinguished the Third republic was the use of that strategy in combina-
tion with the quasi-official adoption of enlightenment ideology and 
its dissemination in the new Ferry schools. it was this combination, 
along with the upheavals due to the recent defeat and the Commune, 
which triggered the fears of lost identity, emotions that were spread and 
magnified by the polemics in learned journals and the mass press. The 
political identification of the internal enemy thus triggered fears of the 
alien enemy within the self.
 in short, what made the political battles of those times and of ours 
into culture wars was and is the unwitting or deliberate politicization of 
extimacy. The achievement of our four novels of education was to bring 
to light this coupling of the internal enemy with threats and promises 
of identity through the exposure of the fantasy scenarios accompanying 
the political programs.
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1887 The Manifesto of the Five, attack on Zola and his novel Earth
1889 henri bergson, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate 
Data of Consciousness
1889 bourget, The Disciple
1887 Wilson scandal, Daniel Wilson, son-in-law of Jules Grévy, presi-
dent of the republic, accused of selling state honors
1888–91 maurice barrès, Cult of the Ego trilogy
1892 Pope leo Xiii’s encyclical calling for French Church to rally to 
republic
1893 Founding of the new spiritualist journal, Revue de Métaphysique et 
de Morale
1894 eugène Spuller, minister of public education, fine arts and cults 
calls for “new Spirit” of reconciliation with Church
1892–93 Panama Canal scandal; legislators accused of taking graft to sup-
port financing of canal
1895 brunetière, “after a visit to the vatican”
1896–98 méline president of the Council of ministers 
1897 anatole France, The Elm-Tree on the Mall, and The Wicker Work 
Woman, first two volumes of Contemporary History
1897 barrès, The Uprooted, first volume of The Novel of National Energy
1897–1900 Dreyfus affair (see appendix b)
1898 Spanish-american War
1899 France, The Amethyst Ring, third volume of Contemporary History
1899 Pierre Waldeck-rousseau president of the Council of ministers
1899–1900 Policy of appeasement
1900 World’s Fair in Paris
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1901 France, Monsieur Bergeret in Paris, book Four of Contemporary 
History
1901 Émile Zola, La vérité en marche, collection of articles about Drey-
fus affair
1900 barrès, Appeal to the Soldier, second volume of The Novel of 
National Energy
1902 Zola, Truth (published posthumously)
1902 bourget, L’étape
1902 barrès, Their Faces, third volume of The Novel of National Energy
1902 barrès, Scenes and Doctrines of Nationalism
1905 Émile Combes’s laws separating Church and State
Main Participants
major esterhazy The actual traitor, author of the memo (bordereau) 
used as main evidence proving Dreyfus’s guilt
major henry military intelligence, forged a note indicating 
Dreyfus’s guilt
General de Pellieux Directed inquiry into esterhazy’s involvement that 
absolved him of any guilt; witness at Zola’s trial, 
designated henry forgery as ‘absolute proof ’ of 
Dreyfus’s guilt
major Du Paty de Clam military intelligence, examining magistrate in 
Dreyfus’s initial court-martial
General de boisdeffre Chief of staff at beginning of Dreyfus affair
General Gonse Deputy chief of staff
General mercier minister of war at the beginning of affair
Colonel Sandherr head of military intelligence at beginning of affair, 
intercepted bordereau sent to German military  
attaché, Schwartzkoppen
Captain alfred Dreyfus accused of passing military secrets to the Germans
mathieu Dreyfus alfred’s older brother, worked tirelessly to clear his 
name
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major (lieutenant- 
 Colonel) Picquart
replaced Colonel Sandherr as head of military 
intelligence, defended Dreyfus to his fellow offi-
cers, imprisoned, career ruined
auguste Scheurer-Kestner vice president of the Senate, defended Dreyfus’s 
innocence, brought case before Parliament
bernard lazare anarchist, waged a campaign in the papers and 
among intellectuals to prove Dreyfus’s innocence
Chronology
October 15, 1894 Dreyfus, identified as author of bordereau (letter to 
German military attaché Schwartzkoppen announc-
ing dispatch of secret military documents), is 
arrested for spying for the German government
november 1, 1894 La Libre Parole, anti-Semitic newspaper, names 
Dreyfus as traitor
December 19–22, 1894 Dreyfus is court-martialed, found guilty of treason, 
sentenced to deportation for life
January 5, 1895 military degradation of Dreyfus
april 13, 1895 Dreyfus is placed in prison on Devil’s island
march 1896 major Picquart discovers petit bleu (message from 
German embassy to esterhazy)
april 6, 1896 Picquart is promoted to lieutenant-colonel
august 1896 Picquart discovers that esterhazy wrote bordereau
autumn 1896 L’Éclair and Le Matin, large-circulation newspa-
pers, draw attention to supposed proofs of Drey-
fus’s guilt; bernard lazare circulates his document 
about Dreyfus’s innocence
October 26, 1896 Picquart is ordered to duty in north africa
november 2, 1896 henry hands forged letter, ‘proving’ Dreyfus’s 
guilt, to General Gonse
november 6, 1896 bernard-lazare publishes his pamphlet, A Judicial 
Error, in brussels
December 1896 henry adds more forged documents to Dreyfus’s 
file
may 18, 1897 Picquart writes letter of protest to major henry
     ~   A p p e n d i x  b
June 29, 1897 Picquart gives his material to his lawyer, maître 
leblois
July 13–14, 1897 leblois shows Picquart’s material to Scheurer- 
Kestner, vice president of the Senate, who then 
informs his colleagues that he thinks Dreyfus inno-
cent
autumn 1897 esterhazy and general staff—Gonse, henry, and du 
Paty under the protection of General de boisdef-
fre—conspire to avoid his conviction; esterhazy 
writes three letters to the president of republic 
accusing Picquart of forging the petit bleu
november 16, 1897 mathieu Dreyfus publishes his accusations against 
esterhazy in Le Figaro
January 11, 1898 esterhazy is acquitted at the court-martial he 
requested
January 13, 1898 Zola’s “J’accuse” is published in Clemenceau’s 
L’Aurore; Picquart is arrested and imprisoned
February 23, 1898 Zola is convicted of libel in criminal court (Cour 
d’assises)
February 26, 1898 Picquart is dismissed from the army
april 2, 1898 The Cour de Cassation (Supreme Court of appeal) 
annuls Zola’s conviction
may 23, 1898 Zola is retried by court-martial at versailles
July 7, 1898 minister of War Cavaignac reads out supposed 
proofs against Dreyfus, thus precipitating rebuttals 
and exposure of henry’s forgeries
July 12, 1898 esterhazy is placed under arrest
July 13, 1898 Picquart is arrested and prosecuted
July 18–19, 1898 Zola is convicted once again; he flees to england
august 13, 1898 henry’s forgery is discovered
august 31–September  
 1, 1898
major henry’s arrest and suicide; esterhazy is 
dishonorably discharged from army, flees from 
France; General de boisdeffre resigns
June 3, 1899 The Cour de Cassation sets aside conviction of 
1894, leading to new court-martial in rennes
June 5, 1899 Zola returns to France
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June 9, 1899 Dreyfus leaves Guiana; Picquart is exonerated and 
freed
September 9, 1899 Once again, Dreyfus is convicted of treason
September 19, 1899 President loubet signs pardon of Dreyfus
June 2, 1900 Senate votes general amnesty, which takes effect 
December 27, 1900
July 12, 1906 The Cour de Cassation sets aside rennes convic-
tion, thus clearing Dreyfus
July 13, 1906 Dreyfus and Picquart are reinstated in army; Drey-
fus is promoted to major, Picquart to general
Introduction
 
 1. Ferry was already minister of Public education and retained that portfolio when 
he was named Président du Conseil des ministres in December 1880.
 2. See my “education and Political identity: The Universalist Controversy” for a 
more comprehensive review of the literature that follows.
 3. all translations from the French in this book are my own, unless otherwise speci-
fied.
 4. i refer specifically to the production of literary texts that offer representations 
of the questions of pedagogical theory and practice. For the teaching of literature in 
the schools, see ralph albanese, Molière à l’École républicaine and La Fontaine à l’École 
républicaine, and m. martin Guiney, Teaching the Cult of Literature in the French Third 
Republic.
 5. bourget is referring here to the tradition of british philosophy and psychology 
going back to locke and especially to hume and his popularizer hartley, as well as to 
their nineteenth-century followers such as mill, bain, and Spencer. Théodule ribot’s 
La psychologie anglaise contemporaine, first published in 1870, was the main source in 
French for information about this trend, along with Taine’s attempted fusion of hege-
lian thought with positivism, De l’intelligence, also of 1870, in which he adopted mill’s 
view of the self as nothing more than the series of its states. it was ribot, however, who 
became the leading authority in France on the new experimental psychology in the latter 
third of the century.
 6. earlier in the century, critics and writers spoke of ‘novels with a thesis.’ it was 
only at the end of the century that the term roman à thèse became the name of a sub-
genre.
 7. in 1902, bourget published a second novel of education designed, like Zola’s 
Truth, to draw the lessons allegedly taught by the Dreyfus affair, titled L’Étape (see 
Charle, Paris fin de siècle 201–26, for a comparison of bourget’s novel with Zola’s Truth). 
While the book shows the changes in bourget’s politics since 1889, it adds little to his 
interpretation of the flaws in republican education or the latter’s effect on national iden-
tity; hence my decision not to include an analysis of it in my text.
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 8. in his comparison of Vérité and L’étape, Charle points out that recent scholarship 
has shown that the republic was actually quite stable at the time, and he argues that the 
crisis actually occurred in the field of the intellectuals rather than in the nation at large 
(Paris fin de siècle 213–15). as the present-day division between red and blue states in 
the United States illustrates, however, it is quite possible for the members of a nation to 
feel they are in crisis, even though the government is stable. and the millions of readers 
whom the popular press—Le Petit Journal and the various regional versions of La Croix, 
especially—whipped up into a frenzy of anti-Semitism during the affair were certainly 
not all intellectuals; on the contrary.
 9. Throughout the decades bracketing the turn of the century, a public debate raged 
in France over the role of the “intellectual” as educator, a category that included profes-
sors and journalists as well as novelists (see Charle, Naissance des intellectuels; and Datta, 
Birth of a National Icon).
 
 
Chapter 1
 
 1. actually, with the exception of the crucial elections of the national assembly in 
1871, the republicans had been steadily gaining ground over their opponents since the 
latter days of the Second empire, and had held majorities in both houses at various times 
before the dates mentioned (see J.-m. mayeur, chaps. 1–2).
 2. in reference to nineteenth-century Catholicism, the term “liberal” designates the 
wing of the French Church that accepted the Concordat treaty, which placed the Church 
hierarchy under the rule of French law and allowed the existence of other religions, thus 
rejecting the dogma that there was no salvation outside the Catholic Church. in politics, 
these were Orleanists, supporters of the monarchical pretensions of the Count of Paris 
and the rule of the traditional, or ‘dynastic,’ bourgeoisie that had reigned supreme during 
the July monarchy (1830–1848).
 3. Church hostility to the republic lasted well beyond the publication of the encycli-
cal. at the same time, many Catholics saw the call for ralliement as the Church’s capitula-
tion to enlightenment ideology.
 4. Under the Falloux laws, primary schoolteachers had to submit to the involve-
ment of priests in their classes, were forced to serve as cantors or sacristans in the local 
churches, and had to teach catechism classes (Compagnon and Thévenin).
 5. See Phyllis Stock-morton’s Moral Education for a Secular Society for a compre-
hensive history of the development of what was alternately called ‘social morality,’ ‘in-
dependent morality,’ or ‘laic morality.’ Stock-morton rightly observes that the vital link 
between Condorcet and Quinet was the philosopher and minister of public instruction 
under the July monarchy, victor Cousin, whose separation of ethics from religion was 
the basis for all later arguments about independent morality and its teaching in the 
schools (29–40).
 6. This was a change from Comte’s earlier position in the Cours de philosophie posi-
tive, where he argued that it is unnecessary to teach morality in a separate course, since 
it would result naturally from the eventual victory of positivism in the public mind and 
from the teaching of sociology (legrand 29–30).
 7. This biographical information on Coignet is taken from the summary of a study 
by Janine Joliot on file in the bibliothèque marguerite Durand in Paris.
 8. See Désiré nolen, “Kant et la philosophie du dix-neuvième siècle” (cited in Di-
geon, 335 n2). Stock-morton declares that “although Durkheim completed the theo-
retical development of morale laïque, we must conclude that the last moral philosophy 
actually accepted by the French for use in education was that of renouvier” (173).
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 9. Digeon mentions a host of writers who maintain that, for better or for worse, 
Kantianism dominated the Third republic and its schools—a. Cresson, La morale de 
Kant (1897; cited in 334 n2); victor basch (cited in 334 n2, itself a citation from 
maurras’s Quand les Français ne s’aimaient pas), as well as l. Daudet, Julien benda, and 
abel hermant.
  Digeon also refers to many writers who attacked Kantianism—Th. Funck-bren-
tano; barrès, of course; Fouillée; and especially members of l’action française, such as 
h. vaugeois (336 n2).
 10. in 1806 napoleon established the Conseil de l’Université, an institution designed 
to organize and govern all secondary as well as higher education in France. in nine-
teenth-century texts and common parlance the term ‘Université’ most often designated 
the public secondary schools (see, for instance, Daudet’s widely read novel Le petit chose 
[1868], in which the hero goes to work for the Université as a monitor in a collège).
 11. For a representative overview of their ideas about morality and education, see 
Steeg, buisson, and Pécaut. See also mona Ozouf 87. in accord with the general thesis 
of Teaching the Cult of Literature in the French Third Republic, that republican education 
imitated the Catholic education it sought to overthrow, Guiney contends that the educa-
tion they instituted owed little to Protestantism; on the contrary, it came to resemble the 
Catholic education they were replacing (86–88). my point here is simply that the notion 
of morality they introduced into the schools was heavily influenced by Kantian ideas.
 12. Guiney provides ample evidence for the view that the calls for teaching either 
latin or literature in the secondary schools were based on the claim that these topics 
conferred a moral sense on the students through their apprenticeship and appreciation of 
form rather than content; the cultivation of “taste” was thus both moral and national, in 
the sense of imbuing pupils with the appreciation of specifically “French” style. This is 
summed up in Fouillée’s pronouncement: “Considered philosophically, grammar has its 
own morality” (quoted on p. 180).
 13. There is some dispute as to boutroux’s impact on bergson. Parodi, Chevalier, 
and Scharfstein assert the importance of boutroux’s thesis for the development of berg-
son’s ideas; others, such as barthélemy-madaule in her Bergson, deny it any significant 
role, relying on bergson’s airy dismissal of boutroux’s teaching as being too Kantian 
(barthélemy-madaule 8–9). On the other hand, it is clear that boutroux’s admiring pupil 
Durkheim adopted his professor’s basic mode of reasoning in giving precedence to the 
social over the individual in Les règles de la méthode sociologique (1895). Stock-morton 
summarizes the argument as follows: “just as the chemical properties of atoms were 
insufficient to account for physiological phenomena, so the nature of individuals was 
insufficient to explain social phenomena” (131).
 14. in thus combating rationalistic natural science by linking contingency and free-
dom to the notion of a voluntaristic God, boutroux was reviving a tradition which goes 
back to the thirteenth century, when bishop Étienne Tempier declared the principles 
of averroism, i.e., aristotelian rationalist philosophy and science, to be heretical (see 
Gilson). a more immediate predecessor was Jules lachelier, who argued in his thesis, 
Du Fondement de l’induction, that all causality is subordinate to purpose and therefore to 
contingency. bergson stated that he considered lachelier to be his teacher even though 
he never took a course with him, so great was the effect of reading Fondement while at 
the rue d’Ulm (bergson, Essais et témoignages 358).
 15. On the level of epistemology, despite his reputed “irrationalism,” bergson’s main 
objection to Kant was the latter’s restriction of scientific knowledge to phenomena, 
whereas for bergson, as for the spiritualist realism of ravaisson, “the mathematical and 
physical sciences tend to reveal reality in itself, absolute reality” (quoted in Scharfstein 
134).
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 16. recall, for instance, renan’s harangue against democracy in La réforme intellectu-
elle et morale de la France as the antithesis of rationality because it represents the triumph 
of number, “that is, of stupidity and spinelessness” (Digeon 197).
 17. irvin edman, in his foreword to the modern library edition of Creative Evolu-
tion (1944); Zeev Sternhell, in Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français (1983); and 
anna boschetti, in Sartre et “Les Temps Modernes,” all document bergson’s adoption by 
the political right, even while they skirt the claim that the philosopher himself drew the 
political conclusions the right attributed to him (see Chaitin, “From the Third republic 
to Postmodernism” 783–85). See also r. C. Grogin (85–88).
 18. in another textbook, Livre de lecture et de morale (1894), Émile Devinat has the 
children recite the following lesson titled “you love your country”: “i love France, my 
country, because its inhabitants are my brothers, children of the same race, with the same 
blood and the same ancestors. . . . France is my mother: in my heart there will never be 
anything above her” (83).
 19. This substitution was not complete, however. Despite the complaints of Catholic 
critics about the vagueness of the religious content of the courses on morals and civics 
(see numerous articles in La Réforme Sociale, e.g., de metz noblat, “l’instruction civique 
à l’école d’après G. Compayré”), most primary schoolteachers and authors of textbooks 
in the 1880s and 1890s were, as Ferry pointed out to Parliament, believers of some sort, 
and they included specific references to God in their teachings (Katan 421–22). The 
only significant function of the God taught in the schools, however, was to guarantee 
the physical order of the universe, the moral order of the self, and hence the social order 
of the human world. Thus, even when this conception of divinity was retained, it easily 
merged into the purely secular versions of independent morality (Steeg, Cours de morale; 
buisson, La religion, la morale et la science; rauh, Psychologie appliquée à la morale et à 
l’éducation; Cours de morale à l’usage des jeunes filles; Katan 425).
 20. in Molière à l’École républicaine and La Fontaine à l’École républicaine, albanese 
details many of the ways the schools of the Third republic attempted to use the study of 
the so-called classics to inculcate in their pupils a sense of national identity and unanim-
ity (Molière 4–6); and to teach them the morals that undergirded the regime’s claims to 
legitimacy (La Fontaine 100).
 21. anderson in fact notes, in a general way, the coincidence of the rise of nationalism 
with the weakening of religion in europe and points out that the nation serves the same 
purposes as religion (18–19).
 
 
Chapter 2
 
 1. all references to The Disciple are to the anonymous T. Fisher Unwin translation, 
reprinted by howard Fertig Publishing. i have occasionally modified the translation after 
comparison with the French.
 2. See Ferdinand brunetière, “a propos du Disciple”; a. France, “Paul bourget: Le 
disciple,” and “la morale et la science.”
 3. The notion of a theory of the subject goes back of course to Descartes, Kant, and 
especially hegel, but in nineteenth-century France it was littré who bemoaned the lack 
of an empirical theory of the subject in Comte’s philosophy, an omission he set out to 
remedy (Caro, M. Littré et le positivisme 125, citing littré’s Auguste Comte et la philosophie 
positive).
 4. The French term revanchard indicates anyone who aims to take revenge, especially 
for a military defeat. it was used extensively after the defeat by Prussia in 1870–71 to 
refer to militaristic French patriots intent on recovering the lost provinces of alsace and 
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lorraine from the Germans. in the novel, Count andré is considered a hero for having 
participated in the war and killed a German soldier.
 5. in fact, Greslou compares himself to Faust (147, 172). it should be pointed 
out that ‘pity for human suffering’ was enjoying a great vogue at the time in France, 
contributing to the popularity of George eliot (just after her death) along with that of 
Charles Dickens and Charlotte brontë, and especially of the russian novel starting with 
the translation of Crime and Punishment in 1884, as well as the publication of several 
critical studies preceding and including vogüé’s Roman russe (mansuy 429–30).
 6. like Goethe’s Charlottes, both the fictional and the real one, Chambige’s mistress 
was also an “older” woman who was married and had children. From the biographical 
perspective, bourget’s Charlotte can be seen as a replacement for Chambige’s maternal 
mme. Grille.
Chapter 3
 1. These novels have not been translated into english. all translations are mine.
 2. barrès announced a study of contemporary nihilism—by which he meant the 
poets baudelaire, verlaine, mallarmé, and rimbaud—in the initial issue of Taches d’encre 
(1884), the first magazine he edited as a young man in Paris. bourget had just made the 
term stylish in his Essais of 1883. in succeeding years, the word became a commonplace 
among writers and intellectuals. Édouard rod makes renan the great priest of noth-
ingness (du néant) in his Idées morales du temps présent (1891) (73). Théophile Funck-
brentano, a professor at the recently created École des Sciences Politiques, wrote a book 
titled Les sophistes allemands et les nihilistes russes (1887), in which he blames all the ills of 
“Western civilization,” by which he means every movement dedicated to the modifica-
tion or overthrow of the political status quo in europe, on Kant and his successors. as 
early as 1799, the German theologian and philosopher F. h. Jacobi had labeled Kant’s 
philosophy “nihilism” in a letter to Fichte.
 3. a more distant source of these ideas is found in barrès’s reading, at the age of 
sixteen, of an article about the “young hegelians” by Saint-rené Taillandier in the Revue 
des Deux Mondes of July 15, 1847: “The ego of max Stirner” eliminates “everything that 
is not the ego” (261). “i alone exist, i alone, outside of myself i can know nothing and 
believe nothing” (258–59). Stirner, he says, “boldly preaches the religion of the ego,” 
“celebrates egoism as the only form of complete freedom” (264; quoted in Frandon, 
Barrès précurseur 54). “no more God, no more human race, no more homeland, nothing 
outside my being any more, not a general idea, not an absolute principle” (70). The same 
article condemns the young hegelians’ “exaltation in nothingness” (262).
 4. at least, so barrès seems to imply. in fact, the model for bouteiller, auguste 
burdeau, was born in 1851. in 1859, when he turned eight, France was still under the 
Second empire. Since bouteiller, like burdeau, fought and was wounded in the Franco-
Prussian War in 1870, his early education could hardly have been carried out under the 
Third republic. no doubt barrès would reply, with Taine, that ever since its institution 
under the first napoleon, the University had been an instrument of centralization and 
deracination (see the last completed volume of Taine’s Origines, titled L’école).
 5. Sternhell points out, however, that barrès’s admiration for Soury dates at least 
from 1888 (M. Barrès et le nationalisme français 256; see “la jeunesse boulangiste,” Le 
Figaro, may 19, 1888). in her Orient de Maurice Barrès, Frandon argues plausibly that in 
fact barrès started attending Soury’s lectures as early as 1886 (39; also 378 n7).
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Chapter 4
 1. This image of Jewish immigrants recalls the fact that large numbers of poor, 
working-class, ghetto Jews fleeing the pogroms in russia and eastern europe had settled 
in France in the 1880s and 1890s. if the anti-Semitic literature of the period is any 
judge (e.g., renan; Drumont), they appeared much more alien to the French than those 
from alsace (Wilson, Bernard Lazare 75–76). bernard lazare himself, during his early 
anti-Semitic period, exclaimed: “Open an anti-Semitic book at random, and you will 
hear people cry out, for good reason usually, against the Frankfurters, the Galicians, the 
rumanians, the russians, who are swooping down onto our country like locusts” (“la 
solidarité juive,” Entretiens Politiques et Littéraires (October 1890), quoted in bredin, Ber-
nard Lazare 110). barrès seems to be assimilating the two groups in order to compound 
revanchism with anti-Semitism.
 2. The elements in Frege’s set are those things that are identical to themselves; ev-
erything real presumably. The empty set contains those things which are not identical to 
themselves, i.e., nothing, which is why it is empty. but if it contains nothing, neverthe-
less it is itself something, a signifier, a set, the first element in that other set, the series of 
integers; it is the zero term that acts as the starting point necessary to launch the infinite 
series.
 3. Strictly speaking, this should be termed a ‘hypnotic’ rather than a transferential 
theory, according to Freud’s analysis in Group Psychology and Ego Analysis. likewise, bar-
rès’s fiction should be classified as hypnotic rather than transferential narrative, since the 
speaker (the hypnotist) is the authority rather than the listener (the psychoanalyst) (see 
Chaitin, “Psychoanalysis and narrative action” 284–301, 293–94). it is lacan’s notion 
of the analyst as the “subject supposed to know,” developed in his 1964 seminar on The 
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, which Felman then elaborated into a theory 
of narrative in which it is the storyteller, or the author, who becomes the object of the 
reader’s transference, in “Turning the Screw of interpretation.” lacan himself, however, 
reverted in 1967 to something closer to the Freudian idea, claiming that the true subject 
supposed to know(ledge) was the analysand, not the analyst (see Chaitin, Lacan and the 
Rhetoric of Culture chap. 5). i have retained the term ‘transference,’ nevertheless, since, 
in the last analysis, for both Freud and lacan the transference is a kind of spell that must 
be broken in order to attain a degree of mental health and autonomy.
Chapter 5
 1. Scholars generally give one of two reasons for this interruption: either France 
wanted to downplay France’s opposition to the Church during his candidacy for the aca-
démie Française (which was successful), or he was distracted by the trips he took at the 
time to italy and the north Sea (levaillant 442; bancquart, “notice” to Contemporary 
History 1321; Sachs 118). bancquart adds a third possibility: France simply could not 
see how to organize his individual scenes into a larger whole, on the one hand, and, on 
the other, his characters were so closely related to each other that he could not separate 
them into discrete short stories (“notice” 1324).
 2. in many ways, these arguments constituted a reprise of those brunetière had 
brought forth in the dispute over The Disciple, in which he and France had locked horns 
half a decade before. it is more than a little ironic, then, that neither one of them real-
ized at the time that bourget’s main intention in that novel was precisely to allow for 
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the conciliation of science and religion via Spencer’s ‘unknowable’ (see chap. 2 in this 
volume; see also levaillant 291–98).
 3. as France well knew, brunetière was far from being the sole perpetrator of these 
ideas. levaillant refers to a series of Church publications and doctrines, especially a recent 
encyclical distinguishing theological from scientific truths aimed at eliminating scientific 
textual biblical criticism, and which, presumably, a well-informed contemporary reader 
would have recognized (473–74).
 4. in november 1897, France published two articles—one in L’Aurore, the other in 
the Écho de Paris (the latter adapted from Amethyst)—questioning the judgment against 
Dreyfus (bancquart 228).
 5. This was the standard argument of the anarchists, at that time and even after 
1905, when they judged that the experiment in mass education represented by the Ferry 
reforms of primary education had been a failure: “look at the anarchists, who see the 
French as a spineless, mindless, submissive, indifferent mass. The artisan of this cow-
ardly resignation is of course the schoolteacher, that champion of conformism who has 
replaced, and even ‘surpassed his religious rival’ (it’s le Libertaire of October 1909)” (J. 
Ozouf).
 6. in her “notice” to the first two volumes of Contemporary History, bancquart tries 
to assess France’s attitude toward the Jews before the Dreyfus affair, given the negative 
portraits he paints of Worms-Clavelin and his wife, who, unlike the other caricatures 
in the book, have no redeeming qualities. She argues that the prefect is really very 
antipathetic, like the Jewish bankers of maupassant and Zola, even though all three 
were opposed in principle to anti-Semitism (1343–44). She attributes this to a ‘diffuse’ 
anti-Semitism, “wariness, a sense of difference,” combined out of the prosperity and 
visibility of the well-known Jewish financiers, plus the inclusion of numerous Jews in 
the government and civil service since the rise of the ‘republic of the republicans,’ and 
their support of the Opportunists, who gave them much greater freedom than in other 
regimes and other countries (1345). bancquart concludes that France really did feel hos-
tility toward Jews, especially those who renounced their own heritage, but that he was 
nevertheless opposed to anti-Semitism. See Pierre birnbaum’s Les fous de la République 
(translated as The Jews of the Republic) for a comprehensive history of the Jews who par-
ticipated in the government during the Third republic and the anti-Semitic reaction of 
the period. birnbaum gives detailed information about ernest hendlé, the prefect who 
came to symbolize the Jewish republican prefect capable of entertaining good relations 
with the Church hierarchy and whom France took as model for his Worms-Clavelin 
(32–33).
  in her “notice” to Amethyst, bancquart points out that, with the onset of the 
affair, France dropped Worms-Clavelin and transferred his satire onto the rich capitalist 
Jewish converts to Catholicism, mme. de bonmont and her family (1156).
  it should be noted that in Amethyst, at the height of the affair, France makes a 
point of debunking the anti-Semites’ racist claim that “Jews and Frenchmen cannot live 
together. The antagonism is ineradicable, it is in the blood,” as m. de Terremondre puts 
it—to which m. bergeret responds that the Jews are the most adaptable people on earth 
and that “the daughters of our Jewish financiers marry nowadays the heirs to the greatest 
names in Christian France” (142), admittedly a typical double-barreled critique of both 
groups.
 7. needless to say, anarchists like adolphe retté and younger readers such as adrien 
Chevalier, Georges rodenbach, and léon blum were delighted by the same qualities. 
retté notes with glee that France “demolishes present-day society by undermining: the 
army, the administration, the clergy, not to mention the family” (“m. anatole France: 
L’orme du mail,” La Plume 8 [1897]: 251ff.; cited in Gier 229); blum heartily approved 
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France’s “powerful critique of the State, of society, and of everything generally [consid-
ered] respectable” (Revue Blanche 12 [1er semestre 1897], “les livres,” 144–47 [L’orme 
du Mail, 146–147]; cited in Gier 229).
 
 
Chapter 6
 
 1. i should add that it is not just the women who display this venality and lack of 
principle. it occurs to mme. de bonmont’s son that he should try to make Guitrel a 
bishop in order to be invited to the Duc de brécé’s prestigious hunts. he thinks of loyer, 
minister of public education and churches, who therefore appoints bishops and whom he 
thinks he can influence via mme. de Gromance. he meets Gustave (later called Philippe) 
Dellion, son of one of the leading aristocratic families of their home town (Dellion’s wife 
used to be mme. bergeret’s defender), and who owes bonmont a lot of money. Gustave 
is mme. de Gromance’s lover, which is why bonmont is unaccustomedly nice to him. 
bonmont asks him to ask mme. de Gromance to ask loyer to make abbé Guitrel bishop 
of Tourcoing, more or less promising to buy an automobile for Dellion if he succeeds. 
This imbroglio is meant of course to illustrate the absurdity of the chain of causes leading 
to Guitrel’s appointment as bishop, in the manner of voltaire’s Candide.
 2. There are several passages in Paris about riquet’s defense of the premises against 
the interloper, in which m. bergeret makes the dog out to be a member of the anti-
Dreyfus crowd (as levaillant points out, 252). but then his master recognizes riquet’s 
virtues, such as goodness and protection of the household. above all, riquet/the people 
is governed by fear, the age-old gods of fear and violence; and ignorance.
 3. in his reception speech to the académie Française in 1841, victor hugo distin-
guished the peuple from the populace and then from the foule. The latter became traditional 
in the ideology of the left and was often invoked during the Dreyfus affair to explain 
away the contradiction between the appeal to the people and the reality of the masses’ 
violence and anti-Semitism. Cf. Séverine, “la Foule” for the identical argument distin-
guishing between the good, robust ‘people’ and the evil ‘crowd.’
 4. Cassaing (303) cites several contributors to Clemenceau’s organ, L’Aurore:
Clemenceau: “What we need to change, to reform, is the sovereign people. . . . 
We must educate our master with a thousand heads.”
 Gustave Geoffroy: “how can we conquer this crowd? . . . everything shows 
us that the problem to be solved is that of educating this crowd, helping it to 
conquer its right to life, to a complete life, to a life of the body and a life of the 
mind.” (emphasis in original)
and of course, Zola, as we will see in the following chapter.
  levaillant gives a similar quote, from emile Duclaux: “[if we suffer from this 
type of crisis,] it’s only because people lack critical sense and the masses have not been 
educated”; [therefore we must cooperate] on the rational education of people’s minds” 
(525, n180).
 5. Just as Spinoza’s God is immanent in the universe—is all beings, rather than 
an independent entity, source of all being, outside of or beyond the universe—so the 
communist State dissolves into the set of all the people that constitute society. interest-
ingly enough, m. bergeret cites Spinoza immediately before the passage quoted, but in 
reference to an apparently totally different topic—that intellect and comprehension often 
hinder action.
 6. m. bergeret seeks this ideal in the quintessential representative of the goodness 
of the people, Pied-d’alouette. he returns to this theme in relation to himself after the 
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departure of his wife, when he feels “unmoved by either love or hate” (Wicker Work 
Woman 129). in the subsequent volume, he comes upon mme. de Gromance in the 
street and is delighted to find that, although he knows she will never be his, “he was not 
sad, because his wisdom approached the happy state of ataraxy, without, however, finally 
attaining it” (Amethyst 114–15).
 7. in reality, anatole France devoted much time and energy to launching these uni-
versities, for he believed that by teaching science and economics to the working classes, 
they could become the instrument for changing bourgeois society into a society of social 
justice (bancquart, “notice” to M. Bergeret à Paris 1216).
Chapter 7
 1. all references to Truth are from the livre de Poche edition, which is the most 
accessible and has the best critical apparatus. in a few cases, i have corrected obvious 
typos by comparing the text to that of the François bernouard edition. references to the 
livre de Poche edition will be marked by the letter V in italics. an english translation is 
available (see bibliography), which i have consulted, but it has so many omissions and 
inaccuracies that i prefer to use my own translations.
 2. Cassaing argues most convincingly that Zola espoused the line of Clemenceau 
and the Aurore team, that the secularization of education must precede political and 
economic reform, against the conciliatory stance taken by Jaurès and his socialist party 
toward the Waldeck-rousseau government (303).
 3. Zola repeats this point almost verbatim in the text of the novel: “[marc harbored] 
regret for not having been able to draw an admirable object lesson from this prodigious 
Simon affair, one which would have taught the people. . . . in a few months, the Simon 
affair would have done more to emancipate the people and to establish the reign of 
justice than a hundred years of ardent politics” (quoted in Cassaing 302).
  as for the idea of the people’s ‘infection,’ in his review of Truth in the Revue 
mondiale of February 15, 1903, Georges Pellissier had already observed that the Simon 
affair was just an episode that brought to light “all the deep, latent infection hidden in 
the soul of a people odiously deprived of thought by ignorance, vitiated by prejudice and 
fanaticism” (480–81).
 4. “i know that it [knowledge] alone makes people capable of justice. everywhere 
the bourgeoisie is educated and how it acts in keeping everything. So knowledge is not 
enough, you have to be brought up right, have morals” (Zola’s preparatory notes, quoted 
in laville 221).
 5. The Adventures of Sherlock Holmes was published in 1891–1892, The Memoirs of 
Sherlock Holmes in 1892–1893.
 6. in The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis, lacan points out that the 
correlative of the Freudian subject is the deceived Other; that is, the fear that the Other 
can be deceived and therefore will not understand the meaning of his or her symptom 
(233).
 7. a custom that persisted in France even after World War ii, according to Jules 
isaac: “To those who deplored auschwitz and the fate of innocent Jewish victims, how 
many times has a Christian responded: ‘What do you expect, they are an accursed people 
[un people maudit]’” (L’antisémitisme a-t-il des racines chrétiennes? 36).
 8. in his “letter to the Senate,” Zola wrote: “The most serious, the most painful 
thing is that they have allowed the country to be poisoned by the vile press that has im-
pudently gorged it on lies, calumnies, filth and outrages, to the point of driving it mad” 
(La vérité en marche 138).
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 9. at the height of the Dreyfus affair, La Croix published calls to violence: “evis-
cerate him” [apropos of Zola]; “all this will end badly for them [the Jews]. . . . if the 
police and government remain powerless, the citizens in their disgust will have to mete 
out justice themselves” (Sorlin 120). and to cap it all off, Sorlin writes:
 The issue of 21 July [1898] reproduces, filling an entire page in bold-face 
type, a poster published by the Committee on Justice-equality of montpellier . . .  
  Judas Dreyfus sold out France
  The Jews have grabbed everything, dirtied everything, destroyed every-
thing
  The Jews are turning France upside down for the greater profit of world-
wide Kikedom.
  Let us unite to turn Jewish omnipotence upside down and kick the Jews out of 
[France] (120; emphasis in original).
  moreover, it would seem as though the assumptionists’ efforts met with a certain 
degree of success, since, according to modern scholars, two anti-Semitic masons, unable 
to disembowel Zola, had to settle for murdering him by stuffing up his chimney and 
asphyxiating him (see bedel; mitterand, Olympia 93; brown 23–25).
 10. The idea of the indelible imprint left upon a woman by her first lover is, of course, 
the michelet theory from L’amour et la femme that Zola used as the thesis of his early 
novel, Madeleine Férat (1868).
 11. in this respect, then, Truth is the answer to michelet and Madeleine Férat, rather 
than their repetition.
 12. in a sense, Zola had always espoused a kind of lamarckian theory of the inheri-
tance of acquired characteristics, since the descendants on the macquart side of the family 
inherit their destructive tendencies from their immediate forebears: Étienne lantier, for 
example, inherits the alcoholism of his mother, Gervaise. The difference in Truth is that, 
perhaps in response to the current nationalist ideology of the soil and the dead, Zola ex-
tends the range of operation of heredity to include the entire nation and its past from the 
beginnings to present. Zola uses the language of writing when he has Geneviève protest 
that in her the hereditary flaw seems to be “indelible” (V 493).
Chapter 8
 1. marc’s conviction about the identity of the real criminal is just as independent of 
the evidence as his reasons for refusing to believe in the guilt of the fathers. even after 
receiving the piece of evidence that clinches the guilt of brother Gorgias, he insists that 
reason alone can determine the truth: “all the facts illuminated each other, they all led 
to the same conclusion. even outside the material evidence that they were beginning to 
possess, there was a certainty like the demonstration of a mathematical problem, which 
reasoning alone was sufficient to solve” (i: 302, 311).
  like his adversaries then, marc judges the world by his ideas, his representation of 
it. his relation to phenomena is every bit as ‘subjective’ as that of his opponents, in the 
sense that it depends on mental constructs, even though it is not the least bit capricious 
nor even self-serving.
 2. Zola’s recent biographers do not make a connection between his molestation 
and Truth. brown sees the event as the origin of Zola’s later puritanical moralism and a 
possible source for Thérèse Raquin (a very plausible suggestion) (24), while mitterand 
denies categorically that he “retained the slightest trauma from it,” except that it may 
have favored his later transgression of prudish taboos (Olympia 93).
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 3. Zola is echoing here the party line of L’Aurore in response to the amnesty. in 
the number of October 2, 1899, Clemenceau had denounced the amnesty as a betrayal 
(trahison) of the republic, because it delivered the republican government over “to the 
barracks and the sacristy” (Cassaing 301).
 4. earlier in the novel, while mulling over the causes of the Church’s newfound 
power and arrogance, marc had already expressed his views on the role of the bourgeoi-
sie:
 The bourgeoisie, which used to be liberal, non-believing and rebellious, now 
has been reconquered by its retrograde spirit, out of the terror of being dispos-
sessed, of ceding its place to the rising tide of the people. (190).
 in 89, victorious over the dying nobility, the bourgeoisie had replaced it; and 
for a century it had kept its booty, refusing its just share to the people. now its 
role was finished, it confessed it itself by going over to reaction, hysterical at the 
idea of giving back, terrified by the rise of democracy that was going to sweep 
it away. (172; 192)
 5. it was all the easier for Zola to identify with the Jewish captain, since not only 
was he vilified as a Jew lover during the affair, but many years before, Octave mirbeau, in 
his early anti-Semitic days, had assimilated naturalism to Judaism, because both “lacked 
metaphysics and mystery,” were materialistic and “pornographic,” and, in Zola’s case, 
involved the large-scale commercialization and industrialization anti-Semites associated 
with Jewish capitalism (“le théâtre juif,” in the short-lived anti-Semitic journal, Les 
grimaces [november 3, 1883]; cited in Wilson, Bernard Lazare 71–72). (but note that 
mirbeau later changed sides completely and became a friend of bernard-lazare and an 
ardent Dreyfusard.)
 6. Cosset makes a similar point, but in a more nuanced way. She evaluates this 
episode as just one example of Zola’s artful representation of the relation between real-
ity and utopia, present and future, in the novel as a whole: “The constant criss-crossing 
between a discourse about a ‘pre-utopian’ past and a discourse about the utopian present 
constitutes a form of argumentation that undermines myth and aims toward making 
utopia plausible” (141).
 7. it is true that both Thérèse and marc then attempt to justify the necessity of suf-
fering with various standard theological and scientific arguments, but even the characters 
themselves seem unconvinced by these half-hearted rationalizations. The inevitability of 
physical and mental suffering was, in fact, one of the tenets of turn-of-the-century social-
ism, as we have seen in France’s Contemporary History.
 8. Zola, and Gaillard, are of course simply echoing a view at least as old as Plato’s 
Republic. The main force of L’Assommoir stems not from the stereotyped idea, but from 
the detailed picture Zola paints of the ways the working people of Paris go about finding 
their enjoyment.
 9. “if you can enlighten mankind,” becker and lavielle explain, “the ‘human beast’ 
(la bête humaine) remains, despite everything, crouching in the shadows, ready to drive 
people to crime, to rape, to uncontrollable passions” (“Préface” 28). indeed, mitterand 
contends that Truth is a rewriting of the novel titled La bête humaine (L’honneur 738–
39).
 10. See Jean-louis bory’s introduction to Vérité 999, and laville 131, both of whom 
emphasize the first words of that preface, “Je veux expliquer.”
 11. “i’ve often said that we don’t have to draw conclusions from our works, which 
means that our works carry their conclusions in themselves. an experimenter does not 
have to conclude, precisely because the experiment concludes for him. . . . it’s always up 
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to society to produce or not to produce the phenomenon, if its result is useful or danger-
ous” (Roman expérimental 79).
Conclusion
 1. i should point out that the education novels of the period written about, and 
especially by, women show different concerns: attaining autonomy, developing their in-
tellectual and artistic potential, and achieving professional success, while maintaining 
their desire for sexual, emotional, and maternal fulfillment. no longer do they want to 
be identified only as saints, wives, and mothers, forced to choose between sexual and 
professional gratification. For the women, the question of identity is a matter of their 
relation not to a transcendent Other, but to the immanent Other of social definitions and 
restrictions.
n o t e  t o  C o n C l u s i o n   ~     
acomb, evelyn m. The French Laic Laws (1879–1889). new york: Columbia University 
Press, 1941.
agulhon, maurice. “introduction.” in Manuel républicain de l’homme et du citoyen, 9–28. 
Paris: Garnier, 1981.
———. Marianne au pouvoir: L’imagerie et la symbolique républicaines de 1880 à 1914. 
Paris: Flammarion, 1989.
albanese, ralph, Jr. La Fontaine à l’École républicaine: Du poète universel au classique sco-
laire. Charlottesville, va: rookwood Press, 2003.
———. Molière à l’École républicaine: De la critique universitaire aux manuels scolaires 
(1870–1914). Saratoga, Ca: anima libri (Stanford French and italian Studies), 
1992. 
anderson, benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na-
tionalism. london: verso, 1991.
arendt, hannah. The Origins of Totalitarianism. new york: harcourt, brace & World, 
1966.
athanasius of alexandria. The Festal Letters of Athanasius. edited by William Cureton. 
london: Society for the Publication of Oriental Texts, 1848.
autin, albert. “Le disciple” de Paul Bourget. Paris: Société Française d’Éditions littéraires 
et Techniques, 1930.
baguley, David. “Fécondité”: roman à thèse, évangile, mythe. Toronto: University of To-
ronto Press, 1973.
———. “Du récit polémique au discours utopique: l’evangile républicain de Zola.” Ca-
hiers Naturalistes 54 (1980): 106–21.
bakhtin, mikhail. “Discourse in the novel.” in The Dialogic Imagination: Four Essays, 
edited by michael holquist, 259–422. austin: University of Texas University Press, 
1981. 
bancquart, marie-Claire. Anatole France: Un sceptique passionné. Paris: Calmann-lévy, 
1984.
———. “notice” à L’anneau d’améthyste. Anatole France: Oeuvres. vol. 3: 1133–60. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991.
bi b l i o g r A p h y
280
i
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     1
———. “notice” à Histoire contemporaine. Anatole France: Oeuvres. vol. 2: 1319–48. 
Paris: Gallimard, 1991.
———. “notice” à M. Bergeret à Paris. Anatole France: Oeuvres. vol. 3: 1209–29. Paris: 
Gallimard, 1991.
barrès, maurice. L’Appel au soldat. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 755–1048.
———. Les déracinés. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 493–754.
———. Du sang, de la volupté et de la mort. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 341–
479.
———. L’ennemi des lois. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 259–332.
———. “examen des trois romans idéologiques.” in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 
15–31.
———. Un homme libre. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 87–185.
———. “l’influence de m. Taine.” Le Journal (march 6, 1893). in Taine et Renan: Pages 
recueillies et commentées par Victor Giraud. Paris: bossard, 1922.
———. Le jardin de Bérénice. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 186–258.
———. Leurs figures. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 1049–1214.
———. Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages. edited by vital rambaud. Paris: robert laf-
font, 1994.
———. Mes cahiers 1896–1923. Paris: Plon, 1994 [1963].
———. Mes mémoires. Oeuvres complètes T. Xiii. Paris: Club de l’honnête homme, 1968.
———. “la mode russe.” La Revue Illustrée 1.4 (1886): 123–26.
———. L’oeuvre de Maurice Barrès. ed. Philippe barrès. vol. 4. Paris: au Club de 
l’honnête homme, 1965.
———. “Préface de l’édition de 1904 d’Un homme libre.” in Maurice Barrès: Romans et 
voyages, 186–258.
———. “réponse à m. rené Doumic.” in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 179–85.
———. Scènes et doctrines du nationalisme. Paris: Éditions du Trident, 1987.
———. “la sensibilité d’henri Chambige.” Le Figaro (november 11, 1888).
———. Sous l’oeil des barbares. in Maurice Barrès: Romans et voyages, 27–86.
———. “Taine” (response to survey). La Revue Blanche (1897).
———. “Taine.” in Taine et Renan, 114–15. Paris: bossard, 1922.
barthélemy-madaule, madeleine. Bergson. Paris: le Seuil, 1967.
becker, Colette, and véronique lavielle. “Préface.” Vérité. Paris: livre de Poche, 1995. 
7–28.
bedel, Jean. Zola Assassiné. Paris: Flammarion, 2002.
bellet, roger. Jules Vallès journaliste: du Second Empire, de la Commune de Paris et de la IIIe 
République. Paris: les Éditeurs français réunis, 1977.
benda, Julien. La trahison des clercs. Paris: bernard Grasset, 1977 [1927; 1958].
———. “l’oeuvre nécessaire.” Le courrier social illustré (november 1, 1894).
bergson, henri. Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience. Paris: F. alcan, 1889.
———. Essais et témoignages. ed. albert béguin. Paris: le Seuil, 1965.
———. Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion. Oeuvres. Paris: Presses Universitaires 
de Paris, 1970 [1932].
berman, Sandra. “looking to Particulars: Feminism and the new history.” Yearbook of 
Comparative and General Literature 39 (1990–91): 100–112.
bernard-lazare. “les livres.” Les entretiens politiques et littéraires 6, no. 43 (may 25, 
1893).
bert, Paul. L’instruction civique à l’école. Paris: Picard-bernheim, 1882.
———. Lectures et leçons de choses, à l’usage de l’enseignement primaire et des classes 
élémentaires des lycées et collèges; Cours élémentaire et moyen. 12th ed. Paris: Picard et 
Kaan, 1902 [first edition with Picard et bernheim, in 1887].
     ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
berthelot, marcellin. “la science et la morale.” Revue de Paris (February 1, 1895): 449–
69.
bhabha, homi. The Location of Culture. new york: routledge, 1994.
birnbaum, Pierre. Les fous de la République: Histoire politique des Juifs d’Etat de Gambetta 
à Vichy. mesnil-sur-l’Éstrée: Fayard, 1992.
———. “La France aux Français”: Histoire des haines nationalistes. Paris: le Seuil, 1993.
bluysen, Paul. “Un drame décadent.” La République Française (november 7 and 8, 
1888).
bonald, louis de. Essai analytique sur les lois naturelles de l’ordre social. Paris: a. le Clere, 
1800.
borie, Jean. Mythologies de l’hérédité au XIXe siècle. Paris: Galilée, 1981.
———. “Préface.” in Les déracinés. Paris: Gallimard (Folio), 1988.
bory, Jean-louis. “introduction.” in Vérité. Paris: Cercle du livre Précieux, 1968.
boschetti, anna. Sartre et “Les Temps Moderns.” Paris: minuit, 1985.
bossuet, Jacques bénigne. Discours sur l’histoire universelle. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 
1966.
bouglé, Célestin. “l’éducation morale et l’école.” Encyclopédie française 15, no. 40 (1939): 
10–12.
bourdieu, Pierre, and Jean Claude Passeron. Reproduction in Education, Society and Cul-
ture. baltimore: Johns hopkins University Press, 1976.
bourgeois léon. “le projet de loi sur les universités devant le sénat.” Revue Internationale 
de l’Enseignement 23 (January–June 1892): 263–305.
bourget, Paul. “avant-Propos de 1883.” Essais de psychologie contemporaine. xv–xviii.
———. “avant-Propos de 1885.” Essais de psychologie contemporaine. xix–xxvii.
———. Le disciple. Paris: la Table ronde, 1994 [1889].
———. The Disciple. new york: howard Fertig, 1976. reprint of 1901 edition, pub-
lished by T. F. Unwin, london.
———. Essais de psychologie contemporaine. 2 vols. Paris: Plon-nourrit, 1901.
———. Mensonges. Paris: Plon, 1901 [1887].
———. Pages de critique et de doctrine. vol. 1. Paris: Plon-nourrit, 1912.
———. “réflexions sur Octave Feuillet.” in Pages de critique et de doctrine, vol. 1 (1912): 
116–20.
———. Solidarité. Paris: armand Colin, 1906 [1896].
———. “Théories politiques: Un élève de Taine.” in Essais de psychologie contemporaine: 
Études littéraires, 169–71. Paris: Gallimard, 1993.
boutmy, Émile. Quelques idées sur la création d’une faculté libre d’enseignement supérieur. 
Paris: a. lainé, 1871.
boutroux, Émile. De la contingence des lois de la nature. Paris: alcan, 1921 [1874].
bredin, Jean-Denis. Bernard Lazare. Paris: Éditions de Fallois, 1992.
brown, Frederick. Zola: A Life. london: Papermac, 1997.
brunetière, Ferdinand. “a propos du Disciple.” Revue des Deux Mondes (September 15, 
1889, and July 1, 1889): 214–27. 
———. “après une visite au vatican.” Revue des Deux Mondes (January 1895): 97–118.
———. Le roman naturaliste. Paris: Calmann lévy, 1883.
buisson, Ferdinand e. La foi laïque: Extraits de discours et d’écrits (1878–1911). Paris: 
hachette, 1912. 
———. La religion, la morale et la science: Leur conflit dans l’éducation contemporaine. Paris: 
Fischbacher, 1900.
burgelin, Claude, ed. Lectures de Sartre. lyon: Presses Universitaires de lyon, 1986.
burke, edmond. Reflections on the Revolution in France. london: Penguin, 1986.
burke, Peter. The Fabrication of Louis XIV. new haven, CT: yale University Press, 1992.
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     
Calhoun, Craig, ed. Social Theory and the Politics of Identity. Oxford: blackwell, 1994.
Carassus, Émilien. “De l’affaire Chambige au Jardin de bérénice.” Littératures 24 (1991): 
115–25.
Caro, elme. M. Littré et le positivisme. Paris: hachette, 1883.
———. “la morale de la guerre: Kant et bismarck.” Revue des Deux Mondes (December 
1, 1870).
———. Le pessimisme au XIXe siècle. Paris: hachette, 1878.
———. Poètes et romanciers. Paris: hachette, 1888.
Carroll, David. French Literary Fascism: Nationalism, Anti-Semitism, and the Ideology of 
Culture. Princeton, nJ: Princeton University Press, 1995.
Cassaing, Jean-Claude. “vive la république!” Cahiers Naturalistes 54 (1980): 299–
316.
Chaitin, Gilbert D. “le cauchemar de (la) Vérité: Ou le rêve du revenant.” Cahiers Natu-
ralistes 82 (2008).
———. “education and Political identity: The Universalist Controversy.” Yale French 
Studies 113 (Spring 2008): 77–95.
———. “‘France is my mother’: The Subject of Universal education in the French 
Third republic.” Readings in Nineteenth-Century French Prose 32.1 (Spring 2005): 
128–58.
———. “From the Third republic to Postmodernism: language, Freedom, and the 
Politics of the Contingent.” MLN 114, no. 4 (September 1999): 780–815.
———. Lacan and the Rhetoric of Culture. london: Cambridge University Press, 
1996.
———. “Psychoanalysis and narrative action: The Primal Scene of the French novel.” 
Style 18.3 (1984): 284–301.
———. “Transposing the Dreyfus affair: The Trauma of identity in Zola’s Vérité.” Aus-
tralian Journal of French Studies 38.3 (September–December 2001): 430–44.
Champfleury [Jules-François-Félix husson]. Les souffrances du professeur Delteil. Paris: 
michel lévy frères, 1857.
Charle, Christophe. Naissance des intellectuels, 1880–1900. Paris: Éditions de minuit, 
1990.
———. Paris fin de siècle, culture et politique. Paris: le Seuil, 1998.
Charles-brun, Jean. Le roman social en France au XIXe siècle. Genève: Slatkine, 1973. 
[reprint of Paris: Giard et brière, 1910 edition.]
Chevalier, Jacques. Henri Bergson. Paris: alcan, 1926.
Citti, Pierre. Contre la décadence: Histoire de l’imagination française dans le roman 1890–
1914. Paris: PUF, 1987.
Clark, linda l. Schooling the Daughters of Marianne. albany: State University of new 
york Press, 1984.
Coignet, Clarisse. Cours de morale à l’usage des écoles laïques. Paris: l. le Chevalier, 
1874.
———. De l’éducation dans la démocratie. Paris: C. Delagrave, 1881.
———. “De l’enseignement laïque en France et en angleterre.” Revue Politique et Lit-
téraire (Revue Bleue) (march 29, 1873): 928–31.
———. “De l’enseignement de la morale. Plan, méthode et esprit de cet enseignement: 
instruction secondaire des jeunes filles.” Revue Politique et Littéraire (Revue Bleue) 
(July 24, 1880): 73–82.
———. La morale indépendante dans son principe et dans son objet. Paris: Germer baillère, 
1869.
Colloque sentimental entre Émile Zola et Fagus. Paris: Société libre d’édition des Gens de 
lettres, 1898.
     ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
Compagnon, antoine. La Troisième République des lettres, de Flaubert à Proust. Paris: le 
Seuil, 1983.
Compagnon, béatrice, and anne Thévenin. Histoire des instituteurs et des professeurs, de 
1880 à nos jours. mesnil-sur-l’estrée: Éditions Perrin, 2001.
Compayré, Gabriel. Éléments d’éducation morale et civique, degré moyen et supérieur. Paris: 
P. Garcet, nisius et Cie, 1880.
Comte, auguste. Cours de philosophie positive. vol. i. Paris: baillière, 1864.
———. Discours sur l’ensemble du positivisme. Paris: Flammarion, 1998 [1848].
———. A General View of Positivism. Translated by J. h. bridges. Stanford, Ca: academic 
reprints, n.d.
Condorcet, marquis de. Rapport et projet de décret sur l’organisation générale de l’instruction 
publique, présentés à l’assemblée nationale, au nom du comité d’instruction publique. Paris: 
assemblée nationale de la [Première] république, 1792.
Copjec, Joan. Imagine There’s No Woman: Ethics and Sublimation. Cambridge, ma: miT 
Press, 2002.
Cosset, evelyne. Les Quatre Évangiles d’Émile Zola: espace, temps, personnages. Geneva: 
Droz, 1990.
Cresson, a. La morale de Kant: Étude critique. Paris: F. alcan, 1897.
“le crime littéraire.” La République Française (november 12, 1888).
Crubellier, maurice. L’école républicaine, 1870–1940. Paris: Christian, 1993.
Curtius, ernst robert. Maurice Barrès und die geistigen Grundlagen des französischen Na-
tionalismus. bonn: Friedrich Cohen, 1921.
Darlu, alphonse. “réflexions d’un philosophe sur les questions du jour: Science, morale, 
religion.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 3 (1895): 239–51.
Datta, venita. Birth of a National Icon: The Literary Avant-Garde and the Origins of the 
Intellectual in France. albany: State University of new york Press, 1999.
Dauriac, lionel. Contingence et rationalisme. Paris: vrin, 1924.
De maistre, Joseph. Essai sur le principe générateur des constitutions politiques. Paris: 
1814.
Démann, Paul. La catéchèse chrétienne et le peuple de la Bible: Constatations et perspectives. 
Paris: Cahiers Sioniens, 1952.
De metz noblat, a. “l’instruction civique à l’école d’après G. Compayré.” La Réforme 
Sociale 4 (1882): 337–42.
Derrida, Jacques. Who’s Afraid of Philosophy? Right to Philosophy I. Stanford, Ca: Stanford 
University Press, 2002.
Devinat, Émile. Livre de lecture et de morale. Paris: larousse, 1894.
Devolvé, Jean. Rationalisme et tradition: recherches des conditions d’efficacité d’une morale 
laïque. Paris: Félix alcan, 1910.
Digeon, Claude. La crise allemande de la pensée française (1870–1914). Paris: Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, 1959.
Dupanloup, Félix-antoine-Philibert. L’élection de M. Littré à l’Académie Française. 1871.
Durkheim, Émile. Éducation et sociologie. Paul Fauconnet, ed. Paris: Félix alcan, 1922.
———. L’évolution pédagogique en France. Paris: PUF, 1969 [1938].
———. Les règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: Flammarion, 1988 [1895].
Duruy, victor. Discours prononcé par M. Duruy au Sénat, séance du 22 mai 1868 au sujet 
d’une pétition relative à l’enseignement supérieur. Paris: Ch. lahure, 1868.
Du val, Thaddeus ernest, Jr. The Subject of Realism in the revue des Deux mondes. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1936.
Duveau, Georges. Les instituteurs. Paris: le Seuil, 1957.
edman, irwin. “introduction.” henry bergson. Creative Evolution, i–xxv. new york: 
modern library, 1944.
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     
eros, John. “The Positivist Generation of French republicanism.” Sociological Review 3 
(1955): 255–77.
Falloux, Frédéric-alfred de. De l’unité nationale. Paris: a. Sauton, 1880.
Favre, Julie. La morale des stoïciens. Paris: alcan, 1888.
Felman, Shoshana. “Turning the Screw of interpretation.” in Literature and Psychoanalysis. 
The Question of Reading: Otherwise, edited by Shoshana Felman, 94–207. baltimore: 
Johns hopkins University Press, 1982.
———. What Does a Woman Want? baltimore: The Johns hopkins University Press, 
1993.
Ferry, Jules. “Discours sur l’égalité d’éducation.” Salle molière, april 10, 1870. reprinted 
in legrand, 217–37.
Feuillet, Octave. Histoire de Sibylle. Paris: Calmann-lévy, 1877 [1863].
———. La morte. Paris: Calmann lévy, 1886.
Finkielkraut, alain. La défaite de la pensée. Paris: Gallimard, 1987.
———. The Defeat of the Mind. new york: Columbia University Press, 1995.
Flaubert, Gustave. Bouvard et Pécuchet. edited by Claudine Gothot-mersch. Paris: Gal-
limard, 1979.
Fletcher, Dennis. “Sartre and barrès: Some notes on La nausée.” Forum for Modern Lan-
guage Studies 4, no. 4 (1968): 330–34.
Fouillée, mme. alfred (pseudonym G. bruno). Le tour de la France par deux enfants, 
devoirs et patrie: Livre de lecture courante. Paris: e. belin, 1877.
France, anatole. The Amethyst Ring. Translated by m. P. Willcocks. london: bodley 
head, 1926.
———. “bouddhisme.” in La vie littéraire, vol. 3: 330–37. Paris: Calmann-lévy, 1892.
———. “le colonel Picquart.” Le Figaro (august 16, 1899).
———. “Un crime littéraire—l’affaire Chambige.” Le Temps (november 11, 1888).
———. The Elm-Tree on the Mall. Translated by m. P. Willcocks. london: bodley head, 
1923.
———. Le jardin d’Épicure. Paris: Calmann lévy, 1895.
———. Monsieur Bergeret in Paris. Translated by m. P. Willcocks. london: bodley head, 
1925.
———. “la morale et la science. m. Paul bourget.” in La vie littéraire, vol. 3: 46–68. 
Paris: Calmann lévy, 1925.
———. Oeuvres. vol. 2. edited by marie-Claire bancquart. Paris: Gallimard, 1987.
———. Oeuvres. vol. 3. edited by marie-Claire bancquart. Paris: Gallimard, 1991.
———. “Paul bourget: Le disciple.” Le Temps (June 23, 1889).
———. “les Trublions.” L’Écho de Paris (november 29, 1898).
———. The Wicker Work Woman. Translated by m. P. Willcocks. london: bodley head, 
1924.
Frandon, ida-marie. Barrès précurseur. Paris: Fernand lanore, 1983.
———. “Fait divers et littérature.” Revue d’Histoire Littéraire de la France 84, no. 4 
(1984): 561–69.
———. L’orient de Maurice Barrès, étude de genèse. Genève: Droz, 1952.
Freud, Sigmund. “The economic Problem of masochism.” Collected Papers. vol. 11: 
255–68. london: hogarth Press, 1949.
———. Group Psychology and Ego Analysis. Translated by James Strachey. new york: nor-
ton, 1975.
Funck-brentano, Théophile. Les sophistes allemands et les nihilistes russes. Paris: Plon, 1887.
Gaillard, Françoise. “a chacun sa vérité.” Cahiers Naturalistes 52 (1978): 17–26.
Gambetta, léon. Discours et Plaidoyers Choisis. edited by Joseph reinach. Paris: Char-
pentier, 1886.
     ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
Gauchet, marcel. “Préface.” in Benjamin Constant: Écrits politiques. Paris: Gallimard, 
1997.
Germain, marie-Odile. “Genèse d’un roman: Les Déracinés.” in Barrès: Une tradition dans 
la modernité, edited by andré Guyaux, Joseph Jurt, and robert Kopp, 31–40. Paris: 
honoré Champion, 1991.
Gide, andré. “a propos des Déracinés.” in Prétextes, Suivi de Nouveaux prétextes, 29–33. 
Paris: mercure de France, 1990 [1903; 1911].
Gier, albert. Der Skeptiker im Gespräch mit dem Leser: Studien zum Werk von Anatole France 
und zu seiner Rezeption in der französischen Presse, 1879–1905. Tübingen: niemeyer, 
1985.
Gilson, Étienne. La philosophie au moyen âge. Paris: Payot, 1944.
Girardet, raoul. Le nationalisme français. Anthologie. Paris: le Seuil, 1983.
Giraud, J. Didier. Émile Masson: professeur de liberté. Chamalières: Canope, 1991.
Gleizes, albert. Tradition et cubisme vers une conscience plastique. Articles et conférences, 
1912–1924. Paris: J. Povolozky, 1927.
Goodrick-Clarke, nicholas. The Occult Roots of Nazism. new york: new york University 
Press, 1992.
Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle. vol. 4. Paris: larousse, 1868.
Gregh, Fernand. review of Histoire contemporaine. La Revue Bleue (February 23, 1901).
Grogin, r. C. The Bergsonian Controversy in France 1900–1914. Calgary: University of 
Calgary Press, 1988.
Guiney, m. martin. Teaching the Cult of Literature in the Third Republic. new york: Pal-
grave macmillan, 2004.
hartmann, Édouard de. Philosophie de l’inconscient. Translated by D. nolen. Paris: Germer 
baillière, 1877.
harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity. Cambridge, ma: blackwell, 1989.
hauser, arnold. The Social History of Art. vol. 4: Naturalism, Impressionism, the Film Age. 
london: routledge, 1999.
hegel, Georg Friedrich. Natural Law: The Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law, Its 
Place in Moral Philosophy, and Its Relation to the Positive Sciences of Law. Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975.
idt, Geneviève. “modèles scolaires dans l’écriture sartrienne.” Revue des Sciences Humaines 
174 (april–June 1979): 83–103.
irigaray, luce. “how to Define Sexuate rights.” The Irigaray Reader. ed. margaret Whit-
ford. Cambridge, ma: blackwell, 1991.
isaac, Jules. L’antisémitisme a-t-il des racines chrétiennes? Paris: Fasquelle, 1960.
———. Jésus et Israel. Paris: Fasquelle, 1959.
Janicaud, Dominique. Une généalogie du spiritualisme français. Aux sources du bergsonisme: 
Ravaisson et la métaphysique. The hague: martinus nijhoff, 1969.
“la jeunesse boulangiste.” Le Figaro, may 19, 1888.
Johannet, rené. “l’évolution du roman social au XiXe siècle.” Revue de l’Action Populaire 
(September 20, 1908): 513–39.
Kant, immanuel. Critique of Practical Reason. Translated by lewis White beck. new 
york: macmillan, 1993.
Kaplan, alice yaeger. Reproductions of Banality: Fascism, Literature, and French Intellectual 
Life. minneapolis: University of minnesota Press, 1986.
Karr, alphonse. Fort-en-thème. Paris: aux bureaux du “Siècle,” 1850.
Katan, yvette. “l’enseignement de la morale et de l’instruction civique de la iiie république 
jusqu’en 1914.” in Études dédiées à Madeleine Gravitz, 419–37. Paris: Dalloz, 1982.
Kristeva, Julia. “Women’s Time.” The Kristeva Reader. ed. Toril moi. new york: Colum-
bia University Press.
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     
lacan, Jacques. Le désir et son interprétation. “Compte rendu” de J.-b. Pontalis. Bulletin 
de Psychologie 13 (1959–60): 263–72.
———. The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-Analysis. new york: norton, 1978.
———. “Kant with Sade.” Translated by James b. Swenson. October 51 (Winter 1989): 
55–75.
———. The Seminar. Book 7. The Ethics of Psychoanalysis. Translated by Dennis Porter. new 
york: W. W. norton, 1992.
———. The Seminar. Book 17. The Other Side of Psychoanalysis. Translated by russell Grigg. 
new york: W. W. norton, 2006.
lachelier, Jules. Du Fondement de l’induction. Paris: Pocket, 1993 [1871].
laclau, ernesto. On Populist Reason. london: verso, 2005.
lacoue-labarthe, Philippe, and Jean-luc nancy. Le mythe nazi. la Tour d’aigues: Édi-
tions de l’aube, 1991.
laville, béatrice. “l’éducation et ses enjeux à la fin du dix-neuvième siècle: ‘la vérité’ 
d’emile Zola.” Doctoral thesis, Université de Paris iii, 1991.
lavisse, ernest. A propos de nos écoles. Paris: a. Colin, 1895.
———. “louis liard.” Revue Internationale de l’Enseignement 72 (1918): 88–89.
le bon, Gustave. Les lois psychologiques de l’évolution des peuples. Paris: F. alcan, 1894.
———. La psychologie des foules. Paris: F. alcan, 1895.
lebovics, herman. True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity. ithaca, ny: Cornell 
University Press, 1992.
legrand, louis. L’influence du positivisme dans l’oeuvre scolaire de Jules Ferry: Les origines de 
la laïcité. Paris: marcel rivière, 1961.
lemaître, Jules. Impressions de théâtre. Dixième série. Paris: Société Française d’imprimerie 
et de librairie, 1898.
———. review of Octave Feuillet, La morte. Revue Politique et Littéraire (Revue Bleue) 
(February 6, 1886): 177.
levaillant, Jean. Les aventures du scepticisme. Essai sur 1’évolution intellectuelle d’Anatole 
France. Paris: a. Colin, 1966.
liard, louis. Morale et enseignement civique à l’usage des écoles primaires. Paris: l. Cerf, 
1883.
limayrac, Paulin. “Du roman actuel et de nos romanciers.” Revue des Deux Mondes (Sep-
tember 1, 1845): 937–57.
loué, Thomas. “les fils de Taine entre science et morale: a propos du Disciple de Paul 
bourget (1889).” Cahiers d’histoire: Revue d’histoire critique 65 (1996): 45–61.
luc, Jean-noël. L’invention du jeune enfant au XIXe siècle. Paris: belin, 1997.
lukàcs, Georg. Theory of the Novel. Cambridge, ma: miT Press, 1971.
lyotard, François. “le manifeste des cinq.” Le Figaro (august 18, 1887).
———. The Postmodern Condition. A Report on Knowledge. Translated by Geoff benning-
ton and brian massumi. minneapolis: University of minnesota Press, 1984.
———. “Universal history and Cultural Differences.” The Lyotard Reader. ed. andrew 
benjamin. Cambridge, ma: blackwell, 1991.
mansuy, michel. Un moderne: Paul Bourget de l’enfance au Disciple. Paris: les belles lettres, 
1960.
marin, louis. Utopiques: jeux d’espaces. Paris: minuit, 1973.
marion, henri. Leçons de morale. Paris: a. Colin, 1890.
massis, henri. La pensée de Maurice Barrès. Paris: mercure de France, 1909.
masson, Pierre. Le disciple et l’insurgé: Roman et politique à la belle époque. lyon: Presses 
Universitaires de lyon, 1987.
mayeur, Françoise. L’enseignement secondaire des jeunes filles sous la 3e République. Paris: 
Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1977.
     ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
mayeur, Jean-marie. La vie politique sous la Troisième République. Paris: le Seuil, 1984.
mayeur, Jean-marie, and madeleine reberioux. Les débuts de la Troisième République. 
Paris: le Seuil, 1973.
———. The Third Republic from its Origins to the Great War, 1871–1914. Translated by J. 
r. Foster. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.
mézières, alfred, and Charles rinn. Morale et patrie: Lecture à l’usage des écoles primaires. 
Paris: C. Delagrave, 1885.
michelet, Jules. Le peuple. Paris: Flammarion, 1974 [1846].
———. Le Prêtre, La Femme, La Famille: Les Jésuites. Paris: Flammarion, 1845.
———. “Tableau De la France.” in Histoire De France. 1833, vol. 1, edited by Claude 
mettra, 291–352. Geneva: edito-service, 1987.
miller, Jacques-alain. “extimacy.” in Lacanian Theory of Discourse: Subject, Structure, and 
Society, edited by mark bracher et al., 74–87. new york: new york University Press, 
1994.
———. “Suture.” Screen 18.4 (1977/78): 24–34.
milner, Jean-Claude. De L’école. Paris: le Seuil, 1984.
———. L’oeuvre claire: Lacan, la science, la philosophie. Paris: le Seuil, 1995.
mitterand, henri. “la  bête humaine. in“Étude” de La Bête humaine. Les Rougon-Mac-
quart. vol. 4: 1704–1757. Paris: Gallimard, 1967.
———. “notice.” in Vérité, 1495–1500. Paris: Cercle du livre Précieux, 1968.
———. L’honneur 1893–1902. in Zola. vol. 3. Paris: Fayard, 2002.
———. Sous le regard d’Olympia, 1840–1871. in Zola. vol. 1. Paris: Fayard, 1999.
monod. “De la possibilité d’une réforme de l’enseignement supérieur.” La Revue Politique 
et Littéraire 5 (1873–1874).
moréas, Jean. Le Symboliste (du7 au 21 octobre 1886): n.p.
mosse, George l. The Crisis of German Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich. 
new york: Grosset & Dunlap, 1964.
mouffe, Chantal. “Feminism, Citizenship, and radical Democratic Politics.” in Feminists 
Theorize the Political, edited by Judith butler and Joan W. Scott, 369–83. new york: 
routledge, 1992.
munteanu, basil. “episodes kantiens en Suisse et en France sous le Directoire.” Revue de 
Littérature Comparée 15 (1935): 387–454.
nolen, Désiré. “Kant et la philosophie du dix-neuvième siècle.” Revue Bleue (January 27, 
1877): 717–24.
nye, robert a. The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass 
Democracy in the Third Republic. london: Sage, 1975.
Ordinaire, Dionys. “Chronique.” La République Française (november 13, 1888).
Ouston, Philip. The Imaginatin of Maurice Barrès. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974.
Ozouf, Jacques, ed. Nous les maîtres d’école. Paris: Gallimard, 1973.
Ozouf, mona. L’école, L’église et la République, 1871–1914. Paris: Cana/Jean Offredo, 
1982.
Pagès, alain. Émile Zola, un intellectuel dans l’affaire Dreyfus: Histoire de “J’accuse.” Paris: 
Séguier, 1991.
Parodi, Dominique. La philosophie contemporaine en France. Paris: alcan, 1919.
Payot, Jules. Avant d’entrer dans la vie: Aux instituteurs et institutrices, conseils et directions 
pratiques. Paris: a. Colin, 1897.
Pécaut, Félix. L’Éducation publique et la vie nationale. Paris: hachette 1897.
Pellisier, Georges. review of Émile Zola, Vérité. Revue mondiale (February 15, 1903).
Pernot, Denis. Le roman de socialisation, 1889–1914. Paris: Presses Universitaires de 
France, 1998.
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     
Petitbon, Pierre-henri. Taine, Renan, Barrès: Étude d’influence. Paris: belles lettres, 
1935.
Petrone, mario. “Structures oniriques dans Vérité.” in Il terzo Zola: Emile Zola dopo i 
“Rougon-Macquart,” edited by Gian Carlo menichelli, 409–17. naples: istituto Uni-
versitario Orientale, 1990.
Pillon, François. “le principe d’autorité.” La Critique Philosophique 1.10 (april 11, 
1872): 145–51.
Pinto, louis. “la vocation de l’universel.” Actes de la recherche en Sciences Sociales 55: 
23–32.
Pois, robert a. National Socialism and the Religion of Nature. new york: St. martin’s, 
1986.
Prost, antoine. Histoire De L’enseignement en France 1800–1967. Paris: armand Colin, 
1968.
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph. De la justice dans la Révolution et dans l’Église. Paris: Garnier 
frères, 1858.
Proust, marcel. The Past Recaptured. Translated by Frederick a. blossom. new york: 
albert & Charles boni, 1932.
Quilligan, maureen. The Language of Oratory: Defining the Genre. ithaca, ny: Cornell 
University Press, 1979.
Quinet, edgar. L’enseignement du peuple. 1850. Paris: hachette, 1895.
———. Le génie des religions. 2nd ed. Paris: Chamerot, 1851.
raimond, michel. La Crise du roman, des lendemains du naturalisme aux années vingt. 
Paris: J. Corti, 1966.
rajchman, John, ed. The Identity in Question. new york: routledge, 1995.
rambaud, vital. “barrès et ‘le sens du relatif.’” Mesure 4 (October 1990): 183–96.
rauh, Frédéric. Psychologie appliquée à la morale et à l’éducation; Cours de morale à l’usage 
des jeunes filles. Paris: hachette, 1900.
ravaisson, Félix. “métaphysique et morale.” Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 1 (1893): 
1–25.
reclus, maurice. Jules Ferry 1832–1893. Paris: Flammarion, 1947.
reid, martine. “l’orient liquidé (barrès, Les déracinés).” Romanic Review 83, no. 3 (may 
1992): 379–88.
rémond, rené. L’anticléricalisme en France. De 1815 à nos jours. bruxelles: Éditions Com-
plexe, 1985.
renan, ernest. L’avenir de la science. Oeuvres complètes de Ernest Renan. Tome iii. Paris: 
Calmann-lévy, 1949. 715–1121. 
———. The Future of Science. boston: roberts brothers, 1893.
———. Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? Ernest Renan, texte intégral: littérature et identité na-
tionale de 1871 à 1914: textes de Barrès, Daudet, R. de Gourmont, Céline. edited by 
Philippe Forest. Paris: bordas, 1991.
———. La réforme intellectuelle et morale de la France. Paris: Union Génerale d’Éditions, 
1967 [1871].
renouvier, Charles. “le credo politique de la France et des races latines.” La Critique 
Philosophique 3, no. 31 (1874): 65–79.
———. “la doctrine républicaine, ou ce que nous sommes, ce que nous voulons être.” 
La Critique Philosophique (august 8, 1872): 1–16.
———. Manuel républicain de l’homme et du citoyen. Paris: Garnier, 1981 [1848].
———. “Petit traité de morale à l’usage des écoles primaires laïques.” La Critique Phi-
losophique 4.35 (September 30, 1875): 128–30; 4.49 (1876): 366–68.
———. “la raison d’État en 1872.” La Critique Philosophique 1.12 (april 25, 1872).
———. La science de la morale. Paris: ladrange, 1869. 
  0   ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
renouvier, Charles, and François Pillon, “la doctrine républicaine ou ce que nous sommes, 
ce que nous voulons être.” La Critique Philosophique (august 8, 1872): 1–16.
réval, G. [Gabrielle logerot]. Les Sèvriennes. Paris: Ollendorff, 1907 [1900].
ribot, Théodule. Maladies de la volonté. Paris: G. ballière, 1883.
———. La psychologie anglaise contemporaine. Paris: G. baillière, 1875.
ringer, Fritz. Fields of Knowledge: French Academic Culture in Comparative Perspective. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
ripoll, roger. “littérature et politique dans les écrits de Zola (1879–1881).” Cahiers 
Naturalistes 26 (1980): 41–53.
robiquet, Paul, ed. Jules Ferry, Discours et opinions. vol. 4. Paris: armand Colin, 1896.
rochet, marie-Claudette. “l’instituteur dans les romans publiés entre l’établissement de la 
iiie république et 1914.” Sorbonne maîtrise de lettres classiques, 1969.
Sachs, leon. “Finding l’École républicaine in the Damnedest of Places: François bégaud-
eau’s Entre les murs.” Yale French Studies 111 (2007): 73–88.
Sachs, murray. “The Present as Past: anatole France’s Histoire contemporaine.” Nineteenth-
Century French Studies 5, nos. 1, 2 (1976–77): 117–28.
Said, edward. Orientalism. new york: random house, 1979.
Sartre, Jean-Paul. “l’universel singulier” [1964]. in Situations, IX, 152–90. Paris: Gal-
limard, 1971.
Scharfstein, ben-ami. Roots of Bergson’s Philosophy. new york: Columbia University Press, 
1943.
Scott, Joan Wallach. “multiculturalism and the Politics of identity.” October (1993): 
12–19.
———. Parité! Sexual Equality and the Crisis of French Universalism. Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2005.
Scott, John a. Republican Ideas and the Liberal Tradition in France 1870–1914. new york: 
Columbia University Press, 1951.
Séverine [Caroline rehn]. “la Foule.” Le Journal (September 1, 1900).
Sorlin, Pierre. “La Croix” et les juifs 1880–1899: Contribution à l’histoire de l’antisémitisme 
contemporain. Paris: bernard Grasset, 1967.
Soucy, robert. Fascism in France: The Case of Maurice Barrès. berkeley and los angeles: 
University of California Press, 1972.
Soury, Jules-auguste. Campagne nationaliste. Paris: imprimerie de la Cour d’appel, 
1902.
Steeg, Jules. Cours de morale à l’usage des instituteurs. Paris: F. nathan, 1885.
Sternhell, Zeev. La droite révolutionnaire, 1885–1914: Les origines françaises du fascisme. 
Paris: le Seuil, 1978.
———. Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français. bruxelles: Éditions Complexe, 1985.
Stock-morton, Phyllis. Moral Education for a Secular Society: The Development of Morale 
Laïque in Nineteenth Century France. albany: State University of new york Press, 
1988.
Suleiman, Susan rubin. Authoritarian Fictions: The Ideological Novel as a Literary Genre. 
new york: Columbia University Press, 1983.
———. “Passion/Fiction: l’affaire Dreyfus et le roman.” Littérature 71 (October 1988): 
90–107.
Tadié, Jean-yves. “Jean Santeuil et l’anneau d’améthyste: Deux romans de 1’affaire Dreyfus.” 
in Anatole France: Humanisme et actualité, edited by marie-Claire bancquart and Jean 
Dérens, 79–85. Paris: bibliothèque historique de la ville de Paris, 1994.
Taine, hippolyte. De l’intelligence. Paris: hachette, 1870.
———. Derniers essais de critique et d’histoire. 2nd ed. Paris: hachette, 1896.
———. L’école. Les origines de la France contemporaine. Paris: hachette, 1876–1894.
b i b l i o g r A p h y   ~     1
———. Les origines de la France contemporaine. Paris: hachette, 1876–1894.
———. Les philosophes classiques. Paris: Slatkine reprints, 1979 [1888].
———. La révolution jacobine. Les origines de la France contemporaine. Paris: hachette, 
1876–1894.
Thibaudet, alfred. Le bergsonisme. Trente ans de vie française. vol. iii. Paris: Gallimard, 
1923.
Tison-braun, micheline. La crise de 1’humanisme: Le conflit de 1’individu et de la société 
dans la littérature française moderne (1890–1914). Paris: nizet, 1958.
maître Trarieux. “l’affaire Chambige.” Gazette des Tribunaux (november 9, 1888).
vacherot, Étienne. La démocratie. Paris: F. Chamerot, 1860.
vallès, Jules. Le bachelier. Paris: livre de Poche, 1985 [1881].
———. The Child. Trans. Douglas Parmée. new york: new york review books, 
2005.
———. L’enfant. Paris: livre de Poche, 1985 [1878].
———. “les victimes du livre.” Le Figaro (October 9, 1862). article reprinted in Jules 
vallès. Les Réfractaires. Paris: les Éditeurs Français réunis, 1973. 161–86.
———. Les réfractaires. Paris: Éditeurs français réunis, 1955 [1876].
viereck, Peter. Conservatism from John Adams to Churchill. new york: van nostrand, 
1956.
vogüé, eugène-melchior de. “la ligue démocratique des écoles.” Revue des deux mondes 
117.63e année, 3e période (may 1, 1893): 214–25.
———. Le roman russe. Paris: Plon-nourrit, 1886.
Weber, eugen. Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914. 
Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1976.
Weisz, George. The Emergence of Modern Universities in France, 1863–1914. Princeton, nJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1983.
West, Cornel. “The new Cultural Politics of Difference.” in Out There: Marginalization 
and Contemporary Culture, edited by russell Ferguson et al., 19–36. Cambridge, 
ma: miT Press, 1990. 
Wilson, nelly. Bernard Lazare: Antisemitism and the Problem of Jewish Identity in Late 
Nineteenth-Century France. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
———. “la mise en fiction de l’affaire Dreyfus: quelques réflexions sur Vérité.” in Il 
terzo Zola: Emile Zola dopo i “Rougon-Macquart,” edited by Gian Carlo menichelli, 
487–503. naples: istituto Universitario Orientale, 1990.
Winock, michel. Nationalism, Anti-Semitism and Fascism in France. Translated by Jane 
marie Todd. Stanford, Ca: Stanford University Press, 1993.
Wittmann, Jean-michel. Barrès romancier: Une nosographie de la décadence. Paris: Cham-
pion, 2000.
Wyzewa, Théodore de. Nos maîtres: études & portraits littéraires. Paris: Perrin, 1895 
[1887].
Zarifopol-Johnston, ilinca. “Ceci tuera cela: The Cathedral in the marketplace.” in To Kill 
a Text: The Dialogic Fiction of Hugo, Dickens, and Zola, 176–91. newark: University 
of Delaware Press, 1995.
Žižek, Slavoj. “Sur le pouvoir politique et les méchanismes idéologiques.” Ornicar? 34 
(July–September 1985): 41–60.
———. “Two Ways to avoid the real of Desire.” in Looking Awry, 48–66. Cambridge, 
ma: miT Press, 1991. 
Zola, Émile. “adieux.” Une Campagne. 872–77.
———. Une campagne. Émile Zola: Oeuvres complètes. vol. 11: 695–885. Paris: nouveau 
monde, 2005.
———. “lettre au Sénat.” La vérité en marche. 147–63.
     ~   b i b l i o g r A p h y
———. Le roman expérimental. Paris: Garnier-Flammarion, 1971.
———. Truth. Translated by ernest vizetelly. amherst, ny: Prometheus books, 2001. 
reprint of 1903 edition published by John lane, new york.
———. Vérité. Paris: livre de Poche, 1995.
———. Vérité. Oeuvres complètes. edited by maurice le blond. vol. 41. Paris: François 
bernouard, 1927.
———. La vérité en marche. Oeuvres complètes. edited by maurice le blond. vol. 42. 
Paris: François bernouard, 1927.
Aabstraction, 2, 3, 4, 13, 33, 36, 37, 44, 
47, 61, 64, 65, 71, 83, 86, 87, 92, 
102, 146, 192, 213, 255
abstract principles, 37, 71, 248
abyss, 69, 75, 80, 113, 121, 202, 256
Académie Française, 46, 273n1, 275n3
acceptance, ethic of, 88–92, 99–107, 
109–10, 117, 123–24
l’Action Française, 6, 270n9
adultery, 148, 151–52, 163, 169, 187
affect, 80, 97
albanese, ralph: La Fontaine à l’École 
républicaine, 268n4, 271n20; Molière 
à l’École républicaine, 18, 268n4, 
271n20
Aliette. See La morte
allegory, 73, 92, 160, 200, 217, 244–46; 
Dreyfus as, 197
alsace, 118, 134, 273n1
alsace-lorraine, 29, 104, 271–72n4. See 
also lorraine
Amethyst Ring, The (a. France), 139, 
146, 148, 151, 154, 165, 169, 174, 
175, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 262, 
274n4, 274n6, 275–6n6
amnesty, 12, 189, 197, 219, 229–30, 
237, 242, 267, 278n3
anarchism, 2, 195, 140, 153, 158
anarchist, 194, 124, 205, 265
anarchy, 8, 22, 91, 92, 97, 128, 249
ancestors, 37, 73, 83, 94, 106, 107, 
109, 110, 112, 114–15, 116, 118, 
135, 136, 138, 151, 166, 185, 251, 
271n18
ancien régime, 27, 111, 155, 177, 198
animality, 70, 96–97, 116, 124
annihilation. See death
L’anneau d’améthyste. See Amethyst Ring, 
The
anticlericalism, 19, 149, 197, 199, 211, 
216, 223, 228
antigone, 112
antirationalism. See irrationalism
anti-Semitism, 79, 80, 96, 114, 118, 139, 
205, 206, 219, 225, 229, 237, 242, 
244, 269n8, 273n1, 274n6, 275n3
a-object, 14, 254
Appeal to the soldier. See L’appel au soldat
appeasement, 149, 177, 187, 189, 190, 
193, 194, 226, 229, 230, 237, 270
L’appel au soldat (barrès), 81, 92, 96, 
104, 106, 114, 116, 263
“après une visite au vatican” (bru-
netière), 34, 141, 144–45
À Rebours (huysmans), 55
army, 6, 12, 39, 40, 51, 78, 104, 148, 
151, 154–55, 173, 174, 176, 182, 
183, 185, 188, 189, 197, 198, 199, 
201, 222, 227, 229, 250, 251, 264, 
265, 271–72n4, 274n7
in d e x
293
i
     ~   i n d e x
art, 9, 10, 143, 144, 178, 198, 209, 210, 
255; performative, 212
art for art’s sake, 64, 247, 253
artist, 158, 209, 240
l’art pour l’art. See art for art’s sake
L’Assommoir (Zola), 236, 237, 242, 
278n8
ataraxia, 193, 275–6n6
atavism, 72–73, 217
atheism, 53, 61, 75, 215
Au Bonheur des Dames (Zola), 241, 242
L’Aurore, 213, 222, 223, 245, 276n2, 
278n3
authoritarianism, 81–82,
authority, 63, 227, 233, 268n5, 273n3; 
absence of, 146; claim to, 138; crisis 
of, 37–42, 44, 248–55; derives from 
God, 145; divine, 210; education as 
work of, 42; foundation for, 42; God 
of, 208; legitimate, 40, 145; obedi-
ence to, 32, 76, 145, 154, 183, 216; 
of object, 137; paternal, 30; political, 
250; principle of, 75–76, 147; of 
reason, 38; recognized, 243; relation 
of education to, 82; religious, 25; 
respect for, 185; unquestioned, 198, 
225; voice of, 85
autonomy, 3, 6, 10, 24, 25, 27, 32, 37, 
38, 42, 70, 71–72, 84, 88, 92, 96, 
98, 107, 110, 120, 128, 181, 191, 
193, 208, 236, 253, 273n3, 279n1
Avant d’entrer dans la vie: aux instituteurs 
et institutrices, conseils et directions 
pratiques (Payot), 33
L’avenir de la science (renan), 36, 260
B
Bachelier, Le (vallès), 52
baguley, David, 217, 239, 241, 243, 
244, 245, 246
balzac, honoré de, 50, 68, 85, 130; 
Eugénie Grandet, 66; Lost Illusions, 
52, 90
bancquart, marie-Claire, 12, 139, 141, 
142, 160, 161, 178, 189, 273n1 
(chap. 5), 274n4, 274n6, 276n7
barré-lebiez case, 55–56, 121
barrès, maurice: L’appel au soldat, 81, 92, 
96, 104, 106, 114, 116, 263; Bas-
tions of the East, 96; Le culte du moi, 
7, 81, 93, 100, 102, 109, 110, 116, 
130, 262; Les déracinés, 81, 82–100, 
105, 107, 111, 116, 118, 120, 121, 
123, 129–34, 137, 262; L’ennemi des 
lois 120; “examen des trois romans 
idéologiques,” 7, 82, 135; Un homme 
libre, 93, 109, 110, 111, 113; Le jar-
din de Bérénice, 94, 110, 113; Leurs 
figures, 81, 86, 104, 107, 114, 124, 
135, 138, 263; The Novel of National 
Energy, 11, 79–138, 139, 262, 263; 
“l’oeuvre de leconte de lisle,” 126; 
Réponse à M. René Doumic, 109, 110, 
111, 113; Scenes and Doctrines of 
Nationalism, 13, 81, 89–90, 96, 110, 
112, 118, 119, 263; Sous l’oeil des 
barbares, 53, 107, 110, 252
Bastions of the East (barrès), 96
baudelaire, Charles, 62, 75, 122, 272n2
beauvoir, Simone de, 10
becker, Colette, 230, 278n9
Bel Ami (maupassant), 55
belief, 2, 8, 38, 50, 104, 168, 171–72, 
231; altering, 212; childhood, 84; 
Christian, 63, 185; criticism accept-
ed, 174, 179; in determinism, 77; in 
force of narrative, 133; in free will, 
50, 62; in God, 45, 62–63, 75; in 
intelligibility of world, 99; irrational, 
98; metaphysical, 23; mystical, 216; 
object of, 171; in power of reason, 
40, 96; progressive, 32; religious, 
48, 61–62, 63, 214; separability of, 
171–72; suspension of, 172–73; 
theological, 47; traditional, 249; 
value of, 171
benda, Julien, 5, 255, 270n9
bergson, henri, 34, 36, 60, 76, 262, 
270–71n13, 270n14, 270n15; 
Creative Evolution, 271n17; Essai sur 
les données immédiates de la conscience, 
35–36, 262
bermann, Sandra, 5
bernard, Claude, 21, 67
bernard-lazare, 7, 265, 273n1 (chap. 
4), 278n5
bert, Paul, 21, 22, 30, 39, 261
Bête humaine, La (Zola), 245, 278n9
betrayal, 27, 43, 80, 82, 140, 155, 158, 
164, 181, 182, 187, 196, 230. See 
also treason
bhabha, homi, 4
bibliothèque marguerite Durand, 269n7
Bildung, 3, 92, 113
Bildungsroman, 129, 140, 251, 253
i n d e x   ~     
bill of rights, 3
bismarck, Otto von, 13
blood and soil, 37
blum, léon, 10, 274n7
bluysen, Paul, 53
body, 26, 41, 96, 121, 122, 160, 217, 
227, 238, 275n4
bois, Jules, 11
bonald, louis de, 37, 38, 62, 111, 113, 
259
bonapartist, 17, 176
bond: between fantasy and ideology, 
247; moral and religious, 146; 
between religion and politics, 209; 
social, 23, 77, 145, 187, 250; of 
solidarity, 187; between women and 
the Church, 216
bordeaux Speech (Gambetta), 19, 20, 
261
boschetti, anna: Sartre et “Les Temps 
Modernes,” 271n17
bossuet, Jacques-bénigne (bishop), 161, 
190, 207
boulanger, Georges (general), 55, 82, 
116, 251
boulangism, 11, 55, 101, 104, 105, 113
bourbons, 17, 148, 260
bourdieu, Pierre, 3
bourget, Paul: Cosmopolis, 57, 73; Cruelle 
énigme, 54, 55; Le disciple, 11, 
45–78, 83, 98, 131, 140, 141, 251, 
262, 271n1, 271n2, 273n2 (chap. 
5); Essais de psychologie contemporaine, 
7–9, 51, 55, 59, 62, 64, 73, 125, 
252; L’Étape, 263, 268n7; Lies, 64; 
Nouveaux essais de psychologie contem-
poraine, 7
bourgeoisie. See social class
boutroux, Émile, 34–35, 60, 76, 261, 
270n14; De la contingence des lois de 
la nature, 34–35
brasillach, robert, 79
broglie, albert Duke de, 19, 206
brunetière, Ferdinand, 10, 34, 59, 61, 
64, 141, 144–46, 152, 179, 261, 
262, 274n3; “après une visite au 
vatican,” 34, 141, 144–45; Le roman 
naturaliste, 48
buddhism, 126
buisson, Ferdinand, 29, 270n11, 271n19
burdeau, auguste, 86, 272n4
burke, edmund, 37, 38, 97, 114, 218, 
259
C
Campagne, Une (Zola), 209
Capuchin Order, 204, 205, 210, 213, 
220
Carnot, hippolyte, 27
Caro, elme, 69, 72, 206; M. Littré et le 
positivisme, 46–48, 49, 261, 271n3
Carroll, David, 79, 80, 110, 118, 123, 
124, 126, 133, 134
Cassaing, Jean-Claude, 197–98, 223, 
225, 228, 230, 234, 275n4, 276n2, 
276n3, 278n3
castration, 112, 122
catechism, 40, 43, 210, 211, 215, 226, 
233, 269n4; laic, 27
categorical imperative, 83–84, 86–87, 
88, 92, 114, 115, 132
Catholic education. See education, 
religious
Catholicism, 2, 6, 14, 19, 24, 26, 31, 
37, 74, 76, 145–46, 209–11, 214, 
216–18, 228, 229, 230–31, 233, 
240, 242, 244, 249, 251, 269n2, 
274n6
Chamber of Deputies, 21, 23, 30, 31, 
39, 100, 261
Chambige, henri, 52–59, 64, 66, 70, 71
Champfleury, 51
chance, 112, 142, 148, 160–62, 164, 
181, 208. See also disorder; random-
ness
Chants du soldat (Déroulède), 176
Charterhouse of Parma, The (Stendhal), 
76
chéquards, 105, 106, 124
Child, The. See L’enfant
chronicle, 139, 140, 149; newspaper, 
143–44, 147–48, 162, 168
Church, Catholic, 1, 11, 12, 17–20, 31, 
32, 34, 56, 86, 141–42, 144–46, 
150, 156, 157, 158, 180, 182, 184, 
185, 190, 194, 196–232, 235, 239, 
242, 245, 250, 251–52, 256, 260, 
262, 263, 269n2, 269n3, 273n1 
(chap. 5), 274n3, 274n6
citizen, 25, 28, 39, 83, 125; armies, 155; 
ideal, 212; obedient, 239; republi-
can, 2, 198, 199, 212, 260; as sover-
eign, 115. See also Declaration of the 
rights of man and of the Citizen
civilization, 21, 135, 145, 153, 186, 
255, 272n2
     ~   i n d e x
class. See social class
Clemenceau, Georges, 140, 189, 225, 
275n4, 276n2, 278n3
Coignet, Clarisse, 26–27, 30, 40, 84, 
250, 260, 269n7
collectivism, 106, 107, 109, 158, 192
commentary, 99, 135, 136, 140, 165, 
167, 168, 171, 175, 179, 203, 244; 
narratorial, 102, 120, 129, 136, 174, 
244
Communards, 18, 28, 209
Commune, Paris, 6, 22, 52, 114, 250, 
257, 260
communion, 121, 181, 184, 187, 191; 
first, 215, 227, 233, 235
communism, 27, 192–93
community, 18, 42, 115, 145, 179, 181, 
184, 191–93, 235; imaginary, 42, 
240; imagined, 41
Comte, auguste, 20, 22–25, 34, 37, 48, 
66, 80, 97, 249, 260, 271n3; Cours 
de philosophie positive, 269n6; Discours 
sur l’ensemble du positivisme, 23
Concordat, 142, 269n2
concreteness, 4, 8, 13, 33, 36, 43, 60, 
64, 133, 135–36, 146, 178, 192, 
217, 218, 248
Condorcet, marquis de, 18, 23, 24, 25, 
80, 259, 269n5
confession: Catholic, 199, 215, 227, 
235; in The Disciple, 49, 50, 53, 57, 
62, 64, 66, 67, 77; in Truth, 210, 
234, 235, 238
Congregation of the assumption, 207, 
277n9. See also school, Congrega-
tionist
conservatism, 28, 37, 53, 54, 60, 80, 85, 
91, 97, 128, 166, 250
Contemporary History (a. France), 11, 
12, 139–96, 251, 262, 263, 273n1 
(chap. 5), 274n6, 278n7
contingency, 4, 6, 8, 14, 34–37, 38, 44, 
76, 111, 129, 144, 146, 147, 150, 
178, 189, 257, 261, 270n14
Cosmopolis (bourget), 57, 73
cosmopolitanism, 8, 109, 134, 158
Cosset, evelyne, 211, 237, 241, 243, 
278n6
countertransference, 70
Cours de philosophie positive (Comte), 
269n6
Course à la mort, La (rod), 55
Cousin, victor, 34, 269n5
Creative Evolution (bergson), 271n17
Crime and Punishment (Dostoevsky), 56, 
272n5
Critique of Pure Reason (Kant), 84
Critique of Practical Reason (Kant), 27, 
84, 251, 259
Critique Philosophique, La, 27, 75
Croix, La, 206–7, 245, 269n8, 277n9
crowd, 79, 80, 91, 94, 95, 98, 113–17, 
137, 139, 140, 173, 177, 184–86, 
187, 188, 190–91, 193, 225, 235, 
237, 275n2, 275n3, 275n4
Cruelle énigme (bourget), 54, 55
Cult of the Ego, The. See Le culte du moi
Culte du moi, Le (barrès), 7, 81, 93, 100, 
102, 109, 110, 116, 130, 262
culture, 6, 8, 10, 30, 42, 83, 133, 134, 
135, 153, 257; wars, 6, 11, 255–57
Curtius, ernst robert, 89, 91, 92, 101, 
105
D
Darlu, alphonse, 28
Darwin, Charles, 56, 96, 121, 150
Darwinism, 56, 121; social, 27, 61
Daudet, alphonse: Le petit chose, 270n10
death: as abandonment, 239; abyss of, 
75; acceptance of, 54; denial of, 
111–13; drive, 113; fear of, 111–13, 
117; foretaste of, 160; life versus, 
233; living, 161–62, 213, 234; love 
of, 124, 127; mental, 170; penalty, 
153, 155; perfumes of, 126; protec-
tion from, 74, 113; psychological, 
73; reality of, 116–17; subjective, 
208; thought of, 116–17
Débâcle, La (Zola), 224
decadence, 8, 9, 46, 53–55, 56, 58, 64, 
89, 112, 128, 130, 155, 251, 254, 
256
Declaration of the rights of man and of 
the Citizen, 1, 3, 110, 259
deduction, logical, 208, 220, 222
défense nationale, la, government of, 198
De la contingence des lois de la nature 
(boutroux), 34–35
De l’intelligence (Taine), 105, 268n5
demand, 14, 248, 254
democracy, 8–9, 13, 17, 20, 25–26, 27, 
37, 43–44, 55, 61, 78, 113, 119, 
146, 226, 243, 271n16, 278n4; par-
liamentary, 22, 36, 114, 128, 225
i n d e x   ~     
Democracy (vacherot), 260
deracination. See uprooting
Déracinés, Les (barrès), 81, 82–100, 105, 
107, 111, 116, 118, 120, 121, 123, 
129–34, 137, 262
Déroulède, Paul: Chants du soldat, 176
Derrida, Jacques, 3
Descartes, rené, 168, 271n3
desire, 66–73, 107, 122, 124, 126–28, 
137, 150–51, 159, 163, 173, 179, 
187, 189, 191–94, 200, 216, 223–
24, 229, 230–32, 246, 256; to be, 
155, 157; bestial, 69; civilized, 169; 
feminine, 240, 279; formation of, 
164, 168; frustrated, 121; for iden-
tity, 114; incestuous, 123; insatiable, 
129, 122, 216; irrational, 98, 236, 
246; to kill, 151, 185, 231; to know, 
9; lack of, 155, 159–60, 178; to live, 
97, 111, 117; for love, 234; man of, 
106; maternal, 279n1; mystical, 215; 
not-to-know, 236–37; of the Other, 
77, 192–94, 230; perverse, 215; for 
power, 69; protection from, 73–74; 
sexual, 72, 78, 209, 215–16, 279n1; 
social, 254; for something other, 
122, 216, 246; unconscious, 231; 
for vengeance, 117
despotism, 26, 27, 87, 153, 164
details, small human, 50, 60, 63
detective, 199–202, 224, 231; story, 
199–202, 235
determinism, 35–36, 61, 76, 77, 80, 90, 
91–93, 95–96, 98–99, 101, 104, 
106, 110, 111, 167–68, 172, 178, 
208
Devinat, Émile: Livre de lecture et de 
morale, 271n18
dictatorship, 17, 18, 19, 22, 39, 43, 81, 
87
didacticism, 81–82, 102, 123, 241, 
245–46, 253
Dieudonné, henri, Count de Chambord, 
147, 261
difference, 4–6, 24, 30, 32, 36, 119, 
127, 135, 147, 167, 180, 188, 236, 
237, 238, 246, 274n6
dignity: through democratic education, 
24; human, 26, 69, 84, 88; of the 
individual, 25–26, 67; of moral 
being, 30; of a rational being, 2; 
social, 88
dilettantism, 8, 101
Disciple, Le (bourget), 11, 45–78, 83, 
98, 131, 140, 141, 251, 262, 271n1, 
271n2, 273n2 (chap. 5)
discontinuity, 146
Discours sur l’ensemble du positivisme 
(Comte), 23
discourse: on appeasement, 177; cogni-
tive, 13; free indirect, 102–3, 206, 
215, 220, 241; of identity, 81; of 
the master, 4; of morality, 10; nar-
ratorial, 82; of the nation, 42; of 
the novel, 102; of philosophy, 10; 
positivist, 212; pre-utopian, 278n6; 
prophetic, 234; of religion, 10; of 
the republic, 114; of rootedness, 
127; of the University, 4, 127; uto-
pian, 245, 246, 278n6
disinterestedness, 3, 5, 10, 21, 48, 65, 
67, 70–71, 78, 255–56
disorder, 91, 106, 122, 143, 144, 147, 
161. See also chance; randomness
distance, 124, 137, 168, 170–71, 174, 
177–79, 183, 184, 187, 188, 193, 
203
diversity, 4–5, 8, 92, 129, 146, 154, 155
Le docteur Pascal (Zola), 242
dogma, 2, 20, 24, 29, 31, 34, 39, 41, 
87, 145, 181, 210, 226, 250, 269n2
Dostoevsky, Fyodor; Crime and Punish-
ment, 56, 272n5
doubt, radical, 92
Doumic, rené, 11, 135. See also 
“réponse à m. rené Doumic”
Dreyfus affair, 1, 11–13, 79, 81, 96, 
100, 104–5, 108, 112, 118, 139, 
144, 148, 149, 155, 173, 175, 176, 
180–81, 182, 184, 185, 187, 189, 
193–99, 208, 210, 217, 220, 222, 
223, 224, 225, 229, 232, 237, 242, 
243, 245, 249, 262, 263, 264–67, 
268n7, 274n4, 274n6, 275n3, 
277n9
Dreyfus, alfred (captain), 28, 174, 178, 
181, 184–85, 187, 188, 189, 195, 
196, 202, 208–9, 223, 229, 275n2, 
277n9
Drieu la rochelle, Pierre, 79
Du Fondement de l’induction (lachelier), 
270n14
Dupanloup, Félix antoine (bishop), 19, 
31
duration, 36–37
Durkheim, Émile, 42, 80, 97, 269n8, 
     ~   i n d e x
270n13; Les règles de la méthode 
sociologique, 270n13
Duruy, victor, 20
duty: absolute, 47, 87; citizen’s, 86; in 
democracy, 20; as hereditary rule, 
114; husband’s, 240; idea of, 121; 
of military service, 39; moral, 28, 
30, 33, 39, 43, 145; patriotic, 174; 
social, 151; teacher’s, 129; unmoti-
vated, 115; to uphold truth, 251
E
L’Écho de Paris, 274n4
education: and authority, 42, 82, 138; 
and character development, 50, 103, 
106, 133, 140, 243; content of, 3; 
democratic, 24–25; deracinating, 93, 
129; and desire, 193, 256; effects of, 
49, 60–61, 63–64, 137; and equality, 
23; experimental, 59–66; freedom 
of, 25; happiness through, 121; 
higher, 3, 28, 33; and identity, 7–8, 
50, 59, 134, 271n20; institutional 
forms of, 7; and intuition, 136; and 
irrationalism, 97, 237; laic, 1–3, 19, 
24–25, 26, 31, 41, 59, 78, 97, 149, 
194, 197, 198, 201, 210, 214, 221, 
225, 228, 234–35, 251, 276n2; and 
literature, 7, 51, 82, 268n4; modern, 
21; moral, 19, 20, 25, 30, 39, 42, 
115, 269n5, 269n6, 269n8, 270n11; 
moral and civic, 1, 30, 32–33, 39; 
multicultural, 3; mystical, 215; and 
narrative, 7; national, 21, 24, 65; 
nationalist, 135–36; and national 
unity, 15, 134; novels of, 11, 14, 82, 
129, 140, 168, 174, 194, 232, 241, 
246, 253–54, 257, 268n7, 279n1; 
and particularity, 60, 129, 131; 
popular, 20, 226; positivist, 21–22, 
47–49, 65, 121, 269n6; power of, 
14; primary, 20, 29, 274n5; and 
progress, 189–90; and the ralliement, 
141; rational, 275n4; religious, 1, 7, 
194, 199, 204, 210, 215, 217, 218, 
223, 226, 227, 232, 235, 237, 240, 
269n4, 270n11, 271–72n19; repub-
lican, 1–2, 13, 17–44, 45, 59, 71, 
91, 115, 118, 129, 225, 231, 237–
38, 249, 251, 261, 268n7, 269n5, 
270n11, 271n19, 271n20, 272n4; 
as seduction, 67, 71; and socialism, 
191; technocratic, 3; theory of, 65; 
and transference, 137–38; and the 
unconscious, 93–95, 135; universal, 
1, 2, 13, 21, 26; universalist, 122, 
134; unrealistic, 90; wars, 7; without 
God, 206; women’s, 30, 46, 232–33, 
240, 279n1. See also Ferry, Jules, edu-
cational reform laws
educator, 41, 49, 65–66, 82, 91, 140, 
142, 175, 245, 251, 253; intellectual 
as, 269n9; novelist as, 7
ego. See self
Elm-Tree on the Mall, The (a. France), 
139–51, 156–57, 159, 162, 164, 
165, 167, 174, 189, 187, 262
emancipation. See liberation
empire: First empire, 87, 259; Second 
empire, 8, 10, 18, 19, 26, 29, 52, 
56, 65, 88, 159, 242, 250, 251, 260, 
269n1, 272n4
empiricism, 33, 98, 237; empirical 
consequences, 92; empirical data, 
36; empirical evidence, 60; em-
pirical facts, 90; empirical observa-
tion, 10, 36, 62, 63, 65, 83, 222; 
empirical particularism, 93; empirical 
psychology, 72; empirical reality, 
83; empirical theory of the subject, 
271n3; empirical truth, 222; empiri-
cal world, 35; empiricist education, 
135; empiricist narrative, 60
empiricists, 77, 98
Enemy of the Laws, The (barrès), 120
energy: creative, 94–95, 100; napoleon, 
professor of, 100, 133; national, 21; 
revolutionary, 125
L’enfant (vallès), 7, 52, 261
enjoyment, 54, 70, 113, 119, 121, 127, 
193, 231, 278n8; of destruction, 
151; feminine, 215–16, 240; of the 
mob, 113–16; mystical, 240, 257; 
sadistic, 78, 154; society of, 124
enlightenment, 4, 6, 39, 80, 158, 183, 
196, 234, 238, 243, 246; deperson-
alized universe, 255; ethics, 187; ide-
ology, 5, 257, 269n3; liberalism, 26; 
principles, 99, 191, 255; progress, 
74; reason, 3, 40, 236; republican, 
39, 239; subject, 2, 80, 179, 251, 
256; suspension of belief, 172; uni-
versalism, 3, 14, 246; values, 238
L’ennemi des lois. See The Enemy of the 
Laws
L’enseignement du peuple (Quinet), 19, 
24–25
i n d e x   ~     
epicureanism, 61, 140, 150, 161, 167, 
175
epicurus, 150
equality, 5, 20, 21, 23–24, 25, 27–28, 
30, 147, 232, 236, 241, 249, 251, 
277n9
Essai sur les données immédiates de la con-
science (bergson), 35–36, 262
Essais de psychologie contemporaine (bour-
get), 7–9, 51, 55, 59, 62, 64, 73, 
125, 252
Essay on Indifference in Matters of Religion 
(lamennais), 156
espinas, alfred, 98
esprit nouveau. See new spirit
esterhazy, Ferdinand Walsin (major), 12, 
174, 198, 199, 223, 264, 265, 266
L’Étape (bourget), 263, 268n7
ethic of acceptance. See acceptance, ethic 
of
ethics: dialogic, 99–102; enlightenment, 
187; of experimentation, 67; inde-
pendence of, 269n5; individual, 83, 
95; instruction, 97; Kantian, 84, 85, 
87, 88; nationalist, 92, 104, 112; 
positivist, 49, 77–78; republican, 20, 
28, 38–39; of resignation, 9, 20, 62, 
91, 100, 194, 213; of science, 67; 
revolutionary, 20; of Spinoza, 61, 
68, 71; theoretical bases of, 30; of 
universality, 67, 87, 115, 134
Ethics of Psychoanalysis, The (lacan), 112
Eugénie Grandet (balzac), 66
Évangiles, Les (Zola), 211, 217, 237, 
239, 241, 242, 245
L’Événement, 52
evolution, 38, 61, 94
“examen des trois romans idéologiques” 
(barrès), 7, 82, 135
“existentialism is a humanism” (Sartre), 
35
exner, Sigmund, 80
exoticism, 90, 119–20, 123, 128, 134, 
138
experiment, 54, 65–72, 74, 242, 256, 
274n5; in chemistry and physics, 48; 
ideology of experimentation, 65, 67; 
mental, 47, 66; social experimenta-
tion, 78
experimental method, 65, 198, 237, 246
experimental novel, 64, 65, 200, 209, 
242, 261, 278n11
experimental psychology, 61, 72, 73, 
268n5
expiation, doctrine of, 154, 156, 161, 
162
extimacy, 15, 81, 109, 114, 116, 126, 
127, 257
F
Faerie Queene, The (Spenser), 244
Faisceau, Le, 79
Falloux laws, 19, 21, 260, 269n4
fantasy, 8, 75, 193, 203, 239–40, 247; 
fundamental, 15, 228; matricidal, 
77–78; scenario, 14, 256–57
fascism, 5, 79–81, 99, 102, 114, 125, 
128
fatality, 24, 160–61
father: authority of, 30; fecundating, 
239; figure, 74; guilt of, 221–24; 
identification, 75; national, 219; om-
nipotence of, 240; sin of, 238–39; 
surrogate, 74, 251; treacherous, 228, 
251
Faure, Félix (president), 141, 157
Faust (Goethe), 68, 124, 272n5
Favre, mme Jules, 29, 261
femininity, 74, 118, 119, 216, 240–41, 
245
Ferry, Jules, 2–3, 17, 19, 23–24, 39, 55, 
97, 155, 232, 250, 260, 261, 268n1, 
271n19; educational reform laws, 
1, 11–12, 14, 18, 21, 29–32, 66, 
141, 153, 197, 212, 225–26, 251, 
253, 257, 274n5. See also education, 
republican
Feuerbach, ludwig, 101
Feuillet, Octave, 65, 69, 206; M. de 
Camors, 50; La morte, 11, 45–50, 59, 
60, 62, 63, 73, 261
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 101, 110, 
272n2
fictionalization, 171–77, 198
Figaro, Le, 48, 53, 89, 96, 99, 140, 173, 
209, 266, 272n5
finance, 87, 158–59, 179, 185; Jewish, 
58, 158, 275–76n6
Finkielkraut, alain, 6
Flaubert, Gustave, 8, 10, 46, 102, 130, 
155, 243
focalization, 116, 169–71
Fontenay-aux-roses, École normale 
Supérieure de, 29
foreignness, 110, 118–28, 134, 158, 
176, 185, 190, 211; elimination of, 
114, 118–20, 122, 124, 127, 256
 0 0   ~   i n d e x
Fortune des Rougon, La (Zola), 19, 242
Fouillée, alfred, 270n9
Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanaly-
sis, The (lacan), 193, 238, 273n3, 
276n6
Fourier, Charles, 28
France, anatole: The Amethyst Ring, 139, 
146, 148, 151, 154, 165, 169, 174, 
175, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 262, 
274n4, 274n6, 275–6n6; Contem-
porary History, 11, 12, 139–96, 251, 
262, 263, 273n1 (chap. 5), 274n6, 
278n7; The Elm-Tree on the Mall, 
139–151, 156–57, 159, 162, 164, 
165, 167, 174, 189, 187, 262; 
Monsieur Bergeret in Paris, 139, 148, 
165, 168, 178, 193, 263; The Wicker 
Work Woman, 139, 140, 143, 148, 
149, 151, 153–54, 156, 158–59, 
161–62, 169–70, 174–75, 181, 186, 
187, 189, 262, 275–6n6
Franco-German War, 6, 159, 260, 
272n4
Frandon, ida-marie: L’orient de Maurice 
Barrès, 125–26
Frank, Walter: Nationalismus und De-
mokratie im Frankreich der dritten 
Republik, 79
freedom: as basis of law, 20, 26; and 
contingency, 36, 37, 270n14; and 
democracy, 37; and divine order, 
147; economic, 26; and education, 
20–21, 24, 25, 82, 197; enlighten-
ment, 2, 6, 26; France as world 
liberator, 12; as fundamental value 
of modern state, 24; human, 2, 25, 
35; individual, 26, 37–39, 42, 69, 
71–72, 84, 192, 233, 271n3; inner 
moral, 163–65, 172–73; of Jews, 
274n6; Kantian, 26–28, 30, 35–36, 
84; and morality, 26–27, 35, 98; 
nationalist, 110; of the other, 231; 
political, 19–20, 24, 153, 159, 
217; of the reader, 81, 129, 173; 
and repetition, 163; republic and, 
146–47, 181; and society, 25; of 
thought, 19–20, 24, 29, 38, 65, 
154, 225; and universal suffrage, 
25; and utopia, 232; of the will, 
25, 35, 50, 62, 76, 92, 98, 104, 
262
Freemasons, 23, 261
Froebel, Friedrich Wilhelm, 43
G
Gambetta, léon, 17, 18, 21, 30, 86, 
228, 250, 261
Gazette des Tribunaux, La, 53
Germany, 3, 19, 36, 37, 73, 80, 92, 95, 
96, 104, 106, 113, 114, 118, 119, 
125–26, 134, 135, 206, 229, 264, 
265, 271–72n4, 272n2. See also 
Franco-German War
Germinal (Zola), 43, 72, 202, 224, 237, 
241, 242–43
Gide, andré, 81, 129
Girardet, raoul, 13, 112, 115
God, 2, 6, 14, 29, 31, 35, 40, 41, 42, 
43, 45, 47, 61, 62, 74, 142, 145–47, 
161–62, 181, 202, 204–10, 215, 
251, 270n14, 271n19, 272n3, 275n5
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang von: Faust, 
68, 124, 272n5; The Sorrows of Young 
Werther, 53, 74
Gospels. See Les Évangiles (Zola)
gothic element, 214, 216, 217, 221, 244
government, parliamentary. See democ-
racy, parliamentary
Gramsci, antonio, 255
Grévy, Jules, 156, 262
Guesde, Jules, 188
Guiney, m. martin: Teaching the Cult of 
Literature in the French Third Repub-
lic, 268n4, 270n11
H
habeas corpus, 3
haeckel, ernst, 96
happiness: desire for, 217; earthly, 213; 
general, 47–48, 235; as goal of life, 
154; individual, 2, 47–48; lost, 234; 
in love, 231; mystical, 215; in posi-
tivism, 47; pursuit of, 21, 218
hartmann, eduard von: The Philosophy of 
the Unconscious, 93–94, 261
hegel, G. W. F., 5, 271n3
hegemonic formation, 255
herd. See crowd
herder, Johann Gottfried von, 6, 37, 94, 
114, 125, 134, 259
hereditary flaw, 207, 208, 217, 277n12
heredity, 51, 72, 94, 112, 217, 277n12; 
cultural, 80, 96; physiological, 113
hero: national, 118, 125, 271–72n4; 
romantic, 183
i n d e x   ~    0 1
High School Graduate, The. See Le 
bachelier
hinduism, 126
Histoire du XIXe siècle (michelet), 115
Histoire générale des voyages (abbé an-
toine Prévost), 159, 163–64
history: as changeability, 34; contact 
with, 93; contemporary, 143–44, 
169, 171, 177, 189; contingency 
of, 6, 35, 256; creative spontane-
ity of, 2, 36; development in, 104; 
discontinuity of, 255; of education 
wars, 197; end of, 192; european, 
135; human, 161; of independent 
morality, 269n5; individual in, 89; 
of Jews in Third republic, 274n6; 
literary, 10: meaning of, 162, 191; 
necessity in, 99; particularity of, 2, 
131; period of, 3, 29, 158; political, 
197, 199, 250; redefinition of, 44; 
regional, 135; sense of, 95, 147; 
shared, 18, 138; Sorbonne chair in, 
98; uniqueness of, 36–37
History of English Literature (Taine), 54
hitler, adolf, 79, 118, 149
homeland, 15, 73, 74, 78, 148, 157, 
165, 183, 195, 207, 272n3; as 
family, 24; as God, 40; idea of, 13; 
Jacobin, 86; Jews lack, 118, 206; 
as mother, 72, 74, 78; republican, 
39–41, 71, 211; as soil and dead, 
118; as spirit, 146
homme de lettres. See man of letters
Homme libre, Un (barrès), 93, 109, 110, 
111, 113
hugo, victor, 7, 68, 72, 82, 84, 91, 95, 
96, 100, 116–18, 120–21, 123, 124, 
126, 131, 137, 251, 261, 275n3; 
Notre-Dame de Paris, 210; “Saison 
des semailles,” 239
humanism, 3, 80, 92, 112, 159
humboldt, alexander von, 3
huysmans, Joris-Karl, 47, 155; À 
rebours, 55
hypnotism, 42, 68, 72, 120, 138, 170, 
273n3
I
idea of the University, 3
ideas: abstract, 129, 132, 178; associa-
tion of, 8; general, 10, 13, 154, 174, 
180, 255, 272n3; irrational, 97, 206, 
218, 219, 226; novel of, 9–13, 49, 
77, 173–77, 252–54; political, 9
Idées morales du temps présent, Les (rod), 
272n2
identity, 70, 72, 73, 119, 120–21, 138, 
172, 173, 180, 182, 202, 210, 214, 
231, 239, 243, 245, 279n1; bases 
of, 83; class, 6; common, 137; and 
contingency, 8; cultural, 6, 135; 
crisis of, 44, 59; and desire, 127; and 
difference of sexes, 5; discourse of, 
81; economic, 187; education and, 
7, 151; ethnic, 6; extimate, 109; 
and fear of death, 117; formation 
of, 50, 190, 212; fragmented, 64; 
French, 110, 199; group, 113, 115, 
134; individual, 2, 15, 40, 129, 134, 
192, 199, 254; lack of, 146–47, 158; 
literature and, 52; local, 114; as lust 
for being, 111; of minorities, 4; 
national, 2, 6, 7, 12, 14–15, 40, 59, 
113, 125, 134, 159, 198, 212, 218, 
251, 254, 268n7, 271n20; national-
ist, 78, 81; and nothingness, 125, 
240; parasitic, 218; in peril, 72, 202, 
219, 247, 249, 251, 254, 257; po-
litical, 187, 248; politics of, 7, 190; 
positivism and, 49, 173; regional, 
135–36; religion and, 214–15; rep-
resentations of, 10; of the republic, 
218, 232; of the republican citizen, 
2–3, 13, 40, 42, 44, 115, 199, 212, 
226, 232, 248; rooted, 172; search 
for, 129; sense of, 110; as subject, 
179; substantial, 190; traditional, 
133, 158, 185; trauma of, 14
ideology: anticolonial, 6; of barrès’s 
trilogy, 91, 93–94, 100, 123, 125, 
130, 137; Catholic, 144–45, 211, 
255; of chronicles, 144, 168; 
competing ideologies, 14; conserva-
tive, 85; of education, 14, 18, 83, 
225; enlightenment, 5, 39, 257; of 
experimentation, 65, 67; and fantasy, 
199, 247; fascist, 81; and fiction, 82, 
253–55; fixed, 106; in Germany, 92; 
ideological battle between clericals 
and secularists, 196, 249, 251; 
ideological fantasies, 14; ideologi-
cal reading, 101–2, 229; ideological 
polarization, 11; ideological rape, 
227; of l’imprévu, 76; of the left, 
3, 275n3; liberal, 250; nationalist, 
 0    ~   i n d e x
36–37, 79–80, 123; of new spiritual-
ism, 34; in novels, 129–31, 171; 
Opportunist, 31, 37–38, 55, 212; 
political, 34, 120; positivist, 22, 65, 
246; racist, 94; republican, 43, 49, 
59, 80, 82–82, 97, 128, 147, 209, 
225, 246, 249; of the soil and the 
dead, 111–13, 171; of sovereignty, 
43; of universalism, 237
l’imprévu, 76, 143
independence, 24–25, 29, 43, 83, 119, 
136, 146, 165, 172, 182, 236. See 
also autonomy
indifference, 139, 147, 150, 155–59, 
163, 178, 180, 185, 193. See also 
desire, lack of
individual: abstract, 6, 37, 44; anatomy 
of, 242; conscience of, 250; desire 
of, 193, 200; desubjectified, 255; 
dignity of, 25, 67; dissolution of, 
113, 194; evil instincts of, 69; fate 
of, 160; freedom of, 20, 26–27, 
38, 153, 181, 192, 236; happiness 
of, 47–48, 54; identity of, 42, 59, 
129, 134, 192, 199, 210, 248–49, 
251, 254; interpretation by, 131, 
145, 169; judgment of, 181, 256; 
mind of, 256; moral sovereignty of, 
30; motives of, 74; against national 
unity, 13; obedience of, 145, 233; 
perspective of, 101; reason of, 13, 
80, 96–97, 111, 145; rights of, 
86–87, 115, 249; self-defining, 92; 
selfishness of, 42, 94; and society, 
89, 91, 93, 105, 109–10; and the 
state, 30, 40, 44, 86–87, 192, 
255; subordination of, 61, 80, 91, 
97–98, 104, 107, 126, 208, 270n13; 
temperament of, 164; truth of, 129; 
uniqueness of, 2–5, 35
individualism, 22, 80, 86, 98, 105, 107, 
110, 113, 145
individuality, 36, 86, 95, 113, 115, 124, 
146, 239, 249
induction, 10, 33, 254
inequality, 23, 76, 190; of women, 32
instinct, 6, 9, 64, 74, 76–77, 80, 94–96, 
97, 106, 113, 121, 122, 124, 126, 
131, 138, 145, 150–53, 155, 208, 
209, 238, 248, 256
instituteur, institutrice. See schoolteacher
intellect, 13, 23, 61, 76, 96, 97, 105–6, 
112, 136, 202, 252, 275n5
intellectual, the, 63, 100, 139, 158, 171, 
187–88, 189, 269n9
intelligentsia, 115
intelligibility, 97–99, 147, 207, 224, 257
interpretation, 60, 62, 64, 72, 73, 75, 
81, 82, 102, 107, 118, 123, 125, 
128–31, 135, 137, 138, 145, 150, 
160, 165, 167, 175, 177, 212, 219, 
223, 243–44, 246, 252–53, 268n7
intertext, 49, 245
intuition, 76, 94, 136, 219, 235; Kant’s 
forms of, 126
ionia. See Orient
irigaray, luce, 5
irony, 131, 147, 153, 156, 168, 178, 
179–80, 183, 187, 191, 209; 
double, 172
irrational fear, 205, 206
irrational impulse, 231
irrationalism, 37, 80, 95–99, 136, 207, 
208, 210, 218, 226, 236, 237, 238, 
270n15
irrationality, 98, 198–99, 209, 215, 217, 
236–37, 238
J
Jacobin, 2, 125, 181
Jardin de Bérénice, Le (barrès), 94, 110, 
113
Jaurès, Jean, 140, 188, 189, 225, 276n2
Jew, 114, 118–19, 125, 157–58, 180–82, 
185, 188, 195, 199, 204–8, 211, 
225, 230, 231, 234, 237, 273n1, 
274–76n6, 276n7, 277n9, 278n5
Joan of arc, 142, 148, 174
jouissance. See enjoyment
Journal (amiel), 54
Journal, Le, 97, 106
July monarchy, 20, 88, 260, 269n2, 
269n5
justice, 12, 20, 25, 27–28, 29, 41, 44, 
104, 105, 112, 138, 152, 155, 159, 
177, 185, 188–89, 191, 196–98, 
200, 209, 210, 218, 223, 226, 
229–30, 232, 235, 249, 251, 257, 
275–6n6, 276n3, 276n4, 277n9
K
Kambouchner, Denis, 3
Kant, immanuel; Critique of Practical 
i n d e x   ~    0 
Reason, 27, 84, 251, 259; Critique 
of Pure Reason, 84. See also reason, 
practical; universalism
Karr, alphonse, 51
Kierkegaard, Søren, 6, 238
Kristeva, Julia: “Women’s time,” 5
L
lacan, Jacques, 4, 14, 114, 115, 123, 
149, 193–94, 238–39, 273n3, 
276n6; The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 
112; The Four Fundamental Concepts 
of Psychoanalysis, 193, 238, 273n3, 
276n6; The Other Side of Psychoanaly-
sis, 4, 127
lachelier, Jules, 28, 270n14; Du Fonde-
ment de l’induction, 270n14
lack, 14, 69, 129, 146, 213, 216, 239, 
252, 254
laclau, ernesto, 14, 248, 254
lacoue-labarthe, Philippe: Le mythe 
Nazi, 79
lafayette, mme de, 46
laffitte, Pierre, 22
La Fontaine à l’École républicaine (alba-
nese), 268n4, 271n20
lamennais, Félix: Essay on Indifference in 
Matters of Religion, 156
langevin-Wallon report, 2
language: and abstraction, 36; distrust 
of, 130; fictive, 245; games, 4; 
German, 125; and mentality, 134; 
particular, 3; performative, 212, 
245–46; power of, 245–46; problem 
of, 169; specious sixteenth-century, 
177; system like a, 13, 253
Language of Allegory, The (Quilligan), 
244
launoy, Jean de, 148, 174
law: application of, 112; artificial, 83; 
black, 153; causal, 99; and the 
Church, 146, 157, 226, 263, 269n2; 
by deduction, 208; and desire, 106; 
of determinism, 104; divine, 208; 
and education, 7, 21, 39; external, 
37, 110; and freedom, 20, 28, 226, 
233; general, 8, 33, 35, 36, 93, 99, 
170; giving oneself one’s own, 25, 
27, 84, 110; by induction, 208, 254; 
ineluctable, 68, 70; on inheritance, 
97; inner, 88, 110; intellectual, 106; 
of the jungle, 56, 68; of logic, 35; of 
man’s conduct, 144–45; moral, 25, 
27, 30, 68, 84, 87; natural, 26, 34–
35, 47, 65, 89, 200, 208; necessary, 
93; orderly, 22; of ordinary life, 54; 
patriarchal, 236; principle of, 147; 
psychological, 65, 67, 76; rational, 
77; relativity of, 88; social, 106; and 
society, 38; of the soul, 70; of the 
struggle for life, 61; supremacy of, 
28; transcendent, 47; universal, 36, 
70, 71, 76, 112; voluntary obedience 
to, 29. See also Falloux laws; Ferry, 
Jules, educational reform laws
lazare, bernard, 7, 265, 273n1 (chap. 
4), 278n5
le bon, Gustave, 80, 94–96, 98, 114, 
136–37
leçon de choses. See object lessons
legitimacy: of the cult of ancestors, 249; 
of government, 21, 146; political, 
23; of republican authority, 37, 40, 
43, 145, 248, 271n20; transcendent, 
25, 44
legitimist, 17
lemaître, Jules, 10, 45, 49
leo Xiii (pope), 12, 19, 141, 144–45, 
262
leroux, Pierre, 28
“letter to the Senate” (Zola), 229, 237, 
276n8
Leurs figures (barrès), 81, 86, 104, 107, 
114, 124, 135, 138, 263
levaillant, Jean, 139, 141, 143, 146, 
149, 160, 162, 168, 170, 179, 
273n1 (chap. 5), 274n2, 274n3, 
275n2
liard, louis: Morale et enseignement 
civique à l’usage des écoles primaires, 33
liberalism, 19, 20, 38, 43, 78, 157, 
192, 250; of bourgeoisie, 278n4; 
of Catholic Church, 19, 269n2; 
enlightenment, 26; Kantian, 28; 
liberal principles of 1789, 249; of 
Protestant Church, 29
liberation, 4, 12, 21, 24, 26, 29, 67, 70, 
77, 94–95, 120, 158–59, 163–66, 
171, 172, 190, 216–17, 252, 
276n3; women’s, 45, 228, 232, 233, 
235–36, 240–41
liberty. See freedom
Libre Parole, La, 207
lichtenberg, Georg, 80
Lies (bourget), 64
 0    ~   i n d e x
ligue de l’enseignement, 20, 260
literariness, 102
literature: as alterity, 119; anti-Semitic, 
273n1 (chap. 4); and crime, 52–54; 
decadent, 8, 53–54, 56, 58, 64; 
democratization of, 11; and the 
Dreyfus affair, 11; and education, 7, 
44, 51, 82, 268n4, 270n11, 270n12; 
and emotion, 66; historians of, 46; 
and identity, 10, 52; and morality, 
64–65, 77; national, 36; naturalist, 
9, 261; point of view in, 128; politi-
cal, 247; power of, 51, 57; roman-
tic, 68; weight of previous, 252. See 
also thesis novel
littré, Émile, 20, 22, 31, 46–49, 60, 61, 
66, 271n3
Livre de lecture et de morale (Devinat), 
271n18
locke, John, 98, 268n5
logos, 5, 102, 189, 239
lorraine, 72, 82, 85, 101, 106, 108, 
109, 118, 135. See also alsace-lor-
raine
Lost Illusions (balzac), 52, 90
loubet, Émile (president), 197, 208
louis-napoleon. See napoleon iii
love: altruistic, 40; of authority, 137; 
as basis of social order, 75–76; of 
country, 5, 39–42, 71, 78, 271n18; 
and death, 56, 76, 124; divine, 215; 
of enslavement, 216; and hunger, 
151; of ignorance, 217; of killing, 
175; of the military, 227; modern, 8; 
of self, 5, 6, 40, 78; and self-sacrifice, 
40; sexual, 234; for the soil and the 
dead, 136–37; transferential, 138; of 
truth, 221
loyola, ignatius of, 96
lucretius, 150
lukács, Georg: Theory of the Novel, 129
lyotard, François, 4
M
macé, Jean, 20, 260
Madeleine Férat (Zola), 241, 277n10, 
277n11
madness, 72, 74, 178, 196, 198, 206, 
208–10, 236, 238, 241
maistre, Joseph de, 37, 62, 83, 111, 113, 
114, 260
Maladies de la volonté, Les (ribot), 68
manichaeism, 46
“le manifeste des cinq,” 48
man of letters, 64
Mannequin d’osier, Le. See Wicker Work 
Woman, The
mansuy, michel, 7, 34, 49, 51, 52, 55, 
57, 58, 61, 62, 63, 73, 252, 272n5
Manuel républicain de l’homme et du 
citoyen (renouvier), 27, 43, 260
marguerite, victor, 11
marianne, 41, 73–74
marx, Karl, 95, 194, 255
masses, the, 188, 194, 250; credulity 
of, 185–86; educating, 194, 275n4; 
energy of, 133; good and evil, 186; 
ignorant, 228; indifference of, 256; 
politics of, 80, 95, 114; religion for, 
41; subservience to authority of, 
183; as victims, 201; violence of, 
275n3. See also crowd
massol, alexandre, 20, 26, 260
masson, Pierre, 13, 144, 162, 166
materialism, 49, 60, 88, 167, 278n5
maupassant, Guy de, 274n6; Bel Ami, 55
Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme français 
(Sternhell), 96, 271n17, 272n5
M. Bergeret à Paris. See Monsieur Bergeret 
in Paris
M. de Camors (Feuillet), 50
meaning: abstract, 147; definitive, 190; 
destroying, 134, 138, 147, 179; 
discovering, 254; eternal, 144, 162; 
of events, 13, 130, 131, 133, 149, 
169, 211; and freedom, 167–68; 
giving, 6, 93, 191, 211–12, 253–54; 
guarantor of, 201; immanent, 
129–30, 253; intersubjective, 201; 
lack of, 131, 147, 161, 162, 253; 
meaningful without, 163; national-
ist, 131; new, 189; of objectivity, 
10, 251; petrified, 162; political, 
94; preconceived, 150; ready-made, 
130; of reality, 128, 253; reign of, 
161; repressed, 118; restoration of, 
235; retroactive, 149–50; subjective, 
10; subverting, 128; system of, 201; 
theological, 160, 162; theoretical, 
148; transcendent, 129, 191; univer-
salist system of, 138
mechanism, 61
meirieu, Philippe, 2
méline, Jules, 149, 176, 262
Mensonges. See Lies
i n d e x   ~    0 
metaphysics, 7, 34, 39, 47, 61, 62, 
278n5; western, 4, 5
michelet, Jules 20, 74, 115, 121, 216, 
233, 241, 250, 277n10, 277n11; 
Histoire du XIXe siècle, 115
military, the. See army
mill, John Stuart, 98, 268n5
milner, Jean-Claude, 3
mise-en-abîme, 65, 131, 174, 246
misogyny, 182, 193
mitterand, henri, 196, 198, 223, 224, 
225, 241, 277n9, 277n2, 278n9
M. Littré et le positivisme (Caro), 46–48, 
49, 261, 271n3
mob. See crowd
Molière à l’École républicaine (albanese), 
18, 268n4, 271n20
monarchists, 17, 27, 52, 56, 62, 63, 74, 
155, 179, 230, 251
monarchy, 14, 19, 38, 39, 43, 86, 113, 
146–48, 159, 198, 250, 260, 269n2. 
See also July monarchy
Monsieur Bergeret in Paris (a. France), 
139, 148, 165, 168, 178, 193, 263
montfort, eugène, 11
Moral Education for a Secular Society 
(Stock-morton), 268n5
Morale et enseignement civique à l’usage des 
écoles primaires (liard), 33
Morale Indépendante, La, 20, 26, 27, 260
morality: absolute, 88; and aggression, 
115, 152; basis of, 26, 83, 97; 
Catholic, 30, 63, 86; as conven-
tion, 65; dogmatic, 87; as effect, 
154, 167; of fraternal charity, 56; of 
Goethe, 103; of grammar, 270n12; 
and happiness, 47; immanent, 38; 
independent, 2, 24, 26, 29, 32, 
37–38, 40, 43, 145, 260, 269n5, 
271n19; Kantian, 132; moral life, 
8, 9, 12; and nature, 145, 151–52; 
origins of, 144; and politics, 10, 23, 
28, 30, 198; positivist, 23, 31, 47, 
65, 152; Protestant, 29; republican, 
71; of resignation, 20; and sadism, 
78; science of, 33, 59; secular, 6, 97, 
210, 225, 270n19; social, 19, 23, 
152; and socialism, 198; of Spinoza, 
99; subject of, 246; and sympathy, 
187; transcendent guarantor of, 69; 
true, 30; universal, 23, 24, 30–31, 
38, 59, 71, 92, 153, 226, 229, 236, 
244–45, 249, 254. See also dignity; 
discourse; duty; education; freedom; 
history; individual; law; literature; 
reality; reason; sovereignty
moreau, Gustave, 155
moréas, Jean, 252
Morte, La (Feuillet), 11, 45–50, 59, 60, 
63, 65, 73
mouffe, Chantal, 5
mourning, 166, 218; rejection of, 111, 
127
museum, Pedagogical, 29
mystery: of crime, 202; and first commu-
nion, 215; of life, 91, 144; of man’s 
conduct, 145; metaphysics and, 
278n5; mysterious God, 62; mysteri-
ous social evil, 242; of nature, 88; 
nothingness and, 117; ocean of, 76; 
of the rue Poliveau, 55; solving, 203, 
257; story, 199–200
mysticism, 214–16, 218, 234–35, 240, 
246, 257
Mythe nazi, Le (lacoue-labarthe and 
nancy), 79
N
Nachträglichkeit, 149
Nana (Zola), 236, 242
nancy, Jean-luc: Le mythe Nazi, 79
napoleon i, 82, 85, 87, 100, 101, 133, 
250, 251, 270, 272n4
napoleon iii, 19, 22, 174
narrative, 4, 7, 9, 13, 60, 65, 73, 77, 
84, 91, 93, 101, 103, 123, 129, 
130, 131, 133–34, 137, 140, 143, 
169, 174, 199, 211, 213, 235, 238, 
241–42, 244–45, 247, 253–54, 
273n3
narratorial intervention, 100, 102, 129, 
131, 241, 243, 246
nationalism, 2, 4, 5, 11, 18, 36, 78, 
79–81, 90, 91, 92–93, 95–96, 
104, 106–7, 110–14, 116, 120–28, 
131, 134–38, 149, 168, 169, 172, 
176–77, 179, 181, 183–85, 188, 
190, 192–94, 196, 198–99, 227, 
229, 237, 248, 271n21, 277n12
Nationalismus und Demokratie im Frank-
reich der dritten Republik (Frank), 79
national Socialism, 79
naturalism, 9, 48, 60, 64–65, 72, 102, 
130, 172, 200, 217, 241–42, 246, 
261, 278n5
 0    ~   i n d e x
nature, 8, 9, 24, 97, 121, 186, 213, 218, 
233; beauty of, 117; development 
in, 104; desubjectified, 251; disorder 
in, 161; epicurean, 161; forces of, 
88; human, 5, 24, 35, 38, 42, 145, 
237; human world as, 168, 179, 
181, 182; independent, 77; living 
geometry of, 71; as necessity, 27, 99; 
objectively given, 212; pure, 121; as 
realm of brute force, 47; separation 
from, 9, 24, 47, 120, 145, 153, 167, 
179; undifferentiated, 121; unity of, 
91, 98; women as, 182. See also law, 
natural; morality, and nature
nazism, 5, 92, 118
necessity: autonomy and, 107, 110; and 
human motives, 98; of individual, 
91; inner, 107, 109, 112; logical, 
254; in nature, 27, 99; of suffering, 
278n7
neo-Kantianism, 75, 84, 90, 103, 125, 
210, 239, 246, 249, 261
neutral. See nonsectarian
new spirit, 12, 141, 142, 144, 146, 149, 
157, 226, 227, 244, 262
nietzsche, Friedrich, 56, 180, 252
nihilism, 8, 9, 54, 61, 85–87, 111, 
124–26, 128, 136, 162, 272n2
nondifferentiation, 121, 126
nonexistence, 146, 159, 214
nonsectarian, 20, 31, 155
Nos maîtres (Wyzewa), 48
nothingness, 9, 75, 85, 111, 113, 
117, 121, 124–26, 128, 130, 152, 
182, 188, 190, 192–93, 210, 213, 
214–15, 240–41, 256–57, 272n2, 
272n3
Notre-Dame de Paris (hugo), 210
noumenon, 35–36, 75–76
Nouveaux essais de psychologie contempo-
raine (bourget), 7
Novel of National Energy, The (barrès), 
11, 79–138, 139, 262, 263
O
obedience: to authority, 32, 37, 39–40, 
44, 76, 145, 154, 216, 233; of 
citizen, 239; to confessor, 215; to 
divine law, 208; to duty, 43; to laws, 
29; to reason, 44; to the rule, 87; to 
the state, 87
object: authority of, 137; of belief, 171; 
created by language, 212, 240; of 
desire, 215, 230, 254; distance from 
subject, 168, 178; of identity, 73, 
210; lack of, 216; lost, 75; of love, 
40–41, 216; maternal, 78, 123; mys-
tical, 240; pathological, 78; of quest, 
129; of transference, 273n3; view of, 
172; world as, 168
object lesson, 33, 65, 119, 135–36, 138, 
198, 229, 276n3
objectivity, 3, 9, 10, 21, 38, 65, 67–68, 
70–71, 130, 138, 163, 168, 169, 
200, 203, 208, 209, 212, 231, 239, 
241, 248, 249, 251–56
objet petit a. See a-object
observation: novel of, 9, 65, 241; scien-
tific method of, 10, 33, 36, 62–63, 
65, 67, 130, 200, 208, 220, 222, 
254, 256–57; self-, 178
L’oeuvre (Zola), 242
“l’oeuvre de leconte de lisle” (barrès), 
126
Old regime. See ancien régime
On Education (Spencer), 97
On Intelligence. See De l’intelligence
On Justice in the Revolution and in the 
Church, 260
Opportunist ideology, 37–38, 55, 212
Opportunists, 2, 11, 17, 30, 31, 37–38, 
53–56, 65, 71, 78, 145, 153, 156, 
179, 197–98, 232, 274n6
Ordinaire, Dionys, 54–55, 56
Orient, 4, 90–91, 119–20, 124–26, 134, 
137
L’orient de Maurice Barrès (Frandon), 
125–26
Origines de la France contemporaine, Les 
(Taine), 62, 86, 88, 272n4
Orleanist, 17
L’orme du mail. See Elm on the Mall, The
Other, the, 4, 14, 42, 44, 77, 110, 115, 
123, 126–28, 139, 174, 192–94, 
201, 210, 219, 230, 236, 239, 245, 
252, 256, 276n6, 279n1
otherness, 76, 110, 114, 147, 256
Other Side of Psychoanalysis, The (lacan), 
4, 127
Ozouf, mona, 7, 18, 20, 40, 213, 270n11
P
Panama Canal scandal, 11, 86–87, 100, 
104–5, 107, 124, 156, 262
i n d e x   ~    0 
parable, 73, 92, 109, 137, 173, 176–77, 
189
Parlement, Le, 49, 52
Parliament, French, 1, 22, 30, 82, 87, 
105, 197, 265, 271n19
particularity, 2–6, 8, 10, 13, 23, 24, 
31–33, 34–36, 38, 42–44, 60, 
70, 76, 83, 85, 90, 93, 112, 115, 
129–36, 157, 160–61, 163–64, 
174, 180, 183, 192, 236, 239–40, 
248–49, 253, 254–55
Pasteur, louis, 67
Pater, Walter, 45
patrie. See homeland
patriotism, 12,42, 63, 65, 78, 104, 115, 
181, 196, 198; as religion, 41; as 
self-love, 78
Payot, Jules: Avant d’entrer dans la vie: 
aux instituteurs et institutrices, conseils 
et directions pratiques, 33, 41
peasants. See social class
Pécaut, Félix, 29, 232, 270n11
pedagogy. See education
Péguy, Charles, 41
people, the. See social class
performativity, 7, 254. See also language, 
performative
person, the: autonomy of, 32; depen-
dence of, 89; determinism of, 35; 
free, 2, 25, 35, 50; identity of, 15, 
40; rational, 2, 25; real, 6; respect 
for, 26–27, 43; uniformity of all per-
sons, 115; universally human, 239
personification, 82, 168, 188
perspectivism, 128, 252
persuasion, 84, 137, 182, 212, 231, 245
perversion, 8, 68, 150, 153, 155, 161, 
205, 215–16, 234–35, 248
Pestalozzi, Johann heinrich, 43
Petit chose, Le (a. Daudet), 270n10
Petite République, La, 223
Petit Journal, Le, 55, 206, 207, 222, 245, 
269n8
petits faits humains. See details, small 
human
phenomena, 8, 10, 22, 33, 35, 47, 75, 
93, 97, 99, 128, 133, 150, 201, 208, 
210, 252, 270n13, 270n15, 277n1
Philippe, Duke d’Orléans, 176
Philosophes classiques, Les (Taine), 91
Philosophie Positive, La, 22
philosophy: of the autonomous subject, 
80; british, 268n5; Comte’s, 271n3; 
Derrida’s critique of, 4; decadent, 
53; of education, 29; Goethean, 88; 
of Greece and Germany, 118–19, 
126; hartmann’s, 93; the Jews and, 
118–19; Kant’s, 27–29, 35, 82, 87, 
125, 272n2; littré’s, 47; national 
superiority in, 255; in novels, 10; 
natural, 61, 150; positivist, 47, 
49, 62, 251; rationalist, 270n14; 
renouvier’s, 269n8; repression in, 
247; republican, 13, 82; at the rue 
d’Ulm (École normale Supérieure) 
34; Schopenhauer’s, 8; in secondary 
school, 32, 69; at the Sorbonne, 34; 
Taine’s, 8, 89
Philosophy of the Unconscious, The (hart-
mann), 93–94, 261
Picquart, Colonel Georges, 173, 181, 
265, 266, 267
Pillon, François, 27, 75, 249, 261
pity, 44, 68, 76, 178, 187, 272n5
plenitude, 14, 193
point of view, 10, 102–3, 112, 130, 138, 
169, 254, 256; multiplicity of, 101, 
128, 252–54; opposing, 130
political institutions, 83
political slogans, 1, 124, 183
political unconscious, 118
politics: of anti-Semitism, 114; of ap-
peasement, 189; boulangist, 55, 
133; of Catholic Church, 19, 144, 
269n2; of the crowd, 95; of cultural 
heredity, 80; and culture wars, 255, 
257; demagogic, 137; of differ-
ence, 4; of Dreyfus affair, 11–12, 
181, 228; education and, 7, 17; and 
emotion, 106; ephemerality of, 209; 
erotics of, 14, 248; fantasy in, 193, 
247; identity and, 7, 187, 190, 248, 
257; as instinct, 209; of internal 
enemy, 257; of July 14 ceremonies, 
41; nationalist, 5, 11, 92, 94, 102, 
104–7, 120, 123, 125, 128; of 
national unity, 89; of the new spirit, 
244; in novels, 10, 14–15, 74, 82, 
142–43; of particularity, 2, 5; popu-
list, 248; and power, 18; of privilege, 
26; of ralliement, 141, 144, 145, 
147, 189; realist, 101; republican, 
19, 25, 31, 38–39, 158, 197, 209, 
229, 246; revanchard, 63; right-
wing, 37, 182, 271n17; as salvation, 
140; of self-interest, 81; of social 
 0    ~   i n d e x
republic, 198; as spectacle, 140; 
subjectivity in, 210; of universalism, 
2, 4–5. See also authority, political; 
education, republican; freedom, 
political; ideas, political; ideology, 
Opportunist, political, republican; 
legitimacy, political; morality and 
politics; sovereignty, political
positivism, 2, 10, 20–23, 27, 29–31, 
33, 34, 36, 38, 40, 45, 46–49, 56, 
61–65, 71, 72, 77, 80, 93, 97, 121, 
130, 135, 142, 152, 173, 179, 200, 
210, 212, 213, 214, 219, 239–40, 
246, 249, 250, 252, 253, 256–57, 
260, 268n5, 269n6, 271n3
postmodernism, 6, 7
poststructuralism, 6
press, the, 53, 57, 59, 142, 198, 257, 
269n8, 276n8
Prévost, abbé antoine: Histoire générale 
des voyages, 159, 163–64
progress, 21, 22, 41, 47, 48, 74, 162, 
208, 211, 232–33, 235
proletariat. See social class
Prost, antoine, 2, 32, 43, 213
Protestant, 26, 29, 30, 53, 125, 270n11
protofascism, 80, 95–96, 98
Proudhon, Pierre-Joseph, 20, 26, 28, 80; 
On Justice in the Revolution and in the 
Church, 260
Proust, marcel, 11
provincial life, 60, 84, 142, 160–62, 
166, 178–79, 183, 193
Prussia. See Germany
Psychologie anglaise contemporaine, La 
(ribot), 98, 268n5
Psychologie appliquée à la morale et à 
l’éducation, La (rauh), 271n19
psychology, 49, 53, 54, 61–65, 67–69, 
72–73, 95, 137, 251, 268n5
public opinion, 13, 159, 182, 202, 206
Q
Quilligan, maureen: The Language of 
Allegory, 244
Quinet, edgar: L’enseignement du peuple, 
19, 24–25
R
race, 2, 5, 72, 73, 94, 99, 108, 112, 113, 
127, 136, 157, 271n18
racism, 36, 73, 80, 92, 94, 96, 114, 
274n6
Raison, La, 196
ralliement, le, 12, 19, 141–42, 144, 
147–49, 155–57, 162, 179, 185, 
187, 189, 197, 226, 262, 269n3
randomness, 111, 144, 147, 151, 161. 
See also chance; disorder
rape, 153, 195, 199, 215, 223–24, 228, 
230–32, 241, 242, 278n9; ideologi-
cal, 227; of the republic, 227, 230, 
232, 245
rationalism, 33, 62, 76–77, 80, 95–99; 
abstract, 36, 61, 83; atheist, 75; 
critical, 21; enlightenment, 5; 
Kantian, 90; scientific, 96–97, 200, 
270n14; Taine’s, 99; universal, 59; 
verbal, 146
rationality, 5, 35, 97, 208, 231, 236, 
271n16
rauh, Frédéric: La psychologie appliquée à 
la morale et à l’éducation, 271n19
ravaisson, Félix, 34, 270n15
reading, 9, 51–52, 64–65, 66, 90, 
101–2, 120, 161, 164, 194, 196, 
229, 243, 252–54
real, the, 127, 131, 199, 255
realism, 10, 64, 128, 130–31, 136, 
140, 170, 178, 211–12, 217, 238, 
243–47, 253; spiritualist, 270n15
reality, 13, 118, 120, 128, 130, 133, 
138, 165, 170–71, 178, 193, 209, 
211, 215, 243, 245–46, 270n15; 
abstraction as, 61; daily, 61, 199; 
of death, 116; distortion of, 9; 
empirical, 33, 83; in fiction, 252–53, 
278n6; human, 171; image of, 178; 
knowable, 35; loss of, 202; of the 
moral law, 84; observable, 75; sense 
of, 120; social, 14; of the Unknow-
able, 75
reason, 25–29, 43, 68, 76, 86, 94, 98, 
138, 189, 207, 215, 220, 226, 237, 
257, 277n1; abstract, 3, 61; author-
ity of, 38; enlightenment, 236; 
Goddess of, 41; individual, 13, 80, 
96–97, 111, 145; law of, 84, 110; 
and morality, 23, 44; objective, 21; 
Kant’s postulates of, 251; power of, 
40; practical, 27, 29, 35, 134; pure, 
67, 83, 88; universal 3–4, 26, 38, 44
Red and the Black, The (Stendhal), 52, 
76
i n d e x   ~    0 
Réforme intellectuelle et morale de la 
France, La (renan), 271n16
Réfractaires, Les (vallès), 7, 51–52, 261
regeneration, national, 29, 37, 232
Règles de la méthode sociologique, Les 
(Durkheim), 270n13
reid, martine, 118–19, 122, 123, 124, 
134
religion, 2, 5, 20, 23–24, 38, 63, 
144–45, 207, 210, 213, 250–51, 
269n5, 271n21; of the ego, 272n3; 
of humanity, 48; irrationality of, 
198; of love, 41; money and, 162, 
230; of particularity, 5; and politics, 
209; in the schools, 228; science 
and, 63, 75, 144, 150, 227, 274n2; 
of science, 211. See also authority, re-
ligious; belief, religious; bond, moral 
and religious; bond, between religion 
and politics; buddhism; Catholi-
cism; Church, Catholic; discourse, 
of religion; education, religious; 
hinduism; identity, religion and; 
masses, the, religion for; patriotism, 
as religion; Protestant; tolerance, 
religious; unity, of religion
renan, ernest, 18, 36, 48, 61, 95, 96, 
97, 99, 101, 115, 125, 218, 260, 
271n16, 272n2, 273n1 (chap. 4); 
L’avenir de la science, 36, 260; La 
réforme intellectuelle et morale de la 
France, 271n16; What Is a Nation?, 
261
renouvier, Charles, 27–29, 39, 43, 
75, 80, 249, 261, 269n8; Manuel 
républicain de l’homme et du citoyen, 
27, 43, 260
renunciation, 48, 115, 123. See also eth-
ics, of resignation
repetition, 69, 125, 159–65, 167, 179, 
189, 200, 204, 208, 224, 232, 235, 
238, 277n11
Réponse à M. René Doumic (barrès), 109, 
110, 111, 113
representation: beyond of, 238–40; of 
character, 8; and desire, 164; of 
Dreyfus affair, 175, 245; crisis of, 
44, 130–31; and freedom, 168; 
historical, 144; human reality as, 
171; of imaginary communities, 14; 
independence from, 172; indirect, 
189; as manipulation of events, 177; 
moral ideas as, 154; novelistic, 10, 
47, 59, 130, 140, 151, 207, 246, 
268n4, 278n6; political, 177, 229, 
240, 245; process of, 253; realistic, 
170; of the republic, 41; stability of, 
252; system of, 224, 249; of univer-
sality, 255; of the world, 277n1; the 
world as my, 178. See also identity, 
representations of
repression: of bond between fantasy and 
ideology, 247; of the Commune, 
28; of logos over writing, 5; of the 
people, 158; psychological, 4, 116, 
118, 171; return of the repressed, 
216–17, 221; of the working classes, 
74
republic: First republic, 2, 41, 259; 
Opportunist, 28, 47, 80, 139, 150, 
155, 187, 211, 230, 257; radi-
cal, 187; of the republicans, 248, 
274n6; republic of italy, 19; Second 
republic, 19, 27, 188, 260; Third 
republic, 2, 8, 10, 14, 17–18, 22, 
26, 27, 32, 34, 36, 39–41, 44, 55, 
66, 73, 82, 86–87, 125, 134, 142, 
148, 157, 163, 194, 197, 206, 209, 
228, 242, 246, 249, 250, 253, 257, 
260, 270n9, 271n20, 272n4, 274n6. 
See also citizen; discourse; education; 
enlightenment; ethics; freedom; his-
tory; homeland; identity; ideology; 
legitimacy; morality; philosophy; 
politics; rape; representation
République Française, La, 20, 21, 23, 
53–54
resignation, 32, 91, 106, 124, 187, 
189, 194, 274n5. See also ethics, of 
resignation
responsibility, 27, 49, 52, 57, 64, 72, 
98, 106, 220, 230; moral, 47, 64, 
77–78; of science, 64; social, 39–40, 
87; of the teacher, 83, 132; of the 
writer, 53–54, 58, 64, 77–78
retté, adolphe, 274n7
revanchard, 63, 73, 118, 134, 271–72n4
revolution of 1848, 11
revolution, French, 6, 18, 21, 23, 27, 
31, 38, 39–40, 44, 51, 62, 82, 97, 
110, 111, 113, 114, 125, 187, 249, 
251, 257, 259
Revue Blanche, La, 99–100, 274n7
Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale, La, 
34, 262
Revue de Paris, La, 99
 1 0   ~   i n d e x
Revue Illustrée, La, 56
Revue Occidentale, La, 22
rhetoric, 23, 82, 123, 125, 137, 211, 
239; nationalist, 18; of reconcilia-
tion, 141
ribot, Théodule: Les Maladies de la 
volonté, 68; La psychologie anglaise 
contemporaine, 98, 268n5
rights, 20, 25, 28, 30, 68; of citizens, 
59; civil, 3, 31; of the community, 
145; human, 12, 26, 76, 81, 113; 
of illegitimate children, 30; of stock- 
and bondholders, 158; universal, 32. 
See also Declaration of the rights of 
man and of the Citizen; individual, 
rights of
ringer, Fritz, 60, 64, 83, 88, 89, 92, 
113
ripoll, roger, 209
rod, Édouard, 11; La course à la mort, 
55; Les idées morales du temps présent, 
272n2
rodenbach, Georges, 274n7
Roman de l’énergie nationale, Le. See 
Novel of National Energy, The
Roman experimental, Le (Zola), 9, 200, 
209, 242, 261, 279n11
Roman naturaliste, Le (brunetière), 48
Roman russe, Le (vogüé), 48, 85, 262, 
272n5
romanticism, 3, 8, 36–37, 56, 68, 72, 
119, 124, 130, 172, 181, 183, 239
rootedness, 93, 112, 127–28, 172. See 
also nationalism
rosenberg, alfred, 118
Rougon-Macquart novels (Zola), 217, 
236, 237, 241–42
rousseau, Jean-Jacques, 43, 85, 130
S
Said, edward, 4
Saint-Simon, henri de, 28, 135, 249
Salle molière Speech (Ferry), 17, 23, 
32, 260
sameness, 80, 114–15, 165, 167, 237
Sand, George, 7, 9
Sarcey, Francisque, 54
Sartre, Jean-Paul, 5, 10, 35; “existential-
ism is a humanism,” 35
Sartre et “Les Temps Modernes” (boschet-
ti), 271n17
Scenes and Doctrines of Nationalism  
(barrès), 13, 81, 89–90, 96, 110, 
112, 118, 119, 263
Schlegel, Friedrich, 10
School: Catholic, 1, 25, 40, 205–7, 213, 
225–26; Congregationist, 20, 30–31, 
141, 194, 196–97, 202, 204, 220, 
230, 252; German, 19; for girls, 
1, 24, 29–30, 217, 226, 232, 261; 
laic, 26, 31, 71, 194, 221, 226, 228, 
234, 261; lemonnier, 26; modern, 
6; normal, 226; primary, 20, 23, 
29–33, 39, 65, 71, 194, 196–98, 
201, 210, 211, 214, 225–27, 231, 
235, 261; public, 7, 23, 206, 214, 
225, 227; secondary, 1, 2, 13, 
20, 24, 28, 29, 32, 69, 132, 261, 
270n10, 270n12; without God, 2, 
31. See also education
schoolteacher, 20, 29–30, 33, 41, 71, 
115, 194, 195, 200, 203, 205, 214, 
223, 225, 232, 234, 243, 269n4, 
271n19, 274n5
Schopenhauer, arthur, 8, 53, 54, 80, 93, 
126, 178, 252
science, 2, 8–9, 14, 17, 20–22, 23–24, 
27, 33–36, 41, 43, 47–48, 54, 
56–57, 59, 61–65, 67–71, 72–78, 
95–97, 119, 123, 125, 144–45, 148, 
150, 161, 191, 200, 207, 209, 211, 
227, 239–40, 251, 254–55, 257, 
270n14, 270n15, 274n2, 274n3, 
276n7, 278n7. See also ethics, of 
science; morality, science of; religion, 
science and; religion, of science; 
responsibility, of science; subject, the, 
of science
Scott, Joan Wallach, 5, 190
Scott, John, 28
secular education. See education, laic
Sée, Camille, 1, 261
self, 66, 95, 111–14, 155, 165–66, 167, 
172, 187, 271n19; analysis of, 51, 
53, 178; annihilation of, 113; child-
hood, 9; conscious, 113; control of, 
70; criticism of, 64, 173, 178; desir-
ing, 127; disappearing, 113; distance 
from, 174; divided, 54, 58–59, 61, 
64, 70, 75; in duration, 37; empty, 
189, 256; enemy within the, 15, 69, 
126, 198, 257; equilibrium of, 210; 
extimate, 15; 110; freedom of the, 
110; individual, 110, 113; inner, 8, 
111, 114, 194; limits of, 70; loss of, 
i n d e x   ~    1 1
111, 113, 133, 185; love of, 5, 6, 
40, 78; multiplicity of, 8; mutilation 
of the, 78, 123; as nothingness, 9, 
111; noumenal, 35; observation of, 
178; other as, 110; otherness within, 
256; presocial, 124; proliferation 
of, 239; real, 95, 181; rehabilitation 
of, 113; sense of, 59, 73; as series 
of events, 8, 268n5; social, 110–11, 
183, 188, 190, 193–94, 256; stable, 
9; threat to, 178; understanding of 
the, 173; unified, 9, 59; whole, 193
self-destruction, 127
self-government; 2, 25–27, 29–30, 38, 
42–44, 71, 110, 249–50
self-identical, the, 119
self-interest, 6, 26, 28, 48, 68–70, 73, 
76, 81, 94, 97, 105, 118, 183, 193, 
196, 198, 201, 228, 236
selfishness, 23, 28, 42, 47, 54, 61, 67, 
73, 119, 145, 183, 197–98, 202, 
204, 209, 231
self-loathing, 69–70
self-reflection, 178, 253
self-rule. See self-government
self-sacrifice, 73
Senate, 17, 24, 30, 32, 39, 183, 261, 
265, 266, 267. See also “letter to the 
Senate”
Sèvres, École normale Superieure de, 
29, 261
Simon, Jules, 34
sin, original, 20, 31, 145
singularity. See particularity
skepticism, 8, 84–85, 126, 128, 168, 
190
social class: aristocracy, 17, 48, 51, 73, 
151, 152, 175, 180, 251, 275n1; 
bourgeoisie, 3, 4, 17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 
29, 32, 46, 65, 87, 95, 149, 188, 
189, 193, 197–98, 200, 228–29, 
230, 232, 234, 236, 249, 269n2, 
276n7, 276n4, 278n4; class hostility, 
73; class warfare, 22; nobility, 60, 
73, 78, 85, 151, 289n4; peasants, 
2, 21, 26, 31, 46, 48, 73, 106, 154, 
169, 174, 186, 204, 206; the people, 
4, 30, 32, 41, 94, 147, 158, 179, 
186–88, 190–91, 193–94, 196–98, 
200, 201, 206, 210, 218, 223, 225, 
232, 234, 235, 236–37, 243, 260, 
275n2, 275n3, 275–6n6, 276n3, 
278n4; proletariat, 13, 43, 95, 115; 
upper class, 2, 21, 73; working class, 
2, 3, 17, 20, 21, 31, 69, 73, 74, 114, 
145, 157, 188, 237, 242, 273n1 
(chap. 4), 276n7
socialism, 26, 28, 95, 140, 158, 187–91, 
193, 197, 238, 278n7
socialist novel, 237
socialist parties, 17, 276n2
socialists, 20, 27, 86, 151, 225, 228–29, 
234, 249; Saint-Simonian, 28
social feeling. See social sense
social order, 13, 22, 38, 48, 74, 75–76, 
85, 88, 105, 162, 236, 239, 271n19
social sense, 2, 22, 24. See also com-
munity
Socrates, 84
soil and the dead, the, 13, 36, 106–7, 
111, 113, 118, 124, 136–37, 
277n12
solidarity, 41, 115, 187, 208, 218, 221
Sorrows of Young Werther, The (Goethe), 
53, 74
Soucy, robert, 79–80, 89, 91, 92, 101, 
104, 106, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 
128
Soury, Jules-auguste, 80, 95–99, 105–6, 
118, 126, 135, 272n5
Sous l’oeil des barbares (barrès), 53, 107, 
110, 252
sovereignty: moral, 30; political, 30
Spencer, herbert, 53, 61–62, 75, 96, 98, 
268n5, 274n2; On Education, 97
Spengler, Oswald, 6
Spenser, edmund: The Faerie Queene, 
244
Spinoza, baruch, 9, 66, 68, 71, 98, 99, 
107, 110, 121, 275n5
spiritualism, 14, 34, 46, 49, 73, 88, 149, 
184, 270n15; new, 34–36, 262
Spuller, eugène, 141, 149, 262
state, the: authorities of, 43; bourgeois, 
230; communist, 275n5; critique 
of, 274n7; democratic, 40, 44, 137; 
desire of, 193–94, 256; disappear-
ance of, 192–93, 255; and educa-
tion, 20; free, 40; impersonal, 250; 
laws of, 29; legitimacy of, 23; lost 
prestige of, 250; modern, 19, 24; 
philosophy of, 13, 82; property and, 
191–92; republican, 31; secular, 47, 
250; separation of Church and, 1, 
11, 225, 263; social, 211; tension 
between University and, 3–4. See also 
 1    ~   i n d e x
freedom, as fundamental value of the 
modern state; individual, and the 
state; obedience, to the state
Steeg, Jules, 29, 270n11, 271n19
Stendhal; The Charterhouse of Parma, 76; 
The Red and the Black, 52, 76
Sternhell, Zeev, 79–80, 89, 92, 96, 98, 
114; Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme 
français, 11, 96, 118, 271n17, 272n5
Stirner, max, 101, 272n3
Stock-morton, Phyllis, 269n8, 270n13; 
Moral Education for a Secular Society, 
269n5
subconscious. See unconscious
subject, the, 10, 14, 77, 168, 173, 178–
79, 181, 189, 193–94, 246, 255–56; 
abnegation of, 193; abstract, 2, 5, 
36, 43, 256; annihilation of, 170; 
autonomous, 80, 92; barresian, 130, 
182; Cartesian, 219, 256; collective, 
130; desire of, 163; and desire of 
the Other, 77, 193; enlightenment, 
2, 179, 256; and freedom, 28, 110, 
168; freethinking, 208; Freudian, 
276n6; individual, 130, 210, 239; 
Kantian, 246; of knowledge, 35; and 
madness, 178; modern, 201, 255; 
nationalist, 127; nation-Subject, 
118; and object, 168; patriotic, 80; 
philosophy of, 80; rational, 36; rela-
tion to others, 76; of representation, 
168; republican, 246; of science, 
239; solitude of, 77; supposed to 
know, 273n3; theory of, 60, 251, 
271n3; thinking, 171, 180, 252; 
universal, 2, 43; void in, 122
subjectivism, 126, 130, 178, 252
subjectivity, 169, 207–10, 212, 240–41, 
246
suffrage, universal, 2, 13, 18, 25–26, 
61, 188
suggestion, 42, 136–37
Suleiman, Susan, 11, 81, 91, 102, 103, 
122–23, 129, 243–44, 254
superego, 115
superstition, 20, 41, 142, 188, 194, 207, 
210, 237
survival: of the fittest, 56, 121; instinct 
for, 121, 151; national, 104; of the 
republic, 17, 42, 157, 228, 231
suture, 127
Symbolic, the, 59, 127, 178, 179, 
199–201, 257
symbolic system, 13, 14, 130, 179, 201, 
207, 212, 225, 232, 238–39, 246, 
253
Symbolism, 102, 128, 130, 178, 252, 254
sympathy, 23, 47–48, 53, 69, 97, 
186–87, 191, 220
T
Tadié, Jean-yves, 172
Taine, hippolyte: De l’intelligence, 105, 
268n5; History of English Literature, 
54; Les origines de la France contem-
poraine, 62, 86, 88, 272n4; Les philos-
ophes classiques, 91
Tarde, Gabriel, 80, 137
Teaching the Cult of Literature in the 
French Third Republic (Guiney), 
268n4, 270n11
Tempier, bishop Étienne, 270n14
Temps, Le, 54
Terre, La (Zola), 48
Terror, reign of, 37, 125
Téry, Gustave, 196
Their Faces. See Leurs figures
theology, 29, 47, 48, 150–51, 160–62, 
180, 274n3, 278n7
theory, 59, 71, 73, 121, 174; of the 
accursed family, 235; of allegory, 
244–45; Comte’s, 23; of deracina-
tion, 93–95; and desire, 150; of epi-
curean disorder, 161; of evolution, 
61; of fascism, 102; of absolute im-
mediacy, 136; lamarckian, 277n12; 
of literature as causative force, 52; 
of literature as rival of education, 
51; michelet’s, 277n10; of moral-
ity, 32–33; of narrative, 273n3; 
naturalist, 151–52; of number, 127; 
Opportunist, 31; postcolonial, 127; 
of right to kill, 56; of self-rule, 29; 
of sociability, 92; synthetic, 83; 
transferential, 136, 273n3. See also 
education, positivist; experimental 
novel; self, divided; state, disappear-
ance of; subject, theory of; survival 
of the fittest; two Frances
Theory of the Novel (lukács), 129
Thérèse Raquin (Zola), 54, 241, 277n2
thesis novel, 9–11, 13, 46, 49, 60, 
102–3, 129–31, 133–34, 136–37, 
173–74, 202, 211, 235, 241, 243–
44, 246, 253–54, 268n6, 277n10
i n d e x   ~    1 
Time and Free Will. See Essai sur les don-
nées immédiates de la conscience
tolerance, religious, 19–20, 46, 147, 
157, 230
totalitarianism, 4–5, 80
totality, 80, 91, 98, 193, 254–55
trahison. See treason
transcendence, 23, 25, 38, 42, 44, 65, 
69, 76, 129, 138, 145, 191, 254, 
279n1
transference, 82, 136–37, 245, 273n3
transience, 143–44, 146–47, 209
Trarieux, maître, 53, 56
trauma, 6, 14, 57, 59, 130, 169, 170, 
189, 199, 215, 217, 223–24, 227, 
229–30, 232, 238–40, 244–45, 251, 
277n2
treason, 5, 12, 174, 196, 223–24, 
229–31, 232, 244–46, 249, 265, 
267, 278n3
Truth (Zola), 11, 41, 140, 194, 
195–247, 251, 254, 263, 268–69n7, 
269n8, 276n1, 276n3, 277n11, 
277n12, 277n2, 278n9
two Frances, 73, 75, 213, 217
U
unconscious, 9, 66, 72, 73–74, 80, 
94–96, 120, 231, 239; collective, 
93–95, 110, 113; instinctual, 96; 
national, 13, 113; political, 118
unity: abstract, 147; of the army, 154; 
artificial, 27; authoritarian, 154; 
enlightenment, 236; of faith, 146; 
of ideas, 249; and identity, 15; 
imaginary, 201; individual, 254; of 
the intellectual, 100; of life, 91, 117; 
literary, 142–43; metaphysical, 146; 
national, 2, 3, 11, 13, 14–15, 22–24, 
30–31, 65, 80, 89, 97, 114, 117–18, 
127, 146–47, 149, 190, 218, 237, 
254; of nature, 91, 98; organic, 88–
89; of religion, 146; of the republic, 
154, 181; of the self, 8–9; social, 
22, 31, 236, 249, 254; of souls, 32; 
theological, 160–61. See also educa-
tion, and national unity; individual, 
against national unity; nature, unity 
of; politics, of national unity
universalism, 5, 85, 129, 256; of the 
Church, 24; deracinating, 134; 
european, 6; false, 5, 87; of French 
schools, 3; Kantian, 13, 71, 83, 
86–87, 115, 126, 128; of moral 
education, 42; Opportunist, 31; 
republican, 2, 4, 71, 83, 87, 114–15, 
237, 248–49; theoretical, 32; of the 
university, 3. See also education, uni-
versal; education, universalist; en-
lightenment, universalism; ideology, 
of universalism; law, universal; mean-
ing, universalist system of; morality, 
universal; person, universally human; 
politics, of universalism; rationalism, 
universal; reason, universal; rights, 
universal; subject, universal
universality, 1, 2, 13, 23–24, 31, 34, 38, 
65, 67, 71, 86, 89, 115, 136, 248, 
254–55. See also ethics, of universal-
ity; representation, of universality
Université, 29, 89, 92, 227, 259, 270n10
university, 2–4, 5, 13, 60, 90–91, 127, 
159, 161, 180, 184, 194, 272n4
Unknowable, the, 35, 62, 75–76, 274n2
Uprooted, The. See Déracinés, Les
uprooting, 13, 28, 82, 88, 102, 197, 249
utopia, 14, 193, 200, 211, 217, 221, 
233, 235–43, 245–46, 278n6. See 
also discourse, utopian
V
vacherot, Étienne, 20, 25–26; Democracy, 
260
vallès, Jules, 7, 51–52, 57, 59, 249; Le 
bachelier, 52; L’enfant, 7, 52, 261; 
Les réfractaires, 7, 51–52, 261; “les 
victimes du livre,” 7, 52
valois, Georges, 79
velten, Julie Charlotte. See Favre, mme 
Jules
Ventre de Paris, Le (Zola), 202, 210, 241, 
242
verbalization, 170
Vérité. See Truth
La vérité en marche (Zola), 12, 202, 219, 
222, 263, 276n8
versailles government, 18, 209
veuillot, louis, 19
“les victimes du livre” (vallès), 7, 52
violence. See crowd
viollis, Jean, 11
vogüé, eugène-melchior de, 48, 56, 
126, 130, 252; Le roman russe, 48, 
85, 262, 272n5
 1    ~   i n d e x
void, the, 14, 74–75, 85–86, 116, 122, 
130, 194, 210, 215, 240, 251, 256
voluntarism, 35, 92, 95, 270n14
W
Waldeck-rousseau, Pierre, 225, 262, 
276n2
want-to-be. See desire
Weber, eugen, 18, 31, 250
West, Cornel, 4
Wicker Work Woman, The (a. France), 
139, 140, 143, 148, 149, 151, 
153–54, 156, 158–59, 161–62, 
169–70, 174–75, 181, 186, 187, 
189, 262, 275–6n6
Wilde, Oscar, 155
Wilson scandal, 156, 262
Wittgenstein, ludwig, 4
women: as allegory, 73; caricatures of, 
182; enlightened, 32, 232; equality 
of, 30; equality in difference, 30; 
equated to nature, 182; heterogene-
ity of, 237; ignorant, 32; as nothing, 
240; novels about, 279n1; rights of, 
23, 32; schoolteachers, 29; subjec-
tion to the Church, 215–17, 227–28, 
233, 235; unscrupulous, 182, 
275n1. See also education, women’s; 
liberation, women’s; misogyny; 
school, for girls
“Women’s time” (Kristeva), 5
Wundt, Wilhelm, 80
Wyzewa,Théodore de, 130, 252; Nos 
maîtres, 48
X
xenophobia, 79–80, 92, 114, 116, 121, 
223
Z
Zola, Émile: L’Assommoir, 236, 237, 242, 
278n8; Au Bonheur des Dames, 241, 
242; La bête humaine, 245, 278n9; 
Une campagne, 209; La Débâcle, 
224; Le docteur Pascal, 242; Les 
Évangiles, 211, 217, 237, 239, 241, 
242, 245; La fortune des Rougon, 19, 
242; Germinal, 43, 72, 202, 224, 
237, 241, 242–43; “letter to the 
Senate,” 229, 237, 276n8; Madeleine 
Férat, 241, 277n10, 277n11; Nana, 
236, 242; L’oeuvre, 242; Le roman 
expérimental, 9, 200, 209, 242, 
261, 279n11; La terre, 48; Thérèse 
Raquin, 54, 241, 277n2; Rougon-
Macquart novels, 217, 236, 237, 
241–42; Truth, 11, 41, 140, 194, 
195–247, 251, 254, 263, 268n7, 
269n8, 276n1, 276n3, 277n11, 
277n12, 277n2, 278n9; Le ventre de 
Paris, 202, 210, 241, 242; La vérité 
en marche, 12, 202, 219, 222, 263, 
276n8
